The phenomenology of the passage of time

Abstract

In the first chapters of my work I illustrate and defend the Block Universe view, while in the last chapters I develop and defend a view that descrive our temporal experience in a way that is compatible with the Block Universe view. The fil rouge of my thesis is the phenomenology of the passage of time and our temporal experience; however, just as there are different conceptions of the nature of temporal awareness, there are different physical conceptions of the time of the universe as a whole; before looking closely at our temporal experience, then, it is useful to take a look to the metaphysics of time, and in particular to concentrate on a point that links these two different approaches in a privileged way: temporal passage. While few deny that time seems to pass (more on that later), there are many who have denied that time really does pass. What does it mean that the present always changes? Are the future and the past as real as the present? The thought that inspires the whole work is that the passage of time is a notion compatible with the Block Universe. I started describing how the model should account for this passage; during the work, however, I developed an increasing interest in the literature concerning our own temporal phenomenology, instead of the more general metaphysical modelling; it seems, in fact, that our 'dynamic' experience is a key component of the prephilosophical intuitions of those opposed to the Block Universe View. The desired result was an homogeneous defence of a metaphysical model that keeps an eye on our common sense. In particular, I have tried to develop three 'original' arguments: an argument in favor of the specious present, an argument in favor of 'veridicalism', and an argument in favor of the existence of a mechanism called 'temporal subitizing'.