by Dewi Sartica (Mrs Surawinata), nor to the girls' madrasah founded by Rahma el Júnusiah, which taught both the Qur'an and modern subjects.

In spite of these initiatives, the proportion of illiterates in Indonesia after the second World War still reached 85%. One of the first concerns of the Republican Government was to organize existing schools, to create new ones, to train teachers, to organize or encourage the creation of evening classes. Women co-operated with the government in this field. Those who had followed University courses or wished to do creative work became leaders of the many women's associations, some of which were founded even before Independence. These associations created kindergartens, homes for students, organized transportation for school children etc. The rapid increase of school population and of the number of schools would have been impossible without the co-operation of all. Very often the population itself would contribute by work or money. But this left the problem of books and teachers unsolved.

In 1959-40 there were 40,583 teachers who had been trained in Dutch schools; this was not enough for the number of schools which had increased by 35% in 1950-51. Accelerated two-year teachers' training courses were set up for young boys and girls just out of primary schools (it should be noted in this respect that primary education starts later and is finished later than in Western countries and there do not seem to have been school teachers under 18 years of age). By 1950-51 the number of teachers had doubled. In 1953 a number of accelerated courses were closed down (they served a useful purpose but the level of education they provided was unsatisfactory). The government also made use of existing mission schools. Muslim madrasahs, and subsidies were granted to those which submitted themselves to government control and provided the same level of teaching as that given in official schools. Education in Indonesia is characterized by its spirit of tolerance. Religious courses are provided in government schools as well as in Christian or Muslim schools, but in all cases, parents may ask that their children be exempted from attending them.

Progress in the three years after independence has varied according to regions, but as a whole it has been remarkably quick. However, in 1953 only half of the children between the ages of 6 and 11 attended school.


I. M. LEWIS.

I

Progress towards self-government in the British Somaliland Protectorate, and in Somalia which becomes a sovereign state in 1960, creates serious problems for the training and recruitment of Somali officials in the civil service and for the development of efficient leadership in party politics, business, and other private organisations (1). In both territories, however, with their lack of any considerable immigrant European population there is little, if any, racial competition and no legal disabilities hindering 'Somalisation' (2). As far as the civil service is concerned, the problem is essentially that of producing a sufficiently large and adequately trained Somali cadre of officials as quickly as possible and of establishing high standards of efficiency, loyalty, and patriotism. At the present time in both territories it is perhaps the problem of patriotism as opposed to sectional or 'tribal' loyalties which is the most intractable and which is causing greatest concern since this affects all departments

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(1) I take the opportunity of acknowledging my debt to the Colonial Social Science Research Council, London, through whose generosity I spent about twenty months in the Somalilands between 1955 and 1957.

(2) In the Protectorate there are only a few hundred Europeans, almost entirely expatriate officials with their families. The Somali population is estimated at 650,000. There are also a few hundred Arabian and Indian immigrants, largely engaged in trade, and in the case of the Indians particularly also partly employed in the government service as clerks. This has led to some minor frictions with Somali demands for the replacement of expatriate Indian Civil Servants by local Somalis.

The population of Somalia is variously estimated at between one and two million. Bantu and negroid peoples number some 80,000; Arabs, Indians, Eritreans and Ethiopians etc. some 40,000; and Europeans, mainly Italian, some 4,000. The last are chiefly employed in the Italian Trusteeship Administration, although a few are settlers engaged in commerce, industry, and farming.
of life and in the opinion of Somali nationalists even threatens stable government. In this paper I discuss briefly some of the more important recent achievements in the promotion of modern leadership and loyalties and examine some of the difficulties, particularly the problem of 'tribalism'. This term which is used loosely to refer to a variety of traditional allegiances in African societies advancing towards self-government generally refers in Somaliiland to stringent ties of kinship which carry precisely defined economic and political obligations. It is not merely a question of vague links between traditional authorities and subjects, or between a people and their land, but a vital principle of grouping which is basic to the whole structure of Somali society and which, as will be seen, exhibits remarkable resilience in the face of modern developments.

II.

In both Somalia and the British Protectorate the replacement of expatriate staff by Somalis has more or less kept pace with corresponding political developments. In Somalia the first national municipal elections were held in 1934, and Somali ministerial government was introduced after the first legislative assembly elections in February, 1956 (3). By July of the same year Provinces and Districts were in the charge of Somali administrative officers. In the Protectorate the first national elections for the legislative council were held in March 1959 and Somali did not immediately, as in Somalia, gain a majority of seats and form a government. The legislative council was in fact opened in 1957 and at that time contained six unofficial members nominated by the Governor of the territory. In the 1959 elections twelve unofficial seats were contested by election and two filled by nomination (4). New elections for a reconstituted council with a majority of Somali members and ministerial government are to be held in 1960. At the time of the 1959 elections two Somali District Officers were in charge of Districts (of which there are six in the territory) and there was a considerable number of Somali Assistant District Commissioners and District Assistants. By this time in Somalia almost all senior as well as junior ranks in the police force were held by Somali and the force was commanded by a Somali officer, while in the Protectorate there were several Somali Assistant Superintendents in charge of District police establishments.

The Somalisation of other branches of the civil service is proceeding apace in both territories, being generally less advanced in the more technical departments such as public works, health, agriculture and veterinary services etc. and more advanced in education. Here again Somalia has achieved a higher degree of replacement of expatriate staff by Somali than the British Protectorate has.

(3) For an account of these see: Le prime elezioni politiche in Somalia. A.F.I.S., Mogadishu, 1957.

(4) On the government side there were fifteen official members making a total of twenty-nine seats under the presidency of the Governor. The executive council comprised the Governor; three ex-officio members (the chief Secretary, Attorney-General, and Financial Secretary) and two official members, heads of Departments.

MODERN LEADERSHIP AND LOYALTIES IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

By the end of 1958, fifteen out of nineteen government departments in Somalia were headed by Somali officials, the remaining four departments being largely technical. And after independence was gained in 1960 it is estimated that only some thirty-three senior administrative and judicial posts will still have to be filled by expatriate staff. But the total requirement of foreign officials with expert and technical qualifications is anticipated to be about two hundred and fifty after 1960. The greatest need is for teachers (70 expatriates), doctors (51 expatriates), and agricultural experts (25 expatriates) (6). No comparable estimates are as yet available for the British Protectorate for whose independence no date has so far been set. In 1957, however, of a total of some two hundred civil servants in the officer cadre, about thirty were Somali and the proportion of Somali is rapidly increasing.

The Protectorate is furnished with two secondary schools, a teachers' training centre, a trades school of intermediate standard, and a vocational training centre. Since these provide the highest levels of education available locally, the acquisition of higher technical skills and senior administrative training necessitates study abroad. In June 1959 there were one hundred and seventeen Somali students from the Protectorate studying overseas, of whom eighty were in Britain, and the others in Kenya, Uganda, Aden, Tanganyika, the Sudan, and Lebanon. During the year about twenty-two students are expected to return to the Protectorate on the completion of their studies. These will include a civil engineer, a mechanical engineer, three students of public administration, three trained teachers, and a journalist. In 1960 there will probably be two commissioned Somali officers in the Somaliland Scouts (7), and the first qualified Somali Doctor. In 1961 there are expected to be two qualified lawyers and a veterinary officer.

Somalia is better-equipped than the Protectorate with higher educational institutions. In 1954 a Higher Institute of Legal and Economic Studies was opened at Mogadishu and this provides a two-year diploma course recognised by the University of Rome. As early as 1950 a School of Politics and Administration offering a three-year diploma course followed by a year at a higher institution in Italy was opened. By 1957 this was felt to have fulfilled its purpose in providing a cadre of administrative officials with basic training and

(5) A Commission for Somalisation was appointed in August 1958 to study the whole question of Somali advancement in the Protectorate government service and to make recommendations to the government. But the Commissioner's terms of reference were not considered satisfactory by the majority of Somali. The Protectorate government announced in April 1959 that the Commissioner's report was under study and that the government's recommendations would go further towards meeting public demand than the Commissioner's terms of reference had originally indicated. An Advisory Public Service Board was established in July, 1959, to select candidates for overseas scholarships; to make recommendations on overseas training; to recommend the selection of civil servants for promotion; to make recommendations on entrance requirements for the public service; and to deal with other related matters. The Board which is under the chairmanship of the Attourney-General consists of two other official members and two independent Somali members.


(7) This is the local military force stationed in the Protectorate and hitherto commanded exclusively by expatriate British officers.
was transformed into a Technical and Commercial Institute. In seven years it has trained one hundred and sixteen men for appointments in the civil service. Students who complete the four-year course at the new Technical and Commercial Institute can now carry on to take the two-year diploma course at the Higher Institute (8). In addition to the local facilities available for training, many Somali from Somalia also go overseas for further education. In 1958, sixty-three Somali students were pursuing a wide variety of university courses in Italy; and between 1952 and 1958 three hundred and thirty-four students had completed further educational training in Italy.

Some idea of the differences in the standard of general education in the two territories can be gained by comparing the educational requirements for candidates for election to their respective legislatures. Even in 1956 when the first elections for the newly-constituted Somalia Assembly were held all the candidates were required to be literate in Italian and Arabic, whereas in the Protectorate literacy is not yet a requirement except in town electoral constituencies (9). But there is still in both territories an outstanding need for higher educational standards and for more highly qualified staff in private as well as public organisations. There is considerable competition between the political parties and the civil service for well educated men and this is particularly marked in the Protectorate where it is difficult to find an adequate supply for both. This problem is recognised by both the Protectorate and Somalia governments. It is sharpened in the Protectorate by the stringent division which is made between politics and the civil service and diminished in Somalia by the greater latitude which is allowed to civil servants in party politics (10). In Somalia a government servant is at liberty to contest a seat in a constituency outside the district in which he is serving and is granted leave for this purpose. If his candidature is successful the official is allowed extended leave, and when he loses his seat entitled to resume his former position in the government service. Whatever may be said against this procedure it must be conceded that it has certain advantages inasmuch as it encourages men with practical administrative experience and training to go into politics. And what is the civil service's loss may well be parliament's gain.

This brief summary of recent achievements in the promotion of Somali leadership has little meaning unless it is set against the structure of Somali society. For as has been stressed although there are many factors which stand in the way of progress one of the most serious impediments lies in the traditional 'tribal' loyalties of Somali society.

The majority of Somali are pastoral nomads (11), moving over many miles in a year with their flocks of sheep and goats, and herds of camels, and in parts of central and southern Somalia especially, cattle. Patterns of movement are primarily dictated by the distribution of rain and pasture through the seasons; and in its widest sense prescriptive rights are not asserted to grazing which is regarded as a common gift of God to all Somali. But at the level of grouping of the clan there is some association between people and territory, such that most clans, though they lack sharply defined boundaries have some degree of territorial definition over the years both in relation to wells and villages and towns within the clan territory. Clans are often led by Sultans (Ugaas, Bogoor, Garaad, Salladaan, etc.) but generally these positions are tenuous and imply little authority beyond the personal influence of the incumbent. Amongst the pastoralists there are in general no other traditional political offices and pastoral Somali society as a whole is characterised by its lack of chiefs and absence of a hierarchical system of politico-administrative offices. In principle at all levels of grouping policy is determined by all the adult men concerned (or their representatives) speaking on ad hoc councils (shari). The solidarity of Somali pastoral groups, which is exceptionally strong, does not depend either on territorial attachments or upon allegiance to a common leader. Instead, its basis lies in community of descent in the male line (tol), and a kind of polital contract (boor or taatoo) (12).

Somali society as a whole is divided into a vast system of kindred groups which unite and divide according to the context of opposition or competition on any given occasion. It is here that contract (boor) is important, since it is through contract that different spheres of agnatic connection are marshalled as occasion requires. While the system as a whole is stable, its component parts — by allegiance to which the political and jural status of the individual is determined — are highly unstable. On one occasion a man acts with other patrilineal kinsmen as a member of a determinate lineage, while on another his political loyalties lie with a more or less inclusive range of kin, at a different point in the genealogical scale. For the genealogical system which encompasses the whole society represents political and jural affiliation as well as being to some extent a historical or quasi-historical record.

In this system of shifting genealogical attachment, the most stable units are the so-called 'dia-paying groups'. These are composed of men descended from a common ancestor who are bound by a formal treaty (boor) to pay and receive blood-compensation (Arabic dia ; Somali, mag) in concert. A dia-paying group

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(8) In 1958-9, 32 students were enrolled at the Higher Institute which now also offers a course in sociology. For further information see M. Poupet, Civilisations, vol. 1, 1959, pp. 85-86.

(9) The 1959 Protectorate Commission on Representational Reform recommended that all candidates for election should be literate in Arabic or English to the level of standard VII intermediate schooling, but when the matter was debated in the legislative council it was felt that at the present time this requirement would deprive the legislature of many illiterate but politically experienced people. See The Somaliland News, 3 August, 1959, p. 5.


(11) In the Protectorate some 85 % of the population are estimated to live as pastoral nomads. In Somalia where agriculture is more widespread, over 70 % of the population are estimated to be pastoral nomads, and 30 % of the population to be pastoralists practising some cultivation.

is thus politically and legally a corporation: an external act of aggression affecting or committed by one member of a group is held to implicate the group as a whole. I do not have figures for the number of dia-paying groups in Somalia, but in the Protectorate in 1958 there were over 360 such groups in a population of some 650,000. Their male strength varies between a few hundred and a few thousand men.

To understand the significance of this political and legal entity which is the basic unit of pastoral Somali society, it has to be appreciated that the Somali are a warlike people driven by the poverty of their resources to intense competition for pasture and water. Even under modern administration, self-help is the final sanction in redressing wrongs and in adjusting political and legal relations between groups. In these circumstances and with the difficulty of adequately policing the interior of much of the country, the individual's ultimate security depends upon his loyalty to his dia-paying group. In the traditional system no one has rural or political status except as a member of a dia-paying group. But although the dia-paying group is the most stable and fundamental political unit, its identity and exclusiveness do not prevent the mobilisation of wider lineage alliances as occasion requires. Thus dia-paying group opposes dia-paying group, and at a higher level of division, clan stands against clan. The largest genealogical unit is the 'clan-family' of which there are six — the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Daarood, Digil, and Rahanwin. In the traditional social order this unit is too large, too widely scattered, and generally too unwieldy, to act as a corporate political unit. And in the traditional system the clan usually represents the upper limit of effective corporate action.

In the north-west of the British Protectorate and in Harar Province of Ethiopia where there are considerable areas of sorghum cultivation, this pastoral regime has been to some extent modified. In this area Somali have turned to plough cultivation fairly recently, the first farms being founded about the turn of the century, and these cultivating villages have sprung up in which there is a growing sense of attachment to locality. Ties of neighbourhood are beginning to make their appearance and while there is a yet no formal change in the traditional pastoral political structure a new principle of grouping has arisen which is not present in the pastoral organisation. This is evident in the various local activities connected with cultivation in which the Somali of the area cooperate not on a basis of clan or contractual ties but on a basis of common local interests.

The influence of cultivation in modifying the traditional pastoral structure of society is even more marked in the case of the Digil and Rahanwin cultivators occupying the relatively fertile belt between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers of southern Somalia. Here agriculture has a tradition going back several centuries and other important factors have also been at work leading to the formation of a different type of social and political organisation. The most important of these are the influence of the Galla and Bantu communities which the Somali who now occupy the area found there when in the 14th century they began to advance into it from the north displacing most of the Galla but leaving small residual cultivating Bantu communities and a few dispersed Galla groups. Here today there are territorially defined local political groups, and while politics are still largely organised on a genealogical prin-

ciple, the effective rural and political units tend to be larger than in the pastoral society and there is a more hierarchical system of administrative offices (13).

This dichotomy in traditional political organisation between the northern pastoralists and southern cultivating Digil and Rahanwin coincides with the widest social cleavage in the Somali nation. The northern, and essentially pastoral, Somali clan-families are represented genealogically as the 'Sanaa', and opposed to the Digil and Rahanwin united genealogically as 'Sab'. As the numerically dominant conquers of Somalia, and as nomads rather than sedentary cultivators, the 'Sanaa' regard themselves as a pastoral aristocracy and traditionally despise the 'Sab' who in turn seek to repudiate the pastoralists' proud assumption of superiority.

IV.

This traditional pattern has not been radically changed by colonisation or by recent developments and persists within the framework of modern government and of nationalist politics. The effects of economic development have so far been comparatively slight and there has been no extensive agrarian or industrial revolution to change the structure of society radically. Thus the often misleading and certainly question-begging term 'detrabilisation' cannot usefully be applied to the present structure of Somali society (14). Most of the towns of present-day northern Somaliland are small (only a few have populations greater than 20,000 inhabitants) and of recent formation, owing to their permanence and growth in most cases to their selection as administrative centres. These are not cut-off from the rural society, but on the contrary are a total continuation of it. Pastoral politics operate equally in both spheres, and economic ties and interests link the nomads of the interior to their clansmen in the towns. Moreover in town life the same clan and contractual principles very largely govern social relations and the bases of jural and political unity are the same in town and country. Blood-group solidarity is of equal importance in these small northern towns and organised on the same principles as in the nomadic interior. Even in the larger, and much older centres of southern Somalia (whose capital Mogadishu which dates from the 10th century has a population of about 90,000) social relations are chiefly channelled along kinship group lines. Clansmen regularly contribute to a clan fund which is used to meet outstanding blood debts and also to meet burial and other urban expenses. Thus even in towns as large and ancient as Mogadishu the traditional pastoral paying organisation is not destroyed but is retained and indeed extended in scope to meet new contingencies functioning in some respects not unlike an insurance society.


(14) For a recent criticism of the validity of the concept of 'detrabilisation' to the changing conditions of African society see W. Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy, Manchester, 1958, pp. 3-8.
Thus the continuing importance and vitality of traditional social bonds is a striking feature of modern life in Somaliland. Indeed, one of the most significant aspects of the adoption of western procedures is the extent to which these foreign influences have been modified and adapted in keeping with the traditional structure of society. All the nationalist political movements and parties of course, especially the Somali Youth League in Somalia and the National United Front in the Protectorate (15) seek to replace the traditional sectional loyalties by national allegiance. Their ultimate aim is to establish a new spirit of national solidarity and to place country before clan. But internally even these movements are inevitably consortiums of rival kinship group interests rather than homogeneous national bodies. This persistence of traditional schisms within party politics is only one aspect, and indeed a recent one, of the way in which imported institutions are reinterpreted in terms of the all-pervasive traditional system. And here it is important to note that the conflict between traditional and modern political leaders which is a common feature in many African societies in transition is not very marked in Somaliland. Traditional Somali society has little in the way of hierarchical chiefly offices, being essentially democratic almost to the point of anarchy, and what conflict there is between traditional and modern Somali authority is most marked in the sphere of religion. And even here the position of traditional religious authorities — sheikhs and wuudaads — is ambiguous. On the one hand they stand very largely for traditional Islam and are usually opposed to such modern innovations as the extension of voting rights to women, but on the other hand they have always preached the unity of Somali as Muslims irrespective of clan and kinship group divisions and here their ideals and those of the modern nationalists coincide. In practice, the increasing assumption of political and administrative control by Somalis makes it more difficult for religious traditionalists to oppose effectively innovations which they regard as contrary to the spirit of Islam. For they can no longer summon popular support on the basis of opposition to a non-Muslim and by implication infidel administering authority.

Thus by and large the Somalis have readily adapted themselves to imported modern institutions, modifying these where necessary in the light of their own traditional way of life. And the accommodation of new institutions and procedures and their reinterpretation which has been noted in the sphere of party politics is equally apparent in the structure of government and the organisation of the civil service.

From their earliest days the colonial administrations in Somalia and the Protectorate have played an uneven and usually clearly defined role as third parties in Somali kinship politics. With the exception of the brief Egyptian occupation of the Adal or Ogaden (1909-1930) and the slight effects of Italian occupation in the north-west in the 17th and 18th centuries, European colonisation brought the first neutral over-riding authority of which Somalis had experience. And as Somalis obtained appointments in the local government services, at first only in the lower grades of employment, government began to be drawn inexorably into the web of Somali politics. Somali of one kinship group who gained positions in a government department naturally sought to find places for their clansmen, often with curious results. Thus at one time the Department of Agriculture in the British Protectorate was largely staffed by Somalis of the Dheer clan although this clan is amongst the least interested in agriculture in the country. Thus although still controlled by expatriate officials, government became a new province for the interplay of traditional sectional rivalries, competition for appointments in the civil service developed between rival lineages in measure as the opportunities for Somali employment in all branches of the government increased.

At the same time, outside the civil service there is acute competition for amenities and privileges in all matters in which the governments exercise jurisdiction. And business and trade tend to be organised according to and dominated by the same monolithic-like kinship group interests which operate so effectively in other spheres. As far as the administrations are concerned this is reflected in the acute rivalry which attends the granting of government trading licences as much as in direct competition for appointments in such vital organs of government as the police and armed forces.

Thus even while the administrations of Somalia and the Protectorate were still ultimately controlled entirely by foreign officials the latter were subject to constant pressure from and intrigue by the rival groups with which they dealt. Through them Somalis sought to influence the whole pattern of administration to their own kinship group ends.

Today with the increasing participation of Somalis in executive government in the Protectorate as well as in party politics government is losing something of its neutrality as an impartial power and mediator in kinship group politics. This trend has obvious repercussions in administration, particularly in Somalia where Somalis are more advanced in the Protectorate. By his clanman the Somali official is naturally regarded as a friend at court and as the occupant of a privileged position to be exploited as far as possible in the interests of his group. In the past before Somalis held senior positions in the government service, influence could only be exerted indirectly and the District Officer's interpreter held a crucial and powerful position. Now this approach has been superseded since, with the appointment of Somalis to District and Provincial Commissioner ranks, and to senior police ranks, a more direct path is open. This naturally places Somali officials, especially police and administrative officers, in a particularly difficult position; for the impartiality they must strive to maintain is the immediate interests of his own clanman. And here it is important to stress again the binding nature of the traditional kinship ties of Somali society. An official, as much as anyone else, is not merely linked to his kinship group by vague ties of sentiment but rather bound by defined rights and duties expressed economically in terms of co-operation in the payment of blood-compensation. These contractual obligations which in the traditional pastoral organisation are the individual's strongest safe-guard are still observed between Somalis and officials as they are upon Somalis in other walks of life. Few Somalis have succeeded in completely severing their contractual and economic ties with their kinsmen. Only a handful of Sheikhs and religious leaders to whom the traditional system of collective responsibility in homicide
is not merely repugnant but also sinful have taken vows renouncing their contractual allegiances.

Yet despite the continued strength of these traditional kinship group ties there is a wide body of public opinion condemning them. The most outspoken opponents of the 'tribal' system are of course the nationalist leaders who see in 'tribalism' the negation of nationalism. Strong opposition to the continuing influence of the traditional system of collective jural responsibility also comes from the towns which, although they are very much part of the pastoral social system, are also the centers of social change and the reception points for new ideas and aspirations. At the same time under modern administration and with the increasing extension of social services the towns offer the individual greater security in the widest sense, and the townsman correspondingly feels less need of the support of his kinship group. Thus today Somali towns occupy an ambiguous position, being at the same time the centers of pastoral politics in the traditional way of life and also the growing points of party politics and of modernism in general. During the last few years there has been considerable discussion in the towns of the Protectorate of the need to reform or even abolish the traditional dia-paying system. The problem has received attention from all the nationalist parties and has been debated on several occasions in the Protectorate Advisory Council (16). In the legislative council itself a motion was tabled in 1937 calling upon the government to consider the abolition of the system. An inquiry is now proceeding through the district administration.

In Somalia there has until recently been much more reticence in admitting the continued power of traditional allegiances for these have become in the eyes of progressive nationalists the symbol of all that is backward and unprogressive. Whereas in the Protectorate clan and kinship group allegiances are publicly discussed and their significance frankly acknowledged, in Somalia those of the new elite particularly hesitate to emphasise these factors and seek to minimise their effect. In keeping with this trend, the explicitly clan and tribal political parties which along with the nationalist groups contested the first Assembly elections in 1936 have now largely disappeared. And legislation has been passed making it illegal for political parties to bear tribal names. Thus the chief opposition party which mainly represents the interests of the Digil and Rahanwini tribesmen and was formerly called the 'Digil Mirelle Party' has now changed its title to that of the 'Somali Independent Constitutional Party'. Its composition and aims, nevertheless, remain substantially unchanged.

Moreover with the keen competition which exists for appointments to the service, the opposition Digil and Rahanwini Party has in its many attacks on the Somali Youth League government accused the latter of discriminating against Digil and Rahanwini tribesmen in recruitment (17).

Thus despite the ease and remarkable success with which modern democratic government and other western procedures have been adopted and despite the rise of nationalism all departments of life are still very much influenced by traditional group loyalties. Some of the ways in which these new institutions have been modified or reinterpreted to bring them into phase, as it were, with the traditional structure of society have been mentioned. At the same time there is an appreciable shift in the character of group loyalties. This is most noticeable in Somalia with its greater degree of Samalisation and where today it is rather the clan-families than simply the clans and smaller units of society which are ranged against each other in a struggle for national power. And this involves competition for control not only of the legislature and of the civil service but also for the most advantageous share in development and progress in general.

V.

In Somalia there has recently been a marked change in attitudes towards the problem of 'tribalism' and its inhibiting effects on the development of modern leadership and the growth of national loyalties. The increasing power of Somali in the control of their country's affairs and the receding influence of the Italian administering authority have, not surprisingly, been accompanied by a rise in tribal schisms and conflicts. And the problem of tribalism is now openly acknowledged and frankly discussed. Indeed the programme of the new Somali Youth League government formed in June after the elections of March 1939 devotes considerable attention to the question.

It is proposed to set up a tribunal to study tribalism and to consider how the traditional sectional loyalties can best be extended to a wider national patriotism. Today as in the past Somali nationalists attach great weight to the extension of popular education as a means of widening group interests and of fostering a national awareness. And while the previous Somali Youth League government regarded nomadism as the inevitable way of life of the majority of the country's inhabitants, the present government seeks to encourage settlement amongst the nomads with a view to curtailling nomadism and to increasing the sedentary population. Here of course the fundamental limitations are geographical and climatic, and any ambitious project to settle an appreciable proportion of the nomadic population will require considerable financial resources. Nevertheless, the government is clearly aware of the constant strife over access to grazing and water which fosters the traditional sectional interests of the nomads and

(16) This non-legislative and purely advisory body was established in 1946 and has in principle met annually. It consists of 48 'elected and selected' members, representative of all the administrative districts of the Protectorate and of all sectors of public opinion. With new Advisory Council might become a house of assembly with consultative powers to provide for the representation of traditional leaders who would not be eligible for election to the legislative council.

(17) There are in fact a considerably higher proportion of Darood and Hawiyie in the civil service than of Digil and Rahanwini in relation to their proportions in the total population of Somalia. In 1946 the figures were: Darood in civil service 35% (in total population 19%); Hawiyie 28% (in population 49%); and Digil and Rahanwini 18% (in population 35%). This, however, is a new phenomenon and cannot be attributed simply to discrimination. From the earliest days of colonial rule the predominant government appointees were of the Darood and Hawiyie clan. The Digil and Rahanwini, by and large have been content to follow them in the traditional farming occupations in the rich lands between the Juba and Shelle River.
hinders the extension of national loyalties, and is evidently impressed by the less belligerent characteristics of the sedentary cultivators of southern Somalia. If the necessary capital can be found to implement this project it is very likely to enjoy some success in weakening traditional kinship bonds and in fostering new territorial loyalties. In this connection it is of interest to record that those northern Somali who cultivate in the west of the Protectorate have recently initiated a variety of community self-help schemes to improve grazing and to extend soil conservation.

The emphasis on extirpating tribalism — however difficult this may in fact prove — in the new policies of the Somali Youth League government of Somalia is accompanied by an increased interest in fostering pan-Somali unity and moving towards the amalgamation of the various Somali territories (French, British, and Ethiopian Somali, and the Northern Province of Kenya) in one Greater Somalia. The ideal of such a Somali federation which was one of the original aims of the Somali Youth League has in the past few years been in the background of S.Y.L. policy, for the government of Somalia has had sufficient problems to deal with at home. In August 1959, however, a Pan-Somali National Movement was founded in Somalia which includes representatives from the Protectorate and from French Somaliland (18). The objects of the new movement are to achieve the unity and independence of all the Somali territories by peaceful means, to reject all tribal divisions, to establish and maintain close relations with other emergent African states, and to strengthen ties with the Muslim World.

These new developments have been precipitated by the approaching independence of Somalia and while they are likely to stimulate internal national solidarity in both Somalia and the Protectorate they will undoubtedly pose considerable problems of leadership. The Prime Minister of Somalia has been accused by his rivals of returning to tribalism in selecting the members of his government which includes representatives of all the main clan families of Somalia, and is in this sense a truly national government. The need to give a high weighting to tribal considerations has meant that while the government is thoroughly representative it excludes some of the better educated ‘new men’. This difficulty will clearly lessen as educational facilities extend.

In discussing some of the difficulties attending the promotion of modern leadership of Somalia and the Protectorate I have emphasized the problem of tribal affiliation as Somali nationalists themselves now do. I have stressed the effects on modern government of the traditional structure of society, where there must always be a dynamic equilibrium — a precarious balance — between opposed kinship and tribal group interests. But it would be wrong to overemphasize the importance of traditional cleavages for many Somali politicians as well as officials are showing themselves capable of resolving their conflicting loyalties and at the same time of setting high standards in impartial leadership at a local as well as national level.

(18) Amongst these is Mahamoud Harbi, a former Vice-President of the French Somaliland Territorial Assembly and one of the Somali nationalist leaders of that territory.
les relations politiques et juridiques entre les groupes. Ceux-ci se répartissent à
leur tour entre six clans principaux.

Le régime pastoral connaît des exceptions, notamment dans le Nord du Pro-
tectorat où la culture du sorgho a entraîné l'apparition de fermes et de villages,
et entre les vallées du Djouba et du Chebni où les traditions agricoles mainte-
nues par les Bantous et les Galla sont antérieures à l'occupation somalienne au 14e
siècle. Dans ces régions, l'organisation politique et administrative est plus
progressée. A cette différence d'organisation politique traditionnelle correspond
une division sociale marquée ; les « Samaale » se considèrent comme une arist-
ocratie pastorale ; les « Sab » agriculteurs tâchent de repousser cette préten-
ction.

L'apparition d'une administration moderne et d'une politique nationaliste
n'a guère modifié cette situation, car le développement économique a été peu
marqué jusqu'à présent. Les centres urbains restent modestes. L'esprit tribal
continue à se manifester même à Mogadiscio, où l'organisation traditionnelle
du dada a été étendue pour faire face aux contingences nouvelles et fonctionne
un peu à la manière d'une compagnie d'assurances.

En fait, les structures d'importation étrangère ont été adaptées à la structure
traditionnelle de la société. Les partis nationalistes — Ligue des Somalis
en Somalie, Front national unifié dans le Protectorat — s'efforcent de rem-
placer les loyalties traditionnels par le loyauté à la nation. Mais à l'intérieur
même de ces mouvements, des luttes d'influence se poursuivent entre membres
de clans différents. (Par contre, le conflit entre dirigeants politiques tradition-
nels et modernes n'est pas fort marqué, en raison de l'absence d'autorités tra-
ditionnelles véritable). En ce qui concerne l'administration, dès les débuts de
la somalisation, les membres d'un clan qui obtenaient des postes dans un minis-
tère cherchaient à y introduire leurs alliés. La concurrence entre clans reste
egalement forte dans les secteurs commerciaux, la police, les forces armées. Les
fonctionnaires somalis sont souvent dans une position délicate, car une stricte
impartialité peut les obliger à agir contre les intérêts immédiats de leur groupe.
Cependant, un mouvement se dessine aujourd'hui contre la subsistance des
liens traditionnels. Le gouvernement somali, dirigé par la Ligue des Jeunes
somalis, tend à encourager la stabilisation des nomades par la voie de l'éduca-
tion, il est en effet conscient de ce que la lutte pour l'eau et les pâturages
favorise les dissensions claniques et tribales et nuit au développement d'un
véritable loyauté national. Cependant, le gouvernement actuel comprend des
membres de toutes les principales familles claniques. La nécessité de tenir
compte de considérations claniques donne au gouvernement un caractère vérita-
blement représentatif, mais en excluant peut-être certains « hommes nouveaux »
parmi les plus doués.

L'auteur signalait enfin l'apparition de tendances pan-somaliennes. La fusion des
territoires somalis français, anglois, éthiopien et de la Province septentrionale
du Kenya est recherchée notamment par le « Mouvement national pan-somali »
créé en août 1959, qui comprend des représentants de la Somalie, du Protectorat et de la Côte française des Somalis.

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**Document**

**Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo**

A. RUBBIENS

*(translation)*

On 4 January 1959 the Abako (Association tribale des Bakongo) was
banned from holding a meeting in the Y.M.C.A. premises in Leopoldville.
In spite of the call for submission issued by Abako leaders, Africans insisted on
entering the premises. The native manager of the Y.M.C.A. informed
the police. Two white police officers, accompanied by a number of
African policemen, cleared out the crowd from the courtyard, while individ-
uals who had been driven outside the premises turned over the jeep belonging
to the police; petrol spread and somebody struck a match. The fire was a
signal for the riot. The population of Leopoldville, inflamed by political prop-
ganda in favour of independence, offered a favourable ground for the
spread of subversion.

European cars were stoned, windows were broken in « European » buildings
located in « Congolese » areas : police stations, shops, Christian missions,
clubs, schools, etc. In the beginning these acts were mostly carried out by a
gang of idle young men living as parasites with their families in Leopoldville ;
the first rioters were the young Bakongos chased out of the meeting ; they
were soon joined by others of the same age group and by numbers of unem-
ployed men who had vainly sought admission into the post-primary schools
of the capital.

Fearing that the riot might develop if there was shedding of blood, the
police moved back to the limits of the European quarters and left the Con-
golese quarters and the European enclave (missions, shops and social centres)
under the care of township authorities. For the next 48 hours, these disap-
pointed young men, intoxicated by xenophobic passions as well as by alcoholic
drinks, carried out their destruction with impunity, by the light of fires ; they
were particularly eager to destroy proofs of European action in favour of the
African population. These gangs of angry men who proclaimed the coming of
Independence were soon reinforced by plunderers; vengeance was carried out
parmi les plus doués.