Problems in the Development of Modern Leadership and Loyalties in the British Somaliland Protectorate and U.N. Trusteeship Territory of Somalia.

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I

Progress towards self-government in the British Somaliland Protectorate, and in Somalia which becomes a sovereign state in 1960, creates serious problems for the training and recruitement of Somali officials in the civil service and for the development of efficient leadership in party politics, business, and other private organisations (1). In both territoiries, however, with their lack of any considerable immigrant European population there is little, if any, racial competition and no legal disabilities hindering 'Somalisation' (2). As far as the civil service is concerned, the problem is essentially that of producing a sufficiently large and adequately trained Somali cadre of officials as quickly as possible and of establishing high standards of efficiency, loyalty, and patriotism. At the present time in both territories it is perhaps the problem of patriotism as opposed to sectional or 'tribal' loyalties which is the most intractable and which is causing gravest concern since this affects all departments

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(1) I take the opportunity of acknowledging my debt to the Colonial Social Science Research Council, London, through whose generosity I spent about twenty months in the Somalilands between 1955 and 1957.

(2) In the Protectorate there are only a few hundred Europeans, almost entirely expatriate officials with their families. The Somali population is estimated at 650,000. There are also a few hundred Arabian and Indian immigrants, largely engaged in trade, and in the case of the Indians particularly also partly employed in the government service as clerks. This has led to some minor frictions with Somali demands for the replacement of expatriate Indian Civil Servants by local Somali.

The population of Somalia is variously estimated at between one and a half and two million. Bantu and negroid peoples number some 80,000 ; Arabs, Indians, Eritreans and Ethiopians etc. some 40,000 ; and Europeans, mainly Italian, some 4,000. The last are chiefly employed in the Italian Trusteeship Administration, although a few are settlers engaged in commerce, industry, and farming.

of life and in the opinion of Somali nationalists even threatens stable government. In this paper I discuss briefly some of the more important recent achievements in the promotion of modern leadership and loyalties and examine some of the difficulties, particularly the problem of 'tribalism'. This term which is used loosely to refer to a variety of traditional allegiances in African societies advancing towards self-government generally refers in Somaliland to stringent ties of kinship which carry precisely defined economic and political obligations. It is not merely a question of vague links between traditional authorities and subjects, or between a people and their land, but a vital principle of grouping which is basic to the whole structure of Somali society and which, as will be seen, exhibits remarkable resilience in the face of modern developments.

II.

In both Somalia and the British Protectorate the replacement of expatriate staff by Somali has more or less kept pace with corresponding political developments. In Somalia the first national municipal elections were held in 1954, and Somali ministerial government was introduced after the first legislative assembly elections in February, 1956 (3). By July of the same year all Provinces and Districts were in the charge of Somali administrative officers. In the Protectorate the first national elections for the legislative council were held in March 1959 and Somali did not immediately, as in Somalia, gain a majority of seats and form a government. The legislative council was in fact opened in 1957 and at that time contained six unofficial members nominated by the Governor of the territory. In the 1959 elections twelve unofficial seats were contested by election and two filled by nomination (4). New elections for a reconstituted council with a majority of Somali members and ministerial government are to be held in 1960. At the time of the 1959 elections two Somali District Officers were in charge of Districts (of which there are six in the territory) and there were a considerable number of Somali Assistant District Commissioners and District Assistants. By this time in Somalia almost all senior as well as junior ranks in the police force were held by Somali and the force was commanded by a Somali officer, while in the Protectorate there were several Somali Assistant Superintendents in charge of District police establishments.

The Somalisation of other branches of the civil service is proceding apace in both territories, being generally less advanced in the more technical departments such as public works, health, agriculture and veterinary services etc. and more advanced in education. Here again Somalia has achieved a higher degree of replacement of expatriate staff by Somali than the British Protectorate has

(3) For an account of these see, **Le prime elezioni politiche in Somalia** A.F.I.S. Mogadishu, 1957.

(4) On the government side there were fifteen official members making a total of twenty-nine seats under the presidency of the Governor. The executive council comprised the Governor ; three ex-officio members (the chief Secretary, Attorney-General, and Financial Secretary) and two official membrers, heads of Departments.

(5). By the end of 1958, fifteen out of nineteen government departments in Somalia were headed by Somali officials, the remaining four departments being largely technical. And after independence is gained in 1960 it is estimated that only some thirty-three senior administrative and judicial posts will still have to be filled by expatriate staff. But the total requirement of foreign officials with expert and technical qualifications is anticipated to be about two hundred and fifty after 1960. The greatest need is for teachers (70 expatriates) doctors (51 expatriates), and agricultural experts (25 expatriates) (6). No comparable estimates are as yet available for the British Protectorate for whose independence no date had so far been set. In 1957, however, of a total of some two hundred civil servants in the officer cadre, about thirty were Somali and the proportion of Somali is rapidly increasing.

The Protectorate is furnished with two secondary schools, a teachers' training centre, a trades school of intermediate standard, and a vocational training centre. Since these provide the highest levels of education available locally, the acquisition of higher technical skills and senior administrative training necessitates study abroad. In June 1959 there were one hundred and seventeen Somali students from the Protectorate studying overseas, of whom eighty were in Britain, and the others in Kenya, Uganda, Aden, Tanganyika, the Sudan, and Lebanon. During the year about twenty-two students are expected to return to the Protectorate on the completion of their studies. These will include a civil engineer, a mechanical engineer, three students of public administration, three trained teachers, and a journalist. In 1960 there will probably be two commissioned Somali officers in the Somaliland Scouts (7), and the first qualified Somali Doctor. In 1961 there are expected to be two qualified lawyers and a veterinary officer.

Somalia is better-equipped than the Protectorate with higher educational institutions. In 1954 a Higher Institute of Legal and Economic Studies was opened at Mogadishu and this provides a two-year diploma course recognised by the University of Rome. As early as 1950 a School of Politics and Administration offering a three-year diploma course followed by a year at a higher institution in Italy was opened. By 1957 this was felt to have fulfilled its purpose in providing a cadre of administrative officials with basic training and

(5) A Commissioner for Somalisation was appointed in August 1958 to study the whole question of Somali advancement in the Protectorate government service and to make recommendations to the government. But the Commissioner's terms of reference were not considered satisfactory by the majority of Somali. The Protectorate government announced in April 1959 that the Commissioner's report was under study and that the government's new proposals for Somalisation would go further towards meeting public demand than the Commissioner's terms of reference had originally indicated. An Advisory Public Service Board was established in July, 1959, to select candidates for overseas scholarships ; to make recommendations on overseas training ; to recommend the selection of civil servants for promotion; to make recommendations on entrance requirements for the public service ; and to deal with other related matters. The Board which is under the chairmanship of the Attorney-General consists of two other official members and two independent Somali members.

(6) See **Economic Requirements of the Territory of Somalia on the Expiration of the Trusteeship Mandate**, A.F.I.S., Rome, 1958. p. 26.

(7) This is the local military force stationed in the Protectorate and hitherto commanded exclusively by expatriate British officers.

was transformed into a Technical and Commercial Institute. In seven years it has trained one hundred and sixteen men for appointments in the civil service. Students who complete the four year course at the new Technical and Commercial Institute can now carry on to take the two-year diploma course at the Higher Institute (8). In addition to the local facilities available for training, many Somali from Somalia also go overseas for further education. In 1958, sixty-three Somali students were pursuing a wide variety of university courses in Italy ; and between 1952 and 1958 three hundred and thirty-four students had completed further educational training in Italy.

Some idea of the differences in the standard of general education in the two territories can be gained by comparing the educational requirements of candidates for election to their respective legislatures. Even in 1956 when the first elections for the newly-constituted Somalia Assembly were held all the candidates were required to be literate in Italian and Arabic, whereas in the Protectorate literacy is not yet a requirement except in town electoral constituencies (9). But there is still in both territories an outstanding need for higher educational standards and for more highly qualified staff in private as well as public organisations. There is considerable competition between the political parties and the civil service for well educated men and this is particularly marked in the Protectorate where it is difficult to find an adequate supply for both. This problem is recognised by both the Protectorate and Somalia governments. It is sharpened in the Protectorate by the stringent division which is made between politics and the civil service and diminished in Somalia by the greater latitude which is allowed to civil servants in party politics (10). In Somalia a government servant is at liberty to contest a seat in a constituency outside the district in which he is serving and is granted leave for this purpose. If his candidature is successful the official is allowed extended leave, and when he loses his seat entitled to resume his former position in the government service. Whatever may be said against this procedure it must be conceded that it has certain advantages inasmuch as it encourages men with practical administrative experience and training to go into politics. And what is the civil service's loss may well be parliament's gain.

III.

This brief summary of recent achievements in the promotion of Somali leadership has little meaning unless it is set against the structure of Somali

(8) In 1958-9, 32 students were enrolled at the Higher Institute which now also offers a course in sociology. For further information see M. Pirone, **Civilisations**, vol. ix, 1959, pp. 85-89.

(9) The 1959 Protectorate Commission on Representational Reform recommended that all candidates for election should be literate in Arabic or English to the level of standard VII intermediate schooling, but when the matter was debated in the legislative council it was felt that at the present time this requirement would deprive the legislature of many illiterate but politically experienced people. See **The Somaliland News**, 3 August, 1959, p. 5.

(10) For a discussion of this problem see, **Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Unofficial Representation on the Legislative Council**, Somaliland Government, Hargeisa, 1958, pp. 16-19.

society. For as has been stressed although there are many factors which stand in the way of progress one of the most serious impediments lies in the traditional 'tribal' loyalties of Somali society.

The majority of Somali are pastoral nomads (11), moving over many miles in a year with their flocks of sheep and goats, and herds of camels, and in parts of central and southern Somalia especially, cattle. Patterns of movement are primarily dictated by the distribution of rain and pasture through the seasons ; and in its widest sense prescriptive rights are not asserted to grazing which is regarded as a common gift of God to all Somali. But at the level of grouping of the clan there is some association between people and territory, such that most clans, though they lack sharply defined boundaries have some degree of territorial definition over the years both in relation to wells and villages and towns within the clan territory. Clans are often led by Sultans (*Ugaas, Boquor, Garaad, Suldaan*, etc.) but generally these positions are tenuous and imply little authority beyond the personal influence of the incumbent. Amongst the pastoralists there are in general no other traditional political offices and pastoral Somali society as a whole is characterised by its lack of chiefs and absence of a hierarchical system of politico-administrative offices. In principle at all levels of grouping policy is determined by all the adult men concerned (or their representatives) speaking on *ad hoc* councils (*shirs*). The solidarity of Somali pastoral groups, which is exceptionally strong, does not depend either on territorial attachments or upon allegiance to a common leader. Instead, its basis lies in community of descent in the male line (*tol*), and a kind of polical contract (*heer* or *tastuur*) (12).

Somali society as a whole is divided into a vast system of kindship groups which unite and divide according to the context of opposition or competition on any given occasion. It is here that contract (*heer*) is important, since it is through contract that different spheres of agnatic connection are marshalled as occasion requires. While the system as a whole is stable, its component parts — by allegiance to which the political and jural status of the individual is determined — are highly unstable. On one occasion a man acts with other patrilineal kinsmen as a member of a determinate lineage, while on another his political loyalities lie with a more or less inclusive range of kin, at a different point in the genealogical scale. For the genealogical system which encompasses the whole society represents political and jural affiliation as well as being to some extent a historical or quasi-historical record.

In this system of shifting genealogical attactment, the most stable units are the so-called 'dia-paying groups'. These are composed of men descended from a common ancestor who are bound by a formal treaty (*heer*) to pay and receive blood-compensation (Arabic *dia* ; Somali, *mag*) in concert. A dia-paying group

(11) In the Protectorate some 80 % of the population are estimated to live as pastoral nomads. In Somalia where agriculture is more widespread, over 70 % of the population are estimated to be pastoral nomads, and 30 % of the population to be pastoralists practising some cultivation.

(12) For a fuller discussion see, I.M. Lewis, 'Clanship and Contract in Northern Somaliland', **Africa**, 1959, July.

is thus politically and legally a corporation ; an external act of aggression affecting or committed by one member of a group is held to implicate the group as a whole. I do not have figures for the number of dia-paying groups in Somalia, but in the Protectorate in 1958 there were over 360 such groups in a population of some 650,000. Their male strength varies between a few hundred and a few thousand men.

To understand the significance of this political and legal entity which is the basic unit of pastoral Somali society, it has to be appreciated that the Somali are a warlike people driven by the poverty of their resources to intense competition for pasture and water. Even under modern administration, self-help is the final sanction in redressing wrongs and in adjusting political and legal relations between groups. In these circumstances and with the difficulty of adequately policing the interior of much of the country, the individual's ultimate security depends upon his loyalty to his dia-paying group. In the traditional system no one has jural or political status except as a member of a dia-paying group. But although the dia-paying group is the most stable and fundamental political unit, its identity and exclusiveness do not prevent the mobilisation of wider lineage alliances as occasion requires. Thus dia-paying group opposes dia-paying group, and at a higher level of division, clan stands against clan. The largest genealogical unit is the 'clan-family' of which there are six — the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Daarood, Digil, and Rahanwiin. In the traditional social order this unit is too large, too widely scattered, and generally too unwieldy, to act as a corporate political unit. And in the traditional system the clan usually represents the upper limit of effective corporate action.

In the north-west of the British Protectorate and in Harar Province of Ethiopia where there are considerable areas of sorghum cultivation, this pastoral regime has been to some extent modified. In this area Somali have turned to plough cultivation fairly recently, the first farms being founded about the turn of the century, and stable cultivating villages have sprung up in which there is a growing sense of attachment to locality. Ties of neigbourhood are beginning to make their appearance and while there is a yet no formal change in the traditional pastoral political structure a new principle of grouping has arisen which is not present in the pastoral organisation. This is evident in the various local activities connected with cultivation in which the Somali of the area co-operate not on a basis of clan or contractual ties but on a basis of common local interests.

The influence of cultivation in modifying the traditional pastoral structure of society is even more marked in the case of the Digil and Rahanwiin cultivators occupying the relatively fertile belt between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers of southern Somalia. Here agriculture has a tradition going back several centuries and other important factors have also been at work leading to the formation of a different type of social and political organisation. The most important of these are the influence of the Galla and Bantu communities which the Somali who now occupy the area found there when in the 14th century they began to advance into it from the north displacing most of the Galla but leaving small residual cultivating Bantu communities and a few dispersed Galla groups. Here today there are territorially defined local political groups, and while politics are still largely organised on a genealogical principle, the effective jural and political units tend to be larger than in the pastoral society and there is a more hierarchical system of administrative offices (13).

This dichotomy in traditional political organisation between the northern pastoralists and southern cultivating Digil and Rahanwiin coincides with the widest social cleavage in the Somali nation. The northern, and essentially pastoral, Somali clan-families are represented genealogically as the 'Samaale' and opposed to the Digil and Rahanwiin united genealogically as 'Sab'. As the numerically dominant conquerors of Somalia, and as nomads rather than sedentary cultivators, the 'Samaale' regard themselves as a pastoral aristocracy and traditionally despise the 'Sab' who in turn seek to repudiate the pastoralists' proud assumption of superiority.

IV.

This traditional pattern has not been radically changed by colonisation or by recent developments and persists within the frame-work of modern government and of nationalistic politics. The effects of economic development have so far been comparatively slight and there has been no extensive agrarian or industrial revolution to change the structure of society radically. Thus the often misleading and certainly question-begging term 'detribalisation' cannot usefully be applied to the present structure of Somali Society (14). Most of the towns of present-day northern Somaliland are small (only a few have populations greater than 20,000 inhabitants) and of recent formation, owing their permanence and growth in most cases to their selection as administrative centres. These are not cut-off from the rural society, but on the contrary are a vital continuation of it. Pastoral politics operate equally in both spheres, and economic ties and interests link the nomads of the interior to their clansmen in the towns. Moreover in town life the same clan and contractual principles very largely govern social relations and the bases of jural and political unity are the same in town and country. Blood-group solidarity is of equal importance in these small northern towns and organised on the same principles as in the nomadic interior.

Even in the larger, and much older centres of southern Somalia (whose capital Mogadishu which dates from the 10th century has a population of about 90,000) social relations are chiefly channeled along kinship group lines. Clansmen regularly contribute to a clan fund which is used to meet outstanding blood-debts and also to meet burial and other urban expenses. Thus even in towns as large and ancient as Mogadishu the traditional dia-paying organisation is not destroyed but is retained and indeed extended in scope to meet new contingencies functioning in some respects not unlike an insurance society.

(13) On the social structure of the southern Somali see, M. Colucci, **Principi di diritto consuetudinario della Somalia meridionale**, Florence, 1924 ; I.M. Lewis, **Peoples of the Horn of Africa, Somali, Afar and Saho**, London, 1955.

(14) For a recent criticism of the validity of the concept of 'detribalisation' to the changing conditions of African society see W. Watson, **Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy**, Manchester, 1958, pp. 3-8.

Thus the continuing importance and vitality of traditional social bonds is a striking feature of modern life in Somaliland. Indeed, one of the most significant aspects of the adoption of western procedures is the extent to which these foreign influences have been modified and adapted in keeping with the traditional structure of society. All the nationalist political movements and parties of course, especially the Somali Youth League in Somalia and the National United Front in the Protectorate (15) seek to replace the traditional sectional loyalties by national allegiance. Their ultimate aim is to establish a new spirit of national solidarity and to place country before clan. But internally even these movements are inevitably consortiums of rival kinship group interests rather than homogeneous national bodies. This persistence of traditional schisms within party politics is only one aspect, and indeed a recent one, of the way in which imported institutions are reinterpreted in terms of the all-pervasive traditional system. And here it is important to note that the conflict between traditional and modern political leaders which is a common feature in many African societies in transition is not very marked in Somaliland. Traditional Somali society has little in the way of hierarchical chiefly offices, being essentially democratic almost to the point of anarchy, and what conflict there is between traditional and modern Somali authority is most marked in the sphere of religion. And even here the position of traditional religious authorities — sheikhs and *wadaads* — is ambiguous. On the one hand they stand very largely for traditional Islam and are usually opposed to such modern innovations as the extension of voting rights to women, but on the other hand they have always preached the unity of Somali as Muslims irrespective of clan and kinship group divisions and here their ideals and those of the modern nationalists coincide. In practice, the increasing assumption of political and administrative control by Somali makes it more difficult for religious tranditionalists to oppose effectively innovations which they regard as contrary to the spirit of Islam. For they can no longer summon popular support on the basis of opposition to a non-Muslim and by implication 'infidel' administering authority.

Thus by and large the Somali have readily adapted themselves to imported modern institutions, modifying these where necessary in the light of their own traditional way of life. And the accommodation of new institutions and procedures and their reinterpretation which has been noted in the sphere of party politics is equally apparent in the structure of government and the organisation of the civil service.

From their earliest days the colonial administrations in Somalia and the Protectorate have played an often uneasy but usually clearly defined role as third parties in Somali lineage politics. With the exception of the brief Egyptian occupation of the northern coast (1875-1885) and the slight effects of Omani and Zanzibari jurisdiction in the south between the 17th and 19th centuries, European colonisation brought the first neutral over-riding authority of which Somali had experience. And as Somali obtained appointments in the

(15) On Somali nationalism and Somali political parties see, I. M. Lewis, **Modern Political Movements in Somaliland**, International African Institute memorandum XXX, Oxford, 1958 ; and A.A. Castagno, **Somalia. International Conciliation**, No. 522, New York, 1959, pp. 337-400.

local government services, at first only in the lower grades of employment, government began to be drawn inexorably into the web of Somali politics. Somali of one kinship group who gained positions in a government department naturally sought to find places for their clansmen, often with curious results. Thus at one time the Department of Agriculture in the British Protectorate was largely staffed by Somali of the Dulbahante clan although this clan is amongst the least interested in agriculture in the country. Thus although still controlled by expatriate officials, government became a new province for the inter-play of traditional sectional rivalries. Competition for appointments in the civil service developed between rival lineages in measure as the opportunities for Somali employment in all branches of the government increased.

At the same time, outside the civil service there is acute competition for amenities and privileges in all matters in which the governments exercise jurisdiction. And business and trade tend to be organised according to and dominated by the same monopolistic-like kinship group interests which operate so effectively in other spheres. As far as the administrations are concerned this is reflected in the acute rivalry which attends the granting of government trading licences as much as in direct competition for appointments in such vital organs of government as the police and armed forces.

Thus even while the administrations of Somalia and the Protectorate were still ultimately controlled entirely by foreign officials the latter were subject to constant pressure from and intrigue by the rival groups with which they dealt. Through them Somali sought to influence the whole pattern of administration to their own kinship group ends.

Today with the increasing participation of Somali in executive government as well as in party politics government is losing something of its neutrality as an impartial power and mediator in kinship group politics. This trend has obvious repercussions in administration, particularly in Somalia where Somalisation is more advanced than in the Protectorate. By his clansmen the Somali official is naturally regarded as a friend at court and as the occupant of a privileged position to be exploited as far as possible in the interests of the group. In the past before Somali held senior positions in the government service, influence could only be exerted indirectly and the District Officer's interpreter held a crucial and powerful position. Now this approach has been superseded since, with the appointment of Somali to District and Provincial Commissioner ranks, and to senior police ranks, a more direct path is open. This naturally places Somali officials, especially police and administrative officers, in a particularly difficult position ; for strict impartiality may oblige an official to act contrary to the immediate interests of his own clansmen. And here it is important to stress again the binding nature of the traditional clanship ties of Somali society. An official, as much as anyone else is not merely linked to his kinship group by vague ties of sentiment but rather bound by defined rights and duties expressed economically in terms of co-operation in the payment of blood-compensation. These contractual obligations which in the traditional pastoral organisation are the individual's strongest safe-guard are still as binding upon Somali officials as they are upon Somali in other walks of life. Few Somali have succeeded in completely severing their contractual and economic ties with their kinsmen. Only a handful of Sheikhs and religious leaders to whom the traditional system of collective responsibility in homicide

is not merely repugnant but also sinful have taken vows renouncing their contractual allegiances.

Yet despite the continued strength of these traditional kinship group ties there is a wide body of public opinion condemning them. The most outspoken opponents of the 'tribal' system are of course the nationalist leaders who see in 'tribalism' the negation of nationalism. Strong opposition to the continuing influence of the traditional system of collective jural responsibility also comes from the towns which, although they are very much part of the pastoral social system, are also the centers of social change and the reception points for new ideas and aspirations. At the same time under modern administration and with the increasing extension of social services the towns offer the individual greater security in the widest sense, and the townsman correspondingly feels less need of the support of his kinship group. Thus today Somali towns occupy an ambiguous position, being at the same time the centres of pastoral politics in the traditional way of life and also the growing points of party politics and of modernism in general. During the last few years there has been considerable discussion in the towns of the Protectorate of the need to reform or even abolish the traditional dia-paying system. The problem has received attention from all the nationalist parties and has been debated on several occasions in the Protectorate Advisory Council (16). In the legislative council itself a motion was tabled in 1957 calling upon the government to consider the abolition of the system. And an enquiry is now proceeding through the district administration.

In Somalia there has until recently been much more reticence in admitting the continued power of traditional allegiances for these have become in the eyes of progressive nationalists the symbol of all that is 'backward' and unprogressive. Whereas in the Protectorate clan and kinship group allegiances are publicly discussed and their significance frankly acknowledged, in Somalia those of the new elite particularly hesitate to emphasise these factors and seek to minimise their effect. In keeping with this trend, the explicitly clan and tribal political parties which along with the nationalist groups contested the first Assembly elections in 1956 have now largely disappeared. And legislation has been passed making it illegal for political parties to bear tribal names. Thus the chief opposition party which mainly represents the interests of the Digil and Rahanwiin tribesmen and was formerly called the 'Digil Mirifle Party' has now changed its title to that of the 'Somali Independent Constitutional Party'. Its composition and aims, nevertheless, remain substantially unchanged.

Moreover with the keen competition which exists for appointments to the service, the opposition Digil and Rahanwiin Party has in its many attacks on

(16) This non-legislative and purely advisory body was established in 1946 and has in principle met annually. It consists of 48 'elected and selected' members representative of all the administrative districts of the Protectorate and of all sectors of public opinion. With new developments in the organisation of the legislative council it has been suggested that the Advisory Council might become a house of assembly with consultative powers to provide for the representation of traditional leaders who would not be eligible for election to the legislative council.

the Somali Youth League government accused the latter of discriminating against Digil and Rahawiin tribesmen in recruitment (17).

Thus despite the ease and remarkable success with which modern democratic government and other western procedures have been adopted and despite the rise of nationalism all departments of life are still very much influenced by traditional group loyalties. Some of the ways in which these new institutions have been modified or reinterpreted to bring them into phase, as it were, with the traditional structure of society have been mentioned. At the same time there is an appreciable shift in the character of group loyalties. This is most noticeable in Somalia with its greater degree of Somalisation and where today it is rather the clan-families than simply the clans and smaller units of society which are ranged against each other in a struggle for national power. And this involves competition for control not only of the legislature and of the civil service but also for the most advantageous share in development and progress in general.

V.

In Somalia there has recently been a marked change in attitudes towards the problem of 'tribalism' and its inhibiting effects on the development of modern leadership and the growth of national loyalties. The increasing power of Somali in the control of their country's affairs and the receding influence of the Italian administering authority have, not surprisingly, been accompanied by a rise in tribal schisms and conflicts. And the problem of tribalism is now openly acknowledged and frankly discussed. Indeed the programme of the new Somali Youth League government formed in June after the elections of March 1959 devotes considerable attention to the question.

It is proposed to set up a tribunal to study tribalism and to consider how the traditional sectional loyalties can best be extended to a wider national patriotism. Today as in the past Somali nationalists attach great weight to the extension of popular education as a means of widening group interests and of fostering a national awareness. And while the previous Somali Youth League government regarded nomadism as the inevitable way of life of the majority of the country's inhabitants, the present government seeks to encourage settlement amongst the nomads with a view to curtailing nomadism and to increasing the sedentary population. Here of course the fundamental limitations are geographical and climatic, and any ambitious project to settle an appreciable proportion of the nomadic population will require considerable financial resources. Nevertheless, the government is clearly aware of the constant strife over access to grazing and water which fosters the traditional sectional intersts of the nomads and

(17) There are in fact a considerably higher proportion of Daarood and Hawiye in the civil service than of Digil and Rahanwiin in relation to their proportions in the total population of Somalia. In 1956 the figures were : Daarood in civil service 35 % (in total population 19 %) ; Hawiye 28 % (in population 42 %) ; and Digil and Rahanwiin 15 % (in population 31 %). This, however, is not a new phenomenon and cannot be attributed simply to discrimination. From the earliest days of colonial rule the predominantly nomadic Daarood and Hawiye have shown much greater interest in obtaining government appointments than the Digil and Rahanwiin who by and large have been content to follow their traditional farming occupations in the rich lands between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers.

hinders the extension of national loyalties, and is evidently impressed by the less belligerent characteristics of the sedentary cultivators of southern Somalia. If the necessary capital can be found to implement this project it is very likely to enjoy some success in weakening traditional kinship bonds and in fostering new territorial loyalties. In this connection it is of interest to record that those northern Somali who cultivate in the west of the Protectorate have recently initiated a variety of community self-help schemes to improve grazing and to extend soil conservation.

The emphasis on extirpating tribalism — however difficult this may in fact prove — in the new policies of the Somali Youth League government of Somalia is accompanied by an increased interest in fostering pan-Somali unity and moving towards the amalgamation of the various Somali territories (French, British, and Ethiopian Somaliland, Somalia, and the Northern Province of Kenya) in one 'Greater Somalia'. The ideal of such a Somali federation which was one of the original aims of the Somali Youth League has in the past few years been in the background of S.Y.L. policy, for the government of Somalia has had sufficient problems to deal with at home. In August 1959, however, a Pan-Somali National Movement was founded in Somalia which includes representatives from the Protectorate and from French Somaliland (18). The objects of the new movement are to achieve the unity and independence of all the Somali territories by peaceful means, to reject all tribal divisions, to establish and maintain close relations with other emergent African states, and to strengthen ties with the Muslim World.

These new developments have been precipitated by the approaching independance of Somalia and while they are likely to stimulate internal national solidarity in both Somalia and the Protectorate they will undoubtedly pose considerable problems of leadership. The Prime Minister of Somalia has been accused by his rivals of returning to tribalism in selecting the members of his government which includes representatives of all the main clan families of Somalia, and is in this sense a truly national government. The need to give a high weighting to tribal considerations has meant that while the government is thoroughly representative it excludes some of the better educated 'new men'. This difficulty will clearly lessen as educational facilities extend.

In discussing some of the difficulties attending the promotion of modern leadership of Somalia and the Protectorate I have emphasised the problem of tribal affiliation as Somali nationalists themselves now do. I have stressed the effects on modern government of the traditional structure of society, where there must always be a dynamic equilibrium — a precarious balance — between opposed kinship and tribal group interests. But it would be wrong to overemphasise the importance of traditional cleavages for many Somali politicians as well as officials are showing themselves capable of resolving their conflicting loyalties and at the same time of setting high standards in impartial leadership at a local as well as national level.

(18) Amongst these is Mahamuud Harbi, a former Vice-President of the French Somaliland Territorial Assembly and one of the Somali nationalist leaders of that territory.

PROBLEMES POSES PAR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES CADRES ET DE LOYALISMES NATIONAUX DANS LE PROTECTORAT BRITANNIQUE DU SOMALILAND ET LA SOMALIE SOUS TUTELLE ITALIENNE.

(Résumé français)

Tandis que le Somaliland britannique progresse vers l'autonomie et que la Somalie touche à l'indépendance, la formation et le recrutement des cadres somalis pour les secteurs public et privé acquièrent toute leur importance. Le nombre réduit de résidents européens exclut tout obstacle racial ou légal à la somalisation. Celle-ci est cependant rendue difficile par la survivance de l'esprit tribal, qui s'oppose d'autre part au développement d'un esprit natinonal.

Dans les deux territoires, le remplacement du personnel européen par les Somalis a suivi le rythme de l'évolution politique, dont l'auteur rappelle les principales étapes. A l'heure actuelle, la somalisation est généralement moins avancée dans les départements techniques (travaux publics, santé publique, agriculture, services vétérinaires, etc.) et plus avancée dans le domaine de l'éducation. En général, la Somalie a cependant atteint un plus grand degré de somalisation que le Protectorat britannique, notamment parce que les possibilités d'enseignement moyen et supérieur y sont plus développées (La Somalie possède depuis 1954 un Institut Supérieur d'Etudes économiques et sociales). La différence de niveau éducatif entre les deux teritoires apparaît lorsqu'on compare les conditions requises pour les candidats aux Assemblées. En Somalie, lors des premières élections générales, tenues en 1956, tous les candidats devaient pouvoir lire et écrire l'italien et l'arabe. Dans le Protectorat, l'alphabétisme n'est obligatoire que dans les circonscriptions électorales urbaines. Cependant, les besoins en personnel éduqué restent considérables dans les deux territoires. Les partis politiques et l'administration se disputent les meilleurs éléments. Cette lutte d'influence est particulièrement marquée dans le Protectorat ; en Somalie, elle est atténuée par le fait que l'administration de la Somalie permet à ses fonctionnaires de se mêler à la vie politique.

Les problèmes posés par la somalisation sont liés à la structure sociale des deux territoires. La majorité des Somalis sont des pasteurs nomades, dont les mouvements sont dictés par la distribution des pluies et l'état des pâturages Cette société nomade se caractérise par l'absence de hiérarchies administratives et politiques La forte solidarité de ses membres ne repose pas sur une base territoriale ni sur l'allégeance à un chef commun, mais sur une ascendance commune. Les groupés liés par le *dia* (ils sont plus de 360 dans le seul Protectorat britannique) s'engagent par un contrat (*hir*) à fournir et à obtenir par le sang la réparation des torts subis. Tout acte d'agression commis à l'égard d'un membre du groupe intéresse le groupe dans son ensemble. Si l'on songe que la pauvreté des ressources entraîne une âpre concurrence pour l'eau et les pâturages et que la difficulté d'exercer la police à l'intérieur du pays reste considérable, 'on comprendra que l'assistance mutuelle fournie par les groupes liés par le *dia* reste le seul moyen satisfaisant de redresser les torts et d'organiser

les relations politiques et juridiques entre les groupes. Ceux-ci se répartissent à leur tour entre six clans principaux.

Le régime pastoral connaît des exceptions, notamment dans le Nord du Protectorat où la culture du sorgho a entraîné l'apparition de fermes et de villages, et entre les vallées du Djouba et du Chébeli où les traditions agricoles maintenues par les Bantous et les Galla sont antérieurs à l'occupation somalie au 14e siècle. Dans ces régions, l'organisation politique et administrative est plus poussée. A cette différence d'organisation politique traditionnelle correspond une division sociale marquée : les « Samaale » se considèrent comme une aristocratie pastorale ; les « Sab » agriculteurs tâchent de repousser cette prétention.

L'apparition d'une administration moderne et d'une politique nationaliste n'a guère modifié cette situation, car le développement économique a été peu marqué jusqu'à présent. Les centres urbains restent modestes. L'esprit tribal continue à se manifester même à Mogadiscio, où l'organisation traditionnelle du *dia* a été étendue pour faire face aux contingences nouvelles et fonctionne un peu à la manière d'une compagnie d'assurances.

En fait, les structures d'importation étrangère ont été adaptées à la structure traditionnelle de la société. Les partis nationalistes — Ligue des Jeunes Somalis en Somalie, Front national unifié dans le Protectorat — s'efforcent de remplacer les loyalismes traditionnels par le loyalisme à la nation. Mais à l'intérieur même de ces mouvements, des luttes d'influence se poursuivent entre membres de clans différents. (Par contre, le conflit entre dirigeants politiques traditionnels et modernes n'est pas fort marqué, en raison de l'absence d'autorités traditionnelles véritables). En ce qui concerne l'administration, dès les débuts de la somalisation, les membres d'un clan qui obtenaient des postes dans un ministère cherchaient à y introduire leurs alliés. La concurrence entre clans reste également forte dans le secteur commercial, la police, les forces armées. Les fonctionnaires somalis sont souvent dans une position délicate, car une stricte impartialité peut les obliger à agir contre les intérêts immédiats de leur groupe. Cependant, un mouvement se dessine aujourd'hui contre la subsistence des liens traditionnels. Le gouvernement somali, dirigé par la Ligue des Jeunes somalis, tend à encourager la stabilisation des nomades par la voie de l'éducation ; il est en effet conscient de ce que la lutte pour l'eau et les pâturages favorise les dissentiments claniques et tribaux et nuit au développement d'un véritable loyalisme national. Cependant, le gouvernement actuel comprend des membres de toutes les principales familles claniques. La nécessité de tenir compte de considérations claniques donne au gouvernment un caractère véritablement représentatif, mais en exclut peut-être certains « hommes nouveaux » parmi les plus doués.

L'auteur signale enfin l'apparition de tendances pan-somalies. La fusion des territoires somalis français, anglais, éthiopien et de la Province septentrionale du Kenya est recherchée notamment par le « Mouvement national pan-somali » créé en août 1959, et qui comprend des représentants de la Somalie, du Protectorat et de la Côte française des Somalis.