


THE SOMALI NATION, III : *STATE AND SOCIETY :*

Theoretical considerations



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INTRODUCTION

We wish to come to the point right away, as it is urgent. This does not imply that we are full of our own self-importance. The outcome of research, pressing research in our opinion, *multi-mattered* and thrilling that we have been carrying out for the past two years on the theme : *The Somali nation* are not destined only for the experts on the different subjects in question.

The aim of our investigation is to act as a vector : to transmit and to help broadcast within the Somali community this general knowledge that all « should have » (1), and without which man cannot be expected to live in or understand life within the society.

Our epoch accentuates the necessity of such knowledge. It makes of the natural sciences and technology on one hand, and of the science of society on the other, the very condition of the existence of a community and of the men who live within it. Gone are the times of improvisation, strokes of luck and heroics, etc.

They are not only useless in the world where all is measured and calculated beforehand (or tends to be), but they have also become dangerous when tenacity and audacity, always essential, are not guided by the light of intelligence, by solid and conscious knowledge that only science can give.

This general knowledge is the fruit of each people's human experience, each nation taken up by its own advancement owes itself a broad assimilation adapted and enriched by its own experience.

This is the inevitable step which allows people to go ahead on the path of progress.

There is no people, no nation which has not at some moment of its history fought difficulties though variable in their gravity depending on the epoch, but which were permanent ones. Without this ever-present effort to overcome difficulty and dangers, there would be neither evolution nor history. Thus the problem is not that there be problems (especially in a world where there is more and more of a tendency to survey and write in a mathematical manner the different part of a solution) ; but to formulate correctly the given question in putting it in its proper historical and social context ; that is to say in the continuity of human experience and development of the national reality. It is on this condition alone that the intellectual step foregoing action can get away from the powerlessness and deadlock with respect to the snare situation brought about by the problem.

The Somali nation as a whole is today going through a crucial moment : a cross-road from which radiate the diverging paths toward the future. These of course won't all be suitable. The crux of the matter, the vital point, let's say, which reaches beyond internal dissensions and present worries, which will determine tomorrow the destiny of each one of us, is to know which direction amongst them answers to the fundamental needs of our people, to our most legitimate national hopes : social advancement, in dignity, liberty and unity.

This question overrides all the others because it revolves around the very existence of our people as a sovereign nation working toward the recognition of its rights and unity.

This cross-road situation is none other than a crisis. A crisis due to multiple causes reclud in transitory meaning and character. Certain minds lacking depth and historical insight or simply losing faith are seeing all negatively.

Worse again, there are some who declare that nothing can come of this situation, letting themselves go consciously into

extremes : (pessimism, egoism, sophism and demagogy) adding more to the confusion in minds, putting the State and the community into peril by their behavior.

The present crisis is double heded :

— on one hand, growing pains, linked to the advent of the State and to the characteristics of our society.

— on the other hand, a crisis consecutive to a historical ordeal.

The war of liberation of West Somalia 1977-78 (2) was the pivoting event. All the internal difficulties, natural under such circumstances, which came after the retreat of the national liberation armies and the reoccupation by armies of the East (U.S.S.R. and her allies) of the liberated territories, were merely consequences. But the war itself preceeded by innumerable bloody exchanges appears to be the product of dismembering, by the colonialists of the somali nation and of its unerring will towards definitive unification.

This crucial moment is a fertile one and will soon bear fruit ; it allows Somali people to integrate a rich and burning experience and *to find its cadence* in reaching out to its every limit.

With the lull will arise a new outlook on things, the outcome of the national synthesis, through the present social and intellectual unrest.

The status that our country will hold tomorrow in the Assembly of Nations will naturally depend on the way that we manage our domestic affairs and on the possible advance that we could allow ourselves in this respect through our capacity of anticipation.

Such an outlook brings us in its turn to the knowledge that we have of ourselves, of our society and of our history so as to cast aside fiction and the unreal and to search for reality as its stands.

It is for this reason that this phase of crisis of maturation both historical and temporary implies the call for a theoretical effort. This will allow, once understood, to help us to link

and arrange the present-day social phenomena indicating all the while, in so far as it is possible, the way of action.

In fact, the most important phenomena is that our society is changing in its structures and morphology under the pressure of multiple causes : natural, national, regional and international causes. But, in the same way as « a nation whose politics is based on its geography » (Napoleon), so it is, it must be, in a certain way, the dynamic synthesis of the changing causes which concern it.

Only attentive minds, those who do not let themselves be swallowed up in the inherent confusion looking out exclusively for their own personal goals, can perceive the primary sketch of tomorrow's society which is in embryo through the apparent disorder.

It will be different from to-days : in its organisation, in its men, in its ideas. It is in this way that a nation must cast away its old skin, make a new one, catch time it needs to pass from one phase of its existence to another. In so far as we are concerned, it is our wish to aid this transformation part of which the State, as an institution and nomadism as a socio-cultural organisation form the two conflicting poles. This rapport is dominant in our present-day society : it is decisive for its future.

The interest of the theoretical investigation on this theme can only be of a prime interest in our eyes.

It is for this reason that under the title of « State and society », that we propose a study of the historical process of the formation of both and of their reciprocity (II - III - IV) before examining, in the light of these considerations, the situation of our people in this respect (V).

Our study will be preceded by considerations relative to the method (I) and will end with a conclusion.

I. METHODOLOGY

The different parts of our account take in the development throughout history of basic ideas relative to the method, to society and to the State, taking their source, from reflections of a certain number of philosophers and scholars.

Naturally it is not mere chronology which would be of no interest, but it is the evolution of these ideas in their *continuity* ; it is what one could call, in an almost darwinian term, the *life* and growth of the concept in the true environment and in the reflection of the human experience. It is then natural to bring in one's own opinion or to point out a preference for one or the other of the theories.

Without doubt Plato is he, who in the greek world of old, consecrated the most serious effort in thought in the understanding and rectification of the social phenomenon.

He is the first to have proclaimed that the study of the society depended on science ; and that as a consequence, as much elsewhere as here a special knowledge and a fitting method were indispensable in the matter. His political conception still valid because of his depth, its systemacity and its rigour deserves a place apart which would not be relevant to this work.

1. With this new idea comes to light social reflection, so to speak from mythology and miracle. He so ever who speaks of science, speaks of objective knowledge relating to a concrete object of which the external existence, independant of conscience is submitted to determinism. Society has thus

come under the same conceptual categories as the other domains of reality. Society thus turns out to be controlled by laws, which « are the necessary connection springing from the nature of things » (3).

Man, as he is not made as an isolated being, but forming an integrating part of the universe, there will thus be « laws as determined for the development of the human species as for the drop of a stone » (A. Comte) (4).

These laws, defined, in so far as society is concerned, are the outcome of precise causes.

It is in this way that Montesquieu teaches us that at the base of historical movement there are two orders of causes. « *There are general causes, be they moral or physical, which act within each monarchy raising it, maintaining it or precipitating it ; all accidents are submitted to causes ; and if the chance of a battle, that is to say a particular cause, has brought down a State, there was a general cause which determined that the State was to perish by a single battle ; in brief, the principal aspect brings with it all the particular accidents* » (*Considerations...*) (5).

The moral causes, which shape « the general character of a nation » (Montesquieu) (6), rise, form its code of morals and customs, whereas the physical causes have to do with the climate and the nature of the terrain on which the community in question evolves. If these presuppositions are true, so « *the political and civil law of each nation should be so fitting for the people for whom they are made that it can only be a considerable coincidence if those of one nation suit another* » (Montesquieu) (7).

2 — As in the kingdom of inorganic matter, human societies comprise constituting elements. Their varied combinations obeying particular laws determine the general and specific nature of each community according to the time and place of its existence.

They give to each society its form and structure.

In a way the individual and the family represent the

« electron » and the « atom », these basic elementary realities and their more and more complex progressive associations giving birth to molecules, then to the social body. So Spencer (1820-1903) explains to us that :

« Social evolution begins by simple aggregates ; that it progresses by the union of some of these aggregates with larger one, and that after having been consolidated these groups join other similar forms to even bigger aggregates » (8).

This process presents even a mathematical nature in its rhythm and its limits ; indeed, « *society are simply different combinations of one simple original reality. Now, one single element can combine with itself only according to a number of limited modes ; the resulting being, in turn, subjected to the same law, especially when the composing elements are few in number* » (9).

However, combination does not merely mean quantitative condition.

An important dialectic element is going to intervene and state the decisive difference between the whole and each one of the parts that it comprises. For « *Society is not a simple sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own features* » (10).

A pertinent reference on biology will clarify the meaning of this fact for us : « *Biological phenomena are explained analytically by inorganic phenomena. Indeed, it is sure that there are only molecules of raw matter in the living cell. Only, they are associated therein, and it is this association that is the cause of these new phenomena which characterise life and of which it is impossible to find the seed in any of the associated elements* » (11).

Combined human actions thus give off « a new product » which is « the resultant of social living » (11) and is naturally connected with « the number and nature of the elementary

parts which comprise society » (12) and which stirs in its breast.

The comparison with biology covers a deeper aspect. This comparison has scientific, methodological and political implications because it places the animal societies in the furthering of the vital process. So Espinas (1844-1922) believes that it would be necessary : « *In order to found the political doctrine on a firm basis it is necessary (...) to admit that sociology is simply the continuation and the blooming of biology, that human society is concrete and living thing in the same way as the animal societies* » (13).

In the same way of thinking, J. de Maistre (1753-1821) affirms that peoples are realities.

« *That are born and perish like individuals ; that have a general soul, a true moral unity which make them as they are* » (14).

Individuals and groups within society are simply the organs of this living body.

This conception also shows the steps to take in the search for an objective knowledge of human communities : indeed, « *in sociology, as in biology, scientific exploration will use at the same time the three fundamental modes, that is to say pure observation, experimentation and lastly the comparative method, adapted essentially to all studies on human bodies* » (Comte) (15).

The regard for severity in order to tighten social reality more and more, the influence of already accomplished improvement in other disciplines and the under-lying conviction of the unity of sciences, that is to say the applicability or at least the existence of similar laws in different forms lead De Bonald (1754-1840) to look into and determine « the general laws of order between moral beings which society obeys », « as Kepler and Newton wished to discover and calculate the general laws of the physical world » (16).

In a more precise manner, he endeavours to point out :

« *The generative or only constructor principle of society in general, and of every particular society* » (17).

He concludes thus that « abstract propositions which have become obvious truths, principles » (18) to have undergone the trial of history itself which in the words of de Maistre is only « experimental politics » (19).

With Saint-Simon (1675-1755) already roars the imminent upsetting of the social theories in force.

« *Copernic overthrew the old theories of the world... He believes that the earth is not at all the centre of the solar system, much less the centre of the world... Copernic's demonstration undermines the scientific scaffolding of the christian religion at its root* » (20).

3. Neither man nor society will have the same status in the universe. Science diminishes the myth and megalomania of man.

It binds him to modesty and realism. We will therefore study the conditions of existence of the different societies in time and space, the laws of their evolution and of their inter-reaction in history.

Without doubt, the most original theory and the deepest one from this point of view at least in so far as we are concerned, is the one that assimilates society to a living organism and integrates it into the animal kingdom. We will refer to it throughout our study. It represents the different human societies in a whole which demonstrates a common origin, an internal logic in their variations and successions, their bond of kinship and their kinds thus allowing the sketching « the genealogy of the social types » (21) similar to the tree of life.

From the primary state of civilisation « humanity has evolved according to necessary laws of development » (22) which permit us to fill up the gaps where we lack « intermediary links » in the « organic succession » (23) and to show « the great sequences of human progress » (24) since « the human race has the same origin (and) has gone the same way,

by different but parallel paths on each of the continents in a similar manner » (25).

4. Naturally, a philosophical and scientific research such as this has an ethical finality for goal : it will be a question of setting up a harmony between these three different but complementary orders : the *human*, the *social* and the *natural* orders, whilst eliminating the causes of contradiction and conflict which set their elements one against the other and of course respecting their hierarchy.

It is obvious that we will attain this result only if there is, first, a « spirit of discipline (...) founded on reason and truth » (26) that is to say « a homogenous moral » (27) which is the condition of existence of life in the community.

In order to be part of and take active part in the movement of the social body of which he is the fundamental and decisive element the individual must thus possess beforehand reasons of behavior which conforms with social norms. Only then will he be in a position to appreciate to its full extent, the fundamental role of laws (judicial and natural) which govern the moral, social and universal world. He will no longer vainly look for ways « to be free against laws » (28) and pursue solely his own personal interests without worrying about the lot of society, for « as soon as anyone says « What of it ? » about matters of State we must count that the State is lost » (29).

Secondly, society this specific living body, undergoes a permanent change in its internal organisation (anatomic and physiological we would say), its external configuration and its connections with the historical sphere and natural surroundings.

It imposes on the life of the individual the same demand in regard to it. So it will be fitting to extend and throw light on the field of the conscience of the citizen.

Failing which they would run the risk of running aground and to doubt the very survival of society, over and above a certain threshold : « *The more social reality is complex, the*

more it is moving and the more change and adaptation to new conditions are needed from man » (30).

Thus, the lower and mechanical solidarity will be replaced by an organic one founded on the division of work between the different parts of the social body.

Interdependant and complementary the different sectors of social life converge simultaneously in a harmonious order in the general interest which is, in a certain manner, the common denominator of the particular interests, the good of all and personal interest upholding the same dialectic relations as those that link the parts to the whole and reciprocally.

Mechanical solidarity, says Durkheim is the one of the mineral world. This phenomena is to be found also in the human groups at a certain stage of their development. But « *the social molecules which could be coherent in this one manner only could therefore not move with uniformity unless they have no movement of their own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies do, it is for this reason that we suggest (calling) this sort of solidarity mechanical » (31).*

The organic solidarity appears quite different : « *This solidarity resembles the one that we can observe in the higher animals. Each organ indeed possesses its special physiognomy, its autonomy, and nevertheless the stronger the unity of the organism is the more pronounced the individualisation of the parts is » (32).*

5. If we see society as a living being obeying the fundamental laws of life (birth, growth and decline), we must also define the conditions of the state of health of this being so to be able to determine the « pathological cases » and detect the abnormal perturbances which effect the working of its organism.

Only this previous knowledge will allow the research of the appropriate « remedy » in order to reestablish the balance that was ruptured. This is what Durkheim explains and goes on to justify the continuation of this study : indeed, « there is a state of moral health that science only can determine com-

petently, and as this has not yet been carried out fully anywhere it is already an ideal that can be endeavoured to approach. « *Whatsmore, the conditions of this state change because societies are transformed and the most serious practical problems that we have to settle consist precisely of determining it again depending on the changes that have occurred in the sphere. Now, science is supplying us with the laws, by which variation has already passed, allowing us to anticipate those which are occurring and which claims the new order of things* » (33).

II. SOCIETY

Upon tackling this research, one can ask the methodological question of know which, society or the State, deserve priority.

The answer does not seem easy.

State and society uphold, in their development similar relations to those existing between thought and language. That means the further back we go in time and as rudimentary as it may be society carries in his breast a form of power ; the evolution between the two terms, State and society, being parallel and linked dialectically.

We propose to follow the life and the growth of society in a triple point of view which will be a thread in our investigation :

1. Power as the centre of gravity of the community in question.
2. Economy as absorbed energy which is necessary as much for the upholding of the group as for its quantitative and qualificative growth.
3. The internal organisation of the social elements under the influence of the two foregoing elements, in other words the *structure* and the exterior *morphology* of the group.

1. The primitive *horde* : *the plasma*

Naturally, we no longer believe, at least from a scientific point of view, in the propagation of the human race from a couple, resulting from Creation.

There was on the contrary the slow moving and progressive making of man from one or several animals species under determined geological and climatic conditions more and more defined by scientists.

One can consider the horde as the outcome of this long and dark process ; a transitory phase where animal nature ends and where the dawn of humanity rises.

This horde « *would be the true social protoplasm, the seed from which grew out all the social types* » (34).

We establish that power works from the beginning, as if society, no matter where it stands in its development could not do without it for even its own existence. It is defined by a triple characteristic :

- a) it is absolute : the domination is total on the whole.
- b) it is founded on *violence* and *force*. The horde (and this may seem like corollary) would be thus « a homogenous mass the parts of which do not distinguish themselves one from the other and as a consequence would not have made arrangements one with the other (and which) in brief would be devoid of any defined form and any organisation » (35).

The chief forms the single and acting pole for the whole : he in relation to whom all the members of the community are distributed into two categories according to sex : the male is submitted to his will and the female, to his needs ; rivals being subjugated or excluded.

The chief ensures the direction of the internal unity, reinforced by the gregarious instinct of the group.

His power, as long as he is in a position to govern, pursues two primary objectives the vital nature of which is obvious : that is the satisfaction first of all of his sexual and alimentary appetite.

Said in another way again, and here is an important point, power gives access to the possibility of disposing of the two only « objects » produced by society at this stage : subsistence and woman.

But this list is not limited as the evolution of power will show.

Lastly, the *economic* activity which has for limit the exclusive search for daily food by root picking and hunting of thus ensures the first form of production ; that is to say the reproduction and preservation of the elements which compose the horde.

This living and mobile formation, united by mechanical solidarity at the basis and by the ever-present repression of the chief (temporary) is by necessity nomadic.

Its life closely depends on the hazards of the natural environment which supplies it with the means to subsist. It must be pointed out lastly that power is, from the beginning, the stake of a struggle.

2. *Family, clan, tribe*

According to Rousseau, the family is « *if one wants to call it the just model of political societies ; the chief is the image of the father, the people is the image of the children, and all of them having been born equal and free, alienate their liberty for their own use only. The whole difference is that in the family the love that the father has for his children rewards him for the care he renders, and that in the State the pleasure of governing makes up for this love that the chief has not for his people* » (36).

Let us put aside the political implications of this comparison to limit ourselves to the coming of the family and its consequences. Family life, in other words, the sharing between genitors women and offspring, seems a compromise putting an end to the struggle, mortal or enslaving depending on the issue, which opposes the chief to the other male adults.

In fact, family which has undergone different and successive forms throughout history (37) bears witness of the final defeat of the chief whose absolute power, discretionary and direct on the community fails partly to the advantage of his rivals.

But this decisive phenomenon which is characterised by a rupture, turning point in relation to the previous state merits another positive interpretation : the fathers of the family represent the multiple image of the fallen and dead chief who is reproduced as a social personage but also as an indispensable function.

With the breaking up of the absolute power practiced by the chief on the community, comes at the same time the stoppage of homogeneity, the loose and primary unity of the horde. Conjugal life sets up simultaneously in the heart of the group the first structuration, composed indeed of identical unities in their simplicity : the family, which is « *the oldest of all societies and the only natural one* » (38), supplies the basic frame on which the building and future development of society will take their support.

According to Freud, « *the establishing of the family consecutive to the murder of the father by the sons marks out in fact the birth of human society as a group obeying a moral relementation to master the destructive effects of force* » (39). We can also add that the first cultural elements, rites, beliefs, etc., draw their roots in the consequences of this emancipating gesture and the family.

We can, moreover put forward the hypothesis according to which the offspring forms for the parents and in the frame of the family cell the original and primitive form of *property* in the way that they could dispose of their children.

Lastly, the family carries in its breast the possibility of social stratification which is carried out when certain historical conditions are present. To resume the role of the family and look on the perspectives that it opens to human development, let us see what De Bonal was already writing : « *In the beginning of society, the laws of the family form, by their development, the law of the State which springs from the family like a tree from a seed that concealed it. The progress of political society has been to pass from the domestic state to the public state and to fix civilised people, for the new born*

people are nations divided into families and civilised people are families bound together in the body of a nation... » (40).

However the institution of the family always reproduces on a smaller scale the primitive horde from which it has come : as an economic and social unit relatively autonomous when the day-to-day production is consumed daily, the work division being based on the sex, whereas the common property of the means of subsistence is not yet broken down by the demographic pressure and the arrival of inheritance.

From there on, the formation of society seems to follow along quite a simple theoretic schema : the incessant struggle against the environment, the external threats coming from other groups render necessary solidarity and the union of a certain number of families ; thus the clan is formed, composed of the unity of these groups ; the clan formations give birth to the tribe ; a certain number of the later results according to the same process, in *society*.

The clan is an intermediary form between the family and society : an « *enlarged family* », but at the same time, in connection with it, a more advanced model of future society.

The clan represents a certain number of typical features relating to the organisation, to the power and the situation of the members which go to form it.

What defines the clanic (or tribal) structure is « *a system of homogenous segments, similar one to the other* » (41).

Nothing, in fact, can distinguished one individual from another ; it is the same for families, clans and tribes. Through a process similar to that of scission in biology and which was rendered possible by this supple articulation which is « *segmentation* », the group can easily split itself into elementary units (the family) each time there is need for it : search for food, overpopulation, danger, etc.

In comparison with the horde, the clan introduces little change concerning the economy the objective of which is always subsistence, the survival of the group.

Another ressemblance with the family, the « *primitive*

society » is « *basically communistic, lacking important commerce, private property, economic classes, or despotic rule* » (42).

The situation of the individual results from the organisation of the clan.

The freedom of man coincides with his identification in his intellectual and social life to the group which works like a « *uniform mold* » (43) for all its members. The members demonstrate this identity in their behavior, their beliefs and their ideas.

In fact, « *primitive society distinguishes itself not by the family organisation but with clanic organisation. Everything is determined within it, everything is lived and thought out not in reference to the individual but to the group* » (44).

This feature is perhaps explained by the fact that the clan assumes, in a manner as yet indifferenciated, the different forms of power which will be established separately later. It is « *at the same time a political, familial and religious unit* » (45).

Thus the total submission of the individual to the group and the attribution to the latter of the power of the sub-groups (power delegated to a patriarch if need be) brings to mind in certain ways the state of the primitive horde ; at the same time, the flexibility of this integrated organisation permits to the clan to survive better. The reciprocal independance of men and of families and the intermittent character of power come well to the head in this text of Waitz (*Anthropology*) : « *As a general rule, families live beside one another with a large amount of independance and develop little by little in order to form little societies (read about clans) which do not possess definite constitution as long as the internal struggles or external danger, take war for instance, do not bring about that one or several men must break away from the mass and put himself at its head. Their influence which depends only on personal ability does not spread and lasts only while the confidence and patience of others last. Each adult stands in*

front of such a chief in a perfect state of independance. It is for this reason that we witness such people, without internal organisation, holding together only by the effect of external circumstances and as a result of common habit » (46).

In other words, as a general rule and for the most part, these societies are united by what we have called mechanical solidarity and which calls for the necessity of mutual connections (and so to speak minima) between the physical elements.

Anything else is *organic* solidarity ; the structure of societies where it is preponderant is composed of « *a system of different organs, all of which have a special role, and which themselves are formed of differentiated parts. In the same way as the social elements are not of the same nature, so they are not disposed in the same manner. They are not put in a linear juxtaposition like the rings of a ringed (worm for instance) nor do they fit one into other, but they are one to the other in coordination and subordination around a central organ which exercises a moderating action on the rest* » (47).

It is the social division of work which according to Durkheim creates this organic solidarity : it covers a deep meaning which goes beyond the simple unstable human motives.

« *It is not only a social institution which has its source in the intelligence and will of man ; but a phenomenon of general biology the conditions of which, it would seem, one must search for in the essential properties of organised matter. The division of work appears only as a particular form of this general process, and societies, in conforming themselves to this law, seem to yield to a current which came into being long before them, and which entails in the same way the whole living world* » (48).

To summarize let us say that we had first the simple element (the individual), then the social cell (the family), and lastly coming from the latter the clan formation.

Naturally, the passing of the clan into society (englobing an entity of these groups) is carried out depending on the

determined historical conditions which vary in time and space. For the moment, it is fitting to grasp the transformation and the decisive role of power in this evolution.

After having been exercised in an absolute and permanent manner by the chief of the horde, then recuperated in the father figure of the family, we now see it in a third phase, again concentrated in one *external* and *superior* point to all clans (or tribes) comprising society ; focal point and pole of union where the phenomenon of power demonstrates its intermittent throb ; the subsequent social progress with which it will go on developing a dialectic inter-action, will consist of stabilizing it in its justification and its function.

We have worked from the principle according to which society makes up a « *system, analogous to the structure, functioning and specializations of parts of living organism* » (49).

We can, in order to deepen this comparison, establish from now on the fundamental correlations between the living body and society knowing that the nervous system, the organs and the skeleton which comprises essentially the superior organism correspond respectively to the government, to the institutions and the economic structure of the *living* social formations. This analogy naturally brings us, and from a methodological point of view, to clarify the particular characters of the living being, as it has been defined by darwinism in particular :

1) Unity and interdependance of the organs in the complementary framework of their different functions going towards the same goal ; from which the reciprocal influence and tendency to equilibrium between the parts of the whole (*law of correlation*).

2) Slow moving adaptative evolution which is also a permanent structural, functional and morphological one, having for goal the acquisition of vital advantageous aptitudes and, on the other hand, the elimination of unfavourable characteristics. Evolution obeys a determined logic explaining the

variations and survival of previous states, as well as the existence of the different species and their parental connections.

It expresses the heritage of the living being's past, registered on the genetic level, and his dialectic interaction with the environment to open to the future ; that is why all biological phenomena have reason to be in their existence even if they do not apparently seem to be useful to the organism to which they are linked ; whereas the recapitulation by the ontogenesis of all the previous development of the individual perpetuates and proves at the same time the continuity of the evolutive process.

3. The organism forms a *homogeneous sphere* of which the dynamic of the internal and external reactions ensures the preservation within a relative identity.

4. Lastly, the living body is a whole of which all the parts are *arranged among one another and subordinate* to the nervous system.

Having pointed out these marks, let us now come back to social reality.

On this level, the direct projection of the biological and physiological data is particularly striking in the stirring pen of Michelet who writes in his *Histoire de France*, volume I, about national life : « *Life has one sovereign and very demanding condition. It is really life only in so much as it is complete. Its organs are all interdependant and act only together. Our functions are linked and imply one another.* »

If one is missing, then nothing lives. In the past, it was thought it was possible to isolate with the scalpel and to study separately each one of organs. This cannot be as all has an influence on all else. »

It is for this reason that he will try to study in all his aspects the formation of the *French nation* throughout the epochs in order to grasp, in its unity the whole of its historical, physical and vital movement.

Political society begins to take form at a moment when we

do not yet observe any of the mentioned organs. The brain, that is to say the power as a principle of coordination is, though it is at the embryonic stage, the one which emerges first : when one of the chiefs of the clan (or tribe) sees himself invested with a new mission which places him *outside* and *above* the different groups, his own included and that he assumes within the given limits, the command of the entire community. Here we are at the origin of the State, though the birth of the institution is difficult to situate in the current of time and social evolution. Thus, for Deguit, the presence of the State can always be noted, whatever the degree of its formation :

« *In taking the world in its most general meaning, one can say that there is a State each time that there is a political differentiation however rudimentary or complicated it may be, in a given society* ».(50)

In other words, the less the state institution is developed, the more it intermingle with pure power, which always exists necessarily in every human society, in one form or another.

The State appeared in determined circumstances ; it is modified all in developing, its functions, its organisation and its structure as well as the way it is perceived by men.

It is of interest to study the phenomenon of the forming of the State, and its different phases in the Greek world. Indeed, as Engels has us notice, « *the genesis of the State with the Athenians is a particular typical model of the formation of the State in general* » (51).

Engels justifies this privileged situation by the fact that the Greek State was formed in the absence of internal and external violence ; it sprang immediately from their tribal organisation, and by the fact that we dispose sufficient elements of information.

The Greek experience indeed shows us how the State comes slowly out of the primitive organisation of hellenic society in integrating progressively and in modifying itself in consequence.

1. The Greek firstly divide themselves into four tribes (each one composed of 12 phratries) set up on the different territories, and ensuring the governing of their own affairs. These tribes are going to cease being simply on juxtaposition.

« *The change consists especially of the setting up of a central administration in Athens, that is to say that a part of the affairs up until then governed in an independant way by the tribes was declared common and attributed to the general Council sitting in Athens* » (52).

This event has so a triple meaning : firstly this decision represents the undermining of the tribal authority from which is taken a certain number of affairs which up until then were in its bounds. Then, in conceding collectively and voluntarily a part of their power to the benefit of an institution distinct from each one of their tribal formations they take a primary step in the direction of their integration into a unit of which the configuration will never cease to gather precision throughout the evolution of greek society. Lastly, the partial transfer of this tribal power renders possible the institution of a new structure which will confirme itself more and more as an autonomous system, imposing itself progressively on society, but which, at this stage, appears as the dynamic centre destined to promote and forge in its own image the society of the future, that is to say the nation.

It is also important to call attention to how, the new and common institution substitutes a historically and juridically more advanced notion for the clanic or tribal solidarity limited and « mechanical » (as says Durkheim) : the national right which ensures the protection of the Athenian citizen even on the territory of another tribe ; a privilege which begins to work on a parallel with the security provided by the tribe that it will end in eclipsing.

2. The second step of the process of national construction will consist of the introduction of a new principle touching

this time one of the basic elements of the organisation of the traditional society.

« A traditional institution attributed to king Thésée was the dividing up of the whole people without taking phratries or tribes into consideration in three classes : euphratries or nobles, geomores or agriculturers and demiurges or craftsmen » (53).

Up until now, the distribution of men between the different groups comprising society were carried out according to their parental ; now it is their professional activity (and soon private property) which assigns each one his place in the bosom to one or other of the three classes each one having a definite role to fulfill. The economic necessity to divide social work seems to replace the reference to consanguinity or the common ancestor.

Tribal formation here lets out an essential domain of its authority : in giving into the principle of its internal organisation it finds itself in a position depriving it of even the possibility of using its « subjects », of arranging them according to its own demands.

3. Lastly, in order to totally undermine the old groups of consanguinity in their bodies, the correspondance between the tribe and its geographical demarcation was broken in order to get rid of the territorial element which was entering into its existence.

Indeed, the country was divided into 100 circumscriptions. Each citizen had to enroll in his administrative circumscription and take part in the political life of the community through it.

Naturally, these three steps in the evolution of Greek society represent only relative modifications of the old tribal organisation from which came little by little the Athenian State. But, for a certain time, the principles of organisation and the elements of the two societies (traditional and national) go on coexisting and work in parallel. For, when a « new

organisation begins to come into being, it tries to make use of the existing one and to liken to it » (54).

But this intermediary situation, transitory by its very own nature reaches necessarily a limit which calls for the final rupture with the previous state, indeed : « This mixed arrangement cannot last for a long time, because between the two points that it wants to conciliate, there is an antagonism which is bound to give (...). Therefore social matter must enter into completely new combinations to get organized on totally other bases. Whereas the old structure, in as long as it persists, opposes it ; it is for this reason that it must disappear » (55).

This phenomenon seems perfectly normal to us if we still hold to the theoretic conception which grasps social formation as a living substance subdued to the same laws of evolution and transformation according to a continuous, dynamic process throughout its different phases.

III. THE STATE

A. — The Greek city remains all the same an intermediary organisation between the tribe and the nation endowed with the appropriate public power. But it is at the basis of the modern notion of the State transmitted to Rome and then to the Occident. It already represents the state structure advanced enough in the way that it carries out the differentiation and the development of the functions taken on globally and without distinction by the tribal power for the group as a whole : governmental functions, judiciary functions, warfare functions, etc. The central administration with its Council and its hierarchical ramifications as far as the different social groups and territorial circumscriptions ; its institutions corresponding to organs ; its armour supplying the skeleton, the Greek city takes on a form and consistence while sheltering in its breast elements of the previous social order which play essential roles in the new collectivity (such as tribes, phratries, etc.) as intermediary bodies between citizens and the central power.

The construction of the Roman state follows along the same lines.

« A more or less forced merger of Gens into curia, and curia into tribes, and tribes into a same and unique gentilitial society » (56).

Morgan enlightens us on historical movement which, throughout the successive reconstructions of the precedent forms, brings us to the progressive arriving of the state entity

as we know it to-day with its diverse instances that let its origin show through clearly (their « ancestors » we could say) : « *The Gens born from the need that was felt to organise society ; from the Gens came the chief and the tribe and its Council of Chiefs ; from the tribe was born by way of segmentation, the group of tribes which later dissolved into a confederation and finally became consolidated by the merging into a nation ; from the experience of the Council came the need of an assembly of the people, with the sharing of the government between the two organs ; and lastly from the military needs of the united tribes came the supreme military chief, who in his time became the third representative of power but who remained in a subordinate position to the two other superior organs.*

« *The latter's responsibility in his turn is the origin of the one of the supreme magistrate, the king or the president. In this way aren't the principal institutions of the civilized nations but the continuing of those which appeared at the uncivilized epoch, to develop into the barbaric epoch and at last reach the civilized epoch where they exist and progress still » (57).*

B. MESOPOTAMIA

In the ancient Orient, the State comes into being and develops on an analogous model just as logical where trade and agriculture play a decisive role.

1. — Religion, the leading influence supplies the principle and basis of the social organisation. The places of cult where the faithful come together rapidly become urban centres. Cities are raised around the temples which attract a certain amount of crafts and commercial activities. The priest is naturally endowed with the social and political function on top of his mission of spiritual guidance : the organisation of

agricultural production and protection of commercial circuits.

2. — Here, like in the Greek world, we have recourse to the same procedures to face external dangers : the Council of Elders elects a chief who in Mesopotamia becomes a temporary king for the circumstance. The *Lougal*, the temporary highest in charge of these interdependant villages from which the City-State will come, is a war chief as well as a rich land-owner. From there on, the process of formation of the State takes its natural course.

3. — The first step will be the unification of the political power by the elimination of the temporal of the Priest. Monarchy becomes permanent ; it grows taking in cities and territories to come to the construction of a centralised and bureaucratic empire ; the unification of the economic, social and judiciary reglementation reaches its end under Hammourabi, which also solves the threat presented by the nomads, by their settling down and sedentary state.

4. — Lastly one must bring to mind a new justifying element of sumerian power : Narram-Sin is the first who has proclaimed himself to be of *divine* origin (58).

C. INDIA

It is within the first thousand years B.C. that the first state structures of the Ganges Valley came into being. The evolution of these structures will take place, in India, according to a « *schema that will be repeated, modified and reorganised later on, but whose essential elements remain the same* » (59).

Vedic societies comprise clans ; the evolution consists precisely of the progressive and inevitable weakening of their territorial and social solidarity to leave room for the coming of the State. This transformation of the social structure happens

to favour agricultural development, and correlatively the differentiation into social classes.

Here, as in the case of Greece or Mesopotamia, the chief becomes king in trying to set his power on a divine basis through the rites and sacrifices which associate the chief to the supreme Being.

But royal authority has a weakness resulting from the rivalry between temporal and spiritual power.

The strengthening and development of the state organisation will essentially be the result from the action of monarchies, growing at the cost of chiefdoms which failed to take the decisive step which would raised them to the height of the independant communities, that is to say strong and structured enough.

On the contrary, we can see « *a slow fall-back of chiefdoms faced with the coming of the State* » (60), since « *where clan territories were neighbours of kingdoms, the sovereignty of the clan was undermined either by the conquest of area, or by the encroachment of the monarchical power, operated through clearing and cultivating new grounds, and the setting up of agricultural colonies* » (61).

The incorporation of all the elements of the clan in the State structures being complete : « *The rites had for goal to assimilate the divinity of the local clan, to integrate its territory in the new State and to make its priests either brahmen or special civil servants in charge of the temples consecrated to the divinity* » (62).

We can conclude from these experiences that the chiefdom represents an intermediary step between the segmentary and egalitarian society and the state fully developed entity (63).

On the other hand, one can consider economics as the energy source of which the permanent flux proofs to be essential for the working of the social system (we could say of the social « machine ») ; power, in so far as it is concerned would be the *mode* (we might even say *code*) of *distribution* (judicious or not) and *reglementation* of the energy mass

which irrigates the social body ; as a consequence, the union of these two priviledged factors which, it is true to say, do have a connection, has undoubtedly made up an essential condition having impressed a powerful impulsion on the structural and social differentiation of the communities ; which supplies a justification for the theory according to which the coming of State implies the appearance of an aristocracy in relations of political domination and economic exploitation with the body of society.

The natural and dialectic link between economy and politics is demonstrated in the tendancy of the public authorities to keep constant and closer check on the national life in this light. This reality is obvious to-day and has even become an incontestated characteristic not to say a duty, of the modern States.

D. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The continual research of political philosophy on the subject can be resumed in the well known eternal questions :

1. What is the State ?
2. What is its aim ?
3. Which must be the best State ?

It would seem that Machiavel is the first to have used the term in its modern meaning (64). A precise definition of the phenomenon of the State is so much the more difficult that its reality shows from the origin in societies and covers almost all human history, as Deguit observes judiciously ; indeed, « *we are wasting our time, we will never find any difference in nature between the power of a chief of a horde, and that of a modern government composed of a chief of State, ministries and Houses... There is a difference of degree, not of nature* » (65).

Power fulfills in the human community the same function as intelligence or at least instinct in man and living beings ;

that is to say that it coexists and evolves with the social body.

Without it, there would indeed be no society at all because its vital role is « *to judge what is useful or harmful to the preservation of the society of which he is chief and to combat in order to cast aside the obstacles which run against this preservation* » (66).

In other words, power represents the conscience of the social body and it works as such in order to preserve its survival.

Having said this, a second difficulty lies in the plurality of points of view in defining the State depending on whether one considers it from the historical, economical, political, judicial point of view ; the political consideration that we take on now, being the most important. As a fully-fledged definition is hardly possible (nor is it even desirable), it is fitting to adopt another attitude ; it will consist of distinguishing different levels in the state entity : *material, judicial and moral*.

a) It has been said that the State was « a particular way of being of society » (67). It is a vague formula too closed up on itself.

b) The second definition throws more light : the State as *organising principle* of society. It takes in the advantage of not contradicting the primary characteristic of power, its contemporaneousness with the historical social milieu which shelters it ; it admits, in addition, the possibility of being enriched by the open perspectives it proposes.

The state organisation sets up a new *order* founded on *coordination and harmony* of all the elements : human, economic and territorial (68) which enter into the dynamic and changing composition of social formation. This last function shows clearly the fundamental feature of the State as an autonomous, distinct and superior power in comparison to the rest of the social body. This reasoning leads us to what is perhaps the best definition.

c) The State as « *an independant variable around which the*

totality of the social system is reorganised in each one of its aspects » (69).

d) Lastly, for certain theoreticians, the State « *is but an idea* » (C. de Malberg) (70). It exists only through the will power of man : « *The state is not a « natural » phenomenon like the clan, the tribe or the nation. It is constructed by human intelligence as an explanation and justification of the social fact that is political power. Its reality is merely conceptual* » (71).

If it is true that as a corollary of the state reality, a determined behavior in regard to the latter is needed from man so that this institution can work as it should, it is no less true to say that the phenomenon of the State finds, outside individual psychology, a material reality which leans for support on social order, itself upon the more general one, of nature.

1. AIM

The Greek thinkers were in the pursuit of a practical aim for the state institution, « *find out how to build a State and to live in it for the better* » (72).

Three conditions were required :

- . a high enough level of living,
- . the morality of the people,
- . an institutional organisation, allowing on a given territory, the carrying out economic and political independence.

Of course, the pragmatic construction of the state apparatus throughout history is far from dispelling the philosopher's worries of logic and humanism. It is however possible, in anticipating the historical development, to define the State as a social, human and rational milieu which is destined to ensure the internal and external security of each one, and to promote its free and full physical and intellectual blooming in an ordered and harmonious manner with the whole social group. But whatever the objective be, that we can assign to the state organisation of the community we could not be

unaware of the origin of the State, in at least a way that we can see it on the conceptual level. Without doubt it is the famous Rousseau, who on this subject expressed the most complete and rigorous expression as much on the reasons which brought man to form a political society than the finality pursued by him.

The new organisation had to bring together the advantages of the « state of nature » and those proposed by the new community, while reducing to a minimum the negative sides of both situation ; the *Contrat social* intervenes at a precise moment (not so much in time as in the order of reason) where the rupture of the primordial equilibrium puts the survival of man in danger. Taking therefore this condition as a hypothesis of work, Rousseau « *supposes men reached the point where the harmful obstacles to their preservation in the state of nature prevail over the forces that each one can use to keep himself in this state. So this primitive state can no longer subsist, and human kind would perish if it did not change its way of being* » (73).

As a consequence the goal of *le Contrat* will be to « *find a form of association which defends and protects by the force of the whole community, the person and the belongings of each associate, and by which each one uniting himself to all others obeys still himself and remains as free as before* » (74).

But this at goes well beyond practical necessities ; it creates a new social entity in whose existence is expressed the quintessence of *le Contrat social*. « *Each one of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will ; and we accept into the body each member as an integral part of the whole* » (75).

Le Contrat introduces a qualitative transformation not only into society but also and perhaps especially into the life of the individual, who, at this moment, discovers true liberty and the value of virtue. The passage from the state of nature to the civil status « *produces a remarkable change in man in*

substituting in his behaviour instinct by justice and in giving morality to his acts which they lacked beforehand » (76).

Indeed, man, who in his relation with his acts has up till now referred to his desires only, « *finds himself compelled to act on other principles, and listen to his reason before listening to his feelings* » (77).

And becoming clearly aware of this experience of radical change intervening in his view of things, he discovers that « *the impulsion of only appetite is slavery and that obedience to the law that one prescribes for oneself is liberty* » (78).

He pulls himself away, in this manner from his primitive state such as a « *stupid and restricted animal (to become) an intelligent being and a man* » (79).

3. How to build the best State ?

It is of course the crucial question for which there is no ready-made and definitive answer. At least, we can put forward some indications by way of elements of solution...

It is first of all an essential condition without which the State could not exist ; indeed, « *so that there may be a State, this power of constraint must be irresistible. I mean to say that it will only be a state power if inside the group it does not meet up with a rival power opposing it and preventing it from carrying out by force its will* » (Deguit) (80).

This will of monopoly of the public power has brought the State to wage a relentless struggle throughout history against the feudal system and the Church in order to conquer, at their cost, the whole of the power. Thus, in France, for example, monarchy progressively takes hold of the rights of the Seigniors : « *From 1484 to 1515, evolution marches on : the king ensures exclusive rights on tax, justice, army...* » (81).

In so far as the Church is concerned, the long secular duel between the temporal and spiritual powers ends in the law of 1905 which, in proclaiming the separation of the Church and the State, consecrates the final defeat of the former.

From this fundamental outstanding feature of public power comes the tendency forward the arbitrary domination of

the state institution and the abuses of governors who are acting in its name. But if the public power went to the limit of this tendency, it would end up suppressing which is at one and the same time its goal and the basis of its very existence : that is the common good of men and of the collectivity in which they live. It is for this reason that a wholesome mechanism of *auto-regulation* is developed in the breast of the state system ; that is to say an auto-limitation of the power through the respect of principles on which it is founded itself, and rules of rights concerning those governed whose liberty must only be submitted to restrictions when it proves necessary in order to ensure the safeguard of general welfare (82).

Thus the public power, this absolute sovereign which cannot « *impose upon itself any law that it cannot infringe* » (83), if it does not want to risk reducing itself to nothing, must however submit itself to rules so that its strength is used « *in a regular and uniform way* » (84).

In the social body as a whole ; and so that through this conformity to the laws it is deserving of respect and obedience in the eyes of the citizens.

But auto-regulation can operate in a permanent and successful manner only if one condition is respected : the separation of the three powers, legislative, executive and judiciary since only « *power checks power* ».

But this will not be enough to reach the goal sought after. It would be necessary to establish a balance of proportion between the different constitutive parts of the State : its greatness, its strength, its cohesion and its ease of movement, etc. ; indeed, « *as nature has given proportions to the stature of a well formed man, outside of which it makes only giants or dwarfs, so there must be, regarding the best state constitution, some bounds to its expansion, so it should be neither too large to be governed nor too small to maintain itself its existence.*

In each political body, there is a maximum limit of strength

that it cannot overstep and from which it moves away with growing. The more the social link spreads the more it slackens and in general a small State is proportionally stronger than a large one » (85).

Even if one cannot put forward seriously « *a defined relation on mathematical level between the territorial seize and the number of population adequate with each other* », it is none the less true that a « *strong healthy constitution* » (87) of the State implies a mathematical relation (variable by definition) between all the given data, be it geographical and demographic or social, legal and human in such a way as to, writes Rousseau : « *It would be necessary, so to speak, for a kingdom to spread or to tighten with each reign according to the capacity of the prince* » (88).

As for the best of governments, a universal formula valid for every nation does not exist but « *as many solutions as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative positions of people* » (89).

The work of the governors would thus consist more simply and solidly of determining for each people, taking into consideration of its own characteristics in time and space « *a particular system of what would be called the best* » for it (90) and that one can reach through reflection as the single real position of a given political society, since « *as there is only one proportional mean between each relation, then there is only good government possible in a State* » (91).

Having said this, and once the framework of its legal action is mapped out, the State should be able to exercise its supremacy on the collectivity in order to reach the goal which is its reason to be ; this brings us back to the biological conception of the social reality already spoken of in this document.

According to Rousseau, indeed, the constitution of political society by the *Contrat social* creates a living being who has « *his unity, his common me, his life and his will* » (92).

In this body, he identifies with « *the legislative power*

(which) is the heart beat of the State (and) the executive power (which) is its brain and gives movement to all its parts » (93).

Whereas the government carries out the « union of the body and soul » that is to say of society and the State.

From this situation, there will result for the public power a right which founds the exclusivity of the strength and power, the obedience toward it and assumed responsibility to attain its fixed objective.

Also « *if the State or the City is only a legal entity whose life consists of the union of its members, and if the most important care he has is his own preservation, he needs a universal and compulsive strength to propel and place each part in the most suitable way for the goal.*

As nature gives (to man) an absolute power over all his members, so does the social pact give an absolute power to the political body over all of its » (94).

In its terms the development of this tendency ends up in the situation whereby the modern State fills in « *all the social space » (95) taking in the whole social body in the network of its relations.*

Lastly, and if we consider power, law and tax (in other words : *physical strength, moral authority and means*) as defining the elements that constitute the state organisation and action, it is not possible to end this part without referring to the necessity and the role of the resources of the State. The tax returns form an indispensable income in the accomplishment of its mission. Tax allows the government to carry out its fruitful junction (one could say fertile) with the economic. Through this channel, public power invests itself with the necessary means to ensure the reglementation of the energy circulation through the social body ; in such a way that harmony can be set up between the volume, the rhythm of the flux and the needs of preservation and growth of social formation. It is this relation, changeable as all others, that link living realities are, which brings about fiscal law.

Given that man himself is the agent through which the generation of this energy takes place, the portion of the value created by him that he must yield and be transferred to the collective project, will no longer have as a consequence, the drying up of the source of this activity but on the contrary the stimulation through the protection of the human being and his property and in the framework of the safeguard of social equilibrium and the progress of the community. Here, in fact, we have the very meaning of tax with regard to the tax-payer, and consequently to society : the citizen gives a part of his own « *to have the safety of remainder, or to make pleasant use of it » (96).*

As a follow-up : « *there is nothing that wisdom and care should no longer settle, that this portion that is taken away, and the portion that is left to the subjects » (97) if we wish to maintain in the appropriate limits the political and social effects of the fiscal impact. These considerations should keep governors away from the easy and dangerous temptation of wanting to measure the income of the State on « *what the people must give » ; but if ever, adds Montesquieu, from a practical point of view, « it is measured on what the people can give, it must at least be what it can always give » (98) : to avoid the State having to prepare a budget that is uneven in its financial dispositions...**

4. THE POWER

A State without real power is no more real than a circle without radius.

The extent, the particular statute, the mode of production and legitimisation of this power make up the fundamental element, which with the *law* and *tax*, form the definition of the State. The remainder, that is to say, the administration and the institutions come from the material organisation needed through which public power demonstrates its existence socially, and which confers reality and efficiency to power. But this has not always been the form of power.

We can distinguish three stages in its historical development :

a) In what we named « the state of nature, where everyone was struggling with one another and *vice versa*, power was simply put down to physical strength ; strength coincided, became part of the *right*, of which it determined the extent in space and the duration in time. This situation made of each man, for himself, an « absolute sovereign » and potentially a submissive being who falls into a state of slavery just as soon as he ceases to be the strongest ; the purely contingent and transitory superiority creating neither right nor duty of recognized obedience for him.

b) In the chiefdoms the momentary right of command is given with regard to the personal physical and intellectual qualities of the candidate. But his election or his designation already represents progress compared to the previous situation where there is no focal point of power, ever temporary.

c) It is only with the coming of the State that a separation between the power and its holder is established. The procedure by which the power is physically detached from the body of he who uses it is *institutionalisation*. It confers to the public authority an independant existence regarding the hazards of human life and in the same way a continuity in its social function and its efficiency. So « *the institutionalisation of power is the legal operation by which the political power is transferred from the physical members of the government to an abstract entity : the State* » (99).

It is this procedure that founds the legitimacy of the power and the right of he who is to exercise it. According to Duverger, what is legitimate is « the power which conforms to the doctrine of the sovereignty that is admitted » in the society in question.

IV. THE AFRICAN STATE

Let us now resume in a few points the first results of a present research on this matter :

1. — The works of the eminent Cheik Anta Diop introduce a true revolution into the conception of the past and the role of Africa.

This new light brings to an end to a huge and monstrous falsification : it is no longer the history of Africa which is seen and commanded from Paris or London ; it is on the contrary the black continent which becomes, through a reversal of the historical meaning, the origin and the starting point of human evolution.

With « exhumed » proves whose authenticity and seriousness make them irresistibly convincing, the author of *The negro nations and culture* (100) upholds the Egypt was the cradle of the first human civilisation and that was of negro origin, contrary to all that was undertaken wittingly to « whiten » it.

According to Cheik Anta Diop, this civilisation blooms first of all in Sudan to then emigrate towards the north following the Nile valley where it attains its zenith and from where it radiates toward Asia and Europe.

His research leads him to discover the common roots between the Egypt of the pharaohs and the African people, whether it concerns the social organisation, philosophical and religious conceptions or the language. Only the taking into consideration of their common characteristics that we

meet nowhere else, will allow us access to a true understanding of Africa.

2. — One can distinguish three phases in the history of the black people of Africa :

a) First, leaving the region of the great lakes (oriental Africa) and following along the course of the « Great water » (the Nile), they settle in the valley where they become sedentary and devote themselves to an agricultural activity which is the basis of their evolution. From there they carry the flame of civilisation in the Middle-East, Arabia, India, in Europe and even America...

b) Then, and under the pressure of more and more foreign elements, attracted by the prosperity and brilliance of their civilisation, the black people come inside the continent and go to the west and the south of the south-north axis which marked their first itinerary. This migration, certain movements of which could be subsequent to the christian era, never let them forget their origins and that they came from the east : as we are taught by the organisation of their community, their traditions, their legends, their cultures and their art forms.

Up until the colonial conquest, the political organisation of the African society characterizes itself, in general by the existence of a constitutional monarchy where the king, elected, and assisted by a Council, was nothing of a despot as well as a deliberate misinterpretation of history tried to give a deformed picture ; whereas the democratic spirit and tolerance governed the social relation between members and groups comprising the community.

c) The colonial invasion brutally checks all evolution. It dissolves the economic, social and cultural structures, to establish domination, pillage and slavery.

3. — The colonial State presents two essential traits linked directly to its « mission » :

a) It is a matter, by definition of an imported and imposed State with the purpose of exploitation.

b) It is a matter, secondly, of a State of which the normal process of reciprocal integration and adaptation with the society is willfully destroyed so that the colonial administrative organisation does not contradict what represents its declared aim : a force of expression and exploitation which cannot be one with the submissive community.

4. — The *post-colonial State* springing directly from the previous one ; it carries in it the deep stigmas of its origin, and of its historical, national and international conditions, which surrounded or even organized its birth :

a) Firstly, the State rests upon a territorial basis which is badly cut out because of the arbitrary colonial dividing up, admitted in such a way by the O.U.A.

b) As a result, it artificially envelops people who are ethnically and culturally heterogenous, forming an unstable and precarious multinational social body.

c) It is given an institutional and legal organisation traced on a foreign pattern (capitalist or socialist) which cannot supply an appropriate framework where the life and the dynamism of African social formation can be reflected and expressed truly.


5. — It is for this reason that the post-colonial State is a *dependant* and *under-developed* State.

Such a State, threatened itself as an institution and whatsmore confronted by enormous, not to say insurmountable problems, will hardly contribute to the progress of the community.


This explains the violence, the last resort of those who govern and sign of weakness of the regime, in order to « keep quiet » the problems failing solving them...

The end result is that State and society because reciprocal disadaptation seem prisoner of one another and locked into the infernal cycle of protest (society) and repression (State) leading to a series of « coups d'Etat » which are as much attempts to get out of the deadlack but which are bound to fail and so bring back the same process and so on...


V. SOMALIA : CONFLICT STATE — TRIBES



A — First phase : the clans in their natural dispositions



B — Second phase : the advent of the State
The struggle of the clans against the State



C — The final phase :
The victory of the State and structural transformation of the social corps

A nation must be able to represent clearly its self image and that given back by the people amongst which it leads its existence ; this double-sided image of itself is the result of the historical development, of the intellectual level and the will of the inhabitants to know their own collectivity and international reality better.

National conscience develops and becomes richer with the positive assimilation of the history, and by analytic thought on its present state, and by opening onto human experience and the prospects for the future. It must even, in this respect, form within it a group who will devote itself to this vital work for its existence if we believe in what the profound Darwin says.

It must, in fact, supply the necessary theoretical effort allowing the events (in appearance) dispersed and chaotic to be integrated into an explanatory system which at the same time results in ways of action. The intellectual penetration of the phenomena means for man that invaluable advantage of reducing to a minimum the losses of energy and multiplying the possibilities.

1. — Here it is for the somali national collectivity, apart from the difficulties linked in general to the setting up of the State in Africa, the three fundamental problems the consequences of which map out directly its future existence :

- a) the dismemberment of the national ground,
- b) nomadism,
- c) and the conflict between the State and the tribes.

These three questions have naturally brought about diffe-

rent effects. We will not see all of them here.. We put aside the dislocation of the national entity even though up until now, it alone has absorbed the greatest part of the energy of our people, because it deserves a separate work.

In so far as nomadism is concerned, it used to be such an excellent way of surviving but to-day works like a load on the movement of social progress, like a checking effect in the diffusion of culture and technics : we have brought it up in a previous work which was of course, but a beginning (101) in a study that is always going on.

We will keep ourselves here to the State and the conflict which opposes it to these particular social groups which are clans. The solution to these problems implies an order of priority which does not necessarily correspond to the one of their importance or of their chronological succession. Thus the State-clan antagonism seems to us to be covering a decisive, determining meaning in so far as the evolution of the two others are concerned. This conflict between the state institution and the different parts of the community disperses and paralyzes through « fixed ideas » (in the psychoanalytic context) the capacity of intellectual production, practical activity and the normal working of the « nervous system (State) of the social body ».

The precarious situation of a State struggling for the freedom of the city in society and to win the control of the elements comprising the social formation can dispense of only very little time and very few men to fight under-development and follow up the national goals with all the strength, the steadfastness and regularity that are needed.

2. — Between the State, a rational system with a universal vocation and exclusive and closed-in tribal group, there is a total opposition. The strength and authority of one is inversely proportional to those of the other.

Of tribalism, it has been written « a group mentality » (102).

For the herdman of the tribe, his group is perceived as the largest, the best, the most illustrious if need be in arranging the genealogy in order to relate to an ancestor who satisfies the preoccupations of the clan.

Thus, « genealogies, the stakes of political and ideological struggles are signs of the status of the social groups which manipulate them constantly depending on their economic interests, their political and matrimonial alliances » (103).

In brief, each member of a tribe awards to his own, a certificate of superiority relegating all the orders to a position of inferiority not to say scorned upon. So, tribal psychology gives a false, passionate and illusionary image of reality. Considering the excesses to which it leads, it is possible to qualify the tribal ideology as « *harmful systems of view, propelling hatred as retentive as it is artificial, mistrust and unjustifiable hostility* » (104).

The conformism and the discipline imposed on tribal members put heavy pressure on « dissidents » particularly by the help of exodus towards the towns and of the ensuing endemic urban unemployment ; at the same time, this situation creates for the ambitious intellectuals the temptation of making use of the group as a political manoeuvring force. But on this matter experience shows us that « *no political man has ever succeeded to solve all the problems that his tribe can have. He simply relieves some and treats satisfactorily even less* » (105).

Tribal psychology undermines the foundations of the moral and administrative structures of the public power. Indeed, because of it and the disturbing facts to which it leads, « *people lose more and more the notion of justice and equity in convincing themselves that someone belonging to them must support them in the leading instances* » (106) which can, in certain cases bring institutions whose functioning is made erroneous, to pay into nepotism and corruption as a

logical follow-up of this abnormal behaviour of citizens. The consequences of this social situation have in turn an action on the tribal mentality and strengthens it : to the point what the intellectual life of the individual becomes one with the demands and political ideas of the group.

In fact, this cohesion of the clan covers rather the aspects of a gregarious instinct accentuated under the empire of fear, ignorance of history and nature of the social mechanism. It is against this massive retentive, blind and unconditional tribal resistance that the however costly and praiseworthy efforts of the young african States failed tragically in an effort to try to escape from under-development and dependance, as the president N'Guabi explains bitterly.

« But alas ! this bound forward was to be broken some years later by tribalism, this shame of our century, tribalism which drives children of the same country against one another, tribalism which leads inevitably to the cult of mediocrity, tribalism which brings one to consider even the most objective criticism as a demonstration of the « race for power », tribalism which kills objectivity » (107).

It is the very nature of the tribal group with its horizontal hierarchy, its backward and erroneous vision of the State and its anti-national behaviour which make of it a particular entity whose weakening and final destruction appear as the very condition of progress and stability of the social body. Indeed, *« the tribal formation, attached to its autonomy, sometimes living in autarchy, is in its principle of anti-state character » (108).*

For its followers the State *« was never considered as a finality but as a strategic cross-roads in the centre of inter-tribal relations, therefore a strong place to conquer » (109).*

For this reason, *« the process of destructurisation (...) is found at the centre of the State » (110).*

With the decline of the tribal power and, reciprocally the coming and the strengthening of the State the citizens will be

able to build together this supreme national unity, the only thing that assures its members in a continuous and satisfactory manner the material and moral advantages necessary for a decent human life. So *« the new man (...) will have to find in the nation the same guaranties that his ancestors found in the family and in the tribe » (111).*

3. — Alteration of the somali society

A) The somali society, for the most part pastoral is to-day in full change. To take the census of the causes of this evolution which is happening under our eyes, in a thorough manner is hardly possible in the limited framework of this work.

This would demand deep, patient pluridisciplinary studies, necessary to see clearly and measure the effect of the social phenomena taking place. We can at least attempt to point out the headlines.

The nomadic society, egalitarian and segmentary, is formed of independant unities in time and space, the collective solidarity working only in certain circumstances (dangers, etc.). Its body is marked out, according to the lineages, by large divisions that are subdivided in their turn and so on, in practically unlimited dividing up which stops only at the individual, the last link in the genealogical chain. These units and sub-units do not present articulation founded on permanent political or economic relations.

We indicated earlier that the clan identified itself to a group of more or less large families. Using terms belonging to chemistry, we can compare the family to the *atom*, and the family group to a *molecule*. The clan can thus be described as a *unity of molecules* (see diagrams).

The characteristic of such a unity is precisely its spatial mobility, its formal and structural instability, the inherent leaning to the dispersing of the constuating elements. (figure A).

B) The arrival of the modern State represents perhaps the most important event lived through by our national community in the last 25 years. It prevails on all the others : revolu-

tion, war, drought, etc., even though naturally it submits to their influence.

As a principle, different organisation and power, inexistent beforehand, demanding a place in social space, the State could barely avoid going into an inevitably conflicting relationship with the clans. We showed in the afore-going part of this serie that the clanic formation was a rudimentary state organisation, and as such assuming functions, intermittent admittedly that we to-day attribute to the State.

It in turn is brought to drawing arms against rival groups, that it aims to strip of all their advantages, to its own profit. The nature of the State is to monopolize the total control of the social body. It is even right there the *sine qua non* condition of its being and efficiency. As a consequent, it must submit the clanic or tribal forces which claim the right to what they consider an encroachment not to say an intrusion (figure B). It has been said the consolidation of the state structures and drawing back of the positions held by the clans are inversely proportional.

The very existence of the State implies their virtual, inevitable and effective death. This total antagonism of which the stake is all at the same economic and political social and cultural must, in the long term end up with the triumph of the State, the struggle of the tribal or clanic factions being indeed illegal, illicit, disorderly and contradictory, bound to fail.

For, in crinciple, there could never be conciliation but only temporary compromise.

This unshakeable conflict contains a double meaning : the ideological and political hostility developed by the traditional groups of society can be considered as *aprocess of rejection* with regard to the State ; from the latter's point of view, on the contrary, the necessary domination of the social body is seen to be doubled by a will of assimilation (figure C) to form an ambient environment to its own image by the structural destruction of the clanic or tribal units and the reorgani-

sation of their constitutive elements according to the norms of the new society.

This conflict, so marks out a *historical* stage essential for the economic and social development. We can apprehend it as *growing pains*, a necessary period of maturing and transformation at the end of which the national somali community will live the stability of a new social balance, allowing it to start upon a new era in its evolution.

c) Those who have the future in mind, will turn their attention enough to the beats, to the deep-rooted rhythm of our national life cannot but see the present modification of the great given factors which up till now act upon the movement of our community. Our to-morrow's society, which is being born, will be totally different to what is is to-day.

1. — Firstly because of the moving and redistribution (in global terms and in parts) of our population on the national territory. It will hardly be easy, to-morrow, to circumscribe a region designated to and recognized as belonging to a clan and where it (the clan) would claim the majority as to arrogate to itself exclusive rights upon it.

This phenomenon, whose consequences will cause deep repercussions on political life, is the obvious result of several factors : war drought, exodus to the towns, circumstances related to under-development but also to the struggle between the State and clanic formations spoken of above. There will be as a result a greater homogeneity lending to unity favourable to the action of the State and to social progress in the national stability and entente.

2. — Secondly, the traditional town-country balance is ruptured. The demographic swelling of the urban sector makes the country lose value and draws its inhabitants whose 70% used to live there and who feed the town. This as general as worrying phenomenon in the thrid world which presents those in change with serious problems, even insurmountable problems if they go beyond a certain point, effect directly the economic basis of the nation whose essential element was

animal husbandry. The decline of pastoral life (with the arrival « en masse » of the nomads to the towns, we must not overlook a relative regression in the level of political conscience on the part of the people, a normal, momentary regression which will be followed by a positive reaction in the direction of progress) — renders the development of other activities necessary, especially in agriculture and fisheries sectors which attract more and more manpower and capital, and seem, rightly so, to be the sectors of the future. A new dividing up of possibilities and capacities of production is set up, with all its implications, not only economic and commercial but also social, political and even international.

3. — Lastly, everyone is aware of the conflict between modernism and tradition, the present bubbling of ideas, the coming of the young generation, bearing new ideas and demands and who, on this point as on many others, are making the somali community change its way of thinking.

The putting into writing of the national language, which is prospering whatever the circumstances, this unpersihable gift (perhaps the greatest !) of the revolutionary regime to the somali people, has without doubt supplied the decisive factor of this cultural explosion where the richness and personality of our nation is so admirably expressed, as well as its contradiction and question on the future. The general result of all the causes is resumed in the *transfomation* (indispensible and current) of our society.

CONCLUSION

1. — This reminder, necessarily schematic, of human evolution enlightens us on both the positive and negative role of tribes-clans in the coming and the consolidation of the State.

As it is shown in the fundamental work of Lewis H. Morgan (*Archaic society*) of which the conception prolongs, on the social level, the vast and deep views of darwinism, the search for the origin of the State leads up, going back over the centuries, as far as the clanic, primitive and tribal institutions of humanity ; so that the present state institutions (Council, Assembly, President) « descend » so to speak from these forms of social organisation which brought them into being. We have said that the clan was an « embryonic State », where we already discerned the different functions which will be assumed, differentiated and developed later by the public power. The Chiefdom constituted a transitory stage between the clan and the modern State.

But at a certain moment, the positioning of new political structures had however to come into conflict with the traditional organisation of society ; underlining the *anti-state* character of tribes-clans and the necessity of their progressive destruction as a condition of the strengthening of the state power. The internal logic of the latter will bring to the elimination (or submission) of all rival authority in order to conquer the total control of the social body.

2. — Depending on where one stands different definitions are put forward ; we retain the one which designates the State as a « principle of organisation », like an « autonomous

variable » around which come into order all the elements, material and human, that comprise the collectivity.

In as much as, it demonstrates specific characteristics, which are exclusive to it and the essential parts of which are summarized below :

1) The State, is first and foremost a *power*. A legitimate one and accepted as such under certain conditions, defined and put into effect by the institutionalization procedure which aims to separate the power from the person of its holder.

This power is absolute inside and sovereign outside.

2) Though the State is distinct and superior to the social body, its mission is one with the general interest of the collectivity whose survival and prosperity it guarantees.

3) The State, whose power cannot sustain any rival power, is however submitted to a demand for auto-regulation which allows it to limit the arbitrary acts and any excesses in the public power : in order not to miss its aim, in being on contradictory terms with its reason of being : the physical and intellectual blooming of the citizens.

4) The State constitutes an indispensable mechanism to control the inevitable social conflicts within the compatible limits of the demands of life in community. For, in the absence of a respect of these norms and of the necessary balances that they imply, there would soon be neither society nor State.

5) Lastly, the sedentary state, the agricultural works needing irrigation and as a result the organisation, on a vast scale ; the resulting social differentiation and stratification seem to be the principal causes of the formation of the State.

3. — The comparison of the State to the nervous system of society, to a living being, seems pertinent to us and, to-day, generally accepted. In order to complete this analogy, let's add that the economic framework (the bone structure) take

the place of a *skeleton* and that the different institutions play the role of the *organs*. But, a living being :

1) goes through a well known cycle : birth, growth, reproduction, decline and death ;

2) has a genealogy which explains the parental relations which link him to other living beings with whom he shares common generic characteristics ;

3) ensures its existence by a *vital* synthesis of double contradicting movement : homogeneity of the *interior milieu* and, at the same time, structural and functional adaptation towards the outside milieu in constant state of change. It is only on this condition that he can survive ;

4) constitutes a *unity* whose ordered and hierarchical parts, subservient to the nervous system, hold complementary relations and reciprocal dependance and are driving at the same goal ; in such a way that any modification of an organ implies correspondent changes in others so as to conserve the vital balances and harmony of the whole from which come, in their turn, structure and morphology particular to the living being ;

5) carries a heritage : the one of the species recapitulated by the embryonic life (ontogenesis) and stocked on the genetic level and used (« treated ») during lifetime then transmitted to descendants.

These can be applied to social formation, prolonging of biology ; for this reason, it is governed by natural laws just as determined. But it is suitable to point out this important fact, belonging solely to society : the *cultural code* is added to the genetic code, it is entirely acquired by the individual during his lifetime and transmitted to each one, through education, by the community.

IV. THE AFRICAN STATE

The african State carries the stigmas of history. Of exogenous origin, it is ill-adapted to Africa realities ; it is neces-

rily under-developed and dependant, submerged by enormous problems and often driven back, as a wrong way out, to the internal cycle of violence.

But two fortunate events of a decisive nature come to soften this pessimism in projecting, through the humiliating drama of hunger, a light of hope on the horizon of the year 2 000.

1) The upheaval of the direction of history operated by Cheik Anto Diop in particular. Africa is no longer that dark and compact past, the indefinite of non-entity... It is becoming again what it was, the very source of *humanity* and *civilisation*...

2) The current movement of the african rebirth which will perhaps allow our continent to pull itself away from the Hell of absurd, chaos and suffering, at last.

V. As much by its newness and complexity as by its perspectives, our present national reality calls each one of us to reflect. For our society is right now in mutation ; that is to say in a period of gestation where the elements in movement have not yet got back to their respective positions to design the structure and the final form of the community.

This transformation is a sign of life, of dynamism. It demonstrates the will of adaptation of the social body to the new conditions of historical existence.

Nature and history, and we might say knowledge, comprise articulated and coherent wholes which allow their real meaning to come through only if they are recognized and grasped for what they are. This period of change renders necessary a theoretic and essential effort in order to clean up current phenomena and to seize them in their real meaning.

The present day transformation of our society seems to us, from this point of view, to be due to three orders of factors :

1) The causes which effect the nomad community in its economy, its social organisation and, as a result its relation with the urban centres ;

2) Those which are related to the general and reciprocal

adaptation process (state+society) such as those we have endeavoured to analyse in this study ;

3) Lastly the historical conflict between the State, as an institution and the clans.

The somali nation is dragging the resulting iniquity of colonial partition like a weight round its neck. But it will have the strength to carry this heavy load until the day that it can at last get rid of it for good.

It is for this reason that the present situation and the difficulties that come with it will not deter us from the essential, that is to say :

1) our hopes, our legitimate national ambitions, always the same ones : the unity and liberty of our people !

The somali nation may well have an undreamt-of future !
2) the deep upheaval, unprecedented in its size of our world to-day (the ageing of Europe and the decadence of the Occident, the rise of the Third World, etc.).

3) the *second* Africa awakening, the *rebirth*...

NOTES

- (1) Emile Durckheim : *De la division du travail social*, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1932, 2^e édition, p. 16.
- (2) We spoke of this problem in the first number of this series : *The Somali nation, I* ; Historical considerations and issues for the future, brochure, Paris, 1984.
- (3) Husseyn Nail : *L'idée de l'Etat chez les précurseurs de l'école sociologique française*, thèse, éditions Donat Montchrétien, Paris, 1936, p. 13.
- (4) Op. cit., p. 128.
- (5) Op. cit., p. 14.
- (6) Op. cit., p. 16.
- (7) Op. cit., p. 16.
- (8) Emile Durkheim : *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris, P.U.F., 1983, p. 81.
- (9) Emile Durkheim : *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 103.
- (10) Emile Durkheim, op. cit., p. 102.
- (11) Idem, p. 11.
- (12) Idem, p. 12.
- (13) Huseyn Nail, op. cit., p. 191.
- (14) Huseyn Nail, op. cit., p. 56.
- (15) Idem, p. 132.
- (16) Idem, p. 66.
- (17) Husseyn Nail, op. cit., p. 61.
- (18) Idem, p. 62.
- (19) Idem, p. 53.
- (20) Idem, p. 82.
- (21) Emile Durkheim, op. cit., p. 84.
- (22) Lewis H. Morgan : *La société archaïque*, éditions Anthropos, Paris, 1971, p. 64.
- (23) Idem, p. 112.
- (24) Idem, p. 303.
- (25) Idem, forward.
- (26) Idem, p. 123.
- (27) Idem, p. 123.
- (28) Montesquieu : *De l'esprit des lois, I*, Flammarion, Paris, 1979, p. 148.
- (29) Epigraph to *Contrat social*, J.-J. Rousseau.
- (30) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. 16.
- (31) Emile Durkheim : idem p. 100
- (32) Idem p. 109.
- (33) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. XL.
- (34) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. 149.
- (35) Idem.
- (36) J.-J. Rousseau : *Du contrat social*, Aubier, Paris, 1943, p. 61.

- (37) Lewis H. Morgan : *La Société archaïque*.
- (38) J.-J. Rousseau : *Du contrat social*, Flammarion, Paris, 1966, P. 42.
- (39) Sigmund Freud : *Totem et tabou*.
- (40) Timbal : *Cours d'histoire des sociétés politiques*, cours de droit, Paris, 1957, p. 58-59.
- (41) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. 157.
- (42) Elman R. Service : *Origin of state and civilization*, inc. New York, 1975, p. 93.
- (43) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. 125.
- (44) Lewis H. Morgan, op. cit., p. XXXI.
- (45) Timbal : op. cit., p. 77.
- (46) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p. 153.
- (47) Idem, p. 157.
- (48) Emile Durkheim : *De la division...*, p.3-4.
- (49) Elman R. Service : op. cit., p. 38.
- (50) G. Burdeau : *Traité de science politique*, tome II : *L'Etat*, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1949, p. 28.
- (51) F. Engels : *L'origine de la famille, de la propriété privée et de l'Etat*, Alfred Costers éd., Paris, 1931, p. 147.
- (52) F. Engels, op.cit., p. 132-133.
- (53) F. Engels, op. cit., p. 133.
- (54) Emile Durkheim : *De la division du travail social*, p. 158.
- (55) Idem, p. 159.
- (56) Lewis H. Morgan : *La société archaïque*.
- (57) Lewis H. Morgan, op. cit., p. 370-371.
- (58) See for more ample details Jean Deshayes : *Les civilisations de l'Orient ancien*, Artaud, Paris, 1969.
- (59) *Revue Internationale des Sciences sociales*, UNESCO, Paris, vol. XXXII (1980), N° 4, p. 705.
- (60) Idem.
- (61) Idem.
- (62) *Revue Internationale...*, p. 716.
- (63) Elman R. Service : *Origins of state*, p. XIV.
- (64) *Revue Internationale...*, p. 634.
- (65) See Jean Dabin : *Doctrine générale de l'Etat*, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1939, p. 5.
- (66) Timbal, op. cit., p. 20.
- (67) G. Burdeau, op. cit., p. 38.
- (68) Idem.
- (69) *Revue Internationale...*, p. 722.
- (70) See *Encyclopedia Universalis*, 1970.
- (71) Idem.
- (72) T. A. Sinclair : *Histoire de la pensée politique grecque*, Payot, Paris, 1953, p. 7.
- (73) J.-J. Rousseau : *Le Contrat social*, Flammarion, Paris, 1966, p. 50.
- (74) Idem.
- (75) Idem, p. 52.
- (76) Idem, p. 55.
- (77) Idem, p. 55.
- (78) Idem, p. 56.
- (79) Idem, p. 55.
- (80) See G. Burdeau, op. cit., p. 34.

- (81) Idem, p. 91.
- (82) See G. Burdeau, op. cit., p. 38.
- (83) J.-J. Rousseau : *le Contrat social*, p. 53.
- (84) A. Passerin d'Entreues : *La notion d'Etat*, éd. Siney, Paris, 1969, p. 7.
- (85) J.-J. Rousseau : *Du contrat social*, p. 83.
- (86) Idem, p. 89.
- (87) Idem, p. 85.
- (88) Idem, p. 114.
- (89) J.-J. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 123.
- (90) Idem, p. 89.
- (91) Idem, p. 99.
- (92) Idem, p. 52.
- (93) Idem, p. 129.
- (94) Idem, p. 68.
- (95) *Revue Internationale...*
- (96) Montesquieu : *De l'esprit...*, T. I, p. 355.
- (97) Idem, p. 355.
- (98) Idem, p. 355.
- (99) G. Burdeau, op. cit., p. 188.
- (100) Editions Présence africaine, Paris, 1956, 2 volumes.
- (101) See the *Somali nation II : Nomadism and technology*.
- (102) Lancine Sylla : *Tribalisme et parti unique en Afrique noire*, Université nationale de la Côte d'Ivoire, Presse de la Fondation des sciences politiques, 1977, p. 23.
- (103) Cahiers d'Etudes africaines, N° 87-88 : *Systèmes étatiques africains*, p. 490.
- (104) Joseph Mampouya : *Le tribalisme au Congo*, La Pensée universelle, Paris, 1983, p. 55.
- (105) Idem, p. 76.
- (106) Idem, p. 137.
- (107) Op. cit., p. 100.
- (108) Revue *L'homme et la société*, N°39-40, avril-mai-juin 1976 : *Structures tribales et formation de l'Etat dans le Maghreb médiéval*.
- (109) Idem, p. 272.
- (110) Idem, p. 276.
- (111) Charles Toupet : *La sédentarisation des nomades en Mauritanie centrale saharienne*, Thèse, Université de Paris VII, p. 344.