



CORSO DI DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN SCIENZE POLITICHE

XXIX CICLO DEL CORSO DI DOTTORATO

*National Political Cultures in a Transnational Arena.
European Citizens at the (Deliberative) Poll (®).*

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1. Introduction

The real world is looking for possible solutions to let the voice of the people be heard: politics is not listening to the citizens, humanity is ruled through governance and not elected governments, and so on.

If that is the case, then there should be tons of ideas ready to be shared by the global population, and every chance would be a good one to express them, honestly speaking.

But is this happening?

As far as these thoughts crossed my mind, I did observe the actual level of the relationships between the inhabitants of the places I have been through, with this constant question leading my reasoning: what if those words were not missing because of the absence of spaces where to pronounce them, but, instead, it was due to the unwillingness of the population to raise and listen to arguments?

Thus, whether it might sound oversimplifying, the main academic question beneath this dissertation is a basic and comprehensive one: does culture influence deliberation?

Since this is not a new kind of question, but the answers to it have not been thus far providing generalizable results, this work started with the aim of producing a more suitable environment for this question, in the meanwhile contributing to existing empirical research in the field, with three main targets.

First, existing studies on the subject have focused, empirically, on elite or citizen deliberation: by choosing to study citizen deliberation the purpose has been to complement a case study, EuroPolis 2009, a Deliberative Poll held in Bruxelles a week before the European Parliament Elections, with the transcription, analysis and coding of previously not analyzed existing data.

Another contribution has been in the operationalization of Cultural Theory, as elaborated by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky in 1990, at EU level, which has been elaborated following some recent studies on this

(Grendstad 1999, Chai et al. 2009), but adopting different surveys and different items for its production.

Finally, connected with the previous contribution, it has been attempted to approach the study of citizens' deliberation through a real cultural approach, theoretically grounded and empirically falsifiable: that has been a leading target, somehow more than the others, since previous studies on this relationship have usually been more cultural or more deliberative, never offering a complete consideration to both.

However, this study suffers some limitations in its potential results, due to previous analyses of 17 groups (out of 25) from the EuroPolis case study, ideally realized adopting the same methodology followed in the present work by two different research teams (University of Bern and Oslo) but with different approaches, with the former more quantitatively, and the latter more qualitatively oriented.

In this study, building on those previous experiences, published results, and on the new transcripts available, it has been chosen a mixed methods approach, since only 8 out of 25 groups would have been tested if not adopting an interpretive method to use all the existing work.

Another limitation deals with the issue of languages and quality of their interpretation/recording, since following a parsimonious trend in research, I did transcribe myself 12 out of 25 groups with English and Italian languages of the recordings, but the direct translation provided by the organizers did not sometimes allow a complete understanding of the audios, especially in the cases of "bridging translations" (meaning here when a participant had to be translated first in a main language, and then in a more particular one), or when some mothertongues spoke with a really strong dialect or accent.

Therefore, beyond other minimal limitations which will be pointed out throughout the whole work, the answers provided with this dissertation are the most accurate and inspiring possible.

Moreover, further in-depth studies on this are coming soon, with examples like the research from Steiner et al. in Colombia and Bosnia, where also videos are used to help the interpretation of the discussions.

Unfortunately, this solution was still not included in the design of the research in EuroPolis, but it does not mean the efforts to create such a huge event were not widely recognized, and there were not relevant echoes following that project: my interest in this research is an example of the valuable fruits of that project, a few years later.

2. Research Design

2.1 The Problem to Solve

The very first idea for conducting this research was developed starting with a consideration about the current state of my country's "civic education", and the underlying question was, at the time (2009), where had that been hiding in the previous twenty years of Italian history. How to deal with such a concept, and how to investigate it with the existing tools of political research: these rapidly became the further steps of the analysis.

When we discuss about a country's civic education, we are also probably concerned with its national political culture: this assumption derives from the necessary interdependence between the polity (elected or not) and the *polites* (electors or not) of our modern democracies, both of them responsible of the quality of their citizenship (even if at a different degree).

2.2 State of the Art

But, first of all, how do we measure the quality of a citizenship? Starting from this ideal question, one of the possibilities would be observing politicians at work in the Parliaments, or what people's talks are about in daily life and how do they communicate one another, as an example. A (probably) viable solution would be that of looking at ordinary citizens debating about issues related with political decision-making: that basically was the reasoning which showed me the road to follow in the subsequent steps of my preliminary research.

It was anyway an hard task, coming from party politics background in political science (as my master's thesis dealt with the Greek Socialist party and its role in the transition to democracy of the hellenic republic), but this was still helpful to connect my previous knowledge with my future field of research: by chance, actually PASOK leader George Papandreou, in 2006, was the first (and by far, the only one) who chose to adopt the Deliberative Poll method for selecting his party's candidate for the municipality of Marousi, in Athens¹.

Even though local election's results were not positive for the politician selected through this new primary election, this event focused my attention, informing my thoughts and paving the way onwards.

Thus my research went back to Athens, again, but in ancient times, reading through political theory to get to know how this method developed until our days, and this is what has been attempted to make clear through the literature review on deliberative democracy, the first concept that was necessary to operationalize: but since there is not, today, such an institution in the real world, there it came the need for designing something like that through academic and practitioner's work, a deliberative microcosm² where an ideal speech situation could be realized, and this get the present work to the choice of an empirical case study to be analyzed.

Leaving the deliberative issue aside for a moment, the problem of the civic culture of a country needs to be addressed: but how do we know if a population is civic?

Here the theory behind this question takes the debate back in the fifties/sixties of the twentieth century, when the political culture approach was developed through comparative survey research ³ : but notwithstanding the great importance of this field of studies, the research question did evolve, quite unpredictably at the beginning, towards a much more interdisciplinary approach, developed through anthropological and sociological patterns until it was welcomed in political science by the end

¹ For more on this, see Fishkin 2009: p. ...

² See Dahl on this: Democracy and its critics ...

³ Here the link with Almond and Verba's Civic Culture is clear, ...

of the century, then defined as Cultural Theory ⁴ and widely operationalized through various scholarships.

Making a step forward to reach the empirical level of this work, theoretically grounded from the beginning to the end, let me explain how these two literatures speak to each other in a very constructive way: even though I have been receiving a great number of advices to keep this work simple (and at least the overall research question is like that), there was no easier way to fill the gaps I aimed at, if not puzzling several scientific sectors and creating possible issues, that I will address afterwards.

Concerned with these eventual problems to overcome, the research of a reliable connection between the fields of culture and deliberation (where previous studies had failed to answer this empirical question ⁵), has brought me to widen my quest for better explanations, until this study on deliberation across the cultural divide came across my readings, an article published in September 2008 in the George Washington Law Review.

By means of this interpretation, whose aim was looking at the effects of culture on deliberation to eventually reconcile conflicting cultural orientations, the picture was completed, and the present work could finally move on.

2.3 Research Question and Hypotheses

Then it's time to address the main research question of my dissertation, which became more structured and, in a way, more nicely connecting previous and actual studies: “do national political cultures influence citizen's deliberation in a transnational environment?” (and if yes, how?)

Since this is a causal question, I will now proceed in describing the variables and their operationalization, before explaining the hypotheses generated by the theory: it must be noticed that this part of the work has

⁴ For more on the CT see chapter 3 on TEW, but also Mary Douglas previous work on symbolism.

⁵ For more details, see the Chapter 4 with the Theoretical Framework.

taken a bit more time than originally expected, due to several factors later pointed out.

Dependent variable - EuroPolis Deliberative Poll® is the transnational environment in which a citizen's deliberation took place in May 2009, where 348 participants coming from 27 European countries debated about specific issues: even if there were two topics of discussion, third country migration and climate change, the focus has been just on the first one, for project-related reasons that will be explained later.

The operationalization has been made through quantitative content analysis coding, through the Discourse Quality Index developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003), later modified for being adequate in measuring citizen deliberations (see Appendix for coding scheme), for the qualitative data collected during the event by recording small groups discussions: the languages of the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll® were five (English, French, German, Italian and Polish), and my transcriptions regarded the English and Italian groups, whereas the others have been transcribed by researchers from the University of Bern (see Gerber 2014, 2016).

Independent variable - National political cultures have been built with data collected from an existing survey, the 4th wave of the European Value Study, where all of the 27 countries were part of it; four items have been selected for this purpose, following the Cultural Theory approach early operationalized by a number of studies with a similar intention (see Grendstad 1990): v7 (how often discuss politics with friends), v156 (duty towards society to have children), v157 (people should decide themselves to have children), v186 (how interested are you in politics).

The operationalization has been made through polychoric correlation and factor analysis, using the mean values from the survey data, thus building factor scores and elaborating a map of European cultures which follow the grid and group dimensions of the theory.

Hypotheses – Referring to the framework considered in the following chapters, internal and external hypotheses were generated, to be tested through quantitative, qualitative and interpretive methods, depending on the different data generated and adopted to this aim.

These are the four hypotheses developed for answering the overall research question:

H1 – Fatalist countries, in groups where their language is only translated and the composition puts them in minority, will not or minimally raise questions.

H2 – Hierarchical countries, whatever the topics discussed, will not propose constructive politics.

H3 – Egalitarian countries, with no regard to group composition, will be less respectful with out-groups than their group average.

H4 – Individualist countries, with any given language and group composition, will score averagely high in level of justification.

2.4 Data

EVS 2008: 40465 respondents from 27 EU countries in the 4th wave.

The units of analysis in EVS are the European countries (Minkov and Hofstede, 2014), operationalized through their average scores.

EuroPolis: 348 participants from 27 EU countries selected as a stratified sample proportional with each member state's MEP.

The units of analysis in EuroPolis are the speech acts, aggregated to get the country average results.

For a description of the samples, see the Data chapter.

2.5 Methods

Not the first case of mixed methodologies adopted (Bobbio 2013 pp. 364-5, Gerber 2014, 2016), but the first time to investigate the complete set of

small groups of a DP: this is, empirically speaking, the first big achievement of the present research.

Preliminary step of the data generating process (DGP) was to collect the audio files from the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll® held in Bruxelles in May 2009, and then a transcription of more than 40 hours of recordings (Italian and British languages), coming from 12 of 25 small groups of discussion in the transnational event, has been realized, between the 25th of February and the 25th of April 2016, while I was in Zurich as a visiting PhD student at the Chair of Political Methodology by Marco R. Steenbergen.

Then the coding from the small group discussions has been executed based on the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al., 2003) updated (DQI2), that allows for a quantitative content analysis at the level of individual speeches of recorded discussions, measuring the quality of deliberation with indicators anchored in Habermasian discourse ethics (justification rationality, common good orientation, respect and interactivity, questioning and story-telling).

By means of the same method, previous analysis was conducted, and that is why my data do now complete it: with intercoder reliability tests (Standardized Alpha, Spearman Correlation Coefficient, RCA and Cohen's Kappa) the accordance is being verified⁶.

Analysis of the survey data was made with the software R⁷, using packages provided by the developers, for the polychoric correlation and the principal component factor analysis, necessary to reach the goal of creating a map of cultural orientations in EUrope.

The syntax is available upon request, while the results are part of the first section of the empirical chapter.

Last, but most important for the expected result of this research, is the interpretive method to basically recognize what to expect from the dimensions developed through the previous analyses (see the table in 7.3):

⁶ I would like to acknowledge Marlène Gerber and thank her for the incredible help in doing this, and of course the eventual mistakes in this work are only belonging to me.

⁷ R is a free statistical software, whose number of users is constantly growing for the possibilities it offers, and of course its gratuity, compared with SPSS and STATA;

explanation of the process is due, what it can be said in this part refers to the fact that it is one of the contributions to the existing research which has been done through this dissertation, even if the judgement of the results will remain for the peers' evaluations.

3. Literature Review

3.1 Deliberative Democracy: from normative theory, and through its (various) empirical applications, towards a systemic approach.

3.1.1 An Introduction to the Field: Terminology and Concept

Interdisciplinarity sounds like a useful and comprehensive way to frame what this very debated object of study represents: not only because of, clearly, the many different scholarships contributing to its birth and development, but also in the light of its actual achievements and future agenda.

Thus, the attempt to figure out an established definition of deliberative democracy, with the number of scholars and their works (even those still forthcoming⁸), does represent a compelling task: nonetheless, it is necessary to set the limits (but not the limitation) of this field of research through a reasoned but critical review of the existing literature.

As a necessary step before “getting into details”, the term *deliberation* needs a proper clarification, since its meaning is not worldwide accepted as a unique one: italian language, as a concrete (and experienced) example, refers to it as the decision following a discussion, or as a personal evaluation of pros and cons of a situation, whereas the english language mostly identifies it with the weighed exchange of arguments which precedes a choice. Extremely simplifying this important difference among them, in Italy a deliberation is the act, and not the procedure, of

⁸ A sincere acknowledgment to Juerg Steiner, to let me read his forthcoming work a few months earlier than available for the general audience.

taking a decision: by means of this, we may observe how the stress is moving between the plurality and centrality of the discussion, on the one hand, and the final and particular decision (produced by a previous discussion), on the other hand.

Considering various definitions of deliberative democracy⁹, all of them agree “*that the notion includes collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also, all agree that it includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part*” (Elster 1998: 8).

For a better conceptualization, the principles, characteristics and purposes of deliberative democracy, adopting writings coming from the main three disciplines (political philosophy, political science and constitutional law) dealing with deliberative democratic theory¹⁰, do follow.

Accordingly, deliberative democracy has two guiding principles that rule public decisions’ process: a public discussion with a deliberative procedure (exchange of reasoned information and arguments) and the participation of all those potentially interested in the decision deliberated. While the first principle clearly distinguishes this procedure from the voting and bargaining ones (mainly belonging to representative democracy), the second one points at widening as much as possible the participation in the process in open contrast with the actual parliamentary representatives’ number.

Moving to an explanation of the characteristics of a deliberative democracy, the most important one is its reason-giving requirement, in such a way that *reasons are meant both to produce a justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual respect* (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:

⁹ Not the most proper place to talk about the dispute between Rawls and Habermas, but it must be said they are not so far apart as the contrast suggests: in Rawlsian idea of *reflective equilibrium* and Habermasian *ideal speech situation* there seems to be a common core about political choice, that must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, equal, and rational agents, to be legitimate (Elster 1998: 5).

¹⁰ Even though the theories of deliberative democracy mainly adopt methods belonging to political philosophy and political science, their contact is the democratic system, studied from both deliberative theories and constitutional law (Bifulco 2011: 272).

4); another requirement is the accessibility, to all the citizens involved in the process, of the reasons given, with a double meaning of their exposition in a public place and the chance to understand their essential content; a third characteristic is the production of *a decision that is binding for some period of time* (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 5), undoubtedly connected with the last one, the dynamicity of the process, in view of the fact that after a decision is made following a deliberation, it is still *provisional in the sense that it must be open to challenge at some point in the future* (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 6).

Finally, to reach its general aspiration, that is providing *the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics* (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10), four purposes are served by deliberative democracy: promoting the legitimacy of collective decisions; encouraging public-spirited perspectives on public issues; promoting mutually respectful processes of decision-making; correcting the mistakes citizens and officials make when they take collective actions.

Therefore, it is not enough that everyone has an equal right to influence the decisions - for example, limiting itself to only exercise voting rights - it is also required that every vote is preceded and followed by a public discussion and open to participation. And this not only in the sense, relatively little controversial¹¹, that the addition of a reasonable discussion is preferable to sole voting, but advancing the stronger claim that the decision is conclusive in itself – it is still to discuss whether, and to what sense only necessary or sufficient - to legitimize democratic politics.

Not only limited to the purely legislative, deliberative democracy includes divergent ideas, different to the point that, rather than a single 'theory', you must speak rather of a "deliberative approach". In other words, these theories are plural, sometimes closely intertwined, in other cases more weakly connected through "family resemblances": definitely a network of direct and indirect influences, not always linear, whose reconstruction will be among the main objectives of this thesis, and

¹¹ See also: J. D. Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

though the influence of deliberative democracy is not limited to this single area. Although beyond the deliberative approach normative political theory is not as much prominent, there is now a huge amount of political science and social sciences studies that variously employ, either descriptively and through its empirical application, the concept of deliberation. An accurate count would not be very significant, partly because of the difficulty of cataloguing, but it is even likely that, in numerical terms, empirical studies have already surpassed those regulations.

The problem is not only on descriptive judgments, perhaps purely technical, about the functioning of contemporary democracy, but their different concepts of practical-political rationality. Therefore, to better understand the sense of the deliberative approach to democracy there will be a need to contrast it with the widespread tendency to obscure, in political and philosophical thought in general, not only in the strictly scientific and empirical analysis, the importance of the normative dimension. It is therefore in the context of reaction against the many different anti-regulatory bodies that have covered political studies (a reaction mainly exemplified through the works of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls) that it is possible to better understand the emergence and success of the deliberative approach to democracy.

3.1.2 Who Made Who? The Inspiring Fathers

It has been debated whom to quote for introducing the expression *deliberative democracy*, but to avoid going back in time until Aristotle, the first modern author, following some recent scholars' research on the historical development of the studies on deliberative democracy (Bohman and Rehg 1997, Bohman 1998, Dryzek 2000, Gastil and Keith 2005, Sintomer and Talpin 2011, Mansbridge et al. 2012), with whom the contemporary democratic thought started to face this theoretical model was Joseph Bessette's (1980) research on the United States constitution and democracy.

Following this classification, there it comes the need for a focus on those who introduced the normative debate back into the theoretical debate.

Thus, it is almost impossible to find a book of philosophy or political theory published in English in the last decades of the twentieth century whose preface does not have a grateful acknowledgment to John Rawls for having brought into play (in 1971, with *A Theory of Justice*) an attitude toward regulatory bluntly political issues, at a time when the same moral philosophy, to the extent that survived as an object of study in itself, was likely to be reduced, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, to a utilitarianism closely akin to the most popular anti-regulatory trends previously mentioned. Subsequently, starting from the lessons of the eighties, then merged in Political Liberalism, Rawls has placed at the center of the debate the question of the "fact of pluralism", that will become a central motif of deliberative democracy.

The influence of Rawls' work¹² was so wide that, just less than twenty years after *A Theory of Justice*, an introduction to political philosophy could be devoted almost entirely to moral issues.

Moving to the influence of Habermas, it was just as great, and his intent even more ambitious given that crossed multiple disciplines. Its roots were to be found in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, proposing to revise the practical reason in an inter-subjective way, in the framework of an overall restructuring of the theoretical forms of rational discourse.

Habermas anchored the validity of political principles in ordinary language communication: consequently, perhaps more than any other contemporary thinker, Habermas has undertaken a direct debate with the skeptics and anti-regulatory thoughts, wherever they were, from theoretical philosophy to sociology. It is at the culmination of this long and difficult discussion that the idea of "deliberative politics" becomes the

¹² For Rawls, see: S. Freeman, *Rawls*, New York: Routledge, 2007; S. Maffettone, *Rawls: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.

keystone of a democratic theory of the state of law that intends to represent the fulfillment of the conception of communicative rationality¹³.

Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that deliberative democracy will fully share the communicative conception of rationality, nor that Habermas' diagnosis about modernity is an unfinished project; in fact, these positions are sometimes contradicted in studies of deliberation.

Deliberative democracy is to be interpreted as part of the return - which Rawls and Habermas have been the main standard-bearers, but certainly not the only ones - to the classic themes of democratic theory, such as Enlightenment, and even before Liberal Contractualism and Republicanism. Unlike the greater part of modern philosophy, however, deliberative democracy does not intend to place the will of a single person (individual, collective, historical and/or spiritual) at the center of politics, and of practical reason in general, but it tend to replace it precisely with the intersubjective practices of deliberation. Unfortunately, to go beyond the formula and explain what that means is not easy, since the concept that deliberative democracy has itself looks anything but unique, sometimes even contradictory, as it will be clearer through this work.

3.1.3 Deliberation vs. Participation? An Interesting Relationship

Before getting into the theoretical development, it appears necessary to give an overlook at an important argument of analysis, offering significant contributions from various scholars, whose roots may be found in an ongoing debate still worth to be explored (with any useful method of research, if possible): the relationship between participatory and deliberative theories of democracy.

Different approaches deal with this existing divide or evolution, and the present section will attempt to present some of them, mostly

¹³ J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*. In this work from 1992 (german version) he adopts the definition "deliberative democracy", but his older positions were already considered by the authors elaborating this concept in the previous years.

comprehensive of this aspect of the research: the evolutionary, the cultural and the terminological divide.

Participatory democracy, which was a prominent model of democratic thought in the 1960s and 70s, has been widely regarded as effectively incorporated, and improved, by deliberative theory. Goodin, for instance, declares that “Deliberative democrats tend to be participatory democrats, too.”¹⁴ Thompson claims “the turn toward deliberative theory has not displaced participatory theory (...) Rather than transcending participatory theory, many deliberative democrats see themselves as extending it.”¹⁵ Archon Fung sees a similar focus on the public good in the two theories: “participatory democrats have long claimed that deliberative arenas function as schools of democracy where individuals acquire the skills of citizenship and come to consider public interests more highly in their own preferences and dispositions”¹⁶; Fung and Erik Olin Wright also describe deliberative democracy as “participatory democratic regeneration.”¹⁷ And for Denise Vitale, both participatory and deliberative democracy seek “to re-absorb citizens into public debate and political processes by means of participation and public deliberation,” but deliberative theory represents an advance because “defendants of participatory democracy fail (...) to take the next step of guaranteeing these processes through legal institutionalization,” whereas “deliberative democracy supports the implementation of forms of direct democracy that are defended by the theorists of participatory democracy.”¹⁸

Dissenting views against this prevalent depiction of the deliberative-participatory connection are provided by Emily Hauptmann, who argues that deliberative theory does not aim at the same type of social and political transformation as participatory theory¹⁹; and by Carole Pateman,

¹⁴ Robert Goodin, *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 266.

¹⁵ Thompson, “Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science”, 511-512.

¹⁶ Archon Fung, “Minipublics: Deliberative Designs and Their Consequences”, in *Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern?*, ed. Shawn Rosenberg (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 169.

¹⁷ Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, “Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance”, in *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, eds. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (New York: Verso, 2003), 40.

¹⁸ Denise Vitale, “Between Deliberative and Participatory Democracy: A Contribution on Habermas”, *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32, no. 6 (2006): 753-754.

¹⁹ Emily Hauptmann, “Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats’ Critique of Participatory Democracy”, *Polity* 33, no. 3 (2001): 397-421.

who challenges the notion that upholding deliberative reason-giving within deliberative forums is a sufficient basis for a theory of democracy, rather than just of deliberation.²⁰

The theory of participatory democracy has been outlined most fully by Pateman and C.B. Macpherson. Pateman explains that “The theory of participatory democracy is built around the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another.”²¹

The institutions referred to here are not political institutions alone, for the way in which individuals experience the structures of power in the broader society cannot but influence their capacity to exercise an effect on distinctly political decision-making structures: “democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed.”²² Pateman thus emphasizes the importance of “a participatory society,” and of recognizing that encouraging “the participatory process in non-governmental authority structures requires (...) that the structures should be democratized (...)”²³ She places particular focus on the workplace as an example of such a structure, and provides empirical evidence for the claim that “the development of a sense of political efficacy does appear to depend on whether [an individual’s] work situation allows him any scope to participate in decision-making.”²⁴ She further notes how this workplace of democratization requires concurrent pursuit of “the substantive measure of economic equality required to give the individual the independence and security necessary for (equal) participation.”²⁵ And, she stresses that the point here is not to conceive of how such democratization can be perfectly achieved, but to take present circumstances into account and “modify (...) authority structures in a democratic direction.”²⁶

More recently, Pateman has reaffirmed these participatory tenets, stating that participatory democracy “is about changes that will make our

²⁰ Carole Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited”, *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 1 (2012): 8, 10.

²¹ Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 42.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, 20, 45.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

own social and political life more democratic, that will provide opportunities for individuals to participate in decision-making in their everyday lives as well as in the wider political system,” and that we must focus on “making substantive steps towards creating a participatory democracy (...)”²⁷

Quite similarly, Macpherson identifies participatory democracy with the understanding “that the workability of any political system depends largely on how all the other institutions, social and economic, have shaped, or might shape, the people with whom and by whom the political system must operate.”²⁸

He points to social inequality as the root of much of the apathy we see within modern citizenries, because those who are socially disadvantaged know they must exercise far greater effort than the well-off to have an effect on political processes, and, like Pateman, he highlights the democratization of work relations as a crucial step toward reducing exclusive control of the political system by powerful interests.²⁹ Ultimately, he reasons that we cannot have anything approaching a democratic politics without both “a great reduction of the present social and economic inequality,” and “a change in people’s consciousness” from primarily seeing themselves as isolated consumers in a market and toward recognizing their interdependency with others.³⁰

He also realizes, though, that “it is unlikely that either of these prerequisite changes could be effected without a great deal of more democratic participation than there is now...Hence the vicious circle: we cannot achieve more democratic participation without a prior change in social inequality and in consciousness, but we cannot achieve the changes in social inequality and consciousness without a prior increase in democratic participation.”³¹

For a solution, he describes a process in which a democratic change in either the social or political dimension of this vicious circle will affect the other dimension, imagining “an incomplete change in one [dimension] leading to some change in the other, leading to more change in the first,

²⁷ Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited”, 10, 15.

²⁸ C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 88, 103-104.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 100.

and so on (...) we needn't expect one of the changes to be complete before the other can begin"; he further explains how "we may look for loopholes anywhere in the circle, that is, for changes already visible or in prospect either in the amount of democratic participation or in social inequality or consumer consciousness."³²

And, again like Pateman, Macpherson rejects the attempt to "simply try to draw mechanical blue-prints of the proposed political system," and instead focuses on the movement in the direction of participatory ideals by asking "what roadblocks have to be removed, i.e. what changes in our present society and the now prevailing ideology" are necessary to further democratize political and non-political authority structures.³³

For other thinkers who belong to the participatory tradition, emphasis is again placed on the idea of participatory democracy as an ideal which is never fully achieved, but which gives us guidelines toward which to strive. Jack Walker depicts participatory theory as providing "an outline, a set of prescriptions for the ideal polity which men should strive to create," and he points to "broadly based social movements" as appropriate means for producing significant political, social, and economic change.³⁴ Arnold Kaufman equates the claim that substantial democratization is "unrealistic" with an attempt "to describe the fixed frame of human potentiality," and argues we should instead "assume that remedial action is always possible."³⁵

Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes similarly note the hubris involved in presuming "the obstacles to [participatory theory's] realization are irremovable."³⁶

While deliberation may be an available method for democratizing authority structures and for overcoming social and economic inequalities, participatory theory does not commit to such reason-giving as though this practice were necessarily equivalent to democratization. When deliberative thinkers like Bohman, Knight, and Johnson insist on the reduction of social and economic inequality, or on a policy such as public

³² Ibid., 101.

³³ Ibid., 98-99.

³⁴ Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy", *American Political Science Review* 60, no. 2 (1966): 289, 293, 294.

³⁵ Arnold Kaufman, "Human Nature and Participatory Democracy", in *The Bias of Pluralism*, ed. William Connolly (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 194.

³⁶ Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, "The New Democracy", *Political Studies* XI, no. 2 (1963): 166.

financing of campaigns³⁷, they unwittingly hit on an important anti-deliberative point: under conditions of structural inequality, we move in the direction of democracy by taking steps toward overcoming that inequality, not by instituting a deliberative process with an indeterminate outcome. As Pateman explains, participatory democracy works toward allowing individuals “to exercise the maximum amount of control over their own lives and environment (...)”³⁸ Participatory theory focuses on remedying present threats to individual self-government, and locates threats within broader social relations as well as political institutions. We are to then take advantage of available opportunities to either reduce social inequality or combat the exclusive control of government by powerful interests, for a democratic change in one realm may help produce democratic effects in the other realm. And, participatory democracy makes room for this democratic progression to proceed through methods and practices other than deliberative reason-giving. Participatory democracy continuously pursues democracy, rather than continuously pursuing deliberation. Deliberative theory, therefore, cannot subsume participatory theory by primarily advocating the practice of deliberative reason-giving under circumstances of evident structural inequality.

Concluding with some aspects coming from noticeable Italian debate on this relationship, it appears necessary to focus on Gbipki (2005) and Floridia (2015, 2017 forthcoming): while they move through different approaches, such as a theoretical but empirical based for the former, and a completely philosophical for the latter, they keep questioning on this eventually evolutionary theory/transitional phase of the participatory and deliberative theories.

But whereas Gbikpi concludes his article with a concrete and positive answer on this evolution occurred, still Floridia, whose essay treats Barber and Mansbridge works in order to answer the question, leaves the reader without a clear answer.

³⁷ Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, 133; Knight and Johnson, “What Sort of Political Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?”, 294.

³⁸ Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, 43.

3.1.4 Theorizing Deliberation. Birth, Evolution and Growth

This section deals with an exposure of deliberative theories' development since the very beginning, by means of a mixed divide, both chronological and generational, with this evolution leading to the present "fourth generation of deliberative democracy": although *(t)here are indeed considerable overlaps between the different generations, and as new generations emerge, this does not mean that previous generations become redundant* (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016: 141).

3.1.4.1 In Search of a Definition

The first generation deals with works originated in different theoretical contexts, converging on the concept from different points of departure, before its widest diffusion in the following period, where a common terminology is (mostly) agreed.

The first contributions in which 'deliberative democracy' does appear as a term do originate from the area of the American republicanism. Those essays are included in the endless hermeneutical debate on the constitution of the United States, thus introducing a deliberative reading key. Those writings are particularly characterized with two elements, typical of the republicanism: the emphasis on representation against direct participation and the interest for the juridical dimension of deliberation, with particular respect to the role of the Supreme court. Besides this, the attention is on the concrete applicability of the theories, not in the sense of an empirical experimentation, which will follow almost a decade later, but rather focused on the institutional structures: this is a characteristic theme of deliberative democracy, and it is particularly evident in this seam³⁹.

³⁹ See also: J. Uhr, *Deliberative Democracy in Australia*; C. R. Sunstein, *A cosa servono le costituzioni*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2009. For the critics on the closeness of philosophical and practical-political

The article by Bessette⁴⁰ does limit his discussion on the democratic character of the constitution, but there are already themes that will be central for the deliberative theory, together with others that will stay particularly influential among the authors republicanism-oriented. The center of the reasoning of Bessette is found, in fact, in the cognitive value attributed to the deliberation, founded upon the representation, coherently with the republican inspiration, contrasted to the thoughtless and wavy direct dominion of the majority, that would end up betraying the real wish of the citizens, if only they were sufficiently informed and they had available the necessary time to discuss and to weigh every matter, a counterfactual argument that will cross in full the development of the deliberative theories, in different forms.

Thus, the government of a "deliberative majority", would allow the best realization of the democracy really in the sense of the correspondence among the wish of the people and the decisions collectively assumed. Shortly, Bessette doesn't also miss even to put to contrast his own interpretation with those which, not gathering the deliberative aspect of the constitution, do merely sustain a privatistic conception of the composition of the individual affairs through negotiations and bargainings, limiting the role of the citizens only to the choice of the representatives. Still not too deepened, the principal divergences between deliberative democracy and the aggregative approaches are already enough stated.

Cass Sunstein relaunches the value of the deliberation through the interlacement between politics and ethic, within a more technical-juridical interpretation: in the essay devoted to sustain that the intent to dismantle the danger constituted by expressing the "naked preferences", through the mechanisms favoring public deliberation, can be the key for an unitary interpretation of the constitution⁴¹.

This position is taken back and deepened, on the threefold plan of the historical (the debate between federalists and anti-federalists) references, of the legal (to justification of a role relatively interventista of

themes, see: D. Estlund, *Democratic Authority*, cap. 1.

⁴⁰ J. M. Bessette, "Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government," p. 104.

⁴¹ C. R. Sunstein, "Naked Preferences and the Constitution", *Columbia Law Review* 84, no. 7 (1984): 1689-732.

the judicial power) doctrine and of the critic against the pluralistic approaches (against Dahl and the conceptions interest-based)⁴², in an extensive article, one year later, devoted to the discussion of the role of the interest groups in the American public law⁴³, that for many verses, in spite of the apparent technicality of the object, represents still one among the best exposures of the republican approach to the deliberation.

A point of view subsequently confirmed, within a broader resumption of the republicanism, put into comparison with the pluralist, liberal and radical-identitaries theories, in a robust 1988 essay⁴⁴, where the deliberation is the first principle of the republicanism, allowing besides to interpret it in such a way to be consistent with the best of the liberal values, paying particular respect to the recognition of pluralism.

In the second part of this article, devoted to the practical development of the theoretical principles previously expressed, the appreciation of the proportional electoral system stands with the deliberation through the matter of the representation of the social groups⁴⁵, a theme that will be later object of a wider debate⁴⁶.

The republican perspective, however, misses to deal with the cognitive and moral value of the deliberation, something that is not easily avoidable. The risk is that the discourse starts from the position that the deliberation is useful for politics, but this binding affirmation is not yet justified or philosophically founded.

The interlacement of the two validity claims of deliberation, the ethical and the cognitive one, was only able to happen regarding the

⁴² See Dahl's critics to US Constitution: R. A. Dahl, *Quanto è democratica la costituzione americana*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2003.

⁴³ C. R. Sunstein, "Interest groups in American public law", *Stanford Law Review* 38 (1985): 29-87.

⁴⁴ C. R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival", *The Yale Law Journal* 97, no. 8 (1988): 1539-90. A similar approach is adopted by Sunstein about the juridical interpretation, clearly relevant from a deliberative perspective. For this, see: C. R. Sunstein, "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State", *Harvard Law Review* 103, no. 2 (1989): 405-508. Another relevant book on republicanism from those years is: F. Michelman, "Law's Republic", *Yale Law Journal* 97 (1988): 1493-537.

⁴⁵ See C. R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival,"

⁴⁶ I. M. Young, "Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy"; J. M. Valadez, *Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self-Determination in Multicultural Society*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001; J. Bohman, "Reflexive public deliberation: Democracy and the limits of pluralism", *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 29, no. 1 (2003): 85-105; M. R. James, *Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity*; M. Falbo, "On Iris Young's subject of inclusion: Rethinking political inclusion", *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 34, no. 9 (2008): 963-86.

transformation of the individual preferences, principal point of distinction in comparison to the aggregative theories.

The first contributions expressly centered on this theme do originate from Jon Elster, representing a deliberative orientations similar to what may be considered as "standard."

Four years before the most known *The Market and the Forum*⁴⁷, is in the brief fifth paragraph of the first chapter of a book devoted to the problems of the collective rationality that the affirmation of the democratic value of the deliberation is found⁴⁸.

The preferences of the citizens may not be considered exogeneous in comparison to the political trial, their moral and rational content is not indifferent for the political theory, but they cannot even be censored in an heteronomous way; rather, to integrate the appeal of the autonomy with that of the ethical and cognitive validity of the collective choices: (...) *central interest of politics should be the transformation of the preferences, rather than their aggregation. Based on this conception, core of the political trial is the public and rational discussion of the common good, not the isolated exercise of the vote according to private preferences.*⁴⁹

The influence of the habermasian thought is clear, and expressly recognized by the same Elster, through the calls to the rationality of the consensus and the separation among the communicative and the strategic, adjusted this last only to the systemic dimension of the market, in order to avoid the colonization of the first one in favor of the second.⁵⁰

In the same year of the first publication of *The Market and the Forum*, the meeting between the theme of the deliberation and the liberal-rawlsian trend finds a prelude in the epistemic conception of democracy proposed by Joshua Cohen⁵¹. Cohen attaches the alternative proposed by

⁴⁷ An essay comprehended in a social choice publication: J. Elster e A. Hylland, *Foundations of social choice theory* – later on considered as paradigmatical of the deliberative debate.

⁴⁸ J. Elster, *Sour Grapes. Studies in the subversion of rationality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 48.

⁵⁰ J. Habermas, *Teoria dell'agire comunicativo*, Bologna: il Mulino, 1997, chapters 6 and 8.

⁵¹ J. Cohen, "An Epistemic Conception of Democracy", *Ethics* 97, n. 1 (1986): 26-38. See also: J. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy". A recent similar approach to Cohen is Estlund, using the concept of epistemic proceduralism: D. Estlund, *Democratic Authority*. See *infra*, § 3.3.1.

William H. Riker among "populism" and liberalism⁵², sustaining that, if from one side he introduces an artificially weakened version of the first one, on the other side he reconstructs the second in so much minimalist terms to render it meaningless.

The proposal by Cohen is to recognize the epistemic value of the democratic procedures, in the sense that they have the tendency to give best results from the cognitive point of view if compared with other political systems, avoiding on the contrary to consider it an absolute value, as it would be in the caricature of the "populism" drawn by Riker. Such as today that the democratic procedure is not considered constitutive in strong sense of the value of its own results, but these can be judged only if provided of an external criterion for the same procedure.

Despite this, the democratic decisions are also legitimate in the cases in which their contents are unfair or wrong, depending on the fact that, as a whole, democracy produces less incorrect results compared with the non democratic systems, however implying that the electors share some leading principles, also disagreeing on the concrete applications, do vote according to their own judgment on what is the "general will", rather than according to their own individual preferences, and that their competence in choosing an option or the other one is anyway better than the pure casuality⁵³.

Consequently, the principal political problem becomes that to elaborate institutions and decisional procedures that favor the realization of each requisite, method that deliberative democracy will want then to represent.

During those same years, Bernard Manin introduces deliberation as a solution for the typical problems deriving from the attempts to legitimate the principle of majority from the ideal agreement between the

⁵² Vedi sopralbidem, p. 9. To comprehend Cohen's objections, the term populism in the USA does not have, at least not always, a negative understanding, which was typical in Europe until recent political developments. See on this: N. Urbinati, "Democracy and Populism", *Constellations* 5, n. 1 (1998): 110-24; M. Canovan, *The People*, Cambridge MA: Polity, 2005, p. 77.

⁵³ The reference is to the jury's theorem by Condorcet (see: D. Estlund and J. Waldron, "Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited"; R. E. Goodin and C. List, "Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem", *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9, n. 3 (2001): 277-306; F. Dietrich, "The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified", *Episteme* 5, n. 1 (2008): 56-73.

laws and the wish of everybody⁵⁴. Manin underlines the difference among the typical use of 'deliberation' as a decisional, individual or collective result and the classical one (but current in English) which considers the discussion of the various aspects of a matter as the meaning of the term.

Considering the transformation of the individual preferences, the latent contradiction can always be overcome in those liberal and democratic theories that, complimentary to the individualism, do ask for the voluntary and unanimous adhesion to the coercive norms (or at least to their ultimate principles) but that are forced to refold on the majoritarian choice.

Any political situation is recognized through deliberation, because, effectively thanks to the meeting among different points of view, opposed to the unitary general will, and it allows to all participant the best reflection on their own real affairs, together with other people's preferences. It transcends individualism in a collective dimension, without asking to impose a unique truth, since the reasoning through which it develops (different from the logical demonstration) is brought ahead by every single participant but is there for everyone's attention and the potential approval of everybody.

The result of the vote following the deliberation will reflect the matters that have found a great consensus; but also the reasons for the minority, although they resulted less convincing, will publicly be expressed and valued⁵⁵. Therefore the public deliberation, not the general will, neither the original position of Rawls, will be able to legitimate the production of the law.

Thus, the contribution from Manin is an original one, because while he is avoiding to conceive the deliberation in the ways of the general will, he does not even offer a purely epistemic vision of it, thanks to the distinction operated between the deliberative and the logical-

⁵⁴ B. Manin, "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation".

⁵⁵ See this on: C. Lafont, "Is the Ideal of Deliberative Democracy Coherent?". Reading Manin, it is clear how old is the conception of a "continuous deliberative process in between elections". See also: D. Held, *Modelli di democrazia*, p. 439. Also the concept of *democratic iteration* by Benhabib might well be: S. Benhabib, *Cittadini globali: Cosmopolitismo e democrazia*, Bologna: il Mulino, 2008; S. Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy".

demonstrative discourse.

Finally, in 1989, Joshua Cohen gather the threads of the discourse with a dense essay on deliberation and democratic legitimacy⁵⁶, to, taking from Sunstein and Bessette the definition of 'deliberative democracy', but declining it in a perspective that allows the meeting between the theoretical approaches of Rawls and Habermas.

Cohen believes that deliberation, in the form morally directed to the common good which was prefigured in the quoted *An Epistemic Conception of Democracy*, is a principle already part of the common normative perception of the democracy, which corresponds at a philosophical level to the political translation of the conditions of the original Rawlsian position.

Cohen wants however to interpret the original position from Rawls in a much more political way than Rawls does: not a philosophical ("ideal social contract", Cohen writes) device to justify the choice of the fundamental principles of justice, from which would then generate the option for a deliberative democracy, but contrarywise an ideal model that, as far as possible, should be reflected through political institutions⁵⁷.

The model is delineated through five formal conditions (FCs 1-5) to which four characteristics do correspond, of an ideal deliberative procedure (Cs 1-4), besides that well exemplifying the interlacement of rawlsian and habermasian themes, typical of Cohen.

A synthesis may be elaborated in the following way:

FC1) A deliberative democracy is an independent association, whose members expect to be indefinitely continuing over time.

FC2) The members of the association do wish to to act together within institutions compatible with the deliberation and according to deliberatively established norms. The deliberation is the foundation of legitimacy.

⁵⁶ J. Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy".

⁵⁷ See Habermas critic of this Cohen's claim, in: J. Habermas, *Fatti e norme*, pp. 360-62.

FC3) A deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association. The members can have divergent objectives and they don't think there is some obligatory conviction.

FC4) It is preferable that the connections between deliberation and its outcomes be the more possible evident to everybody, and the institutions must be accordingly constituted.

FC5) The members recognize each other the ability to undertake in a public exchange of reasons and to accordingly act with the result of such deliberation.

C1) The deliberation to be free must satisfy two conditions:

a. The participants considered themselves only bound by the results of the deliberation and by its pre-conditions, and not from other authorities.

b. The fact that a decision is deliberatively taken is a sufficient reason for the participants to respect it.

C2) In the ideal deliberation the only force is that of the better argument, and the possible difference of power among the participants does not influence the outcome.

C3) In the ideal deliberation the participants are formally and substantially equal. The rules of the procedure are equal for everybody and the pre-existing distribution of the resources does not influence the possibility to contribute to the deliberation. The participants do also consider the political system as possible issue of a deliberative choice, unless for the necessary conditions to the deliberation.

C4) Ideal deliberation looks for convincing reasons for all the participants. Nevertheless, also under ideal conditions, there is no consensus guaranteed, therefore deliberation might end up with a majority vote. However this does not eliminate the distinction between deliberation and mere aggregation of the preferences, since the same vote will probably produce different results, if preceded by a deliberative procedure.

Still in this work, Cohen also intends to anticipate some possible

objections to the deliberative conception: against the accusation of sectarianism, for which deliberative democracy would correspond to a comprehensive doctrine in the Rawlsian sense, and it would be therefore discriminating and illiberal to impose it to whom would not agree with it, he objects that even if it is reasonable that the deliberative democracy, as any democratic theory, asks for diffused adhesion to its ideal of an active citizen, nevertheless (differently from other possible conceptions) it is not on this ideal of behavior of life that is philosophically founded, but contrarywise, on the idea of political justification previously affirmed already in the article on the epistemic conception of the democracy; generally the matter of the incoherence is brought by the aggregative theories against the democracy, but this issue is bypassed considering deliberation as possible solution of the apories underlined by the social choice⁵⁸; against the eventuality that deliberative democracy violates the fundamental liberties (above all the expression), classical liberal criticism, which is rejected, because these liberties normatively belong to the necessary conditions allowing deliberation to take place;

Against its irrelevance, since the conditions for a direct dialogue among the citizens don't exist and could not exist in the ample and complex modern societies,

He does appreciate the deliberative advantages of the representation, sustaining on the contrary the necessity of organized political parties and publicly financed, that would be an optimal form of deliberative association because they would also allow the access the politics for those who don't possess huge resources, anyway constituting ample and open discursive arenas for various themes, in which it would be therefore possible to direct the deliberation toward the common good.

⁵⁸ Here it is possible to see the meeting point between deliberative and aggregative theories, where the formers would like to solve the right problems proposed by the latters. See also: D. Miller, "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice"; J. Knight and J. Johnson, "Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy", *Political Theory* 22, n. 2 (1994): 277-96. Theories of rational choice might even integrate the critical theory, for they show aspects coming from strategic interactions. See on this: J. Johnson, "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation Between Critical Theory and Rational Choice", *The American Political Science Review* 87, n. 1 (1993): 74-86; J. S. Dryzek, "How Far is It from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt? Public Choice as Critical Theory", *British Journal of Political Science* 22 (1992): 397-417.

That is how Cohen is the first one to systematize a theory of deliberative democracy, even though still on a rather abstract plan⁵⁹, or better, for the first time he focuses both the term and the concept that will be more typical of it. However, his approach appears relatively weak in its aim to explain because why deliberation should give the good and attended results, not going very far from the positions already affirmed by Elster and Goodin. Cohen wants to keep together the autonomy of the participants and the epistemic value of the deliberation, that is then the central point of the whole conception, and this is what he is still not been able to sustain with better results.

3.1.4.2 Emerging to Stay: the Deliberative Turn

In the nineties, deliberative democracy became a theory able to influence, even though not univocally, the multiplicity of fields of investigation which were mentioned in the preceding generation. This coincides with the explosion of the number of articles and books devoted to the matter, which means that from now on this review will not deal with any single contribution, underlining only the most remarkable in picturing the principal theoretical tendencies.

Dealing with these tendencies, the second generation of deliberative democracy experiences emerging polarity among discursivist and liberal theories of deliberation. At the same time, the beginning of this period see the empirical approaches coming into the deliberative field, while deliberative theory begins to be object of more criticisms⁶⁰.

John S. Dryzek is part of this generation, but his work might still be (as Cohen shows with his 1989 work) comprehended in the previous one: two of his books⁶¹ represent two interpretative tendencies, initially among

⁵⁹ See on this: J. Cohen, "The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy", *Social Philosophy and Policy* 6, n. 2 (1989): 25-50.

⁶⁰ Starting with: J. S. Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1991. Fishkin is at the same time a *trait d'union* between deliberative democracy and *mainstream* US political science, largely influenced by Robert Dahl.

⁶¹ See J. S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy*; J. S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*. His book from 1990 has a revision of previously published articles from the eighties.

them weave and both destined, although not in the same measure, to a certain success. Dryzek clearly contrasts his own discursive theory as much to the political liberalism, as to the theories of the social choice, on the epistemologic plan⁶². The two aspects do not proceed separated since the beginning, premise is the characteristic of the critical theory, with the connection among ideology and epistemology, while the author identifies the picture of reference common to the social sciences and to the political-philosophical liberalism in Popper's "critical rationalism".

Dryzek wants to radicalize the habermasian approach, from which he expressly moves. Although his "radicalizing" tendency is not necessarily shared by other promoters of the critical theory⁶³, his double opposition will remain typical of such approach to the deliberation.

The habermasian work *Between Facts and Norms* from 1992 is central for the affirmation of the theory. With this work Habermas intends to complete the reconstruction of the discursive rationality systematically undertaken in the "Theory of the Communicative Action"⁶⁴. While however that 1981 work, moving between sociology and philosophy, was mostly leaving political considerations in the background, *Between Facts and Norms* marks the conclusion of his approach to the philosophy of law and to the proper democratic theory⁶⁵; using deliberation to rebuild the model of democratic state of law democratic that, intended to escape the *aporie* of the juridical positivism without however applying to any giusnaturalistic base, so much unbearable in the theory as in the practice, nowadays.

The contact among the sociological and ethical pre-existing points of view and this, more political-juridical, assumed with *Between Facts and Norms* has to be found in the civil society, a theoretical field broadly run in this as in the following generation⁶⁶. The appreciation (already present in the

⁶² See also: J. S. Dryzek, "Discursive democracy vs. liberal constitutionalism", in *Democratic Innovation*, edited by M. Saward, London: Routledge, 2000.

⁶³ James Bohman in 1998 does already consider deliberative democracy a mature theory, in: J. Bohman, "The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy".

⁶⁴ See ...

⁶⁵ Relevant intermediate steps are the *Tanner Lectures* in 1986 and the essay *Sovranità popolare come procedura*; both translated in: J. Habermas, *Morale, Diritto, Politica*, Torino: Einaudi, 1992.

⁶⁶ The main book for the nineties on this field is: J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992. See also: S. Chambers e W. Kymlicka (eds), *Alternative*

Theory of the Communicative Action⁶⁷) for the emancipative potential of social movements which developed out of the formal politics, elevates the civil society to becoming the second pillar of democracy, close to the parliamentary institutions, in the two-track democracy model typical of the deliberative authors close to Habermas⁶⁸.

All of these elements support of a procedural model of deliberative democracy, constituting its most systematic presentation so far; the reasons for the deliberation are here for the first time explicit, even though not completely missing dark or moving parts, but anyway connected to the leading structure of the communicative rationality.

However, after Cohen's work in the eighties, the success of the liberal approach to the deliberation is relaunched by the work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson⁶⁹. Moving from the idea of public reason, in the meantime elaborated by Rawls⁷⁰, they want to extend its limits because they are perceived as too much narrow for democracy. To this extent, "Democracy and Disagreement" does greatly emphasize the moral dimension of deliberation, but probably exceeding, up to risk of representing more a list of recommendations on how to reach good purposes than a work of political theory. Anyway the book has very much contributed to the notoriety of the deliberative democracy, arousing numerous debates⁷¹, and being probably still today, at least in the United States, the work more often quoted as a paradigmatic example of the whole deliberative approach.

In the same period, the debate among Rawls and Habermas, did represent one of the highest points of the deliberative debate. If the explicit adhesion to the deliberative model from Rawls arrives only toward the end of the nineties⁷², the comparison between the liberal perspective and the critical theory produced in the meantime numerous contributions;

Conceptions of Civil Society, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002; F. C. Alford, "Civil Society and its Discontents", *The Good Society* 12, n. 1 (2003): 11-16.

⁶⁷ As in: J. Habermas, *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica*, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2005), this theme will be recurring part of his works.

⁶⁸ For critics on this, even by close colleagues, see: J. Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, pp. 172.

⁶⁹ A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*.

⁷⁰ J. Rawls, *Liberalismo Politico*, lezione VI.

⁷¹ Some of them collected in: S. Macedo (ed.), *Deliberative politics: essays on democracy and disagreement*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

⁷² About Rawls' late entry, ...

many among the most remarkable met in some important edited volumes gathering fundamental essays which assumed a "canonical" status as main sources of the deliberative democratic debate⁷³.

The book *Democracy and Difference* is variedly devoted to the comparison with positions "radicals", from the participatory democracy⁷⁴, to that "agonistic"⁷⁵, but in general, as announced by the title to the various declinations of the thought of the difference (feminism, multiculturalismo, post-modernism).

The volume edited by Bohman and Rehg it is "central" both temporally and for the positions included, republishing some of the most meaningful contributions of the preceding decade (particularly: *The Market and the Forum* and *Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy*). Elster's edited volume is characterized by the prevalence of contributions of analytical orientation, and, marking in this the passage of the years, it includes various critical interventions in comparison to the deliberative possibilities of concrete application of the ideal⁷⁶.

Joseph Bessette, the first one who had spoken of deliberative democracy, on the base of the largely shared historical interpretation among the republicans, dedicate his work to the defense of the deliberative quality of the government of the United States, with particular attention to the role of the congress⁷⁷. Bessette has a central interest in the contrast between a blind popular will, uninformed, and the most articulated public opinion that it is reachable only through the deliberation.

On an analogous line, although in a more complex way, Cass Sunstein keeps on moving, always pushing on the counterfactual of the better

⁷³ S. Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996; J. Bohman and W. Rehg, *Deliberative Democracy*; J. Elster, *Deliberative Democracy*.

⁷⁴ B. R. Barber, "Foundationalism and Democracy", in *Democracy and Difference*, edited by S. Benhabib, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996; S. S. Wolin, "Fugitive Democracy", in *Democracy and Difference*, edited by S. Benhabib, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁷⁵ C. Mouffe, "Democracy, Power, and the "Political"", in *Democracy and Difference*, edited by S. Benhabib, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁷⁶ J. Johnson, "Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; A. Przeworski, "Deliberation and Ideological Domination", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; S. C. Stokes, "Pathologies of Deliberation", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁷⁷ J. M. Bessette, *The Mild Voice of Reason: deliberative democracy and american national government*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.

preferences that citizens could have if they were able to deliberate. Sunstein decidedly proposes an "activist" republicanism (against the prejudice of an impartial neutrality, that would coincide with the sanctification of the status quo in reality) in the promotion of a deliberation directed toward the common good⁷⁸.

In comparison to previous contributions, the author now intends to mostly emphasize the necessity of a wide deliberation for the whole society; nevertheless maintaining some underlying skepticism toward the spontaneous deliberative abilities of the citizens. Therefore, although Sunstein is critical of the excessive centrality of the judicial courts, typical of the American debate, it holds nevertheless that these courts, together with the other governmental organs, must assume an active role in to favor the amplest deliberation among the citizens⁷⁹.

Sunstein already pushes the problem towards "paternalist" positions for which he will distinguish himself in the following generation⁸⁰.

In Sunstein's words, the accent on the transformation of the preferences, that deliberative democracy differentiates from the aggregative approaches, can be interpreted in a rather aggressive way⁸¹.

The main problem just emerging it is that departing from the idea that the deliberation and the democracy are desirable as much as they produce good results, and it is indeed difficult to escape to results of the kind: following this reasoning, citizens could become objects to manipulate.

⁷⁸ C. R. Sunstein, *The Partial constitution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. See also: C. R. Sunstein, *Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech*, New York: Free Press, 1993.

⁷⁹ See also: C. R. Sunstein, "Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court", *California Law Review* 84, n. 4 (1996): 1179-99. For the relationship between deliberative democracy and judicial power, see also: C. S. Nino, *The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy*; M. Van Hoecke, "Judicial Review and Deliberative Democracy: A Circular Model of Law Creation and Legitimation", *Ratio Juris* 14, n. 4 (2001): 415-23; R. Gargarella, "Should Deliberative Democrats Defend the Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights?", in *Deliberative democracy and its discontents*, edited by S. Besson and J. L. Martí, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006; C. F. Zurn, *Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁸⁰ R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein, "Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron".

⁸¹ C. R. Sunstein, *The Partial constitution*, p. 175.

3.1.4.3 Putting Theory into Practice: the Empirical Turn

The increasing diffusion of the deliberative theories has favored a notable and interesting type of application⁸², where the principal problem becomes if indeed the democratic deliberation works as it promises, or it is not, rather, another unattainable philosophical utopia⁸³.

It is not about proposing or criticizing in deliberative terms institutional reforms to realize politically⁸⁴, but to build *ad hoc* experiments to verify the possible and concrete effects of the deliberation⁸⁵.

Therefore, also the field of the empirical approaches is enough internally articulated⁸⁶, both as it regards the real methods of implementation and for the general perspectives on which they are

⁸² There have been quite a lot of events, later defined as belonging to the field of deliberative democracy, that have anticipated its coming. In a kind of give and take process, typical of deliberation, these activities have met with the newcomers, thus improving themselves and contributing to the development of the field, producing a new and wider age of experiments and empirical studies. It is important to notice a fact: somehow ignoring the deliberative theory behind these new experiences, empirical scholars have not behaved, as expected, acknowledging their competences, not considering this as a matter to be solved, even if they did act quite differently in the other way around: L. Bobbio, "Quando la deliberazione ha bisogno di un aiuto", in *La deliberazione pubblica*, edited by L. Pellizzoni, Roma: Meltemi, 2005, pp. 177-78.

⁸³ M. R. Steenbergen, *et al.*, "Measuring political deliberation", *Comparative European Politics* 1, n. 1 (2003): 21-48; J. Stromer-Galley, "Measuring Deliberation's Content: A Coding Scheme", *Journal of Public Deliberation* 3, n. 1 (2007): art. 12. See also Elster's analyses on the quality of communication in the constitutional assemblies: J. Elster, "Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process", *Duke Law Journal* 45, n. 2 (1995): 364-96; J. Elster, "Deliberation and Constitution Making", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. See also: P. Johnston Conover, *et al.*, "The Deliberative Potential of Political Discussion", *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002): 21-62; J. Gardner, "Deliberation and Representation in Congress: Allies or Adversaries?" Oakland CA, 2005; J. Svensson, "It's a Long Way from Helsingborg to Porto Alegre: A Case Study in Deliberative Democracy in Late Modernity", *Journal of Public Deliberation* 4, n. 1 (2008): art. 4.

⁸⁴ With a few exceptions, such as the proposal of institutionalizing a fourth popular branch in the US government through the Deliberative Poll: E. J. Leib, *Deliberative democracy in America: a proposal for a popular branch of government*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004.

⁸⁵ S. W. Rosenberg, "The Empirical Study of Deliberative Democracy: Setting a Research Agenda", *Acta Politica* 40, n. 2 (2005): 212-24; J. S. Fishkin and R. C. Luskin, "Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion", *Acta Politica* 40, n. 2 (2005): 284-98; S. W. Rosenberg, "The Empirical Study of Deliberative Democracy: Setting a Research Agenda"; E. Schneiderhan and S. Khan, "Reasons and Inclusion: The Foundation of Deliberation", *Sociological Theory* 26, n. 1 (2008): 1-24.

⁸⁶ An useful review, with a different approach than that adopted here: M. Bonanni e M. Penco, "Modelli deliberativi: una ricognizione critica". A bit more specific, in classifying different practical approaches to deliberation, is: L. Bobbio e G. Pomatto, "Il coinvolgimento dei cittadini nelle scelte pubbliche", *Meridiana* 58 (2007): 45-68. See also: A. Fung, "Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences", *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 11, n. 3 (2003): 338-67.

implicitly founded. About the relationship with the whole deliberative thought, however, three general positions might be worth to be described:

1. Empirical-Theoretical: these scholars are closely related with theorists, that have contributed to almost elaborate the deliberative democracy from its beginnings; the main example is constituted by James Fishkin, with his proposals of the deliberative poll⁸⁷ and the deliberation day⁸⁸. The first model foresees that a group of some hundred people, are selected as a statistic sample, a survey is administered before and immediately after the discussion among them, usually regarding themes of wide public interest (the project was originally thought for intervening during the primaries for the U.S. Presidential Elections); it develops through small groups' discussions and then in a plenary session, with the support of information and experts of verified impartiality. Besides the civic-educational purposes, the empirical-experimental aspect properly consists in the measurement of the presumed ability of the deliberation to transform the preferences of the participants. The second model, the deliberation day, does represent a much more ambitious proposal, which provides all the registered citizens to deliberate on a day that is recognized as a national holiday, where people get paid if participate as if it were a working day.

2. Pre-Existing Institutions: other forms of "applied deliberation", independent by the development of the deliberative theory, and subsequently integrated. The most known case is represented by the participative experiences⁸⁹, which spread from Porto Alegre towards different parts of the world; but it is also to

⁸⁷ J. S. Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation*; J. S. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995; J. S. Fishkin, "Il sondaggio deliberativo, perché e come funziona", in *Democrazia deliberativa: cosa è*, edited by G. Bosetti e S. Maffettone, Roma: Luiss University Press, 2004. For a review of the Deliberative Polls already held around the world, see the Chapter in this work, and also: <http://cdd.stanford.edu/>.

⁸⁸ B. Ackerman and J. S. Fishkin, "Deliberation Day", *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 10, n. 2 (2002): 129-52; B. Ackerman, "Il deliberation day, festa per informarsi e discutere", in *Democrazia deliberativa: cosa è*, edited by G. Bosetti e S. Maffettone, Roma: Luiss University Press, 2004.

⁸⁹ See *Deliberative Mini-Publics* (2014) ...

quote, more pertinently, the model of the citizens juries⁹⁰, promoted already by the Jefferson Center⁹¹ at the beginning of the seventies. Although also this model, such as the deliberative poll, is protected with a copyright, it has had a great deal of different applications. Anyway, the salient characteristics are the smaller number of participants (typically among 18 and 24), that limits the possibility of statistic stratification and the partial imitation of the model of the trial juries, particularly in the structure of the relationship among the citizens and the experts called "to testify".

3. Post-Defining Debate: a third position is proper of the "empiricals" that, having reached the deliberative debate when this was a relatively affirmed and already structured theory, they tried to test it, connecting theory and practice⁹². This orientation is well represented by authors such as Diane Mutz, that criticizes the difficulty of "trying to test scientifically" the deliberative theory⁹³, or, in Italy, Luigi Bobbio, organizer of various deliberative initiatives

⁹⁰ A. Armour, "The Citizens' Jury Model of Public Participation: a Critical Evaluation", in *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse*, edited by O. Renn, et al., Dordrecht: Springer, 1995; A. Coote and J. Lenaghan, *Citizens' Juries: Theory into Practice*, London: IPPR, 1997; N. Crosby and D. Nethercut, "Citizen Juries: Creating a Trust-worthy Voice of the People", in *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook*, edited by J. Gastil and P. Levine, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005; G. Smith and C. Wales, "Citizens' juries and deliberative democracy", in *Democracy as Public Deliberation*, edited by M. Passerin d'Entrèves, New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006; Y. Sintomer, *Il potere al popolo. Giurie cittadine, sorteggio e democrazia partecipativa*, Bari: Dedalo Edizioni, 2009. Also: L. Carson, "Come migliorare l'attuazione della democrazia deliberativa: un'analisi comparata di due Giurie di cittadini", *Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche* 2 (2007): 127-42; L. Bobbio, et al., "Cinque risposte a Lyn Carson", *Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche* 2 (2007): 143-62. See also, on the model of planning cells: P. C. Dienel e O. Renn, "Planning Cells: A Gate to "Fractal" Mediation", in *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse*, edited by O. Renn, et al., Dordrecht: Springer, 1995; H.-J. Seiler, "Review of "Planning Cells:" Problems of Legitimation", in *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse*, edited by O. Renn, et al., Dordrecht: Springer, 1995.

⁹¹ <http://www.jefferson-center.org/>

⁹² See on this: D. Thompson, "Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science"; D. M. Ryfe, "Does Deliberative Democracy Work?", *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (2005): 49-71; M. X. Delli Carpini, et al., "Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature", *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (2004): 315-44; S. Chambers, "Measuring Publicity's Effect: Reconciling Empirical Research and Normative Theory", *Acta Politica* 40, n. 2 (2005): 225-66.

⁹³ D. C. Mutz, "Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?", *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 521-36. See also: D. C. Mutz, *Hearing the Other Side*.

and critical of the scarce realism of the philosophers⁹⁴.

Critical for this type of studies, is that the differentiation does primarily get through the methodology and this often generates a new categorization of the competing approaches⁹⁵. Nevertheless, as it regards a general analysis of the meaning of the empirical approaches, there are three relevant differences: the participants' selection for the deliberation, the degree of control in applying the designed procedure and the relationships among the deliberative experiment and the political context in which it is run.

The criteria for the choice of the participants, besides their simple number: these are evidently remarkable to translate in practice the ideal of the democratic inclusion, but this tightly interlace with the definition of what the subjects of the deliberation must be from the normative point of view. The greatest part of the empirical methods, especially those stressing the epistemic dimension of the deliberation, have a preference for, above all, the selection of a statistically stratified sample, rather than the self selection of the participants.

This is meant to avoid that the voice of the "activists" prevails on that of the "common citizen"⁹⁶; but also, from a different perspective, to corroborate "scientifically" the results obtained. The tension between these criteria and democracy appears evident, since they largely influence both the final decision and the whole process of the deliberation, risking to make it resemble more a carefully predisposed trial toward expected results than an occasion of independent participation.

Still regarding the selection of the participants, a particular problem is found in the opposition among the methods "purely" statistic and those weighed to furnish equal or analogous representation to those involved. Both the possibilities do introduce risks for the selection of the criteria,

⁹⁴ L. Bobbio, "La democrazia deliberativa nella pratica", *Stato e mercato* 1 (2005): 67-88; L. Bobbio, "Quando la deliberazione ha bisogno di un aiuto".

⁹⁵ For a schematic reference, see mostly: A. Fung, "Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences"; but also: D. M. Ryfe, "The Practice of Deliberative Democracy: A Study of 16 Deliberative Organizations", *Political Communication* 19, n. 3 (2002): 359-77.

⁹⁶ See what the "activists" do critic in deliberative democracy: I. M. Young, "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy", *Political Theory* 29, n. 5 (2001): 670-90; R. B. Talisse, "Deliberativist responses to activist challenges", *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 31, n. 4 (2005): 423-44; P. Levine e R. M. Nierras, "Activists' Views of Deliberation", *Journal of Public Deliberation* 3, n. 1 (2007): art. 4.

but the choice of the stakeholders does coincide with a deliberative option strongly centered on the epistemic importance of the social groups, or of the opinions "in abstract", rather than on the direct participation of the citizens. This implicates a further surplus of planning from the organizers, that at this point do determine alone the object of the deliberation, the formalities and the times of carrying it out, but also what opinions and what existing interests deserve to be represented and how much⁹⁷.

About the second point: deliberative experiments are intrinsically organized and managed in top-down approach⁹⁸ but quantity and quality of the control on the procedure may notably vary, while the results are strictly connected with both the number of the participants and their internal composition. It can be hypothesized, for instance, that ampler it will be the number of the participants, less these will be manipulable from the direct intervention of the organizers (particularly in the combination of various sessions, first in small groups and then in plenary sessions) but, contrarywise, perhaps more subjected to the selection of the relevant information; it is also probable that stakeholders selected like this are less easily influenceable in comparison to a casual statistical sample.

The control of the information administered to the participants, somehow constant element in the organization of the deliberative events, may entirely be summoned by the organizers, usually coinciding avowedly with a "neutralist" approach, or, in the initiatives based on the stakeholders, managed together with these last ones to the purpose of balancing the exposure of conflicting points of view. The direct intervention in the carrying out of the procedure can be minimum or absent, as in the case of the deliberation day, that foresees that also the moderators of the discussions are chosen among the participants⁹⁹, or more often, rather pervasively, through the use of professional figures, the facilitators, with with the task to favor an orderly and profitable carrying out of the deliberation, presumptively from a neutral and equal point of

⁹⁷ See on this: I. M. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*; R. Gargarella, "Full Representation, Deliberation, and Impartiality", in *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by J. Elster, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁹⁸ L. Bobbio, "Le arene deliberative", *Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche* 3 (2002): 5-29.

⁹⁹ This is what happens in the citizens' juries in the US, with relevant effects on the final verdict: L. M. Sanders, "Against Deliberation", *Political Theory* 25, n. 3 (1997): 347-76.

view¹⁰⁰.

On the one hand, it is rather clear as, both as it regards the selection of the information and for the role of the facilitators, so much more pervasive it will be the intervention of the organizers, so much the experiment will offer anymore the criticisms side of anti-democracy, on the kind of the "illuminated despotism"¹⁰¹. On the other hand it is undeniable that, to get a whatever result considerable as "satisfactory" in such a short period of time¹⁰², it is necessary to carefully structure the deliberative context; remarkable necessity also on the theoretical plan, if it is pretended to judge the validity of deliberative democracy analyzing the results it is able to produce¹⁰³.

Finally, concerning the relationships with the political institutions endowed with decisional power, remarkable it is, from a side, the validity formally recognized to the experiment and the influence that it succeeds in practicing in the amplest public opinion¹⁰⁴. In the greatest part of the cases the deliberative experiments have themselves recognized only an advisory role, and in more detail it assumes more or less binding forms for the involved institutions, while the results of the deliberations are rarely considered binding for the institutions endowed with the power to implement them.

However, the importance of these two aspects lays in the fact, apparently almost always removed by the organizers, that the people's attitude involved in the deliberation may consistently vary referring to the auto-perception of their own power and their own responsibilities¹⁰⁵. It is obviously well different to undertake a discussion on a decision knowing that it will be indeed applied, or rather practically considering it as a

¹⁰⁰ L. Bobbio, "Le arene deliberative," p. 12.

¹⁰¹ N. Urbinati, "Democrazia e partigianeria", *Una Città* 144 (2007); L. Bobbio, *et al.*, "Sondaggi deliberativi e democrazia", *Una Città* 148 (2007).

¹⁰² Because of logistic and economic reasons, most of the deliberative events takes place in a few days, and even when more days are available, the time for discussions is usually short.

¹⁰³ This is the prevailing orientation, even if some say the opposite: L. Bobbio e G. Pomatto, "Il coinvolgimento dei cittadini nelle scelte pubbliche," p. 66.

¹⁰⁴ Up to now the influence has been relatively scarce, as it may be read on: L. Bobbio, "Le virtù del sorteggio", in *Dopo la politica*, edited by di D. Zola, Roma: Edizioni dell'Asino, 2008. It does not mean, anyway, that it could not be increasing in the future.

¹⁰⁵ See: M. Ryfe, "The Practice of Deliberative Democracy: A Study of 16 Deliberative Organizations," p. 366.

rhetorical and uninfluential exercise¹⁰⁶: whoever has participated to a minimal political activity knows very well how much the perception of someone's own impotence can be extremely destructive.

It is intrinsically difficult judging the deliberation from an external point of view and, contemporarily, to draw from such judgment the criteria through which organizing the same practice. The will to evaluate certain results, not only the final decisions but also the opinion change occurred, as a better results than that would have been reached without the deliberation can poorly seem controversial for every single case¹⁰⁷; but really reflecting on the general effects of a possible application of these methods, with all the organizational competence needed and with the professional facilitators, it comes the risk that the ideal of a deeper democratic freedom, because informed and aware and permeated by the mutual respect among the citizens, would turn into a manipulated¹⁰⁸ reality.

For a more detailed description of the various empirical approaches, see the case study chapter.

3.1.4.4 Scaling up: the Systemic Turn and Beyond

So far, the effort has been to lead a generational but chronological review of the literature, but in this last section it will be necessary to go back and forward in time to discuss the system approach and its scholars, thus completing the actual range of relevant contributions.

¹⁰⁶ See G. Smith on Empowered Deliberation ...

¹⁰⁷ See how Luigi Bobbio presents the results of a wide deliberative experiment: L. Bobbio, "Come smaltire i rifiuti. Un esperimento di democrazia deliberativa", *Stato e mercato* 1 (2002): 101-41; it is also interesting, and it will be showed later on in throughout this work, the different themes which deliberative projects deal with in different countries: L. Carson, "Creating Democratic Surplus through Citizens' Assemblies", *Journal of Public Deliberation* 4, n. 1 (2008): art. 5; V. Normann Andersen e K. M. Hansen, "How deliberation makes better citizens: The Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro", *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2007): 531-56.

¹⁰⁸ About the risk of manipulating citizens and their opinions, see: G. Regonini, "Paradossi della democrazia deliberativa", *Stato e mercato* 1 (2005): 3-32. It does represent the actual translation of the epistocracy risk feared by the theorists: C. Lafont, "Is the Ideal of Deliberative Democracy Coherent?"; D. Estlund, *Democratic Authority*, ch. 11.

It might be helpful, in this perspective, to introduce it with a few words from Dryzek, quoted from a recent symposium commentary: *(a)ccording to Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça in their introduction to this two-part symposium, we can understand the history of deliberative democracy in terms of its generations. I seem to be placed in their first, second, and fourth generations – though I think I would be equally at home in their third.*

Back to the content of this generation, a first introduction for the deliberative systems was Mansbridge's (1999), when she approached the importance of everyday talk in deliberative politics: building on Habermasian two-track democracy, and with the aim of providing a normative and empirical account of the democratic process as a whole, some scholars followed her way, very much sharing the necessity of evolving from the theoretical and empirical generation, scaling up towards a fully comprehensive theory¹⁰⁹.

The so-called Manifesto of the Deliberative System was published in 2012 (Parkinson and Mansbridge eds.), and they reached a relevant and highly qualitative level of contributors to their new approach, thus setting the road towards further developments of the deliberative theory, while pushing the existing boundaries more far away.

In order to properly define what they mean by a deliberative system, they offer the following definition: *(a) system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labor, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and integration among the parts. It requires some functional division of labor, so that some parts do work that others cannot do so well. And it requires some relational interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring about change in some others. A deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem solving—through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading. In*

¹⁰⁹ Worth to be noticed here the evolution Mansbridge went through her work, as she went *beyond adversary democracy* (one of the two works Florida based his genealogical studies on the relationship between the participatory and deliberative theories of democracy in 2015 and, forthcoming, 2016) in the eighties, then introducing an expansive account of deliberation (1999), until she reached this systemic account for deliberative democracy (2012).

*a good deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant considerations should replace suppression, oppression, and thoughtless neglect. Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. We need to ask not only what good deliberation would be both in general and in particular settings, but also what a good deliberative system would entail*¹¹⁰.

Following the text, there is also direct reference to Habermas, against whom they argue that the state and its legislatures are the ultimate decision makers in a polity, but they are not the centre of everything: above all, the state is not the term of all deliberation¹¹¹.

In response to this new approach, different were the reaction between scholars who, more or less, belong to the ongoing debate on deliberative democracy: starting with Dryzek, who “has been prolific in popularising the systemic turn and in a number of publications has offered a schematisation of the components or elements of a deliberative system that develops Habermas’ original characterisation”¹¹².

In 2010, 2011 and 2014 Dryzek has characterized the components of a deliberative system as follows: a) private sphere (akin to the site of Mansbridge’s everyday talk); b) public space; c) empowered space; d) transmission (from public space to empowered space); e) accountability (of empowered space to public space); f) meta-deliberation (about the deliberative qualities of the system itself); g) decisiveness (in relation to other political forces)¹¹³.

Staying on the positive debate on this turn, other scholars went on building on this approach and developed on it (Boker 2016, Niemeyer 2014) and two symposiums presented reflections on some elements of the system.

Contrarywise, Owen and Smith published a critical survey article on the Manifesto, where they presented problems within the system and versus its resondance to the theory of deliberative democracy: an

¹¹⁰ Mansbridge et al. 2012, pp. 4–5.

¹¹¹ See Mansbridge et al. 2012, pp. 9-10

¹¹² Owen and Smith 2015, p. 215.

¹¹³ See Dryzek 2010, pp. 11–2; Dryzek 2011, pp. 225–6, Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, pp. 27–9.

example is when they refer to the distributed deliberation in the system, which means that there is not a need for every element of the system to be deliberative, but, in fact, at the system level deliberation is produced, thus connecting with another of the relevant issues for the theory, the deliberative capacities and powers of the citizens to have their voice heard¹¹⁴.

Summarizing and focusing, their essay poses two challenges to systemic theories of deliberative democracy. The first challenge consists in identifying a problem with the relationship of existing dominant variants to deliberative democracy as a political ideal: their argument is “that paying attention to the emphasis on the functional value of non-deliberative practices in currently dominant systemic approaches reveals their neglect of the normative significance of practices of deliberation between citizens and of the distribution of deliberative capacities and mutual respect”.

Their second challenge “consists in sketching two contrasting approaches that are worthy of consideration as the systemic turn gathers pace. The first is located firmly within the deliberative democracy tradition: one that places the citizen at the centre of deliberative systems thinking, focusing on the cultivation of a ‘deliberative stance’ among citizens in their formal and informal civic interactions. The second alternative steps away from the deliberative system as the organising idea and focuses instead on deliberation within the democratic system. (...) Whether either of these alternatives are judged attractive, they suffice to demonstrate, at this early stage of research on deliberative systems, that reflection and debate on the assumptions and presuppositions which structure distinct approaches to, and conceptions of, systemic analysis are necessary for the flourishing of this third turn in the intellectual history of theorizing the relationship of deliberation and democracy”¹¹⁵.

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¹¹⁴ See Owen and Smith 2015, pp. 218-219

¹¹⁵ See Owen and Smith 2015, pp. ...;

¹¹⁶ See studies on divided societies, by O’Flynn and Cinalli, Steiner forthcoming.

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¹¹⁷ See also Neblo 2015.

¹¹⁸ Concluding with Florida on the forthcoming 2017.

¹¹⁹ Constitutional deliberative democracy a must-have on recent constitutional turn.

3.2 What is Political Culture? A concept and its tentative indicators.

Through this review of the literature on culture in the political approach, I will show how much attention has been focused on developing still on the seminal work by Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, a very innovative one at the time of publication (1963), but later on needing a more interdisciplinary evolution.

In order to make this intent fully comprehensible, this chapter is structured as follows: first the concept of culture will be introduced, analyzing the most relevant studies on the classical concept.

Moreover, this state of the art is intended to introduce the choice adopted for this work.

3.2.1 Introducing Culture: From *The Civic Culture* until today

By far one of the most compelling concepts in the sciences of politics, in the fifties it was estimated the term culture to have many different meanings and facets¹²⁰.

My research is focusing on the possible influence national political cultures had during the Transnational Deliberative Poll Europolis, held in Bruxelles a week before the European Parliament Elections in 2009, in order to analyze the growth of a European public sphere (Isernia and Fishkin, 2014) in the 27 (at the time) members of the European Union.

Thus, a central concept of my dissertation is that of political culture, defined by most previous studies as a set of shared values, assuming the existence of a single, national culture within each country they analyzed (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1965; Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 1999).

As Pye (1991) calls political culture one of the few mega-concepts in the social sciences, a huge amount of conceptual and definitional discussions is available nowadays, being culture “a complex multi-level construct shared among individuals belonging to a group or society” (Taras and Half, 2009).

It is possible to find, at least, three significant trends in efforts to define political culture in political science, different but not mutually exclusive: the first defines it as “shared values legitimating social relations” (Wildavsky, 1987); the second draws inspiration from game theoretic depictions of coordination dilemmas, tipping processes and behavior influenced by lack of complete information (Greif, 1994; Laitin and Weingast, 2006; Kuran and Sandholm, 2008; Carvalho, 2011); finally, Weeden (2002) offers his conceptualization of culture as “semiotic practices” with a focus on meaning-making through rhetoric and symbolic displays, drawing inspiration from Laitin’s proposal to refocus the study

¹²⁰ See Kluckhohn and Kroeber (1952): Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions.

of political culture on cultural symbols to be interpreted in their “full ethnographic context”¹²¹.

Although political cultures are multifaceted and they do not necessarily overlap, spatially, with national borders (Nesbitt-Larking, 1992), advances in statistical analysis have made it possible to characterize the multifaceted nature of political culture to a greater extent than it was previously possible: in fact, Silver and Dowley (2000) find that within-country variation across ethnic groups often exceeds variation in attitudes across countries, suggesting that countries may not be the best units of analysis for exploring questions of political culture.

Defining an adequate working definition of political culture for my research has been, then, a meaningful task, which did also consider the existence of various political subcultures in each European country: following Blaydes and Grimmer (2013), “different processes might lead to the existence of multiple subcultures within a single state” (ethnolinguistic, religious, geographic. etc.).

After these brief notes, now a complete analysis of the most relevant literature on (political) culture will follow, in order to give an adequate anticipation to the choice of the approaches and theories I did.

It will be clear from the beginning of this review how important is the interdisciplinarity of the themes chosen, thus starting to defend the approach adopted to answer the main research question.

Fifty years after the introduction of the concept of political culture in the social sciences¹²², an always increasing number of scientific contributions cannot have discussed of its importance, of its meaning, of its content, of its dimensions and of its operationalization. Still today we cannot affirm that in the scientific community anyone does agree with every element of the debate. An example might be that on the disagreement on the matter if considering political culture as a concept or as an explanatory theory: so far many scholars have treated it as two distinct floors, or with a few differences and with many questions. Whereas the distinctions have kept

¹²¹ On the interdisciplinary approaches through Triandis, Davidov, Hofstede ..., Geertz pp. 40-41 on Kluckhorn concepts of culture and his connection with Weber's concept.

¹²² Note on The Civic Culture

them separated, there is an impression that while the problematic aspects related to the theory have lifted the formulation of alternative proposals, those related to the conceptual difficulties are resolved in little attempts of re-elaboration to overcome the barrier of different epistemologic and methodological formulations.

In this work political culture will be understood as a concept under which to describe (and to whom ascribing) the attitudes of the citizens toward politics and society, in an empirical perspective, as derived from the application of the Cultural Theory (1990)¹²³, which will be presented in the theoretical framework. For this reason, in this chapter the term will be analyzed through an exhaustive literature as a concept rather than as theory, leaving some final introduction to the theory and the theoretical framework to complete its presentation.

The interest for the cultural substratum of the political phenomena is not new. Of its traces can be found again among the intellectuals that have founded the origins of the western political thought from the Greek philosophers to the founders of the modern social sciences. Gabriel Almond, whose work expressly introduces in the dictionary of the political science the expression "political culture", does trace the articulated run of the origins of the interest and the importance of this concept, going from Plato, Aristotle and Plutarco to Machiavelli, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Tocqueville, up to Marx and Weber: posing the accent on the dispositions and on the attitudes of the citizens toward the "res publica" is very important through these authors, because of the characteristics and the good output of the governments.

Reading the classical works underlined by Almond ¹²⁴, particular prominence is given in fact to the human nature inside which the governments are born and take form: conceived as human products, those vary depending on some dispositions of the man (Plato, *La Repubblica*, cit. in Almond 1990: 138). The connection between the civil society and the exquisitely democratic results does appear among the enlightened scholars such as Tocqueville, which in his *Democracy in America*, clarifies the

¹²³ See Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky.

¹²⁴ The reference here is to the 1990 essay by Almond, but on this, see also *The Civic Culture Revisited* (1980), from the same author.

sense in which the word "customs" is intended, in order to give prominence to the moral and intellectual condition of the people (Almond 1990: 139). Nonetheless, the connection between the political culture and the political processes is also part of the modern sociology, particularly in Marx and in Weber, both underlining the importance of the role of the values and of the public spirit of the citizens on the political processes, the importance of the role of the individualism, of the religious substratum and of the spirit of the capital, very central matters in the reflections of the western political thought (ibidem).

Despite the traces of the reflection on the role of the "public spirit" of the citizens on the political processes is lost along the centuries, Almond and Verba finalize the first political study centered on the concept of political culture (1963), introducing in the political science a terminology borrowed by the socio-anthropological tradition, to re-phrase in a modern style themes of which political thinkers kept on being interested upon since the ancient age (Sani 1989: 91).

Almond introduces in 1956 a proposal of conceptual renewal of the categories of analysis, inserted in a process of general transformation of the political science, until then effectively stuck on the study of the institutions. Accepting concepts borrowed by other social sciences, the approaches of study widen to the observation of other political contexts adopting a comparative perspective in a systematic and explicit way, setting the accent on the behaviors rather than on the norms and on the institutions, as well as assigning the task to corroborate it, or to look for an improved theoretical reflection, to the empirical control (Mannheimer and Sani 1988: 198).

Moreover, Almond lists the influences and the scientific progress that have allowed the emergence of this new perspective. From the point of view of the intellectual suggestions, the author quotes the sociological tradition (with the *stimuli* coming from Weber, Durkheim and Parsons), that of the social psychology (quoting, among the others, Adorno and Horkheimer, Benedict, Mead, Lasswell) and the psychoanthropological tradition (more than the others, Lippman and Lasswell).

The impulses coming from the sociology of Max Weber were particularly

remarkable, with the central role assumed by the values in the Action Theory and his definition of the bases of legitimacy of the political authority, as well as those coming from the proposal by Talcott Parsons on the “patterns variables” (universalism - particularism, achievement - ascription, specificity - diffusion, affective neutrality - affectivity). Also the development of the Freudian approach freudiano in American anthropology, with the concept of basic personality and the importance of the processes of socialization, not only relevant in the infancy but for the whole cycle of someone’s life (Almagisti 2006).

The concept of political culture has been able to emerge with the development of the behavioral perspective of the social psychology, thanks to the work by Louis Guttman, Rensis Likert and Charles Osgood, the empirical analysis of the attitudes did develop, with the elaboration of different attitude scales to collect and to compare data on opinions, attitudes and values and the new methodology of the survey research, that allowed to take note of the data through structured questionnaires and to also replicate the same survey in different contexts and different moments. Almond considers the development of the methods of research through the survey as the most important factor for the affirmation of the field of political culture: "(t)he invention of the technology of the survey research can be compared to the invention of the microscope, since if the latter has made it possible and accurate a strongly increased decomposition of the biological data, the former has reached the same result for the social, psychological and political data" (Almond 1990: 142).

Initially Almond uses the concept of political culture (1956) to give a framework and a typology of political systems able to inform the following empirical research, though without defining and identifying the concept of political culture, neither its status as variable in the interpretative scheme. Almond reaches a less vague and ambiguous definition, together with Verba, in the 1963 volume: they clarify that political culture as a whole represents the subjective orientations towards the politics within a national population or in a subgroup of it, and it is constituted by knowledge and beliefs towards politics, as well as by the adhesion to certain political values.

Therefore Almond and Verba adopt a definition of culture that

fundamentally has a psychological base, being a whole attitudes, or better a particular configuration of attitudes, referable to three dimensions: the cognitive one, constituted from the beliefs and from the knowledge related to the politics; the affective one, constituted by the personal feelings toward the structures of authority; the evaluative one, constituted by the judgments and the opinions of the individuals on the political phenomena.

From the combination of these three dimensions the authors elaborate a classification of political culture corresponding to three groups: parochial, characterized by scarce awareness of the system; subjective, characterized from citizens that ask to participate, but that are not willing to; participant, in which citizens are explicitly interested in political activity by asking and participating. Almond and Verba do therefore associate three different types of political structures to these three types of political culture: the traditional localistic, the authoritarian centralized, the representative democracy.

The *almondian* conception of political culture suffered numerous criticisms during the years, that can analytically be gathered in three separate seams, although introducing a lot of overlaps and often one collides with another one. The first seam is effectively on the nature of the concept of political culture; the second one is on the adopted methodology; the third one is, finally, on the theory of the political culture, the interpretative scheme which portrays political culture as determining the quality of the democratic institutions.

Relatively to the first seam of criticisms, the accent is set on the functionalist and behavioralist origin of the *almondian* concept and on its meaning. The weight of the functionalist paradigm is present above all, by the critics, in the narrow connotation that Almond gives of the concept of political culture, considering the political sphere as clearly separated from the rest of the social system. The separation of the political sphere from the other social dimensions, has the risk of not considering the relationships that also exist among the political, the economic, the religious and the other dimensions of the life in a society.

Taking the political sphere out from culture, considered by the other disciplines as an integrated and not separable whole: on the one hand this

is a consequence of importing in the discipline a concept by itself subject to a plurality of meanings (Almond and Verba 1963: 14); on the other hand, it creates an "external definition, created by the researcher", and therefore "conventional and arbitrary (...) easily object of criticisms" (Mannheimer and Sani 1988: 200).

Staying on the functionalist formulation of the almondian approach, another related criticism concerns the strong normative formulation of a theoretical scheme built on the base of the ideal American democratic liberals. The categories used for operationalizing the concept of political culture hid valorial conceptions with a cultural matrix of Anglo-Saxon tradition under the claim of generality and applicability in different contexts (Pateman, 1980; Wiatr 1980). The strong normative accent is criticized especially in how much it would darken the ability to understand and to explain the differences among the different contexts that inevitably do emerge with a comparative analysis, risking to fall into homologation and leveling (Caciagli 1988: 272).

At the same time, the homogeneity of the single term culture doesn't foresee the hypothesis of a cultural differentiation that would suit much better for complex realities such as the modern societies (Mannheimer and Sani 1988: 201). Besides that, to consider the political culture as deeply shared from everybody or from the greatest part of the actors of a society, it would betray a conservative vision, supporting the status quo, therefore missing an explanation of the change and the consideration of the elements that would be awry of the cultural factors, such as the social and institutional position of the subjects and the presence of coercive strengths and affairs that maintain and strengthen the conformity to the established norms (Wiatr 1980).

Moreover, from the behaviorist formulation of the almondian approach, it derives the conception of the political culture as mere aggregate of individual psychological tendencies, without any distinction between subjective and intersubjective meanings, within a dimension out of the history, that doesn't allow to gather the heritages of the past and the characteristics of the socio-economic and geographical environment identifying its genesis and persistence (Allum, 1988; Caciagli 1988). The meaning issue is central for the criticisms, that have then started

alternative attempts of a new formulation of the concept.

The empiricist epistemology forces to directly read culture beginning from the behaviors and their changes, rather than to understand it and to interpret it based on descriptions and signs, full of meanings, or on the social routines it is constituted of (Allum 1988: 262-263). The almondian approach does therefore confuse public opinion and political culture, the aggregate of beliefs and values with the social framework, or rather with the structures and the systems of meaning within which the beliefs and the values find place.

Culture provides the range of the possible behavioral alternatives, while subjective and psychological factors, such as values, beliefs, feelings and orientations do compete to determine the choice among the practicable alternatives in a precise moment. It is therefore different the status of the concept, where political culture is no more the factor determining the action, but it is a system of meaning that, giving a sense to the action, does offer its presuppositions. The hermeneutic approach, to which this interpretation is referred, sees also therefore a different explanatory ability of the concept in comparison to the empiricist approach. Empirically intended, political culture is very useful in explaining and foretelling the political action, while the hermeneutic approach does not have any idea of doing it: it does not deal with a previous understanding previously but with a posterior one, to describe and to deepen the object under investigation.

Laudan (1977; cit. in Johnson 2003: 92) calls this an external conceptual problem: that political culture developed beginning from the almondian approach and conceptualized as aggregate of attitudes, values and subjective beliefs, but it did not keep in mind the advancements in the other disciplines.

Beginning from Geertz's interpretative approach to culture (1973), defining it as the whole symbols and practices embodying the meanings through which humans model their experiences, the cultural anthropologists of different theoretical origins did agree with the idea that culture consists of intersubjectively shared symbols, manifested in ritual or other cultural practices to whom the actors assign again meanings

when they must give a conceptual order to the political and social world. These conceptual developments, following words from critics, are not kept in consideration in the research on political culture that followed to the pioneer *The Civic Culture*, because driven by methodological obligations to assume a more suggestive definition of "mass orientations" or "public opinion" (Reisinger, 1995: 332).

It is evident from the previous debate that the controversies on the conceptual plan do inevitably call for the methodological choices, closely connected and very much criticized. The choice to adopt the survey methods responded both to the definition of political culture adopted by the authors and to the demand, proper of the influential trends of those years, to systematically submit the formulated hypotheses to empirical validation in the theoretical center and to the necessity to have comparable data related to more cultures from different contexts.

The authors chose this method of research, the survey, substantially due to the negative judgment on the traditional methods of research: direct observation, participant observation, study of documents, content analysis did not satisfy the demands of systematic collection of data (Mannheimer and Sani 1988: 203-204).

Nevertheless, if the methodological choice of the cross-cultural survey responded to precise theoretical objectives, the limited national samples (a thousand of interviews for each of the five countries) did not allow to adequately deepen the treatment of complex attitudes and composing a national political culture. Moreover, in some contexts such as Italy, where *The Civic Culture* has been welcomed with a certain skepticism among the researchers, the survey tool aroused different perplexities relating to its reliability, given the well-known unwillingness of the population to openly talk about politics and to reveal their own political preferences (Sani 1980)¹²⁵.

The theoretical scheme which constitute the base of the concept of political culture, has received many criticisms: the most frequent notes

¹²⁵ Almond and Verba founded their conclusions only on 52% of the respondents. The difference between those who answered to be voting PCI and PSI, and those who effectively voted for these two parties is extremely relevant (4,4% of the sample declared to be voting PCI, when they received 22,7% in the previous elections, likewise those who answered to have voted PSI were 5,5% respect to the 14,2% of votes casted in the previous elections).

concern, on the one hand, the problem of the causality of the terms of the relationship and, on the other hand, the claim to consider political culture as a connection between the micro and the macro dimension of analysis of politics.

Regarding the first aspect, the critics focused on the fact that the civic orientations are not a cause of the democracy but rather an effect, and the fact that it would be the democratic political organization to produce high-level of civism and not the other way around (Pateman, 1971, 1980; Barry, 1970, 1978). Although Almond and the other researchers that have applied its approach did reply that the direction of the relationship is quite ambiguous, meaning that causality is valid in both the directions (the political attitudes influence the structure and the political behavior, and the structure and the political performances do influence the attitudes) (Almond, 1980, 1983, 1990; Inglehart, 1988; Verba, 1965; Putnam, 1993), the critics of the theory of political culture argue that the missed specification of the causal mechanisms does represent an insuperable logical leak, mostly for the functionalist matrix to which it is inspired (Dittmer 1977).

About the second main criticism, the claim to consider political culture as a connection between micro and macro dimensions of politics, the concern is on the lack of elements to consider the systemic implications that political culture (considered as mass attitudes) would have as scientifically founded. The same Verba (1980), Almost twenty years after *The Civic Culture*, Verba (1980) admits that the bond between the political values and the activity of the political system is too much weak, and above all it is still a connection that remains without explanation. The importance of this conception of political culture is therefore limited to the problems of micro-politics, in how much the mass attitudes very rarely have implications on the characteristics of the political system (for example, conditioning the behaviors of the society, such as voting) (Mannheimer and Sani, 1988)

3.2.2 Culture vs. Political Culture? How to make a distinction and why

The definitions of the concept of political culture are numerous and diversified at least as much as the researchers that have made use of the same concept during the decades (Reisinger 1995; Lane 1992; Patrick 1984). In their empirical job, Almond and Verba (1963) define political culture as the whole attitudes of the citizens toward the political system and its parts and towards their own role in the system. A couple of years later, Verba (1965) defines it as the system of the empirical beliefs, of expressive symbols and of values that define the situation in which the political actions take place, showing a problem that the researchers had already met in the preceding definition, likewise the vagueness of the limits of the term "attitude" used to characterize the elements of political culture (Reisinger 1995).

Also Inglehart, departing from the original definition of Almond and Verba describes (1988) political culture in terms of habits (or customs) and diffused attitudes among the population, including therefore the types of behavior, which Almond and Verba excluded from their definition; in other works (1990), he defines it as a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that are broadly shared inside a society, transmitted by a generation to the other. Another exponent of the theory of the political culture, Eckstein (1988) in the definition of the components of the political culture (cognitive, affective and evaluative), does prefer the term "orientations" rather than "attitudes", since it is more general and it welcomes attitudes, too, considered as more specific, contrarywise.

A further difference among these authors concerns the choice of the terms to define the complexity of the attitudes/orientations involved in the concept of political culture. If for Almond and Verba it deals with a "together", postponing to an approach of elements which are equal among them, Eckstein writes about "models" and Inglehart deal with "system of", inducing to think about specific relationships existing among the different parts.

Many proposals based on Almond and Verba wide definition of political

culture came into the debate. Patrick (1984) gathered them in four different types:

- the psychological or subjective definition, exemplified from the definition of Almond and Verba (1963) and of Almond and Powell (1966), characterized by an high generality that leaves a relevant uncertainty on what constitutes the political orientations or the political attitudes which still need to be specified, and that therefore it results inadequate in its denotative quality¹²⁶;
- the heuristic definition, proposed by Pye (1962, 1965, 1968, 1972 cits. in Patrick 1984) which although intrinsically refers to the psychological and subjective aspects as that almondiana it distinguishes for the different weight attributed to the aggregation of the orientations of the individuals that cannot be considered by itself the political culture of a country; this will rather be an hypothetical construction derived by the predominant psychological orientations in a certain population, but it doesn't coincide with them;
- the objective definition, employed by Easton (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984) which underlines that the concept of political culture must refer particularly to the coercive or normative elements of the system, or to those norms and values that prescribe particular models of thought, of attitudes and of actions that the individuals perceive to have a coercive strength;
- the global definition, offered by Fagen (1969, cit. in Patrick 1984) and Tucker (1971, cit. in Patrick 1984) which believes that the notion of political culture must not exclusively be of psychological nature, but must also include recurrent models of manifested or latent behavior, therefore extensively modifying the preceding definitions.

The critical aspects on this point are more evident when the results of different projects of research need confirmation or disapproval, since the meaning of the concept varies according to the parameters of research

¹²⁶ Denotation or extension is referred to the series of empirical references to whom the concept may be applied (Sartori, 1984).

every author has (Lane 1992). Looking at the empirical references used by the authors that adopt different definitions (with the greatest part of them adopting the psychological of Almondian origin), Patrick (1984: 281-284) shows as there is a great variety of elements considered and that these can be summarized in cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations, and political objects to which orientations do refer to.

As regards to the cognitive orientations, the main empirical references concern the knowledge and the ability, the information, the perception and the awareness, the expectations, the norms and the myths, the practices, the ideas and the assumptions. Considering the affective orientations, the concern is on the emotional dispositions, the feelings, the attitudes, the trust, the symbols, the identification and the affiliation. Finally, the empirical references of the evaluative orientations, dealing with the values, the ideal, the objectives, the judgments, the evaluations, the opinions, the motivations, the principles.

Indeed, all these empirical references of political culture do refer to the political objects, which are also very diversified: the system of government and the institutions, the political process, the political interaction, the political behavior, the support and the political applications, the actions of the government, the role of oneself and of the others in politics, the nature of the power and the political authority, the rules and the procedures governing the political interaction. For each of these elements of reference the empirical applications in the studies of the different authors are different.

Particularly three elements are the most recurrent independently from the type of definition adopted for the political culture: the values, the beliefs and the attitudes. Nevertheless, according to the type of definition, their content varies.

For the psychological definition the values can refer then to the individual preferences, to the needs or to the desires, as to the evaluations of the consequences of a particular course of action on the instrumental use of determined political objects, in order to reach the decided purposes, or to the principles and the criteria of judgment that determine the preferences and that are active in the process of evaluation, or still to the perception

of the system of values that drives the political life and that can finally refer to the feelings and the appointment toward the political system from its members.

Contrarywise, for the heuristic and objective definition, the values are not individual but the system of values in its complex, what for instance determines the choice of the goals that pursues the political system perceives.

Also the empirical content of the beliefs, the second most recurrent element, does differ according to the definition of political culture adopted defined. For Verba (Pye and Verba 1965, cit. in Patrick 1984), the beliefs concern models of political interaction and political institutions and may refer to the actual state of the political life. In fact the beliefs in this perspective are constituted by a combination of the affective, evaluative and cognitive components, and they concern deeper, more rooted and general dimensions of the thought than those which could be described by attitudes or opinions.

Nevertheless, the authors that tightly define the political culture in a psychological sense do often operationalize the beliefs in terms of levels of trust or mistrust toward the political system and the political authorities or as beliefs on the legitimacy of these political objects.

Finally, the attitudes, the third more recurrent element, do assume a great importance for the psychological and global definitions, that intend them as stable ways to think, or as opinions, feelings and psychological predispositions toward particular models of behavior.

These differences make the definition of the limits of the properties of the concept somehow problematic, therefore leaving it open to the most different meanings. According to Patrick (1984) to delineate the confinements of the concept is necessary to specify its original subject or the "place" where it is formed, its content, its function. Nevertheless, on each of these elements there is great differentiation in comparison to the different types of definition of the concept.

Looking at the original subject of political culture means to focus on its unit of analysis. The place where it is originated, it is formed, it emerges:

that is the space to be observed to describe and to understand the political culture of a country. For the authors working with the psychological and global definition, the unit of analysis is the plurality of the individuals, considering them as an aggregate, likewise a national population or subgroups of it. For those working with the objective and heuristic definition instead, the unit of analysis of the political culture must be found in the system, understood as the normative frame that defines it. For the first formers the references are the value principles and the imposed rules sustaining and comprehended in the character of a political regime. For the latter the reference are the values, that can be indeed critical for the endurance of a political regime.

The particular properties, the characteristics, the dimensions that constitute the content of political culture are the focus of observation of the researchers and, as it was previously noticed, this is particularly represented by the beliefs, the values and the attitudes for most of the authors. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the empirical references are very diversified. In the literature there is not a unique criterion to select the indicators of such beliefs, values and attitudes.

Some authors do emphasize basic general, native and fundamental value models, while others focus on the political importance, on the wide share or frequency with which they are produced, thus stretching the concept, which inevitably suffers from the evaluations and the interests of the researcher.

Verba (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984) does elaborate three criteria to identify the most meaningful aspects for a political culture: the importance in classifying and differentiating the political systems; the importance in the political system, since the individuals should have some orientations to that respect; the importance for the modernization and the political development. The third element, the function of political culture is, unlike the others, rather shared in the literature, beyond the differences in definition.

According to Patrick¹²⁷, political culture would develop a double function inside a political system, an individual or psychological one and a

¹²⁷ See ... Patrick 1984

systemic or organizational one. The individual function works in the moment in which the common norms and the frame of values imposed by a political regime provides the individuals with the definition and the meaning of the situation they are not familiar with.

Likewise, for those authors following the psychological definition, political culture is at the same time a source of meanings and tool to understand those meanings. For Verba (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984) political culture defines the situation in which the political action takes place, while for Rosenbaum (1975; cit. in Patrick 1984) it teaches to the people how to form their own opinions, how to express them and whereto head them, which ones are important by themselves and which expectations to have toward their own role in the civic life. Finally, for Pye (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984) political culture guidelines for an effective political behavior.

Also on the systemic or organizational function there is a good convergence among the researchers that refer themselves to the different definitions of political culture. For Parsons (Parsons and Shils 1962; cit. in Patrick 1984) and Easton (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984), political culture constitutes the most effective mechanism to induce the citizens to voluntarily conform through the internalization of a common system of norms, values and symbols imposed by the authority. Likewise for Verba (1965; cit. in Patrick 1984) political culture represents a system to control the social interactions, while for Pye it gives a structure of values and rational considerations to the collectivity, thus assuring coherence in the activity of the institutions, and therefore providing discipline.

Through all of these reflections political culture is functional or not to the survival, to the duration and the persistence of every political system: it is functional if compatible with its purposes and principles; it is not functional if there is incongruity between beliefs and reality.

Including the function of political culture among the elements defining the concept allows to fill the discrepancy among its different conceptualizations. If the psychological definition, unlike that objective and the heuristic ones, does not address the matter of the differentiation among attitudes that are culturally operational in the political field from

those that are not, the function developed by the political culture can set the limits of the concept, adding to the mere specification of the content. The first definition, in fact, referring to the states of mind of an aggregate of individuals, can be closed using the function of maintenance of the stability of the political system which limits the denotation to the attitudes relevant to this goal.

Through the elements considered till now, therefore, Patrick succeeds in re-conceptualizing political culture, carrying the differences in the present definitions in the literature toward a synthesis that keeps in mind the common elements and those that specify the concept more than other, by increasing its adequacy on the denotation plan. Political culture, in this perspective, is seen how "the whole beliefs, values and fundamental attitudes that characterize the nature of the political system and that regulate the political interaction among its members. The core of these beliefs, values and fundamental attitudes is constituted by those orientations associated with:

- the conceptions and the knowledge related to the nature of the political reality;
- the conceptions related to the purposes and to the objectives of the government;
- the conceptions related to the nature and to the purpose of the power and the authority" (1984: 297-298).

Almond and Verba in *The Civic Culture* propose a model of reproduction of political culture mainly founded upon the socialization made by the family, the institutions, the mass media. Socialization is the principal mechanism that operates for maintaining the stability of the political system.

In the chapter devoted to the formation of the political culture, the authors widen and complicate the classical model of the primary socialization, including the phases of adolescence and adult life in which the subject is socialized to politics, and comprehending as meaningful experiences to the purpose of the formation also other not political orientations. Thus, the participation to the decisions inside the family, of

the school and of the job or the possibility to express personal points of view and the consideration inside these contexts, all of those become meaningful experiences that have an impact on the formation of the involvement of the individual inside the society and, particularly, into the political sphere.

The experience with different models of authority, as well as with different models of interpersonal relationships that happens in the infancy, in the adolescence and in the adult age would be therefore an explanatory factor of the greatest or smaller political participation. The individuals would bring the experience related to non political contexts inside the political life, developing competence, propensity to participate and trust in their own ability to influence collective decisions.

Nevertheless, according to some authors, this model has not been enough investigated. An explanation of the narrow relationship between the civic culture and the socio-economic status of the individuals is not available, assuming civic culture to be casually distributed among all the citizens, and underestimating the impact of the structure on culture (Pateman, 1971; 1980). The political competence, the involvement, the trust, are cultural traits tied up to the social position of the individuals, to their level of education, to their occupational status and their gender.

The highest social positions are also those with the greatest levels of political participation, making therefore evident that civic culture is not casually distributed among the citizens. Pateman (1980) suggests that it is not possible to consider the existence of a unique political culture for every political system, while more political cultures do exist in close relationship with the presence and the dimension of the different social groups inside a society. Almond and Verba simply underestimate the social inequalities underlying their model of the civic culture and the formal political equality of the model of the liberal democracy they were inspired by.

Besides this gap, the model realized by Almond and Verba, although expressly speaking of political socialization in the adult age and dedicating a lot of pages to the importance of the experiences inside non-political contexts, does not problematize the mediatic experience, that

approaches the citizen to politics, forming and informing him about the *res publica*. The experience mediatica is in fact just mentioned in the text, without being problematizzata. But almost thirty years later, Almond (1990) takes back the most meaningful changes intervened in the process of political socialization expressly quoting the advent of the electronic media and particularly the relevance assumed by the television.

Almond wrote *The Civic Culture* when the role of the media in the formation of the attitudes and the political behaviors of the citizens was considered minimum or however mediated by the social context, and above all from the opinions leaders, trustworthy people coming from inside the community, interpreting the messages coming from the mass media, to protect the individuals from mass manipulation¹²⁸.

The diffusion of the television has weakened the importance of the opinions leaders, making the access to the political information immediate and acquiring a main role in the formulation of values and attitudes (Almond 1990). The research teams driven by Verba in the following years have underlined as also the political élites do consider the mass media at a very high level of influence (Verba and Orren 1985; Verba et al. 1987; cit. in Almond 1990). Therefore, the most recent *almondian* formulation sees a weakening of the bond between the ideas and the political beliefs and the experiences in the family and institutional contexts.

Among the other researchers which have been dealing with political culture, Inglehart (1977, 1988 1990) is certainly the one who has devoted, in his theory on the change of the values in the western society, a remarkable place, at least at a theoretical level, to the process of formation of the political culture. He argues that the conditions of economic and social comfort that have characterized the western societies in the postwar period have determined a progressive change of the values of the generations, that have lived the infancy under conditions of relative safety. The process of socialization, considered by Almond and Verba the engine of the civic culture, does receive further details with Inglehart: he is able to take into account the individual material conditions, while looking at the collective conditions that might have implications on the

¹²⁸ It is the *Two step flow of communication* as by Lazarsfeld and Katz in 1955.

orientations of the people¹²⁹.

3.2.3 Some notes on the Italian situation on the studies of political culture.

The book by Almond and Verba was not positively welcomed by the Italian scientific community, and it can be rather possible to affirm that it was almost ignored (Sani 1980).

The reasons for such indifference were various and different: during the same period in which *The Civic Culture* was published, in Italy other studies went out on the relationship of the citizens with politics, arousing a lot of interest and creating the bases of the knowledge of the mass attitudes and of the political behavior of the Italian citizens. The job of Spreafico and La Palombara (1963, cit. in Sani 1980) on the 1958 political elections investigated similar themes to those analyzed by the American researchers, using their same techniques but with a great adherence to the Italian reality. In the same times, some researchers, gathered through the Institute Cattaneo, had started a series of researches on political participation, with a closer approach proper to European sociology, completely different from the survey's adopted by the Americans.

From this point of view, the information and the data related to the cultural aspects of the Italian politics were already available without considering the study by Almond and Verba, which seemed to suit very little for the Italian democracy. Moreover, studies dealing with the quality of the operation of the democratic regime were rather focused on the institutional architecture and on the structural characteristics like the party system, the presence of antisystem-parties, the lack of change of the political parties in power, the international pressures. The cultural factors at the mass level were not considered central matters in the analyses and in the interpretations of the stability of the democratic regime.

¹²⁹ Note on Inglehart approach and results ... Welzel and Dalton (2015)

The Italian political culture was characterized, through the perspective of Almond and Verba, from a scarce trust in the democratic institutions and in his/her representatives, by a scarce participation in the public life, by a low sense of political effectiveness perceived by the citizens, by a mediocrity level of political competence and by limited interest for the *res publica*. Italian political culture was defined parochial, particularistic, and Italians appeared to be lacking other important characteristics to delineate the political culture, besides their relationship with the political sphere focused on distrust, indifference and incompetence.

Particularly, a diffused mistrust was recorded in the social environment that was not the familiar one, and also a scarce participation in the voluntary associations: these aspects were already noticed by a research of the 1958 conducted by Edward Banfield, who had created the expression *familismo amorale* to describe the prevailing cultural line of a small community in southern Italy. He found out “particularism” in Montegrano (false name for the city of Chiaromonte, in the Region Basilicata) through an ethnographic research: although tightly connected with a situation of strong socio-economic marginality of that population, it was due, according to the author, to the incapability of the citizens to associate themselves for advancing common demands to the local administration, while the practice of demanding individual and familiar favors was the most shared one.

The weakness of the social bonds and the absence of a suitable political culture to promote a good management of the *res publica*: this has been also a result Putnam obtained from his research many years later (1993). Nevertheless, in the analysis of Putnam it emerged as the output of the public management was very diversified among the Italian regions according to the intensity of the social capital that characterized that: the social capital was measured with indicators such as the reading of the newspapers and the diffusion of associations (indicators of interest and social participation) and electoral abstention with the referenda and use of the preference vote (indicators of a clientelistic political model).

Nevertheless, the political alienation and the social isolation of the Italian citizens, noticed by the American researches of the 1950s, did not match with the data showing an high rate of electoral participation, millions of

people enrolled in the great mass parties and in the trade unions, besides an important rate of participation for the political and social mobilizations frequently happening in Italy.

Thanks to the first researches on electoral behavior in Italy by the researchers working by the Institute Cattaneo¹³⁰, it emerged the existence of two main political subcultures, the socialist and the catholic, strongly rooted in the different geographical zones, respectively in the Center and in the North-East of the country, tracing two socio-political cleavages, the religious and the social class ones, identified by Rokkan (1967) with his genetic perspective of formation of the European political parties.

Those two deeply different conceptions of the world, to which it could be added at least a third one, culturally defined secular, that furnished, in their interaction, the interpretation of the Italian political system, with its tensions, difficulty of operation and missing evolution (Sani 1989). In comparison to the study of Almond and Verba, which was directed to the comparative analysis, the Italian researches were direct to deeply understand and describe the characteristics of the Italian political culture, without necessarily bringing it back to more general kind of scheme. Besides that, while the American researchers studied the political culture as a unique phenomenon, the Italian researchers were interested in the geo-political differentiations that seemed to be structured since the 19th century.

Different levels of analysis correspond to different sources adopted: the Italian researches, in fact, worked with the many electoral data at town and provincial level, the data of the affiliates to the parties, to the labor unions and the associations connected with the parties, as well as in depth interviews with the activists of the principal Italian parties. Following the researches started by the Cattaneo, in Italy three seams of study were developed: the first one on the study of the electoral behavior, the second one to analyze the territorial political subcultures, the third one to deepen the field of values and attitudes of the individuals (Sani 1989).

¹³⁰ Here the first contribution to be cited are those by Sivini (1967, 1968), Poggi (1968).

From the first type of studies¹³¹, although it did not aspire to privilege the study of political culture, interesting contributions emerged in the direction of the underlying cultural factors to the vote choice. The interpretative scheme of the researchers of the Cattaneo was founded upon the hypothesis that the extraordinary stability of the Italian electorate was essentially explainable with the existence of rooted cultural traditions in some geographical macro-areas, in which the political tradition was also a familiar tradition and in whose nets of affiliation there would have been a good part of the Italian citizens, making the attitude toward the vote as acquired and not modifiable, if not under exceptional conditions (Galli et al. 1968).

These cultural factors were therefore at the base of the vote choice, reproduced through the process of socialization by the family and the structures of political and social aggregation, strictly connected with the hegemonic party in a determined territory.

The typology of vote by Parisi and Pasquino (1977) does directly refer to this connotation, in the moment in which, trying to explain the unexpected electoral fluidity of the seventies, it distinguishes, from other two types of vote, the vote of affiliation which realizes the organic identification of the voter with the subculture he refers to¹³². Poggi (1968) already underlined the great importance, in one of the first secondary analyses of electoral surveys, for the formation of the choices of vote, of the attitude toward the Church, pointing out that the road he observed in the cultural factors and in the nets of affiliation was a better explanation than that founded only upon the socio-economic factors.

The second type of studies originated by the first researches of the Cattaneo scholars was the analysis of the local political cultures. These studies looked at the social, economic and productive structure of the different Italian geographical areas¹³³. The premise of this approach was that there would be sense of speaking about a single Italian political culture, given the elevated fragmentation and differentiation of the

¹³¹ Studies on electoral behavior, in Italy, adopted two approaches: the survey and the ecological-cartographical. They provided different hypotheses on the causal factors underlying the vote choice. See on this: Mannheim 1989.

¹³² The other two forms of voting being exchange vote and opinion vote.

¹³³ The Italian territory was divided in 6 homogeneous zones, regarding political, economic and geographic characteristics.

territory in different subcultures. By this perspective it is therefore privileged the study of single communities and small social components instead of studying the whole population.

The purpose of these studies was gathering the peculiarities, the elements able to differentiate rather than unifying, the details of the groups under analysis. From this point of view, those analyses adopted a plurality of techniques, from the participant observation to the documentary sources, the in-depth interviews and the use of ecological data. This type of analysis investigated political culture in relationship to the local context and its customs, its social routine, its rituals and administrative styles, considering it a politically relevant system of meanings that was socially built, to investigate through life stories and in-depth interviews with an accurate reconstruction of the concrete system of action in a precise institutional context (Almagisti 2006).

The analyses realized by Bagnasco and Trigilia (1984, 1985) on a Third Italy were extremely relevant: this definition regarded an area where the hegemony of a unique party was rooted, a party with its institutional ramifications that had been able to produce and to cultivate a specific political subculture. Very interesting within these studies it has been the interpretation founded on the interlacement among economic and political development that resulted in a socio-cultural system characterized by low social conflicts, strong social relationships and a sense of community able to overcome the class differences.

This seam of studies has been and still is very productive (among the many contributions: Caciagli 1977, 1993; Trigilia 1986; Caciagli, Corbetta 1987; Diamanti, Parisi 1991; Baccetti, Caciagli 1992; Riccamboni 1992; Gangemi 1994; Diamanti 1995, 2003). Actually, there is a substantial agreement on the evolution of the catholic subculture, the white one, traditionally tied up to the DC in the North-Eastern areas of the country, progressively taken over by the Northern League with its autonomist claims and their defense of the identity. There is an ongoing debate with those who observe the unavoidable eclipse of the red subculture, the socialist one, tied up to the PCI in the central areas of the country (Caciagli 2009; 2011), and those who delineates its continuity instead, even though with important elements of change.

Finally, the third type of studies that developed in Italy, does concentrate on the original categories of the political culture: civism, values, trust and representations. The study of the political attitudes of the Italians or specific social groups through the surveys developed along different lines and themes, from the ideology of the elementary teachers and the representations of their own role in the society of the teachers, to the valorial profile of the public officials, of the young people and of the working class, of the entrepreneurial class and so on¹³⁴. It surely needs to be noticed the impressive work by Ronald Inglehart (1990; 1997) on the European data, where he theorized a causal relationship among the economic conditions of the individuals in the period of the socialization and the expression of values he defined as post-materialistic.

Expressly connecting his work with the theory of needs by Maslow (1954)¹³⁵, Inglehart explains the emergence of the needs for political participation, freedom and self-realization of the European generations which were born after 1950, with the conditions of great economic comfort that it guaranteed the satisfaction of the primary needs of personal and economic safety.

Even though the empirical data only weakly defended his theory, probably also because of the scarce methodological sophistication of the techniques used by the researcher (Marradi and Arculeo 1984), the typology of values Inglehart proposed surely enhanced the conceptual picture of political culture, recognizing a new analytical dimension and proposing a vision of the process of socialization also opened to the cohort effects, and therefore not tied up exclusively to the individual experiences. An analysis realized by Cartocci (1983; cit. in Marradi and Arculeo 1984), considering life periods and the educational level of the respondents, did confirm the hypothesis made by Inglehart.

Another strongly innovative research on the conceptual plan has been the one realized by Robert Putnam (1993) on the institutional output of the governments of the Italian regions. Using many sources, such as data collected through surveys, ecological data, official documents and

¹³⁴ For a review on survey research in Italy until the early eighties, see Marradi and Arculeo (1984).

¹³⁵ Maslow's theory of needs (1954) provided a hierarchy in this, comprehending human beings coming from any socio-cultural origin. Not getting into further details, it must be said that precondition for the emerging to the next class is to have satisfied the previous ones.

historical archives, Putnam shows that there is a strong relationship between the social capital and the different performances of the Italian regions. The notion of social capital refers "to the whole elements of the social organization: trust, shared norms, social networks, that can improve the efficiency of the society promoting the coordinated action of the individuals" (Putnam 1993: 169).

However Putnam's concept is strictly tied up with that of civic culture proposed by Almond and Verba, and while many do read it as its extension of his, others (Laitin 1995) consider it as the connection between the micro (individual) and that macro (systemic) level, which was missing in Almondian research. It is in fact its power of collective resource, almost of a public good, to be truly innovative. Not only an aggregate of individual orientations, but, contrarywise, a product of that aggregate, a multidimensional product whose ingredients are participation, trust and the civism, understood as the disposition to follow and to sustain the rules of the community.

Nevertheless, also in the case of the concept of social capital there are still attempts of redefinition, as well as discussions related to the possibility of measurement (Chiesi 2003) of such an abstract concept as that of political culture: this is not the right section in which describing the vast existing debate on this concept, somehow similar to that aroused by *The Civic Culture*¹³⁶. However it is necessary to underline the goals of this job by noticing that the concept of social capital by Putnam has given back new impulses to the researches on the cultural aspects of politics, renewing the interest of the researchers for the orientations of the citizens toward the *res publica*¹³⁷. Moreover, the great importance posed on the aspects of the associative life to the goals of the formation of a civic culture, and therefore of social capital, contributed to introduce more aspects to the analysis of political culture, not only political but coming from social life, too.

¹³⁶ The main criticisms on Putnam's work underline its missing an explicit mechanism connecting governmental performances with the cooperative spirit of its citizens, the missing univocal causal direction between trust and good institutional performance, the application of typical American indicators to the contexts analyzed, very different from Italian regions.

¹³⁷ Note on that about quantitative studies ... *Acta Sociologica, Economics, ...*

3.2.4 Theories of Culture and Cultural Theory: General and single theories

Despite the enormous debate aroused at the international level by the introduction of the concept of political culture by Almond and Verba, arising many and often repetitive criticisms, with numerous but considerable attempts of a new conceptual elaboration, the *almondian* approach remains the principal reference in the studies on political culture, today.

In Italy, where the reflections have been very critical towards its conceptual scheme, the methodology adopted and the interpretation of the results, "no efforts have followed to elaborate a new formulation of an alternative scheme or to propose an integration of the original approach with new components, considered the missing parts and the indication of the type of data that would have allowed to trace a more complete and realistic profile of the Italian political culture" (Sani 1989: 102-103).

Nevertheless, recent studies following the reflections aroused by the investigations of Inglehart and Putnam with their emphasis on richer dimensions than those considered by Almond and Verba, have advanced new proposals of conceptualization. For instance, the cognitive-symbolic approach, that expressly refers to Geertz, considers the political culture as part of the culture, more precisely interpreting not only the concept in relationship to the political features, but also in light of orientations, values, perceptions and beliefs that, also not having an evident and directed reference to the political dimension, nevertheless are able to produce durable and remarkable political effects (Cartocci 2009).

These studies explicitly refer to the concept of "familismo amorale" by Banfield (1958), with which the author describes the cultural syndrome founded upon radical pessimism, mistrust in the others and in the institutions, unavailability to the collective action. Even though it does not have an immediate political meaning, since it identifies a narrow horizon of sociality, it is anyway originating attitudes and political behaviors such as disloyalty and mistrust toward the institutions, therefore deprived of legitimacy, with reduced sensibility toward the

political corruption, scarce respect of the rules, availability to exchange the vote receiving favors for doing it.

"Political culture must be redefined therefore as a relatively fleeing circle of shared meanings, not previously catalogued according to rigid functionalist criteria but rather as a whole of cognitive and evaluative models related to aspects of the world that directly or indirectly assume political importance" (Cartocci 2002).¹³⁸

Likewise in the *almondian* approach, the references are the cognitive and evaluative models, still adopting the survey methodology. Nevertheless, unlike the American authors of the 1960s, there is a cleaner concept of political culture, less confined, mostly inclusive and less separated by the other social dimensions, supporting the analysis of the individual data with the analysis of the local situation (Cartocci, 1987; 1994).

This definition of political culture recovers the historically built intersubjective dimension, not predisposing too much rigid distinctions between the political culture and the cultural system in a wider sense: in other terms, phenomena concerning dimensions as religion or economy, even if not perceived as immediately connected to the political sphere, can anyway heavily condition it and, conversely, be conditioned by it.

3.2.5 Interdisciplinary Approaches to Culture.

Many attempts to define what culture is, and why it should be defined as a political matter, allowed various fields of study to pursue this search on their own.

It is possible to find, at least, three significant trends in efforts to define political culture in political science, different but not mutually exclusive: the first defines it as "shared values legitimating social relations" (Wildavsky, 1987); the second draws inspiration from game theoretic depictions of coordination dilemmas, tipping processes and behavior influenced by lack of complete information (Greif, 1994; Laitin and

¹³⁸ My translation.

Weingast, 2006; Kuran and Sandholm, 2008; Carvalho, 2011); finally, Weeden (2002) offers his conceptualization of culture as “semiotic practices” with a focus on meaning-making through rhetoric and symbolic displays, drawing inspiration from Laitin’s proposal to refocus the study of political culture on cultural symbols to be interpreted in their “full ethnographic context”.

Although political cultures are multifaceted and they do not necessarily overlap, spatially, with national borders (Nesbitt-Larking, 1992), advances in statistical analysis have made it possible to characterize the multifaceted nature of political culture to a greater extent than it was previously possible: in fact, Silver and Dowley (2000) find that within-country variation across ethnic groups often exceeds variation in attitudes across countries, suggesting that countries may not be the best units of analysis for exploring questions of political culture.

Defining an adequate working definition of political culture for my research was, then, a meaningful task, which must also consider the existence of various *political subcultures* in each European country: following Blaydes and Grimmer (2013), “different processes might lead to the existence of multiple subcultures within a single state” (ethnolinguistic, religious, geographic. etc.).

Various degrees of this concept do identify this as a continuous one, thus contributing to elaborate a valid tool to fruitfully investigate the distances between countries’ positioning in the national/transnational poles, since national cultures have been changing quite rapidly (Fernandez et al., 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Taras and Steel, 2006).

Among the several aspects/dimensions which could be chosen to the extent of this research, those explored by Triandis (1995) with Individualism-Collectivism could fit the case in a quite predictive way, somehow anticipating the discourse of multiple subcultures and the national/transnational continuum.

Unfortunately, since I had to look for a better theory to deepen my study, but with great relief (as it is a theoretically grounded approach), the Cultural Theory, developed by Wildavsky et al. on the previous work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (with her *grid-group typology*), does

allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the European Political Cultures with a simple and interdisciplinary portrait.

Douglas' work is a sociological theory of the plausibility of different forms of religion, worldview and ideology: she attempts to relate different varieties of belief to different types of society.

As a Durkheimian, Douglas argues for a causal connection between social life and cosmology: the nature of society is that certain common social experiences take the same symbolic forms, recognizable across historical and cultural diversity.

Douglas' self appointed task is to chart people's social experiences in such a way that their connection with cosmology becomes plain: her grid-group diagram is a scheme for classifying social relations as they are experienced by the individual, and to obtain this she isolates two dimensions of social life relatively independent of one another, vertically called grid and horizontally called group.

Even though Mary Douglas has gone through three versions of her theory, the shape of the theory has remained the same (Spickard, 1989).

Wildavsky et al., in 1990, built their "theoretical edifice" on Douglas' pioneer work, presenting "a theory of sociocultural viability that explains how life maintain (and fail to maintain) themselves. (...) The viability of a way of life, we argue, depends upon a mutually supportive relationship between a particular cultural bias¹³⁹ and a particular pattern of social relations" (Wildavsky et al. 1990, 1-2).

Their theory starts from the grid-group typology proposed by Mary Douglas, who argued that the way an individual is involved in social life should be nicely captured by two dimensions of sociality: the group, the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units; the grid, the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions (Wildavsky et al. 1990, 5).

¹³⁹ "(...) the shared meanings, the common convictions, the moral markers, the subtle rewards, penalties, and expectations common to a way of life (...)" (Wildavsky et al. 1990, 59).

These two dimensions generate 5 social beings (individualist, egalitarian, hierarchist, fatalist, hermit) constituting the elements of the Cultural Theory.

High Grid	B. Fatalism (Apathy, Risk Averse, Nature Capricious, Blame Fate)	C. Hierarchy (Bureaucracy, Decisions from Above, Nature Perverse, Blame Deviants)
Low Grid	A. Individualism (Free Exchange, Competition, Nature Benign, Blame Incompetence)	D. Egalitarianism (Sharing, Concern with Moral Purity and Boundaries against Outsiders, Nature is Ephemeral, Blame the System)
	Low Group	High Group

A draft of the scheme, where hermit position is not put because of a particular reason: while Mary Douglas think of it as completely external of the table, Wildavsky et al. place it at the central crossing.

4. Theoretical Framework.

4.1 Intro to the Puzzled Theories: An Interdisciplinary Approach

What is needed here is a puzzled introduction to the reason why this work needs more than a theoretical approach, to gather the results it is intended to deliver.

As for the literature review, it was hard to join the theoretical framework and squeeze it at once: thus, through a short but explaining conclusion the two theoretical fields will find a common road towards their inter-field position.

Necessary to connect the macro situation, even historically complex, the review of the literature would have needed to be too extensive in order to give details of every particular development in the field: therefore, deliberative and cultural theory are further explained in two following distinct sections, allowing the reader to experience a major knowledge of the ongoing debates with their practical evolution.

4.2 First of All: Deliberative Theory(-ies)

At this point, there is not effective need for justifying the choice of the Deliberative Theory, as if there were any other approach to follow for the purpose of analyzing deliberative small groups in action during the EuroPolis quasi-experiment.

However, through theoretical and empirical studies closely related to the aims of the present research, evidence of the *why* and *how* a particular trend of Deliberative Theory has been adopted, will be shown.

John Dryzek has declared that “Deliberative democracy now constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety (not just

democratic theory).”¹⁴⁰ There is no question that deliberative democracy is the most prominent model in contemporary democratic thought, and I will now provide a general depiction of the main features of deliberative theory. Of course, there is not unanimity among all deliberative thinkers, and the notion of deliberation itself is not the same in all conceptions of the theory; nonetheless, a broad sketch of deliberative democracy’s central characteristics is possible, summarizing and adding to the previous broader review of the literature.

Deliberative democratic theory bears distinct influence from the thought of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas¹⁴¹. Especially important are Rawls’s notion of “public reason,” and Habermas’s description of “opinion-formation in a mobilized public sphere.” Rawls explains how the “ideal of public reason” requires that citizens “should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality,” and that they show “a willingness to listen to what others have to say and [be] ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in [their] own view”; he also states that “public reason applies (...) to citizens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum, in political campaigns for example...[and] to public and government officers in official forums, in their debates and votes on the floor of the legislature.”¹⁴²

Habermas characterizes the formation of public opinion as taking place through a “public sphere [which] can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view (...) the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions”; and ideally, the opinions formed are “motivated solely by the unforced force of the better argument.”¹⁴³

Above all else, deliberative theorists have insisted that deliberators

¹⁴⁰ John Dryzek, “Theory, Evidence, and the Tasks of Deliberation”, in *Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern?*, ed. Shawn Rosenberg (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 237.

¹⁴¹ Rawls and Habermas do have their differences, but as they both note, those differences are “familial”; see Jurgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”, *Journal of Philosophy* 92, no. 3 (1995): 109-131; and John Rawls, “Political Liberalism: Reply to Habermas”, *Journal of Philosophy* 92, no. 3 (1995): 132-180.

¹⁴² John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 218, 252, 253.

¹⁴³ Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 306, 360.

should argue for their various policy positions in terms of reasons that others can be reasonably expected to endorse, and that the outcome of deliberations should be determined simply by the most convincing such arguments within the deliberative forum. Bohman, for instance, remarks that “Deliberative democracy is a complex ideal with a variety of forms, but whatever form it takes it must refer to the ideal of public reason, to the requirement that legitimate decisions be ones that ‘everyone could accept’ or at least ‘not reasonably reject’”¹⁴⁴; and further, “the ensuing collective decision should in some sense be justified by public reasons, that is, reasons that are generally convincing to everyone participating in the process of deliberation.”¹⁴⁵

Joshua Cohen provides a similar view, asserting that “Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties to it are required to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them, or criticizing them. They give reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, their power) will settle the fate of their proposal (...) the discovery that I can offer no persuasive reasons on behalf of a proposal of mine may transform the preferences that motivate the proposal.”¹⁴⁶

Knight and Johnson focus on the equality entailed by such a demand for deliberative reason-giving: “all claims and counterclaims are subject to critical public scrutiny and (...) when challenged, any participant must defend her proposal or back her objection with reasons.”¹⁴⁷

Jon Elster stresses how reason-giving should lead deliberators toward concern with the common good above mere self-interest, because “speakers have to justify their proposals by the public interest (...) self-interested or prejudiced speakers have an incentive to argue for a position that differs somewhat from their ideal point.”¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ James Bohman, “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy”, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 6, no. 4 (1998): 401-402.

¹⁴⁵ James Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 5.

¹⁴⁶ Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 74, 77.

¹⁴⁷ Jack Knight and James Johnson, “What Sort of Political Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?”, in *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 288.

¹⁴⁸ Jon Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution Making”, in *Deliberative Democracy*, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104.

And for Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, reason-giving has a particular value in that it may mitigate the intensity of moral disagreement: “In giving reasons for their decisions, citizens and their representatives should try to find justifications that minimize their differences with their opponents.”¹⁴⁹

Hence, the practice of reasoned debate, the outcome of which is determined by the strength of arguments based on “reasons that all can accept,” is definitive of democratic thought in the deliberative tradition.¹⁵⁰

On the matter of who is to take part in this deliberation, it can be unclear whether the theory intends for direct involvement by the citizenry at large, or whether deliberation among elected representatives is sufficient. The phrase “citizens and their representatives” is particularly conspicuous throughout Gutmann and Thompson’s work¹⁵¹, though they also appear to favor deliberation by the latter group, stating that “(d)ecision-making by the direct assembly of all citizens may not yield either the best laws and public policies or the best deliberative justifications for those laws and public policies. Democratically elected and accountable representatives of citizens may be better deliberators, and are likely to be democratically recognized as such.”¹⁵²

Joseph Bessette is even more explicit about the value of representative deliberation, calling it “The genius and the peculiar challenge of the American system” that deliberation among representatives be combined with democratic accountability: “(b)ecause representatives have the time, information, and institutional environment to reason together on issues facing the nation, the public voice to which they give expression may better promote the public good than the

¹⁴⁹ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.

¹⁵⁰ Bohman and Henry Richardson have recently advocated turning away from “reasons that all can accept” and toward “the simpler idea of what people ‘do accept’”; their argument for this change in wording would take us too far afield here, but it should be noted that their case does not fundamentally alter the justification or aims of deliberative democracy; see James Bohman and Henry Richardson, “Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and ‘Reasons that All Can Accept’”, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17, no. 3 (2009): 264-265.

¹⁵¹ See also, Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, 4-5.

¹⁵² Gutmann and Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?*, 31.

immediate and direct voice of the people.”¹⁵³

And more recently, Stefan Rummens proclaims that “representative politics provides the democratic debate with a kind of visibility which allows representative institutions to play an ineliminable role in the connection of political power to public reason as well as in the generation of the epistemic resources and the sources of solidarity required to support ongoing and open-ended democratic deliberation.”¹⁵⁴

The notion that representative institutions are particularly suitable for establishing deliberative principles is indeed prevalent; although, in the recent empirical literature on deliberative democracy (which we will discuss shortly), the focus has generally been on involvement of ordinary citizens in deliberative forums.

It should also be noted that, while reason-giving and the willingness of deliberators to consider the reasons of others are key features of deliberative theory, there are conflicting viewpoints regarding the form reason-giving must take in order to be genuinely deliberative. Seyla Benhabib takes the position that “Greeting, storytelling, and rhetoric, although they may be aspects of informal communication in our everyday life, cannot become the public language of institutions and legislatures in a democracy for the following reason: to attain legitimacy, democratic institutions require the articulation of the bases of their actions and policies in discursive language that appeals to commonly shared and accepted public reasons.”¹⁵⁵

On this view, the kind of reasoned argument which impartially seeks the common good is necessary to achieve deliberative democracy. Dryzek, on the other hand, opposes “narrow limits on what constitutes authentic deliberation,” and favors “A more tolerant position...[which] would allow argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip. The only condition for authentic deliberation is

¹⁵³ Joseph Bessette, *The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 5, 212.

¹⁵⁴ Stefan Rummens, “Staging Deliberation: The Role of Representative Institutions in the Deliberative Democratic Process”, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, no. 1 (2012): 25.

¹⁵⁵ Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy”, in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 83.

then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion.”¹⁵⁶ Simone Chambers further argues that the quality of rhetoric used by speakers must be a focus for deliberative theory; she distinguishes between “deliberative rhetoric”, which “makes people think, it makes people see things in new ways, it conveys information and knowledge, and it makes people more reflective”, and “plebiscitary rhetoric”, which “is concerned first and foremost with gaining support for a proposition,” and which reigns “when politicians say anything to get elected.”¹⁵⁷

And, Jane Mansbridge et al. seek to incorporate self-interest within deliberative theory, claiming “deliberative democracy must include self-interest and conflicts among interests in order to recognize and celebrate in the ideal itself the diversity of free and equal human beings.”¹⁵⁸

The use of reason-giving to determine the fates of policy positions is essential to deliberative democracy, but there is not unanimity on whether that reason-giving must take the form of impartial arguments about the public good, or can take the form of rhetoric and storytelling which are potentially self-interested.

A few years before the turn of the century, increasing attention has been given to empirical testing of deliberative democracy ¹⁵⁹. This empirical work has largely focused on whether deliberators are, as Gutmann and Thompson put it, “open to the possibility of changing their minds or modifying their positions (...)”¹⁶⁰

Robert Luskin, James Fishkin, and Roger Jowell study a British example of deliberative polling (in which a national sample of citizens are given briefing materials to inform them on a particular subject, and then are gathered together to discuss the subject in small moderated groups, but it will be object of further in-depth explanation in the case study

¹⁵⁶ John Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, 1-2.

¹⁵⁷ Simone Chambers, “Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?”, *Political Theory* 37, no. 3 (2009): 335, 337.

¹⁵⁸ Jane Mansbridge et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy”, *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18, no. 1 (2010): 69.

¹⁵⁹ Thompson has warned that some of the empirical work on deliberation has not suitably captured the principles of the normative theorists; see Dennis Thompson, “Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 497-520.

¹⁶⁰ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 79.

chapter), and argue that deliberators do tend to change their initial policy preferences as a result of this process, and that this can help illustrate what public opinion might look like if it were more informed and reflective¹⁶¹.

Graham Smith and Corinne Wales focus on citizens' juries (in which a randomly selected group of citizens are exposed to information about an issue, listen to expert testimony on that issue, and then provide a report) to again demonstrate how pre-deliberative preferences change through the process of deliberation.¹⁶²

Damien French and Michael Laver similarly examine a citizens' jury in Dublin to track the opinion shifts of the deliberators.¹⁶³

Other empirical studies have taken a more general look at the feasibility of deliberative principles. Dryzek and Robert Goodin, for example, outline how various deliberative "mini-publics" have affected policymaking, with mini-publics being defined as deliberative bodies (including deliberative polls and citizens' juries) which are representative of the public, and which serve mostly in an advisory role rather than exercising decision-making power.¹⁶⁴

Dryzek and Valerie Braithwaite, by surveying political debate in Australia, find that deliberators are willing to consider the views of others even if they have different basic values.¹⁶⁵

Michael Neblo et al. use an experimental test to prove that people would be more willing to take part in deliberative forums if they could believe that the political system were less corrupt.¹⁶⁶

This empirical turn in deliberative democracy, therefore, appears to show that the theory is well-suited to being put into practice in

¹⁶¹ Robert Luskin, James Fishkin, and Roger Jowell, "Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling in Britain", *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002): 455-487.

¹⁶² Graham Smith and Corinne Wales, "Citizens' Juries and Deliberative Democracy", *Political Studies* 48 (2000): 51-65.

¹⁶³ Damien French and Michael Laver, "Participation Bias, Durable Opinion Shifts and Sabotage through Withdrawal in Citizens' Juries", *Political Studies* 57 (2009): 422-450.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Goodin and John Dryzek, "Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics", *Politics & Society* 34, no. 2 (2006): 219-244.

¹⁶⁵ See Dryzek and Braithwaite (2000), *On the Prospects for Democratic Deliberation: Values Analysis Applied to Australian Politics in Political Psychology*, vol. 21, n. 2.

¹⁶⁶ For this, look at Neblo, M.

meaningful ways.

There are of course other normative and empirical accounts of deliberative democracy besides those which are discussed here: nonetheless, the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al. 2003) has made it possible to bridge the gap between Habermas discourse theory and empirical approach to the study of deliberation.

Although it was not the first attempt to study deliberative processes with the tool of content analysis¹⁶⁷, the DQI is widely regarded as the most comprehensive one to measure deliberation, especially because it has been designed to capture almost all aspects of Habermas' discourse theory, and further developed to be still preferable in studying citizen deliberation, besides its initial elaboration was dedicated to measure elite deliberation¹⁶⁸.

Habermas begins his discourse theory with the principle of universalism, which holds that a norm is only valid if everyone who is potentially affected by this norm does accept its consequences (Habermas 1998: 40).

Strictly related to this, the fact that people should consider the common good and treat each other with respect (Habermas 1996: 306).

It should be the process of argumentation what produces the consensus to those norms, not an imposition: this constitute the communicative action, where individuals give reasons and are also able to criticize reasons provided by others, in order to hold or reject particular claims (Habermas 1996: 14), ideally reaching a rationally motivated consensus, as people yield to the force of the better argument (Habermas 1996: 305).

Another point of the theory is that there should be free and equal participation, and everyone ought to share personal attitudes, desires and needs, without internal or external coercion (Habermas 1998: 131).

¹⁶⁷ According to Krippendorff (2004), content analysis involves any kind of analysis where communication content (e.g. speech, written text, interviews, images) is categorized and classified. For other studies with this approach, see: Gerhards (1997), Holzinger (2001), Dutwains (2003), Stroomer-Galleys (2007), Rosenberg (2007).

¹⁶⁸ Steenbergen et al. (2003), Steiner et al. (2004), Bachtiger et al. (2009), Steiner et al. (2012), Steiner et al. (Forthcoming 2017)

Habermas also requires the possibility to provide logical justifications, with the aim to resolve contrasts and and stimulate the deliberative process.

This ideal speech situation¹⁶⁹ would be completed with general truthfulness (Habermas 1987: 27), where anyone should behave honestly and express true intentions during the process, avoiding strategic discourses.

4.3 Cultural Theory

As previously explored and stated in the literature review, choosing between different definitions of culture without a chance to clearly operationalize it with existing data from survey research: that would have been an underestimated compelling work, especially for the aim of its use, as an independent variable providing pre-existing national political contexts for the 27 (at the time) EU countries.

This is why Cultural Theory was weighed as the most suitable approach to the operationalization of the concept of political culture.

Cultural Theory (from now onwards, CT) is an ambitious general social and political theory developed by Émile Durkheim¹⁷⁰, Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky, and others (Douglas 1982; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Wildavsky 1998, 2006). The theory was first operationalized for survey research by Aaron Wildavsky and Karl Dake (1990) and is increasingly being used in surveys.

CT has attracted significant attention across the social sciences and humanities and it has also been the subject of a symposium: Political Science & Politics (“A Cultural Theory of Politics,” 2011), a special issue of The Policy Studies Journal (“Advancing Policy Theory with Cultural Theory,” 2014), and is the focus of another symposium in Public

¹⁶⁹ See ...

¹⁷⁰ Note on anthropological work with symbolism and co.

Administration (“A Theory of Institutions, Cultural Bias, and Public Administration,” 2016). Many of the contributors to these collective publication efforts, used surveys in their research (Gastil et al. 2011; Jones 2011; Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and Herron 2011; Jones 2014; Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin 2014; Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014; Song, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014). Although there is much common ground in conceptualization and measurement in this and other work, there are also significant differences in operationalizing CT¹⁷¹.

CT provides rich theoretical resources and its operationalization in survey research provides fresh insights and often greater explanatory and predictive power than alternative theories and concepts (Ellis and Thompson 1997; Gastil et al. 2011; Jackson 2014; Jacoby 2012; Jones 2011; Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, and Herron 2011; Ripberger et al. 2012; Swedlow 2008; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009; Troussset et al. 2015). For political scientists interested in these topics in other countries and historical periods, CT provides a theory and concepts that are abstract enough to travel well but concrete enough to prevent undetectable conceptual stretching (as discussed in Swedlow 2001, 2011; for examples of non-US and comparative CT studies relying on surveys, see Grendstad 2000, 2001, 2003a, b; Grendstad and Selle 1995, 1997; Lockhart and Giles-Sims 2010; Lockhart 2011; Olli 2012; Maleki and Hendriks 2015).

At its core, CT is a theory specifying the relational patterns and pressures that influence how and what people think. It is a theory specifying social structures and their accompanying thought styles, ideas and ideologies; a theory specifying institutional types and the kinds of attitudes that go with them (Hood 1998).

CT originated with Durkheim and has been further developed by Douglas, Wildavsky, and others (Douglas 1982; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). One of Douglas’s students, Michael Thompson, and one of Wildavsky’s students, Richard Ellis, along with Wildavsky, in Cultural Theory, provided what is regarded as the seminal refinement of the theory (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, hereafter “TEW”; see also Schwarz and Thompson 1990). Douglas (1992, 1999) and Thompson

¹⁷¹ About the European maps and the issue (1999) following that trend ...

(2008) continued to develop the theory after Wildavsky's death. Swedlow has re-cast the theory as a theory of boundaries (2011a, 2015). Kahan and colleagues have developed a variant that they call "cultural cognition theory" (CCT; see Kahan 2012 for an overview), which, fundamentally reworks the basic dimensions of the theory.

These variants of CT provide rich theoretical resources for scholars interested in developing the theory. But these variants of CT also create challenges for the efforts to operationalize CT in existing survey research. Depending on which variant of the theory one is using, the assessment of construct validity may also vary.

For the purpose of the present study, I adopted a pragmatic solution to these challenges: first, all those variants of the theory that have not yet been operationalized in survey research were eliminated, thus maintaining only those of TEW and Kahan and colleagues; second, since TEW is considered the seminal refinement of the theory while some, including Kahan himself, question whether CCT is really still CT (Kahan 2012), we use the 1990's TEW to assess the validity of CT's operationalization in survey research.

A further reason to use TEW for purposes of assessing validity is that it was Wildavsky, working with one of his students, Karl Dake, who first operationalized the theory for survey research (Wildavsky and Dake 1990).

As a consequence, it seems reasonable to use the seminal refinement of CT that Wildavsky co-authored to assess the content validity of the operationalization that he and one of his students developed. Finally, because all other efforts to operationalize CT for survey research, including CCT efforts, developed from the work of Dake and Wildavsky, their operationalization provides a good baseline for assessing the convergent validity of current efforts to operationalize CT for survey research.

For a definition of terms included in TEW, which have been very much of common use in TEW: "Cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs. Social relations are defined as patterns of interpersonal relations. When we wish to define a viable combination of social relations and

cultural bias we speak of a way of life”¹⁷² or culture¹⁷³; about the dimensions of social relations, meaning the Group and the Grid, TEW built explicitly on Douglas, who “argued that the variability of an individual’s involvement in social life can adequately be captured by two dimensions of sociality (...) group and grid. Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated in bounded social units...Grid denotes the degree to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions”¹⁷⁴; finally the resulting cultures, Egalitarian, Hierarchical, Individualist, and Fatalist Social Relations (and Hermits), are defined as “Strong group boundaries coupled with minimal prescriptions produce social relations that are egalitarian (...) When an individual’s social environment is characterized by strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions, the resulting social relations are hierarchical (...) Individuals who are bound by neither group incorporation nor prescribed roles inhabit an individualistic context (...) People who find themselves subject to binding prescriptions and are excluded from group membership exemplify the fatalistic way of life (...) For a few individuals, there is a fifth possible way of life, one in which the individual withdraws from coercive and manipulative social involvement altogether. This is the way of life of the hermit (...)”¹⁷⁵

As regards to the Values, TEW hypothesize that each of these four patterns of social relations is justified by and in turn justify (and make plausible) particular kinds of values and beliefs.

However, in a significant omission, they do not specify which values are associated with each relational pattern, although cultural theorists have inferred these values subsequently. Consequently, this is the one place where we depart from TEW’s account of CT and draw on other accounts to fill in the values blank. For example, cultural theorists hypothesize that people in hierarchical institutions value order, people in individualistic institutions value freedom, people in fatalistic institutions value (good) luck, and people in egalitarian institutions value equality.

Moving the explanation to the functionalism of relations, values, and

¹⁷² see Cultural Theory, p. 1;

¹⁷³ see Cultural Theory, pp. 4-5;

¹⁷⁴ see Cultural Theory, p. 5;

¹⁷⁵ see Cultural Theory, p. ;

beliefs within and between ways of life or cultures, Cultural Theorists hypothesize that these values justify and therefore are functional for their associated institutions. Values and institutions cannot be mixed and matched without disrupting this functional relationship. To live one way and think another is unsustainable, a pathway for cultural change. Changes in values and beliefs are expected to lead to changes in institutions, and vice versa. Thus, institutions constrain values and beliefs, and values and beliefs constrain institutions¹⁷⁶.

For example, people in hierarchical institutions cannot value freedom or equality more than order without undermining their institution. More surprising are the beliefs regarding human nature, the environment, and economics that are predicted to be associated with (again because they are functional for) each institutional type, providing a lot of explanatory leverage¹⁷⁷ and allowing the prediction of a lot of co-variation (and inverse variation) among institutions, beliefs, and values¹⁷⁸.

TEW claim that functionalism operates on two levels: within cultures, between patterns of relations and their functionally related values and beliefs and between cultures, where the cultures are functional for each other.

Moreover, TEW devote significant effort to specifying the myths of nature, constructs of human nature, and ways of economizing that are associated with each pattern of social relations.

These are described briefly here so that the extent to which they are operationalized in surveys using CT can be assessed:

- *Ideas and Myths of Nature.* TEW's strategy for identifying myths of nature that are functional for the different patterns of social relations is to specify in a deductive way what kinds of ideas of nature are functional and then to map myths of nature identified by ecologists onto these ideas of nature. The ideas of nature are as follows: "[F]or fatalism to be a viable way of life,

¹⁷⁶ see Cultural Theory, p.;

¹⁷⁷ for this, see ...;

¹⁷⁸ see on this Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Swedlow 2002; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990;

nature must be constructed as a lottery-controlled cornucopia. For egalitarianism to be a viable mode of existence, nature must be held strictly accountable. For individualism to be a viable way of life, nature must be a skill-controlled cornucopia. For hierarchy to be a viable way of life, nature must be bountiful within strictly accountable limits (the isomorphic idea of nature). The hermit's viability depends on nature's being freely available cornucopia" (1990, 28). The myths of nature identified by ecologists are these: "Nature Benign gives us global equilibrium. The world, it tells us, is wonderfully forgiving: no matter what knocks we deliver, the ball will always return to the bottom of the basin. The managing institution can therefore have a *laissez-faire* attitude. Nature Ephemeral is almost the exact opposite. The world, it tells us, is a terrifyingly unforgiving place and the least jolt may trigger its complete collapse. The managing institution must treat the ecosystem with great care. Nature Perverse/Tolerant is forgiving of most events but is vulnerable to the occasional knocking of the ball over the rim. The managing institution must, therefore, regulate against unusual occurrences. Nature Capricious is a random world. Institutions with this view of nature do not really manage or learn: They just cope with erratic events"¹⁷⁹. "Both the ideas of nature and the myths of nature thus map onto the very same institutional typology. The skill-controlled cornucopia and Nature Benign belong to the individualist; isomorphic nature and Nature Perverse/Tolerant belong to the hierarchist; accountable nature and Nature Ephemeral belong to the egalitarian; the lottery-controlled cornucopia and Nature Capricious belong to the fatalist; and the freely available cornucopia and Nature Resilient, we will show presently, belong to the hermit"¹⁸⁰.

- *Constructs of Human Nature.* TEW go on to identify constructs of human nature that are functional for the different patterns of social relations: "Egalitarians believe that human beings are born good but corrupted by evil institutions... For individualists, human nature, like physical nature, is extraordinarily stable. No matter the institutional setting, individualists believe, human

¹⁷⁹ see Cultural Theory, pp. 26-27;

¹⁸⁰ see Cultural Theory, p. 28;

beings remain essentially the same: self-seeking (...) ¹⁸¹. Hierarchists believe that human beings are born sinful but can be redeemed by good institutions (...). For fatalists, human nature is unpredictable” ¹⁸².

- *Ways of Economizing*. Further, TEW specify ways of economizing, of “making ends meet,” that will be functional for the four patterns of social relations: Egalitarians believe that “you can manage your needs but not your resources.” Hierarchs believe that “you can manage your resources but not your needs.” Individualists believe that “you can manage both your needs and your resources.” Fatalists believe that “you can manage neither your needs nor your resources” ¹⁸³.

Moreover, TEW specify various preferences that are functional for the different patterns of social relations. Blame, envy, economic growth, scarcity, risk, and apathy, they claim, are all constructed in ways that are functional for the different patterns of social relations ¹⁸⁴.

The theory of change is one further important component of CT: “(b)ut if preferences and perception are socially constructed in such a way as to justify particular patterns of social relations, how does change ever occur?,” ask TEW ¹⁸⁵. “Much the same way,” they answer, “as scientific theories lose and gain adherents: the cumulative impact of successive anomalies or surprises.” Anomalies and surprises occur because “nature, for all its accommodating ways, does not meekly accept every cultural construction we try to impose on it, and, in fighting back, it generates a countervailing force: the natural destruction of culture...” In other words, cultural theorists locate a catalyst for cultural change in surprises generated by encounters with nature in which nature displays properties or reveals characteristics that are at odds with scientifically or culturally generated expectations. Stipulating the world is one way and finding out that it actually appears to be another lead to a variety of predictable consequences, and can lead to such changes CT hypothesizes.

¹⁸¹ see Cultural Theory, p. 34;

¹⁸² see Cultural Theory, p. 35;

¹⁸³ see Cultural Theory, pp. 39-51;

¹⁸⁴ see Cultural Theory, pp. 55-56;

¹⁸⁵ see Cultural Theory, p. 69;

Beyond that, TEW say that their unit of analysis is the “socialized individual” or “social being”: by this they mean that none of us are born into a state of nature¹⁸⁶, but, rather, we are born into social worlds defined in part by the political cultural types of CT. Thus, the influence of larger units of analysis, like institutions, is in us, shaping us, even as we are in these institutions, shaping them. TEW say that unlike lab rats, we shape the maze (of social and political constraints) while running it¹⁸⁷, meaning that we construct institutions while they construct us.

To the extent that individuals are socialized in culturally pluralized environments, the question becomes whether they simply internalize and reflect this pluralization or whether a particular cultural bias dominates their cultural orientations. “We would expect that individuals will make significant efforts to bring consistency to their social environments,” TEW¹⁸⁸ write. “This strain to consistency explains why people are not randomly distributed in social contexts. Individuals often seek out social relationships that are compatible with their preferred bias and shun those relations in which they feel less at home.” Still, TEW acknowledge that people may also compartmentalize different cultural biases so that different biases dominate different parts of their lives. “An individual may find himself in cutthroat competition with his business rivals, hierarchical relations in the military, egalitarian relations at home, while treating certain area of life, say inability to carry a tune, with fatalistic resignation”¹⁸⁹.

These different theories of the individual, which have become known as the cultural consistency and cultural mobility theses, have been tested and the results suggest the strain to cultural consistency is more prevalent than cultural mobility¹⁹⁰.

¹⁸⁶ See Enzell and Wildavsky 1998;

¹⁸⁷ See Cultural Theory, p. 22;

¹⁸⁸ See Cultural Theory, p. 266;

¹⁸⁹ See Cultural Theory, p. 265;

¹⁹⁰ See Olli 2012;

4.4 Complementing deliberative and cultural research frameworks

Comprehensively taking these theoretical frameworks into account for two of the three empirical part of this work, it will then lead to match them for answering the fundamental research question of this work: does culture influence deliberation?

In the single empirical sections, more details will be added to the current framework exposed, but through a few lines it is indeed necessary to introduce the very little studies on this approach developed to date, to my actual knowledge.

Deliberation is a social activity and there may well be tremendous variation in *national repertoires* (Tilly 1978), and several theorists have suggested that deliberative democracy is culturally biased (Young 1996, Gambetta 1998, Min 2009), while Cinalli and O’Flynn (2014) take up the issue of cultural and ethnic differences and their impact on deliberation¹⁹¹.

Therefore the main reference for the last empirical chapter, where the attempt is to answer to the main research question quoted above, is found in an article from the Yale Law School, in which four scholars raise the need for taking into account, in the American society, how cultural cognition shapes “and is likely to shape public reactions to emerging reproductive technologies (that) can help those who are engaged in these policy discussions guard against the pull of cognitive illiberalism and help them clear effective paths to common ground that might otherwise have eluded them”¹⁹².

What is important for the present work is the third and fourth part of their article, where they consider “theoretical relationships between the features of deliberation and cultural orientations” and “the potential for deliberative politics on these issues”¹⁹³.

¹⁹¹ See also Dryzek 2014, Pedrini 2011, Gerber 2014, 2016;

¹⁹² Kahan et al. (2008) *Deliberation Across the Cultural Divide: Assessing the Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural Orientations to Reproductive Technology*, p. 1774

¹⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 1774.

Since they use TEW's Cultural Theory as the starting point for their cultural approach, it is very helpful the way they proceed in describing the influence paths from cultural orientations to public opinion, for two reasons related to this dissertation: as it has been previously explained in the Research Design, to answer the main research question, two methods have been developed, the former to measure the influence of culture directly on the internal deliberation into the single small groups (focusing on the DQI coding results), and the latter to measure it externally on the opinion change of the deliberators (focusing on the differences through the two questionnaire waves occurred on the first and on the last day of EuroPolis).

Assessing the validity of the reference to this analysis is unavoidable: Kahan et al. refer to deliberation as a “demanding, rigorous process that can likely never be fully achieved but might be approached with modest success if sufficient thought goes into how we design and orchestrate public debates, forums, and even mass-mediated communication processes”¹⁹⁴; they also do not acknowledge any debate to be a deliberation, but it must be clarified that their work was published before the effective systemic turn previously described in Chapter 2.

Concerning the operationalization of the relationship between culture and deliberation, Kahan et al. provide a scheme (2008: p. 1793) in which they match cultural orientations derived from Cultural Theory and the ideal deliberative process: the aim pursued by them is to assign expected behaviours, that is in line with the leading question of the present research.

Although their approach informs my work in a very helpful way, it must be noted what is not possible to accept, their adoption of the *collectivist* instead of the *fatalist* orientation, which I refer to as one of the four cultural paths: however, based on their guidelines, it is not too hard to desume that last correspondence.

Before summarizing their schematization, it is useful to point out the way it is organized: basically, analytic and social process produce cultural effects on deliberation.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem, p. 1790.

Within the former process, they expand on previous considerations about the deployment of cultural orientations, generally undermining the analytic process of deliberation: in this perspective “(c)ultural filtering corrupts information tools, limits the range of alternatives considered, and biases the weighing of pros and cons (...)”¹⁹⁵.

Through the latter process, the scholars show “a more complex relationship between culture and deliberation with regard to the social aspects of deliberative practices”¹⁹⁶: from this point of view, different “individuals engaged in a cross-cultural dispute might have intrinsically different notions about the appropriateness of public deliberation as a means of resolving policy conflicts”¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁵ Ibidem, p. 1792.

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem, p. 1792.

¹⁹⁷ Ibidem, p. 1792.

5. Methodology and Data

This chapter aims at showing modes and reasons for the adoption of different methodologies and the choice of particular data, both for creating the independent variable, to analyze the Citizens' deliberation and to evaluate the influence of culture on the dependent variable.

Starting from a comparative approach to four European Deliberative Polls[®] (Denmark, Greece, Italy, UK), all of them realized between 2000 and 2010, the case selection moved towards a much more comprehensive and explanatory one: the EuroPolis 2009, held in Bruxelles a week before the European Parliament Elections.

This case represents the most comprehensive design ever realized at a transnational level: with the availability of audio recordings for all the 25 Small Groups of discussions and the plenary sessions, direct translations for any of the 23 languages spoken and five different languages of moderation (English, French, German, Italian and Polish), four surveys (T0, T1, T2, T3) conducted with a treated and a control group, for studying participants and not participants of this event.

Most important, EuroPolis has been built upon the previous experience of the first European wide DP held in 2007 (Tomorrow's Europe), thus correcting the errors and improving the design¹⁹⁸.

Anticipated in chapter 2, here the data and the adopted methodologies will be more explained in details.

Starting with the quantitative elaboration of a European cultural map, it is first necessary to deal with the data collection: these had to be referred to a precise period of time (right before 2009 or the same year), and inclusive of a pre-determined number of countries (the 27 EU members whose randomly selected citizens took part in EuroPolis).

¹⁹⁸ I would like to thank Robert Luskin for pointing out what I just wrote, which introduced me to a deeper analysis of the procedures and effective day-by-day development of the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll, posing peculiar questions on these aspects to the organizers, contributors and the inventor, which are described in the next chapter 6;

Therefore, I chose the 4th wave of the EVS, because it had these characteristics, and I did not select the WVS or the ESS (this last one running every 2 years, compared to the 9 years of difference between the EVS waves).

Regarding the choice of the items needed to operationalize the Cultural Theory approach, I first followed the studies which had previously elaborated on this¹⁹⁹, in order to replicate their models, updating them for my timeframe.

After various attempts, Grendstad's model resulted the closest and the most adaptive to my case: as earlier stated, not all the items he chose were replicable, because he used the WVS 1981-1990.

Thus, I could keep two of them (the "grid items" - v7: how often discuss politics with friends, v186: how interested are you in politics), while I had to evaluate two more "group items" for running the analysis.

Since it was not completely possible to find similar items to those adopted by Grendstad, the choice moved (and now I would say luckily), to the selection of v156 (duty towards society to have children), v157 (people should decide themselves to have children): as a result, the two dimensions were completely grounded in the theory²⁰⁰.

Although more on the methodological process is explained previously, and in the empirical chapters providing the results, the analysis was conducted with the R software, using packages including factor analysis and polychoric correlation.

Moving now to the second empirical method adopted to measure the deliberations of the citizens in EuroPolis, the modified version of the Discourse Quality Index was chosen because it is, nowadays, the most refined and adaptable tool to reach this aim.

Before getting into details on the method, it is necessary to give a clue on the process of translating the SGs, since it was not always clear and easy, depending on the quality of the audio recordings available.

¹⁹⁹ To explain what cultural theory aims at presenting and was it best operationalized previously, see Grendstad, European Cultural Map, items developed in the USA, items adopted in this study;

²⁰⁰ EVS 2008: 40465 respondents from 27 EU countries in the 4th wave.

As anticipated, about 40 hours of records were transcribed, from groups with English and Italian languages ²⁰¹ : problems of misunderstanding, missing audio, missing part of translations, mixed voices in the sessions, these were some of the many difficulties I faced.

This is one of the reasons why, although the quantitative coding was completed for all of them (and it is now available for the discussion on the immigration issue of all the 25 groups), it has been chosen to proceed through a final interpretive method to provide the main answers for this research.

Another limitation of this study is that only the discussions in the first day of the event (May 29th, 2009) were transcribed (Session n. 0-1-2-3), and it might be reasonably possible that the discussions which took place on the Saturday (May 30th, 2009), which dealt with the issue of climate change, could offer better quality of the recordings and/or different behaviors of the deliberators²⁰².

Regarding the coding, whose scheme is part of the Appendix, it has been executed in a rather conservative way and only for the 1st and 2nd session, following Gerber's studies: this is very important to point out here, because results from previous research showed these were the only sessions where an interesting degree of deliberation did occur, therefore justifying the measurement through DQI²⁰³.

EuroPolis: 348 participants from 27 EU countries selected as a stratified sample, proportional with each member state's MEP.

²⁰¹ All the transcripts are available upon request: in the Appendix, some parts of them have been included to explain codings and provide examples of interaction between participants;

²⁰² Results from the Bern research team regarded SGs 1-2-3-4-9-10-16-17-19-20-21-23-24, Oslo research team worked on SGs 7-8-11-12 (but without transcribing them, and for this reason I did transcribe them, too), I have been working on SGs 5-6-13-14-15-18-22-25;

²⁰³ To explain more in details what DQI measures and how it does it, in-depth, see WP from Arena in 2011 on SG11, pp. 15-19;

6. Case study: The EuroPolis Deliberative Polling in 2009.

This chapter is intended to be both descriptive of the case study analyzed, and introductory to the empirical part of the whole dissertation.

First of all, the reasons behind choosing the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll, instead of another one, will be explained and justified, thus allowing a deeper view of the project: this is also the correct section where to briefly explain, the author's decision of changing the initial DPs identified for his proposal (Denmark, Greece, Italy and United Kingdom), cases that would not allow to develop the present research with the question and methodology adopted, had them been finally chosen.

I will now present, in a logical order, what the reader should know before acquiring more knowledge of this case study.

6.1 The empirical field of studies on Deliberative Democracy

As from the literature review, since the second generation of studies on deliberative democracy, but with a major interest reached in the proper empirical turn previously described, “[t]heories of deliberative democracy contain many empirical claims and assumptions, particularly about preference and opinion formation. For example, a central tenet of all deliberative theory is that deliberation can change minds and transform opinions” (Chambers 2003: 318), challenging the various models of realistic application that moved theory into practice.

This leads us to explore the possibilities, designed and offered by academics and practitioners, to let the people become a relevant and influential part of the public sphere: but it should not start without a clear definition of what is the meaning of the term mini-publics.

With a recent important work, edited by Bachtiger et al. (2014), a distinction among three levels of applications for deliberation in mini-publics has been reached, mainly based on differences on the grade of empirical exploration of the common demands of deliberative democracy (*restrictive, intermediate and expansive*): thus far, a convincing description would be the one focusing on a ‘*protected*’ space for deliberation between a broadly inclusive and representative group of citizens, away from the pressures of everyday politics [and] the undue influence of special interests (Grönlund et al. 2014: 21).

Taking this as an ‘explanation in progress’, it is only comparatively analyzing the three forms of mini-publics that it seems to be possible discovering their different characteristics, warming up or cooling down the degrees of deliberativeness inside them, and then moving to the reasons of choosing one instead of another as a case study.

Following a small towards large *continuum*, the most *restrictive* definition (Fishkin 2009) includes only the Deliberative Poll®: by designing his own democratic institution, James Fishkin underlined how the values he recognizes as distinguishing deliberative democracy from any other democratic theory (competitive, elite and participatory), political equality and deliberation, could be fully realized only in deliberative polls, substituting the unpractical face-to-face deliberation between all the citizens with a statistical representation of the relevant population.

Widening the definitions to the *intermediate* ones (Goodin and Dryzek 2006, Smith 2009), there is really a little difference between these scholars: while the formers, as Fishkin does, emphasize the important role played by the combination of representativeness and deliberation (but without insisting on the pure randomness), the latter highlights a number of necessary characteristics to group some institutions together (quasi-random sampling, citizens paid an honorarium for participating, independent facilitations to ensure fairness of proceedings, evidence from and cross-examination of expert witnesses, deliberation amongst citizens in small groups and plenary sessions).

Broadly enlarging this definition, the *expansive* inclusion (Fung 2003) welcomes a variety of designs with very different democratic qualities and functions, ranging from Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre to the Oregon Health Plan, institutions relying on a complete self-selection process.

6.2 Citizen Deliberation

Like participatory democrats, deliberative democrats place significant weight on political autonomy and the transformative potential of democratic processes. Rather than focusing on direct citizen self-government as an end in itself, however, they emphasize the need for reasoned decisions that can be accepted by all. They argue that, under conditions of disagreement, decisions are most legitimate when they are based on reasons that are developed and articulated through discursive processes and recognized by all who are affected (Habermas 1987; 1990; Cohen 1989; 1996; Rawls 1993; Gutmann and Thompson 1996).

Although the theoretical project of deliberative democracy at its core does not require lay participation, indeed some scholars focus on the question of elite and representative deliberation (Bessette 1997; Steiner et al. 2004), and much of the theory suggests the involvement of lay citizens in decision-oriented deliberative processes (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Fishkin 1995; Fung and Wright 2003; Leib 2005).

Nonetheless lasting individual effects are secondary to the goal of reasoned decisions for deliberative democrats, allusions to these individual effects are nevertheless widely present in their work. This is owing in part to the legacy of their participatory predecessors²⁰⁴.

²⁰⁴ The idea that reasoned consensus can be approached through deliberation relies on the assumption that individual understandings of preferences are altered in lasting ways and this has direct bearing on the primary goals of deliberative democracy. However, a broader set of claims concerning the range of civic capacities that are developed as a result of deliberative experiences originate from participatory theory.

Moreover, despite the tensions between different *foci* of participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy (Cohen and Fung 2004; Fung 2007a), it is where they overlap that claims about the lasting educative potential of democratic participation are most common and compelling²⁰⁵.

Following Mendelberg (2002), he sees the main relevant points to analyze, somehow missing in the research, in the role of citizen deliberation are: social dilemma, intergroup relations, group polarization and minority influence²⁰⁶.

6.3 A Short Introduction to Fishkin's Idea

J. S. Fishkin had the original idea of the DP when he was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, in 1987, and he was preparing to introduce another Fellow at the Center, Larry Bartels, for his talk about the presidential primary process: “I asked myself, as a political theorist how I would change the primary system in the best of all possible worlds. The idea of the DP came into my mind as I was thinking about the dynamics and irrationalities of the process he described so well. I am forever indebted with Larry for providing me with the occasion, not just because of his excellent book but because of the problem it posed.” (Fishkin 2009: xii)

However, it was not an easy path towards its realization: at the beginning of the 1990s Fishkin was working to set up a National Issue Convention, but then the Gulf War intervened and the project had to face financial problems, and then was canceled. That is how the “success story” of Deliberative Pollings had its start in the UK.²⁰⁷

As a theorist, he raised questions on whether it was possible to deal with the principles of political equality, participation and deliberation in the same system, or through a unique tool, to expand and deepen the level

²⁰⁵ Fishkin agrees that “the educative function is most compelling for the face-to-face variants” of participatory democracy (2009a, 78).

²⁰⁶ Mendelberg (2002), “The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence” in *Political Decision Making, Deliberation and Participation*, Volume 6, 155.

²⁰⁷ <http://news.stanford.edu/pr/2004/jimfishkin-1013.html>

of the democratic process. Whereas several designs of mini-publics (see the previous Empirical Turn section in Chapter 2) have been introduced before and afterwards (Citizen Juries, Consensus Conferences, Citizen Assemblies, Town Hall Meetings, etc.), with his tool he provided an answer through this explanatory scheme, also referred as the *Trilemma of Democratic Reform*²⁰⁸:

Table 1: options in the *Trilemma*

	Mass Democracy	Mobilized Deliberation	Microcosmic Deliberation
Political Equality	+	-	+
Participation	+	+	-
Deliberation	-	+	+

Fishkin’s method of Deliberative Polling, is said to be “a way of serving both deliberation and equality”²⁰⁹, “an effort to realize a kind of microcosmic deliberation”²¹⁰: he adopted public opinion methods of research to gather a sample of people to deliberate, with anyone having the chance of being part of a discussion in which good conditions were provided for the participants, while deliberating on some policies or political issues.

When compared to other applications of microcosmic deliberation, as Fishkin does²¹¹, several differences may be found: with the possibility to produce a relevant number of data, about the representativeness of the sample and the opinion changes, it does allow to run statistical studies on DPs, opposed to the Citizen Juries and the Consensus Conferences; about the chance to have an useful combination of space and time, when collecting deliberators in the same place and the same period of time to discuss on issues and policies, it offers a great event to be covered by the media, and it also enables to study the small groups through a comparative approach, thus making a clear difference with Planning Cells and Deliberative Panels; finally, other merits are observable when comparing DPs with Televote and the Choice Questionnaire, likewise easing a more intensive intervention “that allows people to experience

²⁰⁸ For more on this, see Fishkin 2009: pp. 32-64.

²⁰⁹ Fishkin and Luskin 2005: 287;

²¹⁰ See Fishkin 2009, p. 55;

²¹¹ See Fishkin 2009, p. 58 and beyond, on the merits of DP versus the other versions of mini-publics;

dialogue with a greater diversity of views over a more extensive period and one that also offers the prospect of more substantive balance”.²¹²

Moreover, Fishkin underlines some points which claims particular reflections on, indicators that people, during the DPs, are effectively deliberating about the issues: the opinion change, referred to the net differences of the attitude items in the pre-post questionnaires, and in this case also the opinions that did not change are valuable as a democratic input; the increased information of the participants after the event, which is not only about these deliberators getting more informed about the issues they did discuss, but also they “learn about competing perspectives and the views of the people very different from themselves in face-to-face discussions”.²¹³

It is hereby interesting to examine the difference between classical opinion polls and deliberative opinion (or, better, informed) polls, which is still needing a fruitful comparison in the present work, in order to justify this evolution fostered by Fishkin’s idea: basically, he considers four defects to be detected in raw public opinion, such as rational ignorance, phantom opinions, selectivity of sources and vulnerability to manipulation.²¹⁴

Dealing with the rational ignorance, the situation is like this: people do have their ordinary lives, they work and run their family business, but most of them do not dedicate much time to getting informed, as their life works even without this: these are the respondents to most of the classic opinion polls, while the situation does change when they are in a DP experience, since not only during the event, but even after that, their level of interest toward information does reasonably increase, according to more than 20 years of *fishkinean* events and publications on these results²¹⁵.

Another interesting matter is that of the phantom opinions: still the respondents to conventional polls are the subjects of this defect, and the problem is their reluctance to answer that they do not know, they just do

²¹² See Fishkin 2009: p. 59;

²¹³ See Fishkin 2009: p. 121;

²¹⁴ See Fishkin 2009: p. 122 and beyond;

²¹⁵ For more on this, see: ;

not wish to say that to the interviewers (in some countries more than in others, of course, as a cultural approach could fruitfully explain there too), thus significantly altering the results of the surveys, while in a DP they are able to form their opinions, at least by the end of the event (still with different cultural results, as it will be showed in the last empirical chapter), even asking questions to experts, politicians and their colleagues in the small groups of discussion.

Then there is this problem of the selectivity of the sources, such as discussing only with like-minded people, which does not help in welcoming opposite arguments coming from different points of view: it is a peculiar issue when looking at it through the lenses of different social conditions, and also emotive or cognitive aspects may have an influence on this selection; but, instead, when people are randomly assigned to deliberative small groups for discussing face-to-face, they become rather obliged to listen to the other side²¹⁶ of the story, therefore learning from different sources.

Finally, regarding the vulnerability to manipulation, differences between the two “family of polls”, concern the content of the information respondents have when answering to questions about a particular issue: while raw public opinion is much more volatile because usually based on low information levels, mostly incomplete and sometimes not perfectly true, the opinions deliberated have been pondered and weighed in due time and with relevant efforts to reach considered judgments.

6.4 A Description of a Deliberative Poll

Deliberative Polls have been developing and evolving since their first application at the beginning of the nineties, but their basic idea is still the same: some time to be spent debating on equal basis of participation in a protected space.

²¹⁶ See also, on this, D. Mutz 2006:

The main characteristics of a Deliberative Poll include random recruitment of participants, informational input about the issues discussed in balanced briefing materials, moderated small group discussions, plenary sessions in which questions from the small groups are answered and repeated attitude measurement (Fishkin, 2009).

However, as a scientific experiment, the Deliberative Poll is very much structured: participants, group discussions, moderators, briefing materials, experts and questionnaires do always constitute its main features.

First of all, a Deliberative Poll consists of a representative sample of participants²¹⁷: the choice of not adopting the self selection as a recruiting procedure depends, mostly, on the possibility it could affect the results because of the motivations to participate in the process; besides that, a stratified sample of participants will go through a preliminary selection weeks ahead of the DP, thus providing personal information to be collected and analyzed for a proper analysis of the whole experiment.

Another important element are the group discussions²¹⁸: citizens selected for the event are invited to participate in a deliberative arena, where they face-to-face with other never-met-before people do have discussions on one or more specific issues, with the aim of confronting their respective ideas, knowledge, experience, competence on the matter at stake, thus concurring in the formulation of a shared and informed meta-consensus on the topic(s) under debate.

Moderators²¹⁹ help the deliberators during the sessions (typically more than one, as it will be described in the section on the EuroPolis setting): their role is to ensure balanced participation to everyone (but also, as in EuroPolis, help them reaching one of the final aims, the formulation of the questions for experts and politicians), making all of the discussion easily following the process designed.

²¹⁷ Both about selection and participants: ...

²¹⁸ Usually composed by 12-15 participants, even if some groups in EuroPolis had to be larger or smaller, due to language reasons. For more on this, see this on cdd.stanford ...

²¹⁹ The role of the moderators has still not received enough attention, due to relatively poor data. Anyway, a few very good studies are those from Shawn Rosenberg ... SPSR and Paolo Spada ... JoPD

Since “the motivation for developing deliberative polls was to correct what is argued as imperfections of conventional public opinion polls, arguing that people’s answers are neither well considered nor well-informed”²²⁰, the briefing materials deliberators receive before the event are equally informative and neutral, approved to be sent after several debates by the organizers of the DP, to let them discover everything they need to know on the issue, in the most impartial way.

The idea of including experts (and politicians in EuroPolis, as well as in some other settings) relies on the possibility for the deliberators to have additional live knowledge on site, someone who knows the ongoing debate and the concrete facts concerning the issues: they are supposed to answer questions from the participants, dynamically informing them to support their previous knowledge.

Finally, the questionnaires: this explains the procedures and the methodology adopted, since Fishkin wanted to create an informed poll, thus using tools coming from survey research, as we have seen with the stratified sample selection of the participants; moreover, and even more important, these questionnaires do monitor the respondents at different times of the process, succeeding in finding out eventual opinion change of the participants (and of the non-participants, those who did not deliberate at all, but were part of the initial recruitment steps, as we will see with the EuroPolis data).

While the evolution of the Deliberative Polls has introduced many interesting improvements in their design, their funding has been always guaranteed through their registered mark (as for the Citizen Juries), thus receiving part of the money they invest on this research.

6.5 Listing the applications of DPs

The very first application of the Deliberative Polls took place in Europe, in the United Kingdom, in 1994: even though it might sound a bit

²²⁰ Anne Linn Flottum Hoen 2011: 21-22;

unreasonable, since they were US-born, this is already an initial clue to foresee their future worldwide development²²¹.

What is interesting also, about them, is the variety of settings, issues and motivations for their adoption: therefore, it will be purpose of this section to provide a general overview of cases, countries and numbers best describing the “gold standard of attempts to sample what a considered public opinion might be on issues of political importance” (Mansbridge 2010: 55).

Where:²²²

North America (USA, Canada)

Europe (UK, Northern Ireland, Denmark, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, European Union, Hungary, Poland)

Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Macao, Mongolia)

Oceania (Australia)

South America (Brazil, Argentina)

Africa (Ghana, Senegal, Uganda)

Themes:

Energy, environment, foreign policy, global economy, national security, healthcare, education, housing policies, unemployment, infrastructures, ethnic minorities, immigration, climate change, labour policies, administrative issues, federalist reforms, pension policies, food policies, territorial organization, constitutional reforms, cultural issues, public workers reforms, mobility and transports.

How and Why:

²²¹ <http://news.stanford.edu/pr/2004/jimfishkin-1013.html>

²²² Last update: 31.01.2017

Not every case has followed a similar path, but the main aim has always been to reach the widest possible audiences while improving the setting of the Deliberative Pollings.

In fact, in recent years it is very interesting how most of them are being organized in Asia and Africa, allowing for resilient and authoritarian deliberations to take place²²³.

While some authors (Min 2014) see a western bias in this tool, it is a fact that the Chinese settings have gone under the supervision of local officials, thus very much adapting to the non-western societies taking part in them²²⁴.

6.6 The Europolis setting

A transnational deliberative experiment already took place in October 2007, with Tomorrow's Europe organized to let European citizens discuss about the future of European Union, in the European Parliament Building in Bruxelles: that was the first time a scientific microcosm of the European people was gathered to weigh public issues affecting the role of the EU in the world and social policy²²⁵.

During that first experience, several problems had to be faced, in order to allow such a wide and varied participation from 27 countries: most of all, cultural and language diversity²²⁶.

Even though the organizers tried to solve the language diversity through simultaneous interpretations, the role of culture, one of the 3 core problems in deliberative democratic theory (others being minority inclusion and varying capacities between political elites and ordinary citizens), was not easy to be addressed.

²²³ For the latter, see also He and Warren 2011.

²²⁴ I would like to thank Robert Luskin for sharing this insight and needed knowledge.

²²⁵ For more on this, see: Barisione (2010);

²²⁶ Other challenges being the non-finished polity and the lack of a constituency of the lay citizens randomly selected, at a democratic level (see Fiket et al. 2011);

With the EuroPolis setting, the second case of citizen deliberation at EU level, many attempts have been made to solve some of them: this was another Europe-wide DP, conducted just before the European Parliamentary elections of 2009, to shed empirical light on an ambitious version of a European public sphere²²⁷.

The participants, a random stratified sample selected from all 27 EU member-states²²⁸, spent time learning, thinking, and talking about issues affecting the whole continent.

EuroPolis gathered a microcosm of the European public together for an intensive weekend, between the 29th and 31st of May 2009, to discuss two issues: climate change and immigration. The participants discussed these issues after being randomly assigned into small groups, led by moderators trained the day before, to finally prepare questions for balanced panels of experts during the plenary sessions: inside those small groups of discussions, questions had been agreed (even if sometimes voted) before being collected and selected by the organizers²²⁹.

The simultaneous interpretations, and in some cases even linguistic bridges, helped to create an artificial common language, allowing any participant both a voice and an understanding of the development in the discussions: even the moderators had somewhere to be translated from their mother tongue, when not using one of the main five languages, and results were quite mixed.

About the questionnaires, it was decided to run 4 waves of them: at the very beginning of the recruitment phase, the first day, at the end of the last day and days after that weekend. There were different versions of the questionnaires, though all of them comparable.

The main innovation in EuroPolis, at least compared to the previous Tomorrow's Europe, "was to probe the conditions for deliberation among citizens in a transnational and multilingual setting through an empirical

²²⁷ For more on Deliberative Polling see Fishkin, 2009; see also Luskin et al., 2002 for the first empirical application;

²²⁸ The random assignment was stratified to ensure a manageable amount of language diversity in each group.

²²⁹ Although there was this task to prepare, for each small group, at least two questions regarding each issue, the followed methods were sometimes different from the suggested ones.

and comparative experiment”²³⁰ : this happened introducing a confrontation level, between those who effectively participated in the event, and those who did not, but were randomly selected to answer the questionnaires by phone.

All the participants were interviewed four times: at home (T1), on arrival (T2), on departure (T3), and several weeks after the election (T4).

Some of the policy attitude questions were asked in all four waves, but some were only asked at T1 and T4, while a more extensive battery was asked via self-completion questionnaires at T2 and T3.

Subjects who were randomly assigned to the control group were interviewed at T1 and T4²³¹. TNS, which administers the Eurobarometer, conducted the sampling and interviewing (as well as in the previous Tomorrow’s Europe).

There were detailed and compact briefing materials offering arguments for and against various policy choices on the two issues. These briefing materials were supervised by an elaborate advisory group that selected the materials for both balance and accuracy.

Another difference between Tomorrow’s Europe and EuroPolis was that the latter was the first test of the unitary public sphere before a concrete election.

EuroPolis was “an empirical exploration, in a quasi-experiment, of a counterfactual ideal: what would people think if they had the correct information and the time to elaborate on that, discussing with other ordinary citizens about relevant issues?”²³².

The EuroPolis project intended to deliver a form of deliberative democracy practically realizable at the European level, but it did not presume to replace contemporary institutions: it was organized to act as a supplement, allowing for representative and informed public judgments

²³⁰ Fiket et al. 2011: p. 6;

²³¹ For more on the participants and not participants, see Olmastroni (2013) *Partecipanti e non partecipanti. Limiti di rappresentatività in pratiche di democrazia deliberativa*, *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 53 (1): 57-96;

²³² See on this Fishkin and Isernia (2014);

about what needed to be done to become part of one or another institutional procedure or part of the public dialogue.

EuroPolis was meant to embody reason-based collective will formation, and as an application of Deliberative Polling, for this reason intended to facilitate a representative sample of European citizens to reach considered judgments and formulate questions they may have initially posed to themselves from personal considerations deriving from previous sources.

The basic idea of the deliberating microcosm, chosen by random sampling, goes all the way back to the first forms of democracy in ancient Athens. There, the randomly selected Council of 500 set the agenda for what could be voted on in the Assembly and legislative commissions (*nomothetai*) of 500 randomly selected citizens were convened for a day to hear the arguments for and against a legislative proposal before voting on its adoption (Hansen, 1991).

As compared to most (but not all) Deliberative Polls, EuroPolis added two further elements: a control group that did not attend the event but that was administered a before–after questionnaire, and a systematic recording of all verbal interactions in the small group to obtain both individual-level and group-level measures of the quality of the discussion, thus allowing an exploration of what happened in the black-box of deliberation²³³.

The two public issues selected for discussion, climate change and immigration, were chosen by the research team for three reasons.

First, they cut across countries and party families and prompt strong citizen opinions (as shown in several public opinion polls, e.g. Eurobarometer).

Second, they are very different issues. Climate change is typically a highly technical issue on which one might expect information to produce changes in attitude due to knowledge gain and exposure to competing arguments through the briefing document, the discussion and the questioning of experts. On the other hand, immigration is still an issue on

²³³ On this, see mostly Flottum Hoen 2011, Fiket et al. 2011, Gerber 2014 and 2016;

which ignorance is widespread and emotions run very high. One issue is thus hot while the other is thus cold (or at least colder).

Third, those issues were expected to be relevant for discussion among parties at both domestic and European levels in the period leading to the European Parliamentary election in June 2009.

But one of the questions raised by scholars was: “how transformative the deliberative poll could be in a transnational setting”?²³⁴

As previously stated, one of the main claims of deliberative democracy is the transformation of preferences, rather than their aggregation: this is an aspect which will be showed through the empirical part of this work, which extended the existing datasets completing previous studies on EuroPolis small groups, by adding the missing SGs through transcription and coding (with the DQI developed by Steenbergen et al.²³⁵, then “modified to account for the specifics of citizens’ deliberations”²³⁶).

Therefore, innovating products of the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll were two sets of data: as a result of the questionnaires, pre-post deliberation, pre-post event, changes in the participants and not participants’ opinions; as a result of the recordings, the effective story of the discussions, qualitatively coded through a coding scheme.

For the analysis run through the present work, these innovative data will be useful to answer the main research question, whether or not culture influences deliberation.

6.7 Interviews, General Audience and Media

Ideally, a well-structured project like EuroPolis was, should have little or no space for changes in the design.

²³⁴ Fiket et al. 2011: p. 6;

²³⁵ I did it myself, with the support of the Swiss branch of this project.

²³⁶ Fiket et al. 2011: p. 8;

However, since it has been a very important step forward in empirical deliberative research, an adequate number of questions came up to my mind when exploring this quasi-experiment, thus I decided to proceed in interviewing important components of the event, that I am very much thankful to: Robert Luskin, Juerg Steiner, Pierangelo Isernia, James S. Fishkin²³⁷.

Their answers ²³⁸ helped me to look at many aspects of the project, since my interest dealt with its project management, organization, process development and evaluation.

Some of my doubts were clarified, since my work on untranscribed records showed different results than those deriving from previous ones:

- at the process level, basically, although moderators went through a training session the day before, they varied a great deal in how much they structured the discussions, and this only depended on the group composition and moderators' attitude;
- at the evaluation level, there must be a different approach, since politically, the subsequent European Parliament Elections did cover its effect in the short-term, whereas mid-term an higher impact it did have through European Commission and European Parliament references to it as a positive example; scientifically, it allowed to work on the quality of deliberation, a very new and useful academic contribution, which allowed to further improvements so far;
- at the project management level, previous designs (Tomorrow's Europe, Intune) helped in improving the original Fishkin's idea (recording the groups, much more complex experimental design), avoiding possible pitfalls (only 2 issues, one each day);
- at the organizational level, a very huge number of people worked through the project (translators, interviewers, recruiters, etc.), with a minimal number of problems occurred.

²³⁷ All of them did answer in different ways and at different stages of the research: I am very thankful for that;

²³⁸ After the event, reports.

7. The Empirical Results

7.1 A Cultural Map of EUrope in 2009

The idea of designing a cultural map of countries is not new, but the approaches adopted through the years, since the availability of comparative survey data for a relevant number of countries, are many and different²³⁹.

Without listing the different kind of possible sources from which these data could have been selected²⁴⁰, it should be explained the *ratio* guiding this procedure and the reasons behind its adoption.

As this cultural approach to deliberation was intended to fill an existing gap in the literature²⁴¹, thus allowing to empirically measure the possible effect of culture on deliberation (in the last section of this chapter 7.3), I chose to design a EUropean map of cultures in 2009, developing a real framework of analysis in which it could be possible to position national political cultures that were member of the European Union in 2009.

Before reaching the most reliable solution, explained through this section, I attempted various analyses, with a much more psychological approach, at the beginning, later evolved to a more theoretically-driven anthro-politological one²⁴².

Some previous empirical studies were available in the literature which I finally adopted, and I attempted to replicate some of them

²³⁹ The most inclusive survey projects from which it was possible to select: WVS, EVS, ESS, etc.

²⁴⁰ Such as, but not complete with all of them, these relevant ones showed here: ...

²⁴¹ I did explain this in the introduction, but summarizing it here, studies dealing with culture and deliberation have never explored the relationship through a completely empirical approach, only limiting the analysis to one or the other variable;

²⁴² Previous results are available upon request, but the main idea was to measure citizen deliberation with 4 empirical indicators, built with data from the 4th wave of the European Values Study: tolerance, human values, political participation, civism;

(Grendstad 1990, 1999; Chai et al. 2009), partly using the same items or similar ones, to reach this aim²⁴³.

Even though both studies were interesting, Grendstad's work was much more suitable for my research: however, I could choose only 2 out of 4 different items he adopted for his 1999 article, because his data were taken from previous WVSs which unfortunately were not suitable for this work (1990 and 1999 waves).

The subsequent results, obtained using data from the 4th Wave of the EVS (2008), and following as much as possible Grendstad's method, were effective and consistent with existing theory and literature on the selected countries²⁴⁴.

7.1.1 From an anthropological approach towards a politological application

“Cultural Theory shows that there is no need to choose between, for instance, collectivism and individualism, values and social relations, or change and stability. Indeed, we argue, there is a need not to.”²⁴⁵

Starting from this quote, which has been chosen because it is quite useful to introduce the analysis prepared for this section of the work, it will be explained the logical path through which it holds.

“Cultural theory is a typological contribution to the field of political culture, based on the assumption that the most important factor in people's lives is how they want to relate to other people and how they want others to relate to them, dimensions which demarcate four omnipresent and interdependent cultures – hierarchy, egalitarianism,

²⁴³ Thanks to the (not only) methodological support received from Marco R. Steenbergen, during my research stay at his Chair (University of Zurich – Institute of Political Science), in the Academic Year 2015/2016;

²⁴⁴ See the Methodology and Data Chapter for more information on the items selected;

²⁴⁵ Wildawsky et al. 1990, 21;

individualism and fatalism – whose combinations determine the political cultural configuration of a country”²⁴⁶.

The idea behind the choice of this approach is that following a typical political culture one, usually more empirically than theoretically grounded, it would not have been possible to defend the development of a map of countries without entering the subcultural debate²⁴⁷.

On the one hand, approaching countries’ cultural orientations through the anthro-politological lenses helps the readers of this work identifying their positions at glance, reducing initial difficulties in the argumentation of its aim; on the other hand, it allows the author in the subsequent justification of the final results, through closeness and distance of the 27 EU countries between themselves and the axes statistically generated, but mostly in clustering their deliberative and/or not deliberative ranking.

Following scholars such as Mamadouh (1999), who conceived national political cultures as conversations between subcultures associated to national political institutions and practices, this work chose a different pattern than aggregated one of individual orientations towards political objects: here, political culture points at the importance of “meaning”.

Therefore, comparing national political cultures is a strategy to understand political culture in general terms (methodologically speaking), due to the evergrowing importance of the interaction between social actors from different states.

Although it might sound like an ideal attempt, the aim of describing EU countries with the help of their scientific samples, and then measuring other samples of them during a deliberative experiment, does allow in-depth reflections on a number of issues which helps a better understanding of different national attitudes when cross-culturally involved.

²⁴⁶ Grendstad 1999;

²⁴⁷ For this, see ...

7.1.2 The Adopted Methodology: polychoric correlation and factor analysis

As previously anticipated, the methodology adopted to operationalize Cultural Theory derives from Grendstad's inspiring 1999 article.

The choice of the data has been extremely straightforward, since the EVS2008 is the most comprehensive wave with the participation of all the EU27 member countries in 2009: therefore it has been downloaded the complete dataset of the European Values Study from the site (www.gesis.org).

It has been necessary to evaluate which items could substitute Grendstad's *group* dimension, since the *grid* ones could be saved: consistently with the Cultural Theory approach, two variables were chosen (v156 – duty towards society to have children; v157 – people should decide themselves to have children), while it was possible to adopt v7 – how often discuss politics with friends and v186 – how interested are you in politics, since these items were part of the questionnaires.

Now moving to the data manipulation, it must be made clear the author has step-by-step improved his knowledge of the statistical software R, whose help with its several statistical packages has worked these results out²⁴⁸.

Sequencing the order of the activities developed for this task: data from the EU27 countries have been filtered and numerically categorized, in order to group them along two main axes (first principal axis score and second principal axis score) with respective distances from them, thus illustrating the positions of the countries in the four quadrants.

With the help of the factor scores produced (and listed below the following map), it is possible to give clearer explanations of the cultural findings to be used in the third paragraph of this chapter: when culture meets deliberation empirically.

²⁴⁸ Synthax for these results is available upon request; packages used in R, are 'dplyr' version 0.4.3, 'ggplot2' version 2.1.0, 'polycor' version 0.7-8, 'psych' version 1.6.4;

Before getting into the results, it must be detailed which tools have been adopted to build the factor scores:

- Polychoric Correlation is a statistical technique for estimating the correlation between two theorised normally distributed continuous latent variables, from two observed ordinal variables²⁴⁹;
- Principal Component Factor Analysis²⁵⁰ is another instrument that allows us to discard the variables/features that have less variance; technically speaking, it uses orthogonal projection of highly correlated variables to a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components, and the number of principal components is less than or equal to the number of original variables (this linear transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal component has the largest possible variance, and it accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible by considering highly correlated features).

Finally, although the data selected from the EVS were very much in line with the theory, still it must be remembered that it was a secondary analysis to have been run, since no large scale survey was implemented to measure the grid and the group dimensions.

7.1.3 Results

The findings deriving from this data manipulation do serve as the empirical groundfloor of this project, thus positioning EU countries onto a cultural map that informs a possible interpretation of European citizens' behaviors.

Cultural orientations work pretty well in this perspective, but it is useful to point out that these results would be subject to change, when certain voices become louder than others in the single countries: this

²⁴⁹ <https://www.personality-project.org/r/html/tetrachor.html>

²⁵⁰ <https://www.r-bloggers.com/principal-component-analysis-using-r/>

derives from the observation of these national political cultures as dialogues (and alliances) between rationalities, differently rooted in the cultural context and in the political arrangements of the member states (Mamadouh 1999, 479).

Table n. 7.1.1

Individualist	Egalitarian	Hierarchical	Fatalist
Italy	France	Bulgary	Portugal
Ireland	Luxembourg	Cyprus	Romania
Finland	Austria	Malta	Spain
Belgium	Netherlands	Greece	Hungary
Lithuania	Sweden	Estonia	Poland
Slovenia	Denmark	Latvia	Slovakia
UK	Germany		Czech Republic
Northern Ireland			

Cultural orientations by country resulting from data

Proceeding to the presentation of the alternative orientations, then what to say?

Results look very interesting and driving comfortable explanations, I must admit, and in line with Grendstad's inspiring article (1999): Cultural Theory shows to be able to reconceptualize the more traditional political cultural knowledge about Europe while testing it quantitatively.

Several studies, as reported in chapter 3, have been analyzing political cultures in Europe (Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 1997, etc.), thus providing expectations on Nordic countries, Southern Europe, Low countries, Anglo-saxon countries, while less on Eastern and Baltic countries.

However, these results must be read all together, without taking off one of the countries from the map: this is even more clear when looking at the factor scores, explaining closenesses and distances from the main axes.

While some, taking as an example the bottom left quadrant, countries such as Belgium and UK look very much individualist, it is not possible to say the same for Italians and Lithuanians, very border line,

and the same example could be made for the other quadrants: this happens because, in the period of the survey, some other discourses were mute compared to the prevailing ones, but it is not possible to say that the remaining orientations were not present in those countries.

This has a great importance throughout this whole dissertation, because in the analysis of the deliberation in the small groups, some differences generate from this compresence of national dialogues.

Back on the cultural orientations, with a few exceptions from Slovenia and Lithuania (bordering with Fatalists), an intriguing divide is that between old and new EU countries: the former individualist and egalitarian, while the latter hierarchical and fatalist.

A map of EUropean cultures in 2009




Table n. 7.1.2

country	mean1	mean2	abbrev
Austria	0.29081614	-0.133163772	AT
Belgium	-0.28584478	-0.425932467	BE
Bulgaria	0.06900440	0.949338641	BG
Cyprus	0.01551016	0.671865695	CY
Czech Republic	-0.05816410	0.358300680	CZ
Denmark	0.48321156	-0.332071452	DK
Estonia	0.08310243	0.082369365	EE
Finland	-0.06476022	-0.482574748	FI
France	0.03520555	-0.268358894	FR
Germany	0.51553905	-0.055359505	DE
Greece	0.13441171	0.405342588	GR
Hungary	-0.22889868	0.053944483	HU
Ireland	-0.09226587	-0.224583969	IE
Italy	-0.03823947	-0.144702705	IT
Latvia	0.17993822	0.066860204	LV
Lithuania	-0.10765329	-0.016811906	LT
Luxembourg	0.12620258	-0.241798263	LU
Malta	0.01475774	0.458198728	MT
Netherlands	0.27079537	-0.493981233	NL
Poland	-0.07670247	0.024136745	PL
Portugal	-0.41965199	0.347697568	PT
Romania	-0.32515689	0.330239778	RO
Slovak Republic	-0.02119390	0.126051722	SK
Slovenia	-0.15512469	-0.003096268	SI
Spain	-0.34881331	0.015378094	ES
Sweden	0.07733492	-0.627655497	SE
Great Britain	-0.17586464	-0.388338900	UK
Northern Ireland	-0.43118079	-0.288346064	NI


Country Factor Scores

7.2 Measuring the quality of deliberation. The Discourse Quality Index applied to all the small groups of deliberation in EuroPolis.

While Deliberative Polls ® have been held all over the world since the first setting in 1994 (Manchester, UK), it is quite interesting that scholars' attention has focused mainly on external rather than internal dynamics of the deliberative process, leaving many questions unanswered, with very little research on these aspects (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2011, Gerber et al. 2015).

Taking into consideration existing studies on both elite and citizen deliberation, a few of them look at the process with a cultural approach (Fiket, Olsen and Trenz 2011, Pedrini 2014, Gerber et al. 2015), despite deliberative theory implicitly states that deliberation works best in situations where participants share the same political culture and speak the same language.

Chart n. 7.2.1



Personal elaboration of data from the following table, matching results from chapter 7.1

Table 7.2.1

CS / SGs	S G 0 1	S G 0 2	S G 0 3	S G 0 4	S G 0 5	S G 0 6	S G 0 7	S G 0 8	S G 0 9	S G 1 0	S G 1 1	S G 1 2	S G 1 3	S G 1 4	S G 1 5	S G 1 6	S G 1 7	S G 1 8	S G 1 9	S G 2 0	S G 2 1	S G 2 2	S G 2 3	S G 2 4	S G 2 5	T O T _ C S
AT	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	6
BE	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5
BG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
CZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
DK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
EE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
FI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
FR	3	8	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	42
DE	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	4	5	6	6	0	8	9	57	
GR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	6	
HU	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
IE	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	7
IT	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	6	6	5	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	37	
LV	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
LT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
LU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
MT	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
NL	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	12
PL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	6	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	30
PT	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
RO	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
SK	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
SI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
ES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	3	0	0	0	0	8	0	7	5	0	0	0	0	0	30
SE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
GB	0	0	0	0	7	7	3	5	0	0	4	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	33
T O T _ G S	15	14	15	14	14	15	11	10	15	14	13	15	13	14	11	15	15	11	16	16	15	13	14	13	17	348

The countries' distribution into the small groups of discussion in EuroPolis.

7.2.1 The Adopted Methodology: Data Generating Process&co.

Had there been such a previous knowledge on cultural orientations as derived from previous section 7.1, when composing the groups of discussion, would have it helped in their formation?

This question does recall one of the early critics of Deliberative Polls, regarding the possible manipulation of the results with the aid of empirical tools²⁵¹.

As this is not a section aiming at this, but rather concerned with showing the empirical results derived from applying the DQI2 to measure the quality of deliberation in the small groups of discussion during the first day of the quasi-experiment EuroPolis 2009, these outcomes will follow.

For the measurement process, the coding has been executed on the transcripts for 21 out of 25 SGs, while the SGs coded by the Oslo research team, even though following the same approach and scheme (see Appendix for it), have done the coding directly while listening to the audio files: this is the reason why, during the methodological explanation and in some other sections of this work, it is possible to find some discrepancy concerning the SGs I personally coded (8) and the SGs I personally transcribed (12)²⁵².


Therefore, adding my contribution to the existing research in this field, the results showed in this section will only be those deriving from my project, leaving the others to be used in the next section, where the Research Question receives an answer and the Hypotheses are tested.

Before that, all the single groups' compositions are here presented to graphically illustrate the cultural expectations, before measuring their effective discussions.


²⁵¹ On this, see Sunstein.

²⁵² Another point must be explained, about the timing of these coding: my coding has been made in 2016, while the other teams have executed it between 2009 and 2013.

SG01



SG02




SG03



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG04




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG05




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG06



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG07




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG08



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG09




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG10




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG11



SG12



SG13




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG14




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG15




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG16



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist


SG17



SG18




SG19



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG20




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG21



SG22




SG23




■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist

SG24



■ Individualist ■ Egalitarian ■ Hierarchical ■ Fatalist



7.2.2 An Empirical Development: Measuring Deliberation

The measurement has proceeded through the complete coding of the 8 groups previously listed, strictly following the coding scheme provided (and part of the Appendix)²⁵³.

A very good help towards a more reasoned interpretation of the evolution in the discussions have been the notes, added to any line of the codings, in order not to get through the audio files again, if not strictly necessary.

Something about the coding process must be highlighted, since it has had some more unexpected difficulties: not only some participants were not present at the beginning of the discussions, but also some discussions did not follow the planned path.

Therefore, however accurate the instruments to measure the deliberations were, still they could not always catch a clear set of discussions, even though these were extraordinarily organized by the project team²⁵⁴.

²⁵³ Steiner et al.

²⁵⁴ This is just a comment on the uncertainty of research, even if completely well-structured;

7.2.3 Results

Through the next tables the results from the 8 groups personally transcribed and coded will be showed and analyzed: following previous studies adopting the DQI2, attention will be on the main aspects of the discourses (justification, respect, interactivity, asking and storytelling).

Table n. 7.2.2

	SG05	SG06	SG13	SG14	SG15	SG18	SG22	SG25
jlev	0.904	0.932	0.917	1.145	1.000	1.800	1.227	1.857
jcon	1.045	1.375	1.167	1.183	1.362	1.686	1.425	1.643
int_part	1.600	1.247	1.833	1.661	1.638	1.412	1.205	1.857
resp_out	1.022	1.329	1.139	1.161	1.276	1.828	1.307	1.500
resp_dem	1.237	1.613	1.139	1.581	1.190	1.486	1.273	1.928
asking	0.222	0.102	0.139	0.113	0.052	0.028	0.281	0.069
storytelling	0.303	0.454	0.417	0.532	0.517	0.400	0.337	0.414
TOT_interrupt	3	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
TOT_Con_Pol	78	69	27	14	37	31	82	26
TOT_NO_just	49	24	9	13	9	3	17	1
TOT_resp_polit	122	84	29	55	54	34	87	24
TOT_resp_in	135	88	36	61	58	32	88	29
PART_Countries	UK 7	UK 7	IT 6	IT 5	FI 4	IT 5	DE 6	DE 9
PART_Countries	LV 5	SK 6	RO 7	UK 2	IT 5	PL 6	UK 3	GR 3
PART_Countries	IE 1	IE 2		EE 6	UK 2		CZ 3	IT 3
PART_Countries	MT 1			MT 1			IE 1	CY 2
Moderation	ENG	ENG	ITA	ITA	ITA	ITA	ENG	ITA
PART_SAs	135	88	36	62	58	35	89	29
MALE_SAs	76	46	24	37	24	17	53	16
FEMALE_SAs	57	40	12	24	32	17	31	9
Country_SAs	107	49	18	34	12	20	35	8
Country_SAs	12	23	18	12	24	15	31	6
Country_SAs	4	16		10	22		12	7
Country_SAs	12			5			7	6
Participants	14	15	13	14	11	11	13	17
Cultures	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	3
Gender	7m7f	9m6f	5m8f	8m6f	4m7f	6m5f	8m5f	9m8f

Full results of the SGs under scrutiny through this section.

This first table summarized the complete results produced to complement previous studies, and it is useful to look at them comparatively, before getting into details: I will focus on their main differences, before turning attention to their commonalities.

As previously anticipated, not every deliberating group followed the original plan, due to various reasons (technical, personal, external): therefore, it may not be possible to explain any result with quantitative or qualitative data, and the help of interpretation in this work is very valuable.

However, it has been very interesting to analyze these groups through different lenses: although research may not find out everything, it is at least possible to find a common path of explanation to their activities.

SG05: they delivered the highest number of speech acts (135) and the language of the moderation (English), together with the issue to deliberate on (immigration) could explain the over-speaking of the Maltese participant; 4 countries were part of this group, 2 cultural orientations (individualist and hierarchical), half old and half new EU members, while the level of justification was the lowest coded.

SG06: there were no interruptions throughout the 1st and the 2nd sequence under investigation, an high level of storytelling, while Slovaks speeches were proportionally low; importantly, gender quotas were respected in participation equality.

SG13: an high interactivity between participants has characterized the activities of this group during the first day, fairly distributed between countries, but unfairly between genders; however, the level of justification was really low compared to the other groups.

SG14: here it looks like moderator's language made a relevant difference on the participation of Estonians, proportionally looking at the number of speech acts per country; moreover, the 2 cultural orientations should explain also the very low number of constructive politics attempts.

SG15: a very low level of questions characterizes this group, containing high storytelling and no interruptions at all, with the language (and the behavior) of the moderator probably producing an influencing role during the discussions.

SG18: expectations from a group with 2 countries and 2 cultures were not clear, especially with fatalist and individualist ones, but the coding registered a very high level of justification and content of justification,

likewise the level of respect towards outgroup; inversely, not many questions arised, although both genders worked properly and proportionally.

SG22: this was one of the 2 groups with 3 cultures, with an evident influence coming from the language of the moderation, but very good results with constructive politics, and the level of questions was the highest coded.

SG25: the other group with 3 cultures, with a greek moderator whose language had to be English, thus generating a very low level of questions, together with high storytelling and no interruptions.

7.3 The Influence of Culture on Deliberation?

Quoting from the conclusion of the article by Kahan et al., since there is a close relationship with the aims of the case study analyzed: “those who seek to advance a policy regime that is respectful of the concerns and needs of diverse cultural groups should keep in mind the importance of understanding the cultural character of their own arguments and the convictions of those with opposing views”²⁵⁵.

The main aim of this dissertation was to analyze this supposed relationship existing between culture and deliberation, and the main efforts have been made in the operationalization of the concepts, and then the search for a theory connecting them.

With the previous empirical sections, these two concepts were created and then became testable, which means it will now be presented the concrete result of this whole project: the effect of culture on deliberation, in this work operationalized as the influence of cultural orientations on citizens’ deliberation.

7.3.1 Answering the main research question

An extremely hard task, since it has never been attempted to empirically establish this “possible effect” with these data.

In order to provide answers to the overall question, this cultural take has been developed, for various reasons: the idea of a European Public Sphere, proposed but not completely realized with the previous Deliberative Poll in 2007, remains a target, but not a systematic attempt has been conducted to comprehend what European citizens are, and if they are, in practice and not only through survey items.

²⁵⁵ See Kahan et al. (2008: 1797).

Thus, exploring their behaviors through in-depth analysis would help to reach a better understanding of their actions, when dealing with issues at the European level, and in Europe.

Adopting the approach of the cultural orientations there is the chance to fill a preliminary gap: not national political cultures internally divided in subcultural differences²⁵⁶, but four European clusters identified through cultures, and not only territorial borders.

7.3.2 The Adopted Methodology: cultural theory informing applied DQI codes

As explained in the previous Chapter 4, there is relatively a few studies on this analysis I have run to match culture and deliberation, thus I have followed Kahan et al.'s approach in preparing the correspondences showed in the following table.

The data which have supported this part of the work come from, basically, three different sources: qualitatively, the transcripts of the discussions in the small groups of Europolis have been elaborated by different researchers, including myself, but in different times, between 2009 and 2016; quantitatively, the coding derives from at least three different sources, including myself, the team of the University of Bern and Oslo, still during the same period 2009/2016.

For answering the overall research question, these correspondences have been tested interpretively²⁵⁷, because of the existing inter-coders differences, that have been extensively verified²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁶ See studies on the differences within countries, rather than between countries, like: Minkov and Hofstede (2014);

²⁵⁷ Interpretive methods: see Dvora Yanow ();

²⁵⁸ Following Steenbergen et al. (2003), various reliability tests have been conducted, and still are: because of this, it has been decided to base the current analysis on an interpretive approach, before the codings do fit better, and integrate this with others.

7.3.3 Previous Attempts

During this long hunt for examples in my research, this work from Kahan et al. (2008) was very inspiring and helping my understanding of the possible correspondences between these two theories, but the results of my research are exploratory as no previous attempts have been made to test these assumptions on a deliberative activity.²⁵⁹

Another work was somehow useful for a better comprehension of the relationship between culture and deliberation, but the difference was in the object of its analysis: it is an article from Steven Ney and Marco Verweij (2014), in which they explore the contributions of Cultural Theory for improving public deliberation, concerning how best to design deliberative practices.

Table n. 7.3.1

	Individualist	Egalitarian	Hierarchical	Fatalist
Interruption	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Level of Justification	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED
Content of Justification	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Respect towards Out-groups	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED
Respect towards In-groups	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED
Respect towards Politicians	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Respect Towards Demands / Counterarguments	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED
Interactivity between participants	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Interactivity between participants and moderator	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Constructive Politics	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Sourcing	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED
Asking	EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	PARTIALLY EXPECTED	UNEXPECTED
Off-topic	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	UNEXPECTED	EXPECTED

Correspondences between deliberative and cultural theories.

²⁵⁹ George Washington Law Review.

Table n. 7.3.2

Cultural Orientations	Egalitarian	Fatalist	Individualist	Hierarchical
SG01	20%	80%		
SG02	57%	43%		
SG03	87%		13%	
SG04	100%			
SG05			57%	43%
SG06		40%	60%	
SG07			100%	
SG08			60%	40%
SG09	47%	53%		
SG10	43%	50%	7%	
SG11	46%	8%	38%	8%
SG12	40%	20%	40%	
SG13		54%	46%	
SG14			50%	50%
SG15			100%	
SG16		60%	40%	
SG17	47%	53%		
SG18		55%	45%	
SG19	56%	44%		
SG20	38%	31%	31%	
SG21	100%			
SG22	46%	23%	31%	
SG23	36%	50%	14%	
SG24	69%			31%
SG25	53%		18%	29%

Matching cultural orientations and small groups in EuroPolis

7.3.4 Results

Regarding these final results, their analysis has been conducted interpretively, as previously explained, due to the different orientations adopted by the research teams that analyzed them earlier.

Considering these differences, an interpretive approach may be useful in unifying the efforts of the researchers, thus enriching the present work with previous academic results.

Therefore, this analysis starts by pointing out where the hypotheses presented in the research design have been tested, due to the composition of the SGs:

H1 – Fatalist countries, in groups where their language is only translated and the composition puts them in minority, will not or minimally raise questions – SGs 01, 02, 06, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23²⁶⁰.

H2 – Hierarchical countries, whatever the topics discussed, will not propose constructive politics – SGs 05, 08, 11, 14, 24, 25.

H3 – Egalitarian countries, with no regard to group composition, will be less respectful with out-groups than their group average – SGs 01, 02, 03, 04, 09, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25.

H4 – Individualist countries, with any given language and group composition, will score averagely higher than other countries, in level of justification – SGs 03, 05, 06, 07, 08, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25.

As it may have been previously read, these hypotheses were generated following the theory, of course: the first two ones deal with a clearer task than the others, more related to deeper understanding of respect and justification, before aiming at their concrete testing.

The groups were all considered at the same level of importance, while some differences between their development did not allow the same proceedings: this is why I consider very significant that this analysis was run over the first day of the deliberative experiment, while participants and staff were all “entering the game” at the same point, probably behaving more naturally than they would the day after.

Debating about immigration first, that worked as a good start for involving anyone in the playground: a colder issue as climate change seems like, would definitely have presented different outcomes, but of course there is not any counterfactual possibility to know about this.

²⁶⁰ In red the SGs were there are Fatalist countries, but not in the conditions to be tested;

Testing Hypothesis 1

Small Groups	Results	Hypothesis Confirmed/Rejected
SG02	3 questions	Rejected
SG06	No questions	Confirmed
SG11	No questions	Confirmed
SG12	2 questions	Confirmed
SG19	6 questions	Rejected
SG20	1 question	Confirmed
SG22	1 question	Confirmed

H1 – Fatalist countries, in groups where their language is only translated and the composition puts them in minority, will not or minimally raise questions.

TEST H1 – Basically, the number of questions raised by each participant belonging to fatalist countries has been counted, with the conditions explained in the H1: results are consistent with theory in 5 out of 7 groups, whereas it must be presented that situations in which more questions were asked by fatalist participants, those all came from groups where there were also egalitarian participants.

Testing Hypothesis 2

Small Groups	Results	Hypothesis Confirmed/Rejected
SG05	2 proposals	Rejected
SG08	7 proposals	Rejected
SG11	3 proposals	Rejected
SG14	3 proposals	Rejected
SG25	4 proposals	Rejected

H2 – Hierarchical countries, whatever the topics discussed, will not propose constructive politics.

TEST H2 – In order to have a clear and simple result, this H2 has been kept free from conditions, but the results have shown an extreme opposition to the theory behind it, completely rejecting the hypothesis tested. Thus, it must be investigated, if feasible, how did the hierarchical countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Latvia) relate with the issue at stake, immigration: looking at the transcripts, connected

with national data on third country migrants (Eurostat), this is a very hot issue for these member states, both as “senders and receivers”. Therefore, with a different issue to be discussed, their cultural orientations would have been more observable in the debates.

Testing Hypothesis 3

Small Groups	Results	Hypothesis Confirmed/Rejected
SG01	0.583 vs. 1.271	Confirmed
SG02	1.647 vs. 1.333	Rejected
SG09	1.029 vs. 1.046	Confirmed
SG10	1.423 vs. 1.204	Rejected
SG11	1.158 vs. 1.107	Rejected
SG12	1.200 vs. 1.246	Confirmed
SG17	1.526 vs. 1.418	Rejected
SG19	1.188 vs. 1.156	Rejected
SG20	1.071 vs. 1.187	Confirmed
SG22	1.353 vs. 1.307	Rejected
SG23	1.189 vs. 1.171	Rejected
SG24	1.292 vs. 1.242	Rejected

H3 – Egalitarian countries, with no regard to group composition, will be less respectful with out-groups than their group average.

TEST H3 – T-test have been conducted with the two different samples of each group coding results for resp_out, assuming unequal variances, and results presented above are a simple product of the statistical analysis. These 12 cases have witnessed differences in cultural orientations’ distribution (from 2 to 4), as well as influential patterns of behaviors among participants. Therefore, notwithstanding results looks like rejecting the H3, slight differences are very much diffused in 7 out of 12 SGs, still allowing room for further debate on the result.

Testing Hypothesis 4

Small Groups	Results	Hypothesis Confirmed/Rejected
SG03	1.600 vs. 1.642	Rejected
SG05	0.874 vs. 0.904	Rejected
SG06	1.031 vs. 0.932	Confirmed
SG08	0.605 vs. 0.603	Confirmed
SG10	0.750 vs. 1.296	Rejected
SG11	0.969 vs. 0.982	Rejected
SG12	1.089 vs. 1.091	Rejected
SG13	1.000 vs. 0.917	Confirmed
SG14	1.196 vs. 1.145	Confirmed
SG16	1.318 vs. 1.402	Rejected
SG18	1.850 vs. 1.800	Confirmed
SG20	1.400 vs. 2.094	Rejected
SG22	1.158 vs. 1.227	Rejected
SG23	0.900 vs. 1.238	Rejected
SG25	2.000 vs. 1.857	Confirmed

H4 – Individualist countries, with any given language and group composition, will score averagely higher than other countries, in level of justification.

TEST H4 – As for the previous hypothesis testing, a t-test has been conducted for H4, and only 4 out of 15 single SG analysis are clearly rejected or confirmed. However, the ratio behind this hypothesis was not explicitly rejected, even though individualist results for the level of justification are especially higher in SGs where there are not egalitarian countries. Further considerations should arise from the possible influence of countries very much involved in the immigration problem on others less concerned on the issue: this is a more in-depth analysis to be run after inter-coder reliability has reached better fit.

8. Conclusion

One of the main purposes of this research, through the many difficulties faced and partly expected, was reached: add to the empirical studies on deliberative democracy and political culture some more available data, and some interesting results through their use.

How this was possible, and how was it made: that has been mostly presented through the methodological chapter, but there is something to add on that, here.

This trend of research, where studies on culture and deliberation do have a common ground, is still in search of a better definition, to position itself in the literature.

With the instruments adopted through this whole research, an attempt has been made to find a useful path, informing both fields of research of their potential results, when working together.

Since my project started, I have been interested in understanding both literatures, while looking for their possible connections, not only at a theoretical level: sometimes harder than expected, a young scholar working on them is now available.

Before designing a possible research, there have been many little parts of it to be found: enough literature, some theories to follow, a case study to be analyzed, the correct methodology to be adopted, interesting hypotheses to be generated.

That part of the project took quite a long time, but after it was complete, this dissertation could finally get to work.

I would like to show some important results that have been reached through the present work, alternating them with the reasons behind the choices made to support them.

From the beginning of my PhD, at least since when it was possible to gather the EuroPolis data, I wanted to see how would the EU be on a

map, a special one in which differences could be more evident than those between old and new countries, Eurozone countries and not.

Moreover, reading through cross-cultural psychology, it appeared to me enough clear that most of the studies did not help my idea, but still there was not such a thing as a political culture map of Europe: until I met the Cultural Theory, and its empirical applications with survey data.

It was quite clear to me, then, what road should have been followed to elaborate the European Map of Cultures in 2009, now available at the beginning of Chapter 7.

Nonetheless, without data from EuroPolis there would not have been any dependent variable to be matched: in fact, both the 4th wave of the EVS data and those available in the Deliberative Poll held in 2009, go hand in hand to allow the realization of this study.

During those years, European people had faced the biggest financial crisis since the EU existed, and this was also another important aspect to point out, when looking at the results of this study.

Besides that, the immigration issue, quite a relevant problem in 2009, did eventually increase its relevance after those years, bringing EU into an unresolved situation like the actual one.

Completing the existing research on the discussions in EuroPolis, it has been a very interesting work: notwithstanding the hard times I had during the transcriptions, it was clear from what I heard that much more could be understood by those records with a more in-depth analysis, even if the DQI helped a lot in rationalizing the discourses.

After having concluded the transcriptions, and during the first codings, I did realize I needed to know more about the whole event from the organizers, inventors, contributors: that is why I asked for interviews with them, by e-mail, Skype or personally, in order to have a better comprehension of such an inspiring project.

My codings have now completed the immigration issue, but it must be said that, since that was happening on the very first day of the event, its results are somehow mixed with other problems, such as missing

experience of some moderators, first-time abroad participants, technical issues, and so on.

Therefore, I evaluated it was more productive to rather interpret these results for my own research, moving along an exploratory line, towards the aim of improving the studies in this inter-field of research.

As from the Hypotheses Testing in chapter 7.3.4, what is somehow surprising are the results from the H3 and H4: this derives from the fact that, while fatalist countries confirmed the hypothesized absence or very low asking attitude, hierarchical countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Latvia) did propose some solution on the immigration issue, probably because of their closeness to the matter, thus rejecting the H2.

Moving to the H3, egalitarian countries appeared quite mixed towards out-groups: although their potential disrespectful position was somehow present, particularly SG02 and SG10 showed very much respect; even though the group composition had only French participants on this cultural orientation, it may not be an indicator since SG01 has the same egalitarian composition, with completely opposite results; it may vary depending on the other participants in the group, or because of the moderator's role.

The last considerations on the individualist result, where these countries reach half-good results, but the SGs where results are more rejecting the H4 are those with Belgium and Slovenia, where the former has a national variety whose results are not always predictable, and the latter is (from the cultural map) bordering with fatalist countries.

What is now known, after this exploratory approach developed with a quantitative operationalization of culture with Cultural Theory, the analysis of new transcriptions from part of the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll held in 2009, and the attempt to connect scholarships on deliberative democracy and political culture? Are there useful results deriving from this research? Is there more to ask for a better understanding of how deliberation works? Was it helpful to study the influence of culture on deliberation, or would it have been needed to observe the other way around?

Sass and Dryzek (2014) adopt an intersubjective conception of culture, and their approach means culture cannot be treated as an independent variable that influences politics from outside [...] since cultures can themselves be the objects of explanation (2014, 7): somehow opposite to my approach, they interestingly observe different deliberative cultures at work in some countries, but for pursuing their aim they see interpretation as necessary where the meaning of action is unclear (2014, 8), and this could be one point where a Cultural Theory approach would help in guiding towards the unknown.

Not referring to Gambetta, Gerber, Pedrini and others whose references were previously made, some different inter-approaches came from Min (2014), Lundell (on Dryzek, 2012), Ney and Verweij (2014), just to show a few: however, referring to detailed aspects of national cultures and deliberative process, they all proposed relevant arguments to this inter-field.

Finally, some overall commentary on the idea this dissertation proposed to investigate: national political²⁶¹ cultures influencing citizens' behaviors has been the line I have been following throughout the whole project, mainly because establishing a European public sphere as existing, but without any analysis of its individualities, did seem to me like missing its real actors; empirical research on deliberative democracy, without a complete set of data to study, would miss its general aspirations; the consequences of culture (Hofstede 1980), in a deliberative process, needed to be explored.

²⁶¹ I keep on labeling as 'political' the national cultures' scores obtained with the quantitative analysis of 4 items in the EVS 2008, when I should more properly call them 'sociopolitical';

9. Appendix

Codebook DQI

Version 1st October 2010

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1. General Codes

sequence Sequence of the discussion

- (1) Problem-oriented
- (2) Solution-oriented
- (3) Formulation of question for experts
- (4) Discussion of party manifestos
- (5) Formulation of questions for politicians
- (6) Evaluation

(or similar)

Notes: The topic of a sequence is defined by the question the moderator asks in the beginning. E.g. “What policy-options do you see for dealing with third country immigration?” → code 2. A sequence ends when the moderator introduces a question on a new topic. When the participants depart from this topic within a given sequence, this has still to be coded as

being part of the sequence (e.g. a participant only talks on the integration of Muslim immigrants when the group was actually supposed to discuss policy options dealing with third country immigration → code 2). In this case, however, the participant gets in addition a code 1 for off-topic talk (variable “offtopic”)

name Name of the participant.

gender Participant’s gender.

(0) male

(1) female

nation Nationality

And other demographics like age, education, mother tongue, etc.

2. Additional Codes for the Moderator

modspeech Nature of speech act given by the moderator

(1) initiates debate on new topic

(2) intervenes if the debate is becoming off-topic

(3) intervenes to engage individual participants in the debate

(4) intervenes to engage specific language group in the debate

(5) intervenes with explanation of purpose of Deliberative Poll

(6) intervenes by reminding respect (incl. no interruptions)/decent language

(7) intervenes by providing information/knowledge

(8) intervenes by making evaluative statements/arguments on the topic

(9) intervenes to ask questions

(10) invites the participants to read the briefing material

Notes: (1) indicates the beginning of a new sequence; (3) and (4) are only

used to integrate participants/language groups that have not spoken for a while (9) is used if the facilitator addresses general questions to everyone. If he asks a question to integrate someone in particular, code (3) or (4) will be given instead.

3. Participation

p_sec Length of speech in seconds.

formal Nature of the speech act (interruption 1)

- (0) Formal speech act
- (1) Informal speech act: the speaker interrupts another speaker
- (2) Informal speech act: a person starts to say something without being authorized (and gets interrupted by the moderator)
- (3) Informal speech act: a speaker talks to his or her neighbour and does not address his speech to the whole group (= does not use the micro)

[if possible, code all DQI indicators not only for the formal, but also for the informal speech acts]

interrupt Interruption of the speech act (interruption 2)

- (0) The speaker can speak freely (= no interruption)
- (1) The speaker gets interrupted by another participant
- (2) The speaker gets interrupted by the moderator

Inter_name If (1), name of the person who was interrupting (interrupt 3)

4. Justification

jus_lev Level of justification

(0) The speaker does not present any argument or only says that X should or should not be done, but no reason is given.

(1) *Inferior Justification*: Here a reason Y is given why X should or should not be done, but no linkage is made between X and Y—the inference is incomplete or the argument is merely supported with illustrations.

(2) *Qualified Justification*: A linkage is made why one should expect that X contributes to or detracts from Y. A single such complete inference already qualifies for code 4.

(3) *Sophisticated Justification (broad)*: Here at least two complete justifications are given, either two complete justifications for the same demand or complete justifications for two different demands.

(4) *Sophisticated Justification (in depth)*: Not only are at least two complete justifications given for a demand, one justification is also embedded in at least two complete inferences.

Notes: (2) is considered to be the reference level for citizen deliberation. If there is one argument that contains one justification but if it is followed by additional speech that is first, a lot longer than the argument and its justification and second, would not qualify for code (2), code (1) is given instead. The same accounts for code (3): If there is either one argument and at least two complete justifications or more than one justified argument, but the following text – which is of equal length or longer - does not fulfill the above mentioned criteria, code (2) is given instead.

jus_con Content of justification

(0) No reference: The speaker does not refer to benefits and costs at all.

(1) Explicit statement concerning constituency or group interests (*own country*).

(2) Explicit statement in terms of a conception of the common good in utilitarian or collective terms (*EU, Europe, global*).

(3) Explicit statement in terms of the difference principle (*solidarity, quality of life, justice, etc.*).

5. Respect

resp_grm Respect toward groups - third country migrants (out-groups)

(0) *No Respect*: This code is reserved for speeches in which there are only or predominantly negative statements about the groups.

(1) *Implicit Respect*: No explicitly negative statements can be identified, but neither are there explicit positive statements.

(2) *Respect (balanced)*: Both, positive and negative respect is equally expressed.

(3) *Explicit Respect*: This code is assigned if there is at least one explicitly positive statement about the groups and either are negative statements completely absent or positive statements are clearly dominating the negative statements.

resp_ingr Respect toward groups (in-groups) (see resp_grm)

resp_polit Respect toward politicians (see resp_grm)

resp_dem Respect toward demands and counterarguments

(0) *No Respect*: Only or predominantly negative statements about demands and/or counterarguments are made.

(1) *Implicit Respect*: No explicitly negative statements were made, but neither are their explicit positive statements.

(2) *Respect (balanced)*: Both, positive and negative respect is equally expressed.

(3) *Explicit Respect*: There is at least one explicitly positive statement about demands and/or counterarguments and either are negative statements completely absent or positive statements are clearly dominating the negative statements.

(4) *Agreement*: This code is given if speakers agree with the demands and/or counterarguments of other actors. In case of demands, they must simultaneously value them. This code is not given if actors state that they “agree” unwillingly or under force.

6. Interactivity

intarg_pp Respect toward other arguments (Interactivity *between participants*)

(0) No reference to other participants’ arguments.

(1) Negative reference to other participants’ arguments.

(2) Neutral reference to other participants’ arguments.

(3) Positive reference to other participants' arguments.

intarg_mp Respect toward other arguments (Interactivity between *moderator and participant*)

(0) No reference to other participants'/moderator's arguments.

(1) Negative reference to other participants'/moderator's arguments.

(2) Neutral reference to other participants'/moderator's arguments.

(3) Positive reference to other participants'/moderator's arguments.

Notes: Just explicit interactivity is coded:

- the name of a participant is connected to a argument
- there was no name mentioned but the following speech act clearly referred to a preceding one.

7. Consensual Approaches

conspol Constructive Politics

(0) *No Proposal*: No new proposal or aspect is introduced.

(1) *Unspecific Appeal*

(2) *Alternative Proposal*: A speaker makes a proposal or introduces an aspect that does not fit the current agenda but belongs to another agenda. In such cases, the proposal is really not relevant for the current debate, although it may be taken up in a different debate.

(3) *New Proposal*: A speaker makes a new proposal or introduces an aspect that fits the current agenda.

(4) *Mediating proposal*

Notes: This is maybe not comparable to the coding of the original variable of "constructive politics", if participants face an open discussion where no consensus has to be reached. The code (3) was given if a speaker simply introduced a new proposal or aspect that was relevant for the current debate and code (2) was given if it was not relevant for the current debate. An unspecific appeal (1) refers to sentences like "we should do something about this or this problem" but does not give concrete ideas on

how to tackle the problem. A mediating proposal (4) fits the current agenda *and* aims at reaching consensus.

8. Sourcing

source1 Main source of arguments.

- (0) No source mentioned.
- (1) Personal experience / storytelling
- (2) Description of situation in one's own country (without using any other source)
- (3) Briefing material
- (4) Other sources connected to the setting (Expert/politician interviews, etc.)
- (5) Politicians (other than those interviewed)
- (6) Media
- (7) Knowledge of other participants
- (8) Knowledge of the moderator
- (9) other

source2 Additional sources of arguments (see source1)

source3 Additional sources of arguments (see source1)

offtopic Is the speech act on- (0) or off-topic (1)?

Notes: A speech act will uniquely be considered as off-topic if not a single argument is included that fits the current agenda. Accordingly, a speech act will just be coded as off-topic, if there is no reference to the guiding question (moderator) and if no statement was made about common regulations on the EU-level, a topic which leads through the whole debate.

9. Asking

ask Informative and argumentative exchange (asking)

- . (0) does not ask any information/justification.
- . (1) asks information/knowledge from other participants
- . (2) asks information/knowledge from moderator
- . (3) asks arguments/justifications from other participants (broad).
- . (4) asks arguments/justifications from moderator
- . (5) questions for experts/politicians are formulated.

Notes: If the moderator or the participants pose general questions that are not addressed at someone in particular, there is no corresponding code in Interactivity I.

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