

Norwegian Red Cross



# Somalia after UNOSOM


Proceedings from a conference  
held in Oslo, 9-10 March 1995



edited by

Jan M. Haakonsen & Hassan A. Keynan

Approximate distribution of Somali clans\*



From the Norwegian Refugee Council's publication "På Flukt" nr. 3, 1991.

\* The map is illustrative only and does not imply the acceptance of any border or other political or social demarcation by the Norwegian Red Cross.

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## Preface

The following texts are the proceedings from a conference entitled **Somalia after UNOSOM** held just as the last UN peacekeeping troops were leaving Somalia after more than two years. The conference was organised by the Norwegian Red Cross with financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I take this opportunity to express our gratitude for this support.

The Norwegian Red Cross has had a special interest in the events in Somalia due to the long-term friendship and co-operation with our sister society, the Somali Red Crescent Society, which has played a remarkably active role in the relief operations both before, during and after the UNOSOM presence in the country. However, the withdrawal of the UN troops in March this year marked a new era in Somalia's turbulent history, and it was on this background that the initiative was taken to review the situation and look towards the future from a humanitarian standpoint.

A number of the best known experts on Somalia from all over the world, from Somalia herself not the least, were thus invited, and we were happy to see that most accepted to come to Oslo to share their views with us. In addition to the 26 invited contributors, some 50 participants from various NGOs, research institutions and ministries in Norway attended. While the conference was an attempt to gain further understanding into Somali culture and society, particularly within the present context, the main underlying theme from our point of view was the implications the UNOSOM withdrawal might or might not have for future humanitarian assistance to the country.

From the point of view of the Norwegian Red Cross, the conference definitely succeeded in widening our knowledge on Somalia, and we hope this will contribute to a more effective humanitarian assistance in the future. We also feel the papers presented at the conference, as well as the many valuable commentaries, made by the panels and the other conference participants, are of such general interest to anyone engaged in the Somali question, that we would like to share them in the form of this simple publication.

The proceedings are meant to reflect as much as possible the sentiments and profound engagement expressed by the various participants, thus the rather oral form of many of the comments as they are based on transcriptions from recordings made during the conference. We apologise in advance for any unintended distortion of statements made. In the course of editing the

transcriptions, we may not always have interpreted the underlying opinion of the speaker correctly, particularly in cases where some of the words were missed out completely as a result of the speaker being too far removed from a microphone.

In the case of the panel commentaries, too, we have generally included the oral version, i.e. the way the commentary was actually presented, rather than the written paper most discussants had prepared in advance and which many decided to depart from. This, we feel, reflects more accurately the atmosphere of the conference.

Oslo, November 1995

Jan M. Haakonsen

Conference Secretary

## Welcoming address

*Astrid Nøkleby Heiberg, President of the Norwegian Red Cross*

*(read by Mr. Sven Mollekleiv)*

Dear guests and participants,

It is a privilege for me, on behalf of the Norwegian Red Cross, to wish you welcome to this conference.

It has been our objective to gather some of the world's most renowned and updated experts on the situation in Somalia here in Oslo, in order to create a forum for an open and fruitful exchange of views and a greater international awareness of the situation in Somalia.

I am therefore very pleased to see that so many outstanding scholars and representatives from different organisations concerned with the future of Somalia, have responded positively to the invitation, and found their way to our small part of the world, which for many of you, I know, is quite far off your ordinary track.

Norway is a long way from Somalia, but you will find here a great concern for the future of that country.

For the Norwegian Red Cross, the link with Somalia goes back to 1981 when our cooperation with the Somali Red Crescent Society started. Together we established a centre for production of prosthesis and physiotherapy to serve the many victims from the Somali - Ethiopian war in 1978. The centre - which I myself had the opportunity to visit only some months ago, is still operational today - as it was during the difficult years of 1991 - 92.

This first initiative developed into a close collaboration between the two national societies, and has extended to an overall support to Somali Red Crescent activities throughout the country. This support, we feel, is as necessary today as it was during the human tragedy some years back.

During the years of 1991 - 92, substantial support was given to the relief operation of the International Red Cross and to the programme of the Norwegian Red Cross, both by the Norwegian Government and by the general public in Norway.

Norway was also one of the many countries which provided troops to UNOSOM when the Security Council of the UN asked the member States to participate in an operation to secure delivery of humanitarian aid and to restore peace and stability in Somalia.

Two years have elapsed since the first UN troops waded ashore in Mogadishu.

Last week the same troops left with bullets flying over their heads as gunmen looted

their left-behind equipment and with the war-lords waiting in the wings, preparing for new murderous power games.

What went wrong?

Where did the international community fail?

Or, perhaps, was the failure not ours, but the responsibility of the Somali people themselves?

What is our obligation towards the Somali people today?

These are the questions asked by the UN, by governments, humanitarian organisations and the public in general, all of whom came forward and contributed to one of the largest relief operations ever.

One might give a simple answer to all these questions. "The enormous resources poured into Somalia with such a lousy result, can not be justified, and it's time to leave it to the Somalis to sort out their own problems".

In a world with an increasing number of wars and conflicts affecting millions of people and putting a very heavy financial burden on the international donor community, such a statement might sound tempting.

For a humanitarian organisation, however, such reasoning can never be the guideline to our actions. In our thinking, the human being comes first. The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental right which must be enjoyed by citizens of all countries.

Fortunately, this view, I know, is shared by many individuals and governments, and is one reason why the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs so generously has supported the Norwegian Red Cross in arranging this conference.

Hopefully, our gathering here today and tomorrow will bring forth some analysis and proposals that might assist the international as well as the Somali community, in identifying a strategy for the reconstruction of the country or at least for the amelioration of the situation for the people.

Today, Somalia stands at another crossword in its history. Whatever course it takes, there will be consequences for the future of the Somali people.

Whatever action the international community takes will affect not only the future of the Somali people, but also the peace and stability of the whole region.

I would therefore like to conclude these opening remarks with a sincere thanks to all the participants for joining us here today and to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their kind support in helping us to bring Somalia back on the international agenda.

I will now give the floor to the State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jan Egeland.

Thank you.

## Norwegian Red Cross Conference on Somalia, The lessons of Somalia

*Opening address by State Secretary Jan Egeland, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Now is the time to learn from our mistakes. This conference is certainly being held at a very appropriate time. Less than a week ago we witnessed the final departure of UNOSOM from Somalia and from Mogadishu. This means that one of the largest, most expensive, and also one of the most difficult military peace operations in the 50 years' history of the United Nations has been brought to an end. There are also many who would like to argue that it has been one of the most unsuccessful such operations ever undertaken, if not an outright failure.

Personally I think it is premature at this stage to make a final judgement on the UN operations in Somalia. We shall now have to monitor closely the development in the country in the coming weeks and months, and I suspect that we shall also still have long and intensive discussions both in the United Nations and in Somalia - as well as in other fora - of the merits and weaknesses of the UNOSOM operations, and of what exactly went wrong in this broad international effort to restore peace, and save the people of Somalia from starvation and political anarchy.

In the assessment we shall have to make, I think it is important that we do not blind ourselves by the problems and faults, but that we approach the issue with an open and constructive mind, in order that we may draw as much experience as possible from this operation. I disagree with those who would argue that the Somalia experience proves that the United Nations should not engage itself in this sort of operations. The UN certainly is not a perfect organisation - as it reflects the international community that it is a product of - but it is after all the best machinery that we have at our disposal to deal with the increasing number of international problems that we are all confronted with, not least with regard to crisis management and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

We should also not forget that less than two months ago another major UN operation in Africa - the UNOMOZ in Mozambique - was brought to a successful conclusion, in spite of the many difficulties and problems during the two years of that operation.

In the crises in Rwanda, and now to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement in Angola, a strong UN presence has been called for, and in both these cases there has been a significant humanitarian dimension.

With hindsight one may certainly argue that a number of things with regard to UNOSOM could - and perhaps should - have been done differently. But it is important that we keep in mind that when the extended mandates for UNITAF and UNOSOM II were being discussed at the Security Council, the world was witnessing a major catastrophe in Somalia; with threats of massive starvation, civil war and total collapse of government, as well as widespread looting and obstruction of relief operations by the various militias. The UN was at the time heavily criticised, also by the relief agencies, for its reluctance to intervene forcefully in the Somali situation. It was also the failure of UNOSOM I to materialise, due to resistance by certain Somali factions, in combination with the deteriorating humanitarian situation and growing violations of human rights in the country, that prompted the Security Council to authorise action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Today we of course know the rest of the story, and we may all try to draw our own conclusions. Even if UNOSOM did not achieve all its stated objectives, especially with regards to establishing peace and political reconciliation, I think it is important to emphasise that at least some of the humanitarian aims were attained, and many human lives were saved from starvation, thanks to the joint efforts by the UN and the humanitarian relief community.

One can argue that the UN intervention in Somalia came too late, both in relation to the humanitarian crises in the country and in order to be able to function as an effective mediator. At the same time one can argue the UN intervention came too early, because no consent had been achieved with the warring parties about exactly what role the UN should play. I think both sides have a point, and that this clearly shows the dilemma that such operations often are faced with, especially taking into account also the problems involved in establishing a major multinational force like the UNOSOM II.

We will also in the future be confronted with situations where there is a clear conflict between an urgent need for international humanitarian intervention and to establish the consent of the parties involved, and we should therefore make serious efforts to find mechanisms to deal with such situations. This is an area where close co-operation and co-ordination will be needed both between the various UN agencies and between the UN and the NGO community. In this context I also think it is important that we develop mechanism for early warning and for conflict prevention and management,

and not only concentrate on conflict resolution once such conflicts have developed into a major international crises or war.

I think that the UN effort in Somalia clearly illustrates the point that it is not possible to impose peace on a nation from the outside. It is probably also true that neither the Security Council, nor UNOSOM as such, fully understood the inner workings and the complexities of the Somali society, and their procedures for resolving conflicts, something that is always essential for any reconciliation effort to be successful.

Now that UNOSOM has left, the challenge is up to the Somalis themselves, but the international community should be prepared to assist in whatever ways the Somali people themselves may want us to, both with regards to the difficult task of reconciliation, as well as for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. Several encouraging steps for conflict resolution has been taken, and deserves our support.

I think it is important that the withdrawal of UNOSOM, and the fading attention of the CNN and other international media, should not mean that Somalia will be forgotten. The international community still has a responsibility to bring Somalia back on its feet, and to help bring peace with dignity and freedom back to the Somali people. In this effort the NGOs and the humanitarian community will also have a very vital role to play.

#### **Use of military forces in support of humanitarian operations**

The general issue of military support to humanitarian operations has received broad attention in the aftermath of UNOSOM. Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda are all examples of a new type of operation where humanitarian action, mandated by the Security Council, becomes essential in internal conflicts. As humanitarian organisations more and more move into situations of conflict, they also move closer to the military and political agenda in the area of operation. The closer links require closer cooperation which again require better dialogue and understanding in order to maintain the humanitarian specificities. Indeed, humanitarian action cannot be fully effective if there is no understanding and respect for the need of humanitarian agencies to maintain a certain degree of independence from UN authorised political and/or military activities.

UNOSOM has amply demonstrated both advantages and disadvantages in linking up with the military in humanitarian operations. Access to military logistical capacity allows the humanitarian organisation a wider outreach. On the other hand, the essential neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action is tested, and in most cases, compromised when coercive measures

are used to ensure access. The Somali experience shows the limits of humanitarian actions in such operations. The use of force against one party inevitably affects the perceived impartiality and neutrality of the United Nations, and by implications, also of humanitarian organisations associated with the operation. In such circumstances, humanitarian organisations might be better off without military support.

In general it seems quite clear that military force should only be involved in humanitarian operations if no other alternatives exist. Efforts should be made to empower humanitarian organisations in order to avoid unacceptable and unnecessary dependency upon military support.

One should also realise that involving military forces is costly. It is said that for each dollar spent on humanitarian activities in UNOSOM, eight dollars were spent on military activity.

The situation might have been different in many parts of Somalia if some of these financial resources had been utilised for humanitarian purposes rather than military.

UNOSOM also provides clear evidence that the more humanitarian action becomes a part of a UN military operation, the more important it is to establish a clear mandate for the operation, clear command and control structures as well as clear roles for different actors. It is essential that the respective mandates be understood and respected by all engaged in each particular operation. Objectives and division of labour should be clearly established in the early stages, or from the onset of an operation. Subject to command and control requirements, humanitarian organisations should enjoy autonomy in accordance with their mandates, and not be subordinated to military or political objectives.

Success or not with regards to joint humanitarian/military operations is not as much a question of what kind of military equipment, techniques or other forms of support which are provided to relief operations, as it is of whether this support is perceived to be used for political or military purposes. The "politicisation" of the humanitarian operation in Somalia is probably the best recent example in this respect.

I am convinced that the interaction between military and humanitarian action will grow in the coming years. The mutual benefit in closer cooperation is all too evident. However, a set of principles for protection of humanitarian mandates in conflict situations needs to be established.

The question is not so much one of whether to use military force or not, but rather about how to use it.

### **The humanitarian situation:**

From 1991 until mid-1993 hundreds of lives were lost due to extensive fighting and famine in Somalia and up to 1.5 million Somalis (roughly 25% of the population) were displaced inside Somalia or in neighbouring countries. Under the initial interventions by the International Red Cross, a few NGOs and UN organisations, courageous efforts were made and succeeded in saving large numbers of people from starvation and death. Norway's humanitarian relief aid to victims of the conflict amounted to some 12 million Kroner in 1991 and rose to 56.2 million in 1992, and again to 58.4 million in 1993, which was close to 1/3 of our budget for humanitarian relief aid to victims of war in Africa. As the acute phase of the emergency receded during 1994, Norwegian humanitarian relief aid to Somalia was maintained at a comparatively high level and amounted to a total of more than 31.7 million Kroner. A major part of our funding during the past four years has been channelled through the Norwegian Red Cross, i.e. in support of projects benefiting the institutional and organisational build-up of the Somali Red Crescent's own relief network.

In spite of the failure and inefficiencies of the international community's humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the fact remains that the acute phase of the emergency has been overcome. At the end of 1994 the health and nutritional standards of the population as a whole showed a marked improvement. Agricultural and livestock production is increasing, although still being below pre-war levels. UN organisations and NGOs continue to implement projects in all of Somalia's eighteen regions, in most of them without the protection of UN troops.

During 1994 the numbers benefiting from free food distributions or enrolled at emergency feeding centres were gradually diminished and more emphasis was given to supporting self-reliance and community services through food-for-work programmes. Few of the basic services in the field of health, water or education have become sustainable, however. Consequently, direct support in the form of supplies, management services and training have assisted the population and have been instrumental in preventing a repetition of the tragedy of 1991-92.

In several areas where conditions of relative stability and security exist, it has been possible to implement modest rehabilitation activities. In other areas programmes have had to be implemented under extremely difficult security conditions. The situation has been particularly volatile in Mogadishu where activities came to a halt over long periods.

In the absence of national institutions capable of coping with even minor



emergencies, Somalia remains vulnerable to threats of renewed conflict. While several NGOs are reported to have left Somalia and abandoned their programmes after having been subject to threats and extortion, other international relief organisations have apparently benefited from strong community support and have been able to resolve disputes with smaller groups or particular leaders by relying on community consensus.

Assurance have been given to Somalia faction leaders that the withdrawal of UNOSOM does not mean that the UN is abandoning Somalia. On the contrary it has been stressed that the UN and its humanitarian agencies and programmes are committed to continue to provide relief and rehabilitation activities during the post-UNOSOM period. According to a recent UN report, the representatives of the UN agencies and programmes, as well as those of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations in Somalia, have reaffirmed their commitment to continue their operations. They have stressed however, that a distinction should be made between Mogadishu and the rest of Somali, and that in the immediate aftermath of UNOSOM, the situation in Mogadishu could become precarious.

While humanitarian programmes and activities in Somalia still focus to a large extent on priority emergency relief, activities linking emergency relief to support for community activities focusing on short and medium-term rehabilitation needs are also being implemented by various relief organisations. In the absence of a government and a functioning public sector, such programme activities are considered paramount in maintaining critical public services.

The recently issued UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for Somalia covering the six month period from 1 January to 30 June 1995 and containing emergency relief and short term rehabilitation activities amounting to a total of USD 70.3 million, highlights certain key considerations on which the humanitarian aid operation should be based. These considerations reflect some main principles which also apply to the Ministry's funding of humanitarian relief and short term "quick impact" rehabilitation activities in Somalia, and can be summarised as follows:

The proactive support and involvement of the Somali people, their leaders and their communities is required. Without such support and commitment, it is unlikely that the proposed projects will meet with any degree of success, the relief needs will probably increase and any progress previously attained will be undone.

The project must address priority emergency relief needs or short to me-

dium term rehabilitation needs, focusing on entities which are capable of becoming self-sustained.

The projects must overlap or duplicate those undertaken by other humanitarian relief organisations in the same geographic or programme area, but must be well co-ordinated with other humanitarian assistance efforts in the area.

In a context of political unrest and inherent uncertainty, considerable flexibility must be built into projects for humanitarian assistance to Somalia in 1995. UN agencies and NGOs have to be ready to adopt their approaches to changing circumstances and to operate in an unconventional manner should the situation warrant it. Humanitarian actions in Somalia must be adopted to the varied reality of each region.

To ensure that linkages are created between the relief phase and reconstruction and development assistance, simple and low-cost rehabilitation activities in the small scale quick-impact projects should be pursued wherever possible.

## SESSION I

### THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA: SITUATION ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

## Salient Features of the Somali Political Scene

*Key-note speech (session I) by Dr. Ioan M. Lewis,  
Emeritus Professor, London School of Economics*

I would like to say a few things first of all about traditional Somali politics which, of course, is becoming again a very powerful force. It is, I believe, potentially a constructive force for the future, even though it has many aspects which seem rather negative, particularly from a Eurocentric point of view.

Somali politics are traditionally very highly and very strongly un-centralised. We could say de-centralised, but that implies you have a centre from which you delegate power, whereas the reality in most of Somalia traditionally is that you have local centres of power rather than a centre from which power has already been delegated. Moreover, to complicate matters further, there are no traditional rulers, nor are there any significant tribal dynasties, although of course, there are some rather symbolic clan heads. There are some people who call themselves sultans or who are called sultan, who are figureheads for clans and sometimes divisions of clans, and the title sultan suggests something rather impressive comparable to something in the Arab and the Islamic cultural tradition. But this is a bit misleading, because usually there is not really very much centralised power at all in these positions. They are not like African kings or chiefs in other parts of the continent. Decisions are made traditionally in *ad hoc* general assemblies, general assemblies which consist essentially of male family heads. These are the people whom we call the elders.

These *ad hoc* general assemblies in certain respects resemble the student general assemblies which were very popular, at least in England, in the 1960s, with the important exception that of course the student assemblies contained many women who played a dominant role, whereas the Somali general assemblies traditionally do not include women. That does not mean that women have no influence, it simply means that they are not part of the official public structure. So, the scene is dominated by male family head, and that means any man who has a family, and it of course means a wide range of

ages. These people are considered the elders, a very loose general category. If one asks the question who are the elders? The answer, as I have said, is all married men, however westernised or non-westernised, if they participate in clan politics, are elders. In this sense, General Aydeed is one of the better known elders outside Somalia, and he enables me to make the point, the rather obvious point, that in this very de-centralised or un-centralised democratic (to the point almost of anarchy) pattern of politics, not all elders, of course, are equal.

There are big men who are big by force of character, by resource, by external resources like money and guns, who may have other economic resources, who may have linguistic resources which make them listened to and attended to more than other people. In theory all the elders are equal but in practice, they are not. This is something that was true in the past and is true again today. I find it a little bit misleading when people try to make out that there is a sort of special new category of leader called warlord who is quite different from traditional category of leader called elder. And when you hear the United Nations and other well-intentioned bodies talking about a twin track peace process, I feel that this is a kind of rhetoric which does not correspond very well with the actual realities of Somali politics, at least not in my opinion.

The 19th century English explorer Richard Burton, not the film star, but the famous Arabist explorer, referred to the Somalis as a "fierce and turbulent race of republicans". And he should know because, after all, he was wounded in the course of his travels around Somaliland. Somebody speared him in the face but he survived when he was audaciously passing himself off as a Muslim and going on a voyage of exploration to the famous city of Harar. When I met Somali elders in the 1950s, which was when I started doing anthropological field research in Somalia, I remember meeting some old men who had met Richard Burton or at least they said they had. They said his Arabic was very good but "of course we knew he was not really an Arab, he was not really a Muslim". But anyhow, I think he captured very well certain salient features of Somali political life. He also noticed the incredible importance of poetry in Somali culture, its political importance as well as its aesthetic importance.

An African sergeant who was one of the forces recruited by the British and brought to Somaliland to fight against the famous Mohammed Abdulla Hassan, the so-called 'Mad Mullah', the famous leader of the *Dervish* forces, who so successfully led a rebellion for twenty years against the Ethiopians, the British and the Italians, made a very interesting comment about the

Somalis, reflecting his frustration with de-centralised Somali politics which, of course, turned out to be very different from what he was used to. This African sergeant, who came from what is now Malawi, and who was used to African chiefs but who did not find many of them in Somalia, said to his English officer, 'Bwana, Somalis no good, every man his own Sultan'. It is this un-centralised, democratised, individualist type of politics, which is very hard for outsiders either to understand or even if they understand to come to terms with, and to adapt policies in a positive fashion. It is really very difficult.

Somali governance is traditionally governed by these very general *ad hoc* assemblies. In the 1950s, when I was first of all doing anthropological field research, or trying to, inside what was then the Somaliland Protectorate, I remember endlessly trying to explain what I was doing and why I was doing it to various groups of elders. Initially I had an interpreter, but then I got a certain fluency in basic Somali, so I could sort of do it myself somewhat, and I remember typically meeting a group of people and explaining that I was interested in their culture and the history and learning about their poetry and I wanted to record this for posterity and so on and so forth. This was at the time, or just after the time, when the British government had returned control of a vast grazing area, the so-called Hawd reserves, to Ethiopia. The only thing, really, that the people I was talking to were primarily interested in was the way in which the British government had deceived them and transferred this territory without consulting them to Ethiopian control.

All the time people would say: "what about the Hawd". I would say I have come here to collect this and that information, and they would just say well, what about the Hawd. This went on and on. Also I found that typically you would give a little explanation of what you were doing to a group of people, and then some new person would arrive and he would expect the whole thing to be repeated, and this process went on and on, and it took days and days. As a novice unused to the Somali scene, I found it infuriating, but that, of course, was what I had to put up with, for it was the opportunity cost of being an anthropologist trying to put himself across or put his case across, or put what he was doing across to groups of rural Somalis. That is the way these groups of people operate. Everybody, every individual wants to hear the whole story and wants to think about it and judge it himself. He is not prepared to accept it as second hand from some other people, even if he is of the same clan or the same group or whatever. This makes negotiating very time intensive, very laborious. And it takes a long time and requires tremendous patience, and also sympathy and sensitivity.

There are no fixed leaders in this society who are able to command followers and sign binding agreements. This of course is the main source of the virtually total failure of UN diplomacy in Somalia. The international community has tended to take at face value those who claimed to be leaders, although at best most of these people were or are simply *ad hoc* leaders situationally put in front of a group for a particular context which of course may have lasted for some months, leaders of very loosely based military bands with no permanent status beyond their variably interpreted and very flexible clan identity. The clan elders have very frequently declined to back agreements signed by the so-called warlords, agreements which have been made in their name, but usually not with their general consent or commitment. To put it more colloquially, in its Eurocentric fashion the international community has tended in effect to say to the Somali people, "take me to your leaders". I am afraid that the Somali response has been to take the international community to the 'cleaners' as we say euphemistically in English.

Political units are based on kinship and a form of political contract or treaty which is not really unlike the kind of treaties that states make in international relations. Genealogies in this system are not historical 'family trees' but political charters which confer multiple citizenship in Somali political units. One of the main problems is that all these units are in principle flexible and fluid, they are reactively defined in opposition to opponents. The *Habar Gedir* will unite against the *Abgal*, the *Abgal* will unite against the *Habar Gedir*, but when they are not in confrontation, they will split into their internal units to some extent. The art for would-be political adventurers and leaders is trying to manipulate these different divisions internally and trying to use the widest possible clan backing externally. Diffuse kinship loyalties are pinned down, to a certain extent, by contractual treaties which define payment and receipt of compensation for homicide and lesser injuries. All of these things are not treated in the Somali tradition as crimes, but as wrongs.

The concept is that if you kill somebody, or if you attack their property or steal their property, you commit a wrong against them personally and against their group. Wrongs can be righted by payment of compensation. The whole thing operates in a system of reciprocity in which compensation is what is at stake when somebody is attacked, even if they are attacked verbally there is owing compensation for deformation. The concept of public esteem linked to defamation is quite strong in Somali culture which is again linked to the extremely highly priced and articulate oral nature, I think, of Somali society and the importance in it of poetry and of poetry as a means of character

assassination as well as a means of praise for those people whom you admire.

The Somalis have of course adapted the Arabic or Arab concept of blood money - *dia* in Arabic and *mag* in Somali - and have made it the basis for a loose alliance within their clans. The problem is that these are always loose alliances and this is in fact reflected in the Somali language, because in the Somali language, as far as I know it at any rate, there are no terms which refer to specific unique levels of grouping. They are all generic words, which mean any level of grouping, so that you can use, for example, the word *reer* to mean family in the domestic family context, but you could also say that *Hawiya* is a *reer* in the sense this huge clan alliance or clan family is a *reer*. These words just mean group and what is a group is always relative to the context.

Perhaps the most definite groups are groups we could call clans, which are the ultimate practical focus of political identity most of the time, but not all the time. They vary very considerably in size, or as the Somalis see it literally in man-power, *qoratisis*, the literal translation is 'penis-count'. They vary a lot in size and male strength. At a rough count there might be about a hundred Somali clans in the total Somali nation, variably estimated at around five million. Clans are grouped in six large groupings which we can call, if we want, 'clan families'. We are familiar with the *Hawiye* clan family in and around Mogadishu, with the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn* in the Riverine area, and with the huge *Darod* clan family. Of course, as soon as I say huge, some people will say *Hawiye* are even huger, even though nobody knows what are the relative strength, and then we have *Isaaq* in the in the north-west in the self-declared Somaliland Republic.

Somalis as a whole in relation to non-Somalis display a very high degree of ethnic exclusiveness, as I think anyone who has ever had any relationships with Somalis would agree. This exclusiveness is based on a common dedication to Islam, and on a largely common, but of course regionally somewhat variable culture, and on a main common language. It has to be said, though, that the language of the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn* in the region between the rivers, the Bay region between the Shabelle and Juba Rivers, is very distinct from the speech of other pastoral Somalis. It is in fact as distinct as perhaps Italian is from Portuguese. It has quite a big degree of difference.

The most pervasive cultural tradition is that of pastoral nomadism, which perhaps more than 60 % of the population still probably practise. But, and I think it is very important to emphasise this, we are not just talking about kind of rustic, antique pastorals, because Somalis for centuries have also been involved in local and international livestock and other trade. They are not people

who are outside the world market system, they have been part of their local world market system for centuries. They are therefore very used to multiple economies. It is no problem for them to operate an economy which is partly pastoralist in subsistence, which is partly livestock sale and export, and which is partly trade, and which also perhaps takes in a refugee economy element which may take in an aid economy element. It is no problem for Somalis.

Although most differences within the nation are actually invisible differences, there is one major internal cultural difference. This is the one I have already referred to, that between the agro-pastoralists, the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn*, in the Bay region between the Shabelle and Juba Rivers, and the other remaining part of the mainly pastoralist tradition Somalis. There are also, of course, other minority groups. What is striking today is that all sub-groups and minorities are emphasising their differences. The *Digil* and *Rahanweyn* are slightly more hierarchical, they have something a little bit more like kind of African style political units than the other Somalis. Ironically they are a microcosm of the whole Somali nation in the sense that they are kind of a melting pot based on migrants from all the other Somali clans.

In fact it is very sad in a way that, because of the way in which they are regarded by snobbish pastoralists in the traditional Somali system, their success in building up multi-clan political units has not been appreciated by other Somalis or used as it could have been used as an example of a pattern of building up successful political units, multi-cultural political units or multi-clan political units in the Somali state. Their traditional structure could have served as a blue-print for a Somali state in which clan ties were transcended, and political units were built up in a very accommodating and positive way. Unfortunately, because of the traditional way in which they are despised by pastoralist Somalis, their traditional political organisation has not had this demonstration effect. I think it could have had if other Somalis had known more about it and had been more positively interested in it.

This people, the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn*, are less belligerent and less aggressive than other Somalis. That is partly why they were preyed upon by the armies of the main factions in the conflict which led up to the Somali crisis and international intervention. The majority pastoralist tradition is based on conflicts over water, grazing and other resources, and it must be said that the Somali culture is essentially highly militaristic. When I read reports about militarisation and de-militarisation by various UN and other agencies, I really become despairing because it shows such a lack of understanding of what traditional Somali culture is really like.

There are two basic male categories in Somali society, there are priests or men of religion, 'wadaad', and there are people who carry spears 'waranle', spear-bearer literally. The spearmen who of course form the majority of the traditional male population, unfortunately, are today mainly armed with Kalashnikovs and AK47s and numerous other automatic weapons. I think that every Somali nomad has at least one of these automatic rifles and/or other sophisticated equipment. These facts make highly questionable such Eurocentric conceptions applied to Somalis as 'militarisation' and 'demilitarisation'. I am afraid that the truth is that the Somali 'Rambo' has a long, and in Somali eyes, not a dishonourable tradition. The earliest written references to Somalis refer to them as being particularly famous for their skill in mounting road ambushes. That was in the 16th century, so it is not a sort of new phenomenon that we hear about.

The situation, I believe today, is very like what it was in the 19th century, in this respect. The country now consists, as I think a number of people who have recently travelled around Somalia have found, of a mosaic of relatively independent clans and unstable clan alliances - each of which has its own "militia". Although pastoralists range widely, there are nevertheless spheres of influence and areas of settlement associated with wells, trade and merchants. No clan, however nomadic, lacks fixed trading stations - fixed local centres. There is a demographic dynamic in the Somali population which on the whole has tended to move over the last few centuries from north to south.

If we looked at the history of Mogadishu, it would be the history of a small Arab trading station or Arab settled trading station which was successively colonised by different Somali pastoral groups, and who then settled down, administered the town and developed the town. The ones who were there first could claim that the place belonged to them, the people who came next could claim that it belonged to them more than the people who came after them. You have a series of waves of population each with its own claims to being the authentic original settlers.

In a sense the recent migration into Mogadishu of people from Mudug, the *Habar Gedir*, for instance, associated with General Mohammed Farah Aydeed, whatever one may think about it positively or negatively, has got some historical precedent in that earlier on the place was overrun by the people who have been sitting in it for some centuries, the *Abgal* and others. This is a part of the historical dynamic of Somali demography and the movement from north to south and the search for new areas of exploitation. Of course, everybody will say that they are the original settlers, that the place

belongs to them, that they have stronger rights than others and so on. But these are very difficult things to assess unless you can locate them against this sort of backdrop.

Within this fluid picture of clan and clan alliances, maybe one can pick out about five *de-facto* zones which are in fact based on clans and clan alliances.

1. The first one is the Somaliland Republic/North-West (the former Somaliland Protectorate) which is based on the *Isaaq* clan family, the SNM guerrilla movement, plus the *Gadabursi* and *Ise* who extend into Ethiopia and Djibouti on the western side, and on the eastern side the *Warsangeli* and *Dulbahante* who extend into the north-east. Here we have a very clear main port in the shape of Berbera and we have a very clear capital in the shape of Hargeisa. This area has supplied one prime minister of the Somali Republic, the person who is currently the president, President Mohammed Hagi Ibrahim Egal.
2. Then we have the north-east which is a fairly clearly defined zone, although its boundary, like that of the north-west, is a little problematic, based on the *Majerteyn* clan and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, which is also present in the South around Kismayu, which from the point of view of the *Majerteyn* is both a problem and something that has positive political and economic aspects. The main port of the north-east, I suppose, is Bosaso but it is not entirely clear what the capital is. Maybe it would be Galkayo, but that is something that has not been completely sorted out yet by the people from the north-east, perhaps I am wrong.
3. Then we could say there is a Central region which is based on the currently bitterly divided *Hawiye* clans, the so-called rather unfortunately named United Somali Congress, or rather inaccurately named United Somali Congress, of Mr Aydeed, Ali Mahdi and others. Each of these two protagonists, Aydeed and Ali Mahdi, as you know very well, seeks to impose his rule over Somalia as a whole. The port and the capital are Mogadishu, unfortunately, and this central unit is obviously not currently a viable unit at all.
4. Then we have the Bay region and Bakol, maybe plus Merka, based on the *Digil/Rahanweyn* clans, and their *Dir* allies in the port of Merka. The capital would be Baidoa, presumably, and culturally and linguistically this is perhaps the most distinctive region within the whole Somali area.
5. Then we have a fifth region, at least somewhat notionally in the shape of

Gedo Province and Lower Juba, which is based on a kind of *Darod* alliance between the *Marehan* clan, of the former dictator Siyad, and *Harti* clans, including some of the *Ogaden*. The port is Kismayu, but I do not know what the capital is. I do not know whether anyone there knows what the capital is.

Around Mogadishu, the clan alliances of General Aydeed and his opponent, Ali Mahdi appear to be loosening, perhaps falling apart, as component clans put themselves into a position to contend for control of the resources left behind by UNOSOM. Recently also, unfortunately, the *Majerteyn* in the north-east have developed severe internal differences and the same applies unfortunately also to the *Isaaq* government in Somaliland.

Thus the current tendency highlights the clan as the most viable local unit. But clans can fall apart and they can also unite, as we have just seen, in wider alliances. It is very interesting that despite clan differences and bitter antagonisms, a significant amount of inter-clan trade is taking place throughout the whole area. This is perhaps one of the most positive features of the current scene, that there is a very lively trade which links clans which are theoretically mutually hostile, but in fact have relations which enable trading to take place between them. Economic interests often underlie or even drive inter-clan peace initiatives, as Dr. Ahmed Yusuf Farah has shown so brilliantly in his report, an analysis of peace making procedures in the Somaliland Republic.

All these local divisions are a far cry from the nationalist fervour of the 1960s, which I remember very well. They are still anachronistically conserved by some of those who call themselves Somali 'intellectuals', and a few others. Today the old slogan, 'tribalism divides, nationalism unites' has a rather hollow ring as what used to be called 'ex-clans' are so powerfully resurrected. I should explain that in the 1960s for very understandable reasons Somali nationalists appropriated the English or Italian word 'ex' into Somali to talk about clans as though they existed only in the past, and they started to talk about people's 'exs' so I could say "*ex-kagi waa maxay*" what is your 'ex', or I could say "*ex-kaygi waxaa weeye*", my "ex" is. I was actually asking what is your current clan, and I was saying what my current clan is, but it was euphemistically consigned to the past by sophistry of language which assigned it historical rather than current political status. Today the "ex's" have all come out of the closet, and are very much alive and pass off the theme that has to be addressed.

Although UNOSOM ceased effective and systematic 'peace-keeping' long before it actually withdrew from Somalia, its presence, nevertheless, acted somewhat like a kettle lid in holding in check large-scale explosions of clan warfare. This constraining effect naturally encouraged pressures to build up which are likely to erupt now that UNOSOM has left Mogadishu. They may not, but it will be miraculous if they do not in some way. At the same time, UNOSOM's heavy-handed and poorly informed political interventions have, in my opinion, complicated inter-clan negotiations and hindered rather than helped move towards co-operation and the formation of a national government. To that extent, the termination of UNOSOM should eventually encourage more substantive negotiations in the more culturally appropriate, protracted, long drawn-out, slow Somali style.

Again, on the positive side, the severe distortion of southern Somalia's economy, caused by the huge US/UN intrusion, which has played such a significant part in fuelling and increasing conflict, should now gradually subside. The militias will now have less easy access to funds to buy ammunition and new weapons, although this will probably take some time to make a significant impact. I am not saying they will not have any way of access to new funds to buy new weapons, but they will not have quite such an immediate source of revenue as was provided by the US presence and then the UN presence. In a way it seems to me that the US/UN presence amounted to a kind of cure which in the end was in some respects worse than the disease itself that it was designed to cure. It is a kind of treatment which, unfortunately, had so many unintended negative effects that its total impact was not very positive.

All this does not, of course, indicate a rapid restoration of the Somali state in its old form, either excluding or including the Somaliland Republic. The only potential quick route to the re-emergence of a southern Somali state, that I can see, would be based on military conquest and would require victory by one or other of the most aggressive militias. Given the widespread distribution of arms and the depth of clan antagonism, this would not be easy and it would cost many lives and it would almost inevitably plunge the whole country back into its previous state of war and famine. Moreover, if victory was achieved by such an aggressive militia, it would likely highly unstable and would almost certainly generate armed resistance on a very wide scale, which would render impossible any effective state administration. I think that it would be good if external players in the Somali crisis would perhaps take note of the implications of such a scenario.

It seems more likely, that after some bitter conflict a new equilibrium will gradually develop in southern Somalia, but probably without any rapid emergence of a coherent state organisation or a representative government. I think that this is a very long way off in the future and that, in the meantime, the functional local units will probably be those based on clans and clan alliances as outlined. An optimistic scenario, with which I would like to associate myself, would see clan tempers gradually cooling down and inter-clan understandings developing with trade networks - in this case the 'flag' would be following trade, rather than trade following the 'flag' according to the old British colonial slogan - along the lines achieved by the local clan elders in the Somaliland Republic and the north-east, and for that matter in the Bay region. The forceful resolution of recent clan tensions in Somaliland seems, moreover, to have had the positive effect, at least in the short term, of consolidating the relatively popularly appointed government that exists there.

It is certainly possible that the same positive trends that we see in Somaliland and in the north-east with all their short-comings, can slowly develop over the months and years ahead in southern Somalia. If they do, they may lead to the growth of a more organically based and culturally appropriate un-centralised or de-centralised political structure in southern Somalia. Thus, in this optimistic view, the present disintegration may provide an opportunity for political developments more in keeping with traditional Somali political processes than the artificial, Eurocentric state structure bequeathed by British and Italian colonisation and the international state system.

Indiscriminate, unco-ordinated international aid has played a major role, I believe, in de-stabilising Somalia and stimulating and maintaining conflict. If this is to be avoided in the future, it is vital that all major foreign aid (UN, EC, NGO etc.) is rationally co-ordinated, and widely and fairly, to the extent that that is possible, distributed on a cautious, very cautious discriminating basis, and that it should be carefully monitored. Above all it must not be all concentrated in Mogadishu, and Mogadishu should be only one of the points of aid delivery. There is even a good argument for disregarding Mogadishu entirely until the security situation there improves quite substantially.

Despite the logistical difficulties, I think aid should be provided very sparingly and targeted to districts and regions which have manifestly well-organised local community structures and which are able to maintain local peace and guarantee the safety of foreign personnel without payment or special arrangements. It is possible that, applied sensitively and constructively, foreign aid could act as a spur, as a trigger to the formation of wider, inter-clan

groupings and the growth of wider public services. Extensive and imaginative use should be made of radio broadcasting, enlisting the help and advice of experienced Somali broadcasters of goodwill, to publicise the new conditions which, ideally, should govern the distribution of aid. Above all, it seems to me, aid should be the price of peace rather than, as hitherto, the cause of war, which is what it has been largely.

Of course, it is complicated, and it takes time to identify suitable local communities and to identify genuinely popular local leadership. But some of the smaller agencies have done this quite successfully and their methods should be studied and applied elsewhere. It cannot be stressed too strongly how Somalis have become addicted to 'aid' in a negative fashion. As is well known, Somalis tend to have a well-deserved reputation as brilliant entrepreneurs and manipulators being, I would boldly assert, on average much more astute and sharp-witted than most European aid-merchants, in fact than most Europeans. And I include myself, obviously. Currently, one of the fastest growth industries, as many people know, in southern Somalia, is the formation of so-called 'local NGOs' designed to extract funds from unsuspecting foreigners.

Aid is one of the most powerful weapons in the armoury of those who seek to encourage Somalis to build viable political structures. It is of critical importance that those who supply aid to Somalia should do so more responsibly and with more understanding of its impact than has been displayed in the past. I am afraid that this requires a more informed knowledge about Somali society and culture than most foreign personnel have previously possessed. There were often dealings with an emergency, with a crisis situation in which people were dying of starvation. There was not a lot of time, I recognise fully, to get clued up on local culture and on local structures, but nevertheless, they could have done more more often than they bothered to do. There has been a tendency to rely on high-tech, rather than local cunning, and local cunning wins every time. There is an urgent need, I would say, for better briefing of NGO personnel and of other expatriate aid staff.

This, surely, is an area where the notoriously independent aid agencies could collaborate. The recipients of aid, of course, prefer those who dispense it to be as ignorant as possible since this makes it easier to manipulate them and control them. Sometimes aid agencies seem also to prefer to remain ignorant of the implications of their interventions. Knowledge, after all, imports constraints which make action more complicated, and that is not always welcome. It is easier simply to blunder on with good intentions and a strong sense of donor virtue, but that actually is not quite enough in a situation like the Somali situation.

## Panel commentaries Session I:

### *Dr. Mohammed H. Mukhtar:*

I have only a few points to underline what Professor Lewis has already covered, and, in fact, cleared for all of us. We must ask ourselves why is Somalia experiencing these tragedies, these devastation, when Somalis claim that they are a monolithic society, that they speak the same language, that they have the same religion, and that they are ethnically homogeneous? If all of the unity and homogeneity that we claim are true, why are we in this terrible predicament? Why is a Somali killing his brother? Why is a Somali raping his sister? Somalia, unlike many other Muslim countries, is not characterised by deep-seated religious cleavages. Almost all the Somalis are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi sect. Why are all of these things happening? The answer is that we probably know very little about the realities of Somalia. Both Somalis and non-Somalis have tended to encapsulate Somalia in simplistic generalisations. Professor Lewis has raised this issue in his presentation. Perhaps what we need is to try to go deep into the Somali reality and in the process reassess and enlighten our understanding of Somalia. We need to think about a Somalia that does not speak the same language, that does not practice the same religion, and that is not ethnically homogeneous. We need to revise the way we perceive and evaluate the Somali society.

We are the ones who claimed that we are so unique. We presented ourselves to the outside world as being so distinct and so different from the rest of Africa. We said that we are a unique nation with a unique heritage. Who is the Somali that we are talking about? Who portrayed us in this fashion? Who said that we are unique? It was this mistaken portrayal by some Somalis that brought about all these misconceptions about Somalia's reality. And that is why neither the Somalis themselves nor the foreigners who came to their rescue have been able to find any tangible or sustainable solutions to the seemingly endless crisis in Somalia. Ideas that are not based on reality cannot generate realistic and enduring solutions.

Many of us, and also many of the foreigners, including Professor Lewis, felt that the Somalis have some kind of uniformity, and that they could form their own nation. But the problem was that nobody knew for sure the kind of state that would be suitable to them or how to achieve it. They might be a nation, but what type of state will/can they build? Professor Lewis raised

this question in his *Pastoral Democracy* and in many other publications. And Professor Said Samatar co-authored, in 1987, a book entitled *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. What form of a state can this nation have? A monolithic, unitary state or a multi-cultural, multi-religious state? In my view Somalia has always lacked the basic principle of nationhood. Nationhood is more than a political parliament. Even the term Somali itself was never considered as an identity by the people who inhabit that peninsula. There were clans yesterday. There are clans today. There are clans who do not even know they are Somalis, yet they inhabit the Somali Peninsula. They have been part of the previous Somali political governing system. If you are talking about rehabilitating, finding some form of governance for those types of people, I think we are in trouble.

Before Europeans came to us, we were just clans, clans who had their own identities, their own geographical locations, and their own political traditions. We were not even familiar with the term Somalia or Somalis. Even the colonial systems that we experienced were vastly different: British, French, and Italian. So it is hard to understand the basis of the unity and homogeneity that Somalis claim. The idea of national unity has only emerged as a political agenda during the political parties in the 1940s and 1950s, to unite Somalia. Those who advocated the unity of Somalia were not even sure what type of Somalia they were talking about. Perhaps they were very much attracted to and influenced by the idea of "la Grande Somalia", the Greater Somalia, which was created by the colonial powers. They adopted this alien concept. But it was baseless, and it failed.

In the 1960s when the unification of the two regions, the former British Somalia and the former Italian Somalia, took place, that unity was not supported by all Somali clans. It is a fact. In southern Somalia the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn* that Professor Lewis talked about, opposed it. They even rejected the 1956 election when one party established the first Somali government. They argued that a unitary Somali state is not going to satisfy all the Somali clans, and suggested that a decentralised state structure would be a better alternative. They were ignored and they and many other clans in the south were forcefully incorporated into the evolving centralised Somali state. In the north the vast majority of the people rejected the unification project. The referendum then clearly showed their disenchantment with that unitary state of Somalia, and in fact, they tried to secede immediately, but were crushed with overwhelming military force. I think we need to abandon the simplistic generalisations, and think carefully about the real character of the Somali society.



The second point relates to the perception that foreigners as well as Somalis have of the economics of Somalia or Somalia's economic potentialities. There is enough literature indicating that Somalia is among the least developed countries, a poor country in other words. Although that literature is everywhere, it rarely clicks in our minds. We always think of it as a false statement. We believe that Somalia is a rich country that can produce more than its inhabitants need. We believe that colonialism came to Somalia to exploit its wealth, and that is why they divided and manipulated us. This is the principal source of our suffering, we argue. I think that is not true at all. The colonial powers had some other interests, otherwise northern Somalia would not have been a protectorate. It was not a colony, it was not a wide-settled area, it was just a protectorate. The Italians were doing the same thing. I think we Somalis must come to grips with reality. It may not be easy, but we must accept that we are poor.

I have been to Somalia last year. And since I was coming from the States, everybody was telling me that the United States' interest in Somalia is economic, and that is why they are here. I was in a situation where I could not give a proper answer. It is hard for me to understand the logic behind this argument. Where is the wealth in Somalia that has attracted the Americans? Realistically speaking, for the last fifty years of Somalia, no administration, whether foreign or Somali ever relied on its own resources. All relied on external aid. To give you an example, in the 1950s southern Somalia was under what we call United Nations Trusteeship System. The UN funded that administration. Very little money came from local resources. We won independence in the 1960s. All the successive governments always depended on international dole provided by the EEC, or the USA or what was the Soviet Union. What does that tell us? It is very clear that we are a poor nation. I think we need to accept our poverty. This will enable us to find reasonable solutions to the grim realities that we face. Now that UNOSOM has disappeared, Somalia has no choice but to rely on itself. I think this is a positive development on its own. We have been addicted to foreign aid for so long. Now we must begin to rely on our own expertise and our own meagre resources.

***Dr. Ken Menkhaus:***

What I would like to do briefly in ten minutes is talk a little bit about the scene, the radical localisation of Somali politics. Since I have written this up in a short paper that will be available out in the foyer, there is no reason for me to re-read it. What I will do is simply highlight some of the themes most

of which I think you will find are reiterations of what Professor Lewis and Professor Mukhtar have said. Anyone with a passing acquaintance with the Somali political scene, is now aware that the defining feature of Somalia is a radical localisation of its politics. The centrifugal forces in Somalia, both political and social and economic, far overpower any centralising tendencies in the country. I think most of us know why. I can review some of those reasons.

On the economic side the central state in Somalia historically was patched together, was cemented by large amounts of foreign aid, and for those of us with short historical memories it is worth recalling that one hundred percent of the Somali development budget in the 1980s was derived from foreign funds, and over half of the current budget was derived from foreign aid. This was a completely unsustainable, artificial, bloated governmental structure. And as soon as aid was frozen in the late 1980s, it collapsed. There are no prospects for that large amount of cold war induced foreign aid in the future. So Somalia, if it is to have any kind of central government in the future, will have to find resources from within. That means taxation, and that is something that Somalia has never really experienced in significant quantities.

Now, having passed through this terrible civil war, it is extremely unlikely that significant revenues are going to be derived from taxation beyond the local level again. For those of us who have been out in the field, which probably constitutes over half of this group in the hall, we have seen cases of local taxes being collected and used at a village level, at a neighbourhood level, but not beyond. And it is going to be extremely difficult for a central government to tax remote villages and nomads for use in the capital. That means that there is very little by way of economics to support a meaningful central state in the near future. Socially we all already know about the centrifugal force of clan politics: It is prone to fissure, alliances are unstable, it is not conducive in the absence of the cement of a well-funded patronage system at a centre, it is not conducive to a political centre holding.

And then on the political side it is worth recalling, too, that there are out there in Somalia still today vested interests in statelessness and even anarchy. There are those who benefit enormously from an economy of plunder, from a mafia-like control of particular sectors, from various unlawful activities which can range from laundering drug money to actually producing and selling drugs. And there are those whose political constituency is enhanced and increased by fear and instability, not the normalisation of politics. There are those whose control of real estate is based on conquest, not on popular refe-

rendum. Those interests collectively, and those social and economic forces collectively, have so far stymied all efforts to create a central state, and probably will for some time to come, whether we like it or not. The politics of centrifuge have also impacted on the factions which, though they have pretensions to national leadership, have in the past year demonstrated across the board growing weakness and growing inability to control the fears even within their strongholds and within their own clans, and in terms of day to day politics, day to day governance in Somalia, are basically irrelevant. Most, not all, but most are more political fictions than political factions.

Now, all this is not to say that Somalia is in or sliding back into a state of anarchy. And that is one of the main points I would like to underscore. On the contrary, at the local level in Somalia, in urban neighbourhoods, in agricultural villages, and in pastoral ranges, there exists dynamic and diverse "polities". Local communities have adapted to the prolonged collapse of the state by developing, and in some cases rediscovering, a variety of informal systems and mechanisms which to varying degrees provide a minimum function of day to day governance. They are not ideal, some are quite fragile, some are limited in effectiveness, and some, as we have recently seen, reprehensible in their practices. But this mosaic of localised polities is and will remain the defining feature of Somali political landscape for the foreseeable future.

Let me go off script for a minute and give a couple of examples. I imagine that in this room we could come up with hundreds of cases of how local governance actually takes place. In a neighbourhood in Mogadishu that one of my Somali friends helped monitor for me, and study informally, one of the most fundamental governmental practices, that thing that citizens demand first and foremost of their state or their government, law and order, was handled quite well without a formal structure. Over time neighbourhoods developed local neighbourhood watch systems, where a block or a two-block area would equip itself with whistles, and would have a common agreement among themselves that if armed intruders came into the neighbourhood, they would blow the whistle, everyone came out, with their guns of course, and chased the intruders away. This is basically the equivalent, for an American, of the old western armed posse. The difference between vigilantism and policing is a fine line. So is the difference between extortion and taxation, and this brings me to my second example.

In the Lower Juba Valley, where very weak minority farming communities exist which were among the principal victims of the famine for a long time. One of the reasons that they were victims of famine is because armed bandits

would come in, arbitrarily loot them of everything, raid them, kill them and leave them unable to feed themselves after prolonged banditry. But over time these bandits settled in to a pattern of a more normalised relationship with these villagers, and began extorting half of the crops instead of just taking everything at random.

If you want to be scientific, they went from being a malignant host to a benign parasite. They learned not to kill their host. At a certain point I found that these agricultural villagers with whom I once lived doing my dissertation research, found this much more preferable. They did not like it, it approached them as kind of a feudal 'fiefdom' on the part of these little bands of militia men up and down the river valley. But it was predictable, and it offered them at least minimal protection, the deal was they provided half of their crops, and these bandits would serve as some sort of policemen against outside bandits. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not. Again a grey area between extortion and taxation, between vigilantism and policing.

This is the reality in Somalia today. There are lots of systems like this that are emerging, that overlap, and that the donor communities have to deal with. It is the challenge for the international donors to come to a clear understanding of these localised polities, and to determine to what extent aid could and should be channelled through them. And here I guess I will be the first to underline a question that will come up again and again today. And that is, we have to be careful, once we have collectively agreed that local polities are all that exist, about the political implications of working through them. Donors must be sensitive to the fact that some may criticise you for channelling aid through local communities, local authorities, saying that you were trying to break Somalia up, that you are promoting clans, promoting the disintegration of the state. And indeed it will at some point in time become harder for a central state to recapture control of the allocation of foreign aid once local authorities get accustomed to having their hands on it. But, having said that, I would argue that there is little choice right now for donors but to deal with the realities on the ground, and the reality on the ground is that local level authority is all that there is in Somalia.

My next point is a troubling one, and one you have already heard. It is that the evidence from around the country points to the fact that these local polities are quite diverse, and they vary considerably from one local to the next. Foreigners seeking easy broad generalisations that lend themselves to formulaic approaches to targeting aid through local authorities will be disappointed, and those foreigners who insist on operating on broad

generalisations, will be disruptive and destructive. Beware of sweeping statements about particular social categories, elders, faction leaders, intellectuals, clerics, district council members, businessmen, militiamen, local NGOs and their legitimacy as leaders. The fact is that their legitimacy as social and political leaders is fluid, it varies from one place to the next, and it is prone to change over time, and it depends on the issue of what type of authority one is seeking.

For example, while clan elders are almost always central players in reconciliation and conflict mediation, they might not be the most effective or appropriate actors for managing a de-mobilisation programme. And, for instance, though generally extortionate and disruptive under certain conditions, militias have proven to be forces for peace. We have to be aware of the fact that this changes from place to place.

By now I imagine most donors are saying: Great, we have invited all of these academic specialists to help us out, and they are refusing to give us generalisations. But from this argument you can derive a generalisation and a prescription. That is that the only way out of this baffling complexity at the local level for donors, is to adopt a patient, labour-intensive and decentralised approach to aid giving. Agencies must commit themselves to particular regions, get to know the local politics of that area well, and learn who is a legitimate authority in that area, and who is a bird of prey. There is no substitute for in-depth knowledge of local politics, and in this sense I am reaffirming what Professor Lewis said that there are some NGOs who have successfully committed themselves to local areas, they know the area and they are not tricked. They know who they can work through and who they cannot. That is really the only solution.

Successful day to day governance at the local level invariably involves a complex interplay between all of these different actors I have just identified. International donors who enter the picture are going to discover that their funding and intentions are pivotal tools with which these competing political elements try to empower themselves at the expense of one another. Failure to understand this can quickly doom an aid project. This latter point is worth underscoring. I think all of us know this intrinsically, but it is not often stated explicitly. Most political anarchy in Somalia today is spent not on conflicts between hostile clans and between hostile factions, but within political communities.

Just as one example, I am sure that 95 % of General Aydeed's energies are devoted to trying to control and influence his fractious power base, not trying

to outmanoeuvre his arch-rival Ali Mahdi. He spends most of his time coping with rival militia leaders within the *Habar Gedir*, as well as dissatisfied elders, independent-minded businessmen, and more recently, the rapidly expanding Islamic courts right in his own neighbourhood that he is having trouble controlling. He is not alone. All of the faction leaders, all of the elders, all of the businessmen, all of the politicians face similar kinds of complexities.

Let me finish with a somewhat unrelated observation but one worth reinforcing. In southern Somalia part of this complexity that donors have to deal with includes coming to grips with the very politically explosive issue of conquest and occupation. Professor Lewis used the word 'colonialisation', and I think that might be appropriate as well. One of the ugly realities of the Somali civil war and famine, but one which has been too often overlooked by aid agencies, is that much of southern Somalia today is under subjugation by force, especially along the fertile and densely populated river valleys, but also in most of the cities and towns.

Militarily strong pastoral clans have swept in and occupied real estate and agricultural land from weaker clans such as the *Rahanweyn* and minority ethnic groups. It was these groups, as we all know, who were principal victims of sustained banditry and then famine. Aid agencies with a poor sense of history and land tenure in Somalia have in recent years assumed that occupying clans have been the legitimate authorities and inhabitants, and have often provided them with agricultural assistance. Some would argue that the imperative to revitalise Somali agricultural production necessitates this pragmatism, but others worry that such aid has helped reinforce and legitimise conquest. This is a difficult and unavoidable issue for any aid groups working in southern Somalia from Bardera to Kismayo to Shalambod right into the neighbourhoods of Mogadishu. The reality of conquest in southern Somalia also vastly complicates patterns of authority in that zone, and here is where I would qualify some of the statements that Professor Lewis made about equilibrium.

I think when we look at the north-west and north-east of Somalia, political equilibrium is within view. In Southern Somalia the notion of political equilibrium coming into existence over time is going to have to first cope with this idea of conquest. It may well be that, as Professor Lewis said, this is part of a historical pattern that is irreversible, that the southward sweep on the part of some *Hawiye* clans well beyond their traditional strongholds into most of, for instance, the Lower Shabelle and into even the Lower Juba, is irreversible. It may be that some of the towns along the Lower Juba which

were once predominantly *Rahanweyn*, are now permanently strongholds of the *Darod* clan, or it may not be. This is going to create politically explosive situations precisely in the zones that most aid agencies want to work in most. I do not think we have coped with that very well in the past, and I think that needs to be the centrepiece of discussions about Southern Somalia in the future.

**Dr. Ahmed Y. Farah:**

What I would like to do is just give a summary of Professor Lewis' paper, because I tend to agree with most of the analysis and discussion in the paper. The paper started with general characteristics of the Somali society. I think Lewis rightly described the Somali society as a homogeneous society, of course, in relation to other sub-Saharan African countries. The common features are language, although there are some dialects such as *may-may* and standard Somali, pervasive kinship, a common belief in and practise of Islam, and tremendous love for poetry. Lewis also underlined the distinction between the pastoral faction of the Somali society and the agricultural faction. He explained the political differences by describing the agricultural groups in the south as less bellicose, hierarchical communities based not only on kinship but also on locality.

The first part of this general introduction was followed by an analysis of the current political situation. Lewis rightly designated clans and notoriously clan based coalitions as the most important functional political entities resulting from the dismemberment of the Somali state. Neither clans nor clan based associations are cohesive. The *Isaaq* clan family, in the north, joined forces against Siad Barre's regime during the civil war, but, after the fall of Siad Barre's government and the formation of the self-proclaimed 'Republic of Somaliland', fragmented into traditional rival clans competing for power and access to state resources. The same applies to *Majerteyn* in the north-east, which has achieved relative peace and stability primarily by resorting to traditional structures of governance. Here also the local *Majerteyn* developed serious internal differences.

Despite endemic security constraints, mutual co-operation between groups controlling different spheres of influence take place through trade. People and goods continue to cross clan territories or 'de-facto' zones as identified by Professor Lewis. In the predominantly pastoral areas, the exigency of livestock husbandry, i.e. access to often scarce grazing and water, allows various degrees of intermingling between rival clans. This is particularly true

in the north where embattled neighbouring clans entered contracts, as part of inter-clan peacemaking, sanctioning free access to pasturage and naturally occurring water. These remote agro-pastoralist areas are little affected by factional wars and continue to move freely across clan boundaries. It is also a fact that, in most of the factional fighting or crisis in urban centres, most importantly Mogadishu in the south and Hargeisa in the north, the protagonists are politicians, military officials and clan militias corrupted by the civil strife and with vested interest in the continuation of crisis. And this point supports Mr. Menkhaus' position.

From the collapse of Siad Barre's regime to the conference in Borama in May 1993, various inter-clan peace conferences took place in the north. The supreme achievement and the vigil of grassroots movement driven by traditional leaders has been the formation of Egal's government. The stability experienced in the north after the Borama conference was shattered by eruption of violence, over control of Hargeisa Airport, between government forces, made of coalitions of clans, and *Idegale* militia, in and around the airport, supported by *Garhajis* politicians allied with Aydeed's faction in the south. Although this latter round of violence raised the spectre of resurgence of the lawlessness and anarchy characteristic in the north in 1992, the government came out stronger as Lewis has explained. That is in the north. Opportunities for consolidating a working government is much better than any time after the end of the civil war in 1991. In this sense the north is different from the south, because in the north there has been a legitimate government, although it had problems dealing with militias. I am optimistic that the present government will continue to establish itself firmly throughout Somaliland.

Clan composition is less complex in the relatively peaceful regions in the north and north-east. In the north, for example, there is one large dominant clan family (*Isaaq*), and this clan family has managed to establish an *Isaaq* dominated administration in the entire north in 1991. There is still an *Isaaq* dominated government in the north. But the situation in the south is more complex because there are several families of clans all competing for power. There is *Hawiye*, there is *Darod*, there is *Digil* and *Rahanweyn*, and there are dispersed *Dir* groups. More importantly, the rival clans in the south are militarily balanced. No single clan family or clan has the ability to prevail over its rivals and capture the entire region. The south is more complex, and I agree with Lewis that it will take time in the south for things to cool down, and for local grassroot movements to emerge and gradually develop into community structures.

UNOSOM's large scale military intervention and political agenda, seeking the remaking of the Somali state by force, distorted the political process and prolonged the emergence of a local solution to the crisis in the faction-ridden south. This approach has often favoured self-styled political leaders whose loyalty and ties to their clans are dubious. These middlemen held hostage UNOSOM, the international community, and the local clans. Thus UNOSOM's withdrawal may open the door for a peaceful reconciliation among the embattled clans in the south, using traditional methods of peacemaking and state formation however slow and cumbersome.

Finally Lewis concluded with emphatic remarks on the potential implications of aid. Uncoordinated and unfairly distributed aid has deepened the crisis and has diminished the prospects for a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Lewis urges the international community to reassess its assistance to Somalia, particularly during the critical post-UNOSOM period. Lewis calls for a co-ordinated, monitored and fairly distributed aid. If managed properly, aid can be a constructive tool. It should be used as an incentive for encouraging and consolidating peace, not for rewarding war.

***Dr. Said S. Samatar:***

When Mr. Haakonsen kindly asked me to participate in this panel I appreciated the gesture, but at the same time I wondered, well, another Somalia peace meeting? Then I remembered maybe, just maybe, this is the most appropriate place, given that the Norwegians, if I am correct, have established a good reputation for handling the most difficult, intractable conflict since they have brokered a peace-deal between the Palestinians and the Israelis. So perhaps here, too, they will perform a similar miracle. At the very least I think we should give them the benefit of the doubt.

I have been asked to respond to the paper in five to ten minutes. That request is an act of cruel and unusual punishment because first, I am a Somali, and second, I am a professor! And you should not ask professors to respond to a question in anything less than 45 minutes. What I have decided to do under such circumstances, is to draw on a few questions based on my reading of the paper. Like Dr. Ahmed, I would like to take us back to the paper, and perhaps draw out some of the salient points, but unlike Dr. Ahmed, I am afraid, Professor Lewis, I will be a bit contentious.

First as a compliment, the paper and the presentation in general, I thought, was vintage Lewis, brief, to the point and brilliant. Lewis' expressions are a marvel of economy. He can say so much in so few words. Now, if he thinks

that in saying this I am simply carrying favour with him, he is wrong. I am trying to disarm him so that I can deliver the knock-out punch.

First I would like to ask a question about the 'Rambo' character and the issue of 'militarisation' and 'demilitarisation'. To do that I would like to cite a few sentences from the paper. This is by the way on page two, first paragraph, for those of you who care to look: "Every male Somali", Lewis writes, "has at least one such weapon ( meaning an assault rifle). These facts make highly questionable the Eurocentric conceptions applied to Somalis as 'militarisation' and 'demilitarisation'. The Somali 'Rambo' [and those of you who are not familiar with that term, Rambo refers to the name given to the male character of an American male fantasy, a swashbuckling white male who is synonymous with random violence and daring-do] has a long, and in Somali eyes, an honourable tradition - the earliest reference to the Somalis refers to them as famous for road ambushes".

This reminds me of the language, more flamboyant language I might say, of an American marine who acted in the Mogadishu fiasco in 1993: "The Somalis", he said, "are a nation of ingrates, an ungrateful nation which bites the hand that feeds it, therefore let us get the hell out of here and leave the bastards to kill one another". When you (Lewis) write that militarisation and demilitarisation are meaningless conceptions in the Somali context, are you, in the somewhat characteristically applied British way, implying that demilitarisation is out of the question? Are you in a sense reflecting the sentiment of marines that demilitarisation should not be attempted as an objective, and that we in effect should leave the bastards to kill one another? I wonder whether that is what you were implying.

My second point has to do with your point about the indiscriminate uncoordinated aid playing a major role in destabilising Somalia, that point is well taken definitely. And here I do not think that you mince words. You are convincingly accurate that in general, international aid has caused more harm than good. To me this is a devastating critique. This is an indictment, and I am wondering what, in response, the NGOs have to say for themselves on this question.

Then you go on to remark on how Somalis have become "addicted" to foreign aid in a negative fashion, adding that currently one of the fastest growing industries in southern Somalia is the formation of local NGOs designed to extract funds from unsuspecting foreigners. I wonder whether this is another sideways warning for international aid donors not to get ripped off by wily, self-serving Somalis, masquerading as philanthropic organisations.

My third question. In the last four paragraphs you offer a great deal of good advice, in my opinion, emphasising the need for previously, and I like this phrase, "notoriously independent aid agencies" to collaborate, in synchronising their programmes. Now, this is good, and I think it is an advice that they will do well to heed. But what about the cases where aid agencies are, or when an aid agency is less than forthcoming if not downright deceptive. There certainly have been heroic philanthropical organisations that have done a great deal of good in Somalia, and we can name many.

But there have also been examples of blatant abuse committed in the name of humanitarianism. For example, and I will not name names by the way for reasons of self-interest, I know of a respected agency in America that flooded the television networks during the height of the crisis with commercial advertisements of ghastly images of starving Somali children with fly-infested faces. The commercial was designed to extract contributions from a horrified American public. And it went for weeks on end, in fact it caused me a measure of insomnia. And yet, as fate would have it, when towards the end of 1992, I went to Somalia to help some American network to cover the landing of the marines, and some of you know my eventful adventures there, I found that this agency did not even operate a single soup kitchen in Somalia. Perhaps the time has come to think of establishing some kind of a watch dog entity to verify what is going on in Somalia in the name of humanitarianism.

**Mr. Sture Normark:**

My task will be to try to comment on Professor Lewis' paper from the perspective of being someone who has been directly involved in Somalia from my organisation, the Life and Peace Institute, an NGO trying to assist and advise the UNOSOM political division. That is not an easy task, but I will try to explain a little about our role. We have discussed, and you took it up also, about the United Nations, if they entered too late or came perhaps in too early. From our perspective I felt that they came in too late. But it was after much pressure from the international community, and also from the Somali communities at home and abroad, that the Security Council finally decided to intervene in Somalia. Their involvement would also include peace and reconciliation, which was a specific task for the United Nations.

The first special representative for the General Secretary in Somalia was an experienced African diplomat, sitting here in the front row, Mohamed Sahnoun. He understood the complexity of such an intervention, I understand, and realised that the UN needed all the support and advice it could get

before it entered into the reconciliation process in Somalia. He needed to consult with the experts on Somalia, and he also needed financial support for a process for peace. There was money for the military, there was money for the humanitarian input, but not a cent for this political intervention. Sweden was approached, I do not know why, and the Life and Peace Institute was called in to assist in this very complicated endeavour.

The first task we got was to call for a meeting with the leading international experts on Somalia. Anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and specialists in conflict resolution. The meeting was held in Uppsala in August 1992, with 15 experts. The main actors from the UN mission in Somalia were present with us there, representing the political, the humanitarian and the peace-keeping departments. They got recommendations, and I will just name some of these because it is very much in line with what we have heard from Professor Lewis here. The UN people were clearly told that the search for peace in Somalia must start from the bottom upwards. You cannot impose peace from outside or from above. You have to start out in the districts, out in the regions and you will have to build on traditional structures already there. You have to involve the elders, the traditional and religious leaders, women and other representatives from the civil society must be involved, must be empowered to play the main role in peace-making in Somalia. The UN was also told that to the same extent as these groups will be empowered, warlords and self-appointed political leaders must be marginalised. Another thing they said was that this whole process will take time, and must take time. Do not rush into anything when you start a reconciliation process in Somalia. They also said it is too early at this stage to talk about national reconciliation.

This was the Uppsala meeting and that was the first task the Life and Peace Institute got. It was a very clear message from some of the people sitting here and some other experts on Somalia from all over the world. But we also wanted to listen to the Somalis themselves, the so-called intellectuals. Leading Somali intellectuals from within, what are they saying about the peace process in Somalia? It was a difficult task to know where to meet and so on. We flew a group of eighteen people from within, from the war zones in different parts of Somalia, and took them to the Seychelles. Eighteen intellectuals, including five women. They were there for four days, meeting about how to go about the reconciliation process in Somalia.

It was interesting to hear how the message from Uppsala was underlined, this time with more concrete proposals on how to continue the process for peace and reconciliation. After that meeting, unfortunately, we must say,

Ambassador Sahnoun left the scene. It was the last meeting he had in his position as a special representative. The pragmatic approach to the problem in Somalia chosen by him was abandoned, and the UN entered a more common, and I must say western way of peace-making, involving and giving much more heed to the warlords and the political leaders and different political factions.

Much attention was given just to Mogadishu, and especially the conflicts between Aydeed and Ali Mahdi. This is how the Life and Peace started to try to advise the UN in this very difficult task of supporting peace-building in Somalia. This was in the autumn of 1992, it was the time when the big influx of big military intervention came. At the same time as all these troops came in, there was also much more pressure put on the United Nations to find a quick solution to the Somali problem, because a military intervention was very expensive. Troops could not be kept there for a long time. Therefore the reconciliation process was to speed it up, very much against the recommendations, both from Uppsala and the Seychelles. The so-called political leaders could now envision a straight path to power, and we could follow how this happened.

The peace meeting called by the General Secretary in January 1993 in Addis Abeba gave positive signals to the warlords and the Somali politicians striving for power. They were given too much attention, treated as statesmen, and given the impression that they were to solve all problems and create a new Somalia. Those who were supposed to be marginalised were instead empowered. We were following this process, and it was a hard time for us as advisors to this process to see how the whole thing took a completely different direction from what we had suggested based on the knowledge we had got from people like Professor Lewis and Professor Said Samatar and others, who have helped us to get a better understanding of how the Somali society will function and find its peace.

This is what was our role. It was not an easy task as you understand, but we even tried to intervene in Mogadishu within the political division, with our people. The so-called LPI liaison officers, were called in to live together with UNOSOM people there, to give some advice on how to move forward in the peace process.

You know the meeting in March 1993, the so-called Addis Abeba meeting, and the Addis Abeba Report and the Addis Abeba Agreement which was telling people that now you have to go home and rebuild Somalia. It was quite an interesting meeting because there were lots of people, not only the

politicians, not only the warlords. There were lots of people coming from all over the world, putting pressure on the political leaders to work for peace instead of just fighting on. I think the meeting was important because of the presence of these people from the civilian society, which more or less pushed the UN but also the political leaders, to at least come up with some good proposals, of writing a charter, of how Somalia could be rebuilt. They said you have to start with the districts, you go to the regions, and then you might come up with a government. But you have to start from the bottom, out in the regions. The UN and their political divisions, took as their task to try to implement this proposal made by the Somalis themselves, it was not the UN thinking behind this charter. It was a Somali proposal of how Somalia should be rebuilt. They came up with a suggestion of how to form district councils and regional councils, and the work started. This process has been going on since then. It has not been followed by the media because that is not of any interest to them. What the media followed was what was happening in Mogadishu, not the process, which I think was quite good, where they were setting up or helping the people to set up district councils all over Somalia. Today there are fifty-eight district councils set up in the country, out of the seventy-seven districts in the southern part, Somaliland not included.

The Life and Peace people were in this process trying to listen to what we have heard here and trying to see to it that this process was going on in the Somali way. We could understand, and we have understood, that it has been a struggle. We do not say that all this is a perfect solution, but there is an embryo today, something to build on in line with a decentralised Somalia. We have held training for over eight hundred district councillors over these years. There are about six hundred still to be trained. Support has also been given to the districts in helping them to repair their buildings, their district offices. They have been given administrative kits. This is really the support from the Nordic countries, including the Norwegian government. This, it must be said, is something positive which has happened all over Somalia during these years.

Now UNOSOM is leaving, and much of what this UN machinery called UNOSOM has achieved seems to be a failure. But not everything, and I think we have to say it here. There is new hope in all the districts and regions where there are councils set up, and they feel that something can come out of this. I am aware of that some, perhaps even many councils, have performed poorly so far. In some councils, I think you find the wrong people, not the right ones, involved. Some of the newly appointed councils, and some of the

newly appointed councillors, are also misusing their new power positions, and perhaps also taking over positions which traditionally and rightfully should remain with the council of elders and other key structures in the local areas. But an embryo is there, to be empowered and supported. The councils can help the regions and the districts to handle their own affairs in the best interest of those they are going to administer and serve. So I think there is something to build on, now when UNOSOM is leaving. I underline very much the last points of Professor Lewis' suggestions, that there must be a co-ordination, there must be a role for each one of us now to make the best out of the new situation, together with the UN agencies still there, like UNDP and the others, as well as the NGOs, like the Norwegian Red Cross and the International Red Cross and so on.

## General discussion session I:

### *Mr. Sam Engelstad:*

As the former Chief of Humanitarian Relief for about six months in 1994, I have two questions. My first question is directed to Mr. Normark. What is the situation with regard to the establishment of district and regional councils? My second question is to Professor Lewis, whose paper was absolutely marvellous. He talked early on about that there are no crimes but wrongs, and that wrongs might be righted. My question concerns the apparent rise of fundamentalism and Islamic law being introduced, particularly in north Mogadishu, Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle. I would like to know how the two tally, and in any event I would like to hear somebody address themselves somewhat to that issue.

### *Mr. Sture Normark:*

On the district councils, I am aware that this is a very hot potato. It is an attempt from the Somali side to build on some of their local structures. I am aware that it has not functioned very well in all places. The Life and Peace Institute is a research institute also, and we feel that whatever we are involved in, it should be documented and also tried. So we have an ongoing research now on the functioning of these district councils, we have been, in a way, helping set up. One of the researchers has been Dr. Mukhtar, who is sitting here with us. We hope that we will get a fuller picture with having another two areas to be researched, I mean to look into in order to see if this is a complete failure, or if there is something in this which is very much in line with the local structures. You have to build on something. I must say that, during this time, it has been a very hard time to be close to UNOSOM, and also to the lack of co-ordination within UNOSOM as such. You have the political department, you have the humanitarian department, and you have the military. It was hard for us to see how they were unable to communicate with each other, how they criticised each other. It was the main task for the head of the humanitarian department to criticise the political department, and vice versa. Dr. Kapungo was very much criticising the humanitarian, and all the military, of course. This has made us sad and frustrated.

It is very important that there is some kind of co-operation in the future. I am looking forward to the post - UNOSOM era with hope and optimism. I hope that we will be able to build a framework in which the NGOs, district



councils, regional councils, or whatever they are called, and UN agencies can work together for the benefit of the people of Somalia.

***Dr. I.M. Lewis:***

There are many people, like Said Samatar, who are better qualified than me to speak, but I think that the situation is that, as perhaps in all or most Islamic countries, there is always the tension between the role of Islam and the range of Islamic jurisdiction, and the role and range of traditional or secular jurisdiction, relating to the state structure, whatever the state structure is. This tension has existed throughout the history of Islam in varying ways in different countries, and it is just intrinsic, really, to a totalising faith which from certain points of view is relevant for everything, but can also be accommodating and be shrunk to being essentially a religious tradition with perhaps a legal relevance only in domestic affairs, which is of course the situation in many Islamic states. The balance, historically, as everybody here knows and many people know much better than I, has varied remarkably over the centuries in Islam in different places in different countries. I think what one is seeing in Somalia, with the collapse of the state, and the shrinkage or the disappearance of any effective judiciary, is the resurgence of small centres of Islamic power, and a tendency of Islamic law, the shariah, to expanded outside the domestic context in which it previously operated principally in Somalia into a wider range, which of course is open because of the collapse of other judicial institutions, except those linked up with the traditional practice of offering compensation for death and injuries, which is also present. So you have a kind of tension and a conflict between these different views about the nature of Islamic people in an Islamic country, and the jurisdiction of Islamic law in an Islamic country, which is not going to be resolved now or tomorrow, but which will go on as part of one of the inherent tensions in any Islamic country, I believe.

***Dr. Said Samatar:***

One of the things that has intrigued me in connection with this question of fundamentalism, is the absence of Messianic movements. Usually it is the rule of anthropological canon that whenever you have, in a given society, a massive, sustained social upheaval, a perpetual anarchy, it fosters and inspires the rise of a Messiah, of a saviour. Why the Somali scene so far has not introduced a Messiah, a redeemer, is most astonishing. What features in Som-

ali society prevented this from happening? The application of shariah and the amputation, for example, of limbs and so on, is a very un-Somali practice. Somalis have never really been governed through Islamic law, except to limited degrees. So maybe the rise of this Shariah practice is a prelude, I hope not, to a coming Messiah. But I must repeat that the Somalis have not historically been in the habit of submitting themselves to an entire regime of Shariah law.

***Dr. Roland Marchal:***

I would like to add a few comments first on this question of fundamentalism because it could be very badly understood, and would create more problems. The Islamic movement as such developed, I would say, in 1992 and the beginning of 1993. I am talking about the Mogadishu area. What is very important for me is to point out that this movement more or less collapsed after late June, July 1993, over the issue of Aydeed's war against UNOSOM or UNOSOM's war against Aydeed. Some of them wanted to get involved. Others were reluctant to openly participate in the war. Later on, I would say, maybe eight or ten months later, the Islamic movements reappeared. Their presence right now in Mogadishu is mainly related to the welfare activities they provide. They are running a lot of schools, and they are pretty efficient compared to many other Somali NGOs. So they are doing well on that side. What is important to say is that the issue of the shariah code in the north was not raised by the fundamentalists. It was raised mainly as a conjunction of various strategies.

For example, Ali Mahdi, who lost his popularity among his own clan, tried to get some new rules and decided to introduce the Shariah. Moreover, the Shariah code, as necessity of law and order, was very popular among the Abgal people in north Mogadishu. Of course, some of the traditional religious leaders wanted and supported the implementation of the Shariah, but again it makes sense only if you consider the specificities of northern Mogadishu compared to the southern part. Northern Mogadishu is quite homogenous in terms of clans. It is mainly inhabited by people with urban background, and the kind of insecurity you face in northern Mogadishu is very different from the one you face in southern Mogadishu. It is mainly a kind of banditry which is not unlike the banditry one encounters in New York City. What is simple banditry in north Mogadishu could easily be the source of a full scale war in the southern suburbs. So it makes a difference for the people. The Shariah code is introduced mainly because it works well.

Now I would like to make a few comments about the presentations. Like everybody else in this room I was very impressed by Professor Lewis' very good paper, and I would like to add a few points. One very important point is that you have all these Somali cultures, but I do not like to call them traditional cultures. What I would like to emphasise is that we have got a kind of very modern political culture, which is related to the state. It means that when you deal with the intellectuals, or the political class, or the educated class, they will talk about a state apparatus. So to say that the need of a state apparatus, that a central state is only something which is brought and supported by foreigners, is very, very untrue.

What is very important, too, to understand, is the role of Mogadishu. Why Mogadishu is in such a situation is mainly because as in Beirut, as in Kabul, as in Monrovia, as in many other cities which have been confronted with civil war, the capital city is the place where there is the legitimacy of a regime, and that is the only place where you could get international aid. You will not get that in Hargeisa or in Bosaso. Only a small amount of aid will reach these places. If you are able to control Mogadishu, if you are in control of the capital city, that will be very nice. I think it is one point that should be taken into account, because it highlights the existence and significance, in Somalia, of a political culture which is very much related to the state. And ignoring this means ignoring an important aspect of the political realities in Somalia.

The second important point is related to the land issue. I think again I would agree with Professor Lewis on the move towards the south. One thing is very clear, too, and again Somalia is not an exception. And this is that war first means migration, and now what is at stake, I would say, is to see to what extent we still are in a situation of conquest, and colonisation, or if we are already in a situation of cohabitation. I think this is a matter of debate, but I would like to give you a few examples. I was researching on the *mooryaan*, which could be translated as 'freedom fighters' or as 'bandits', according to the situation, and the time. Some of these *mooryaan*, again a very modern culture, wanted to settle in agricultural areas. So a colony of *mooryaan* settled there. They did not manage very well in the beginning and they encountered many problems. But after a while they worked out an agreement with the farmers, they married local people in order to be integrated into the community and to develop some familiarity with the local culture and environment. So in such a situation is it still fair from a historical point of view to describe this as a conquest or as a more mixed situation? This is a very important debate because this is going to be one of the main stakes of the Middle Shabelle and the Lower Juba.

The third point is related to trade. What I do believe very much is that there is no such thing as Somali people. There are various groups with various interests. If we take the trade networks, they could be inter-clan, but what is sure is that some of them have vested interest in the continuation of the crisis in the country, and some want to keep law and order, because is necessary for their own business. So what we have to enquire is who these various groups are. We must also ask why some traders still are at ease with anarchy and do not want state structures to be restored and strengthened.

### *Dr. Sharif Harir:*

Thank you very much. And thank you to Norcross for making it possible for us to be part of this present crowd. As everybody has done, I must also thank Professor Lewis for a very interesting paper. In my undergraduate days, I did not forget the Pastoral Democracy. To begin my comments, I would say that I never forgot how impressive it was when I was introduced to pastoral democracy as a part of my anthropological syllabus in the undergraduate studies at the University of Khartoum. When I read it, I said, who needs a state, because these people are so republican, so democratic. And I think the Somali situation should bring us a little bit further from the concrete Somali situation to what is happening in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. I would say that the problem that we dare not touching upon is the fact that the national state, as it has been imported and imparted upon Africa, is the problem. So actually the Somali problem will not be the problem. I think there will be a state problem in much of Africa.

Now, in a society like the Somali, which is so democratised, so republican and so forth, when you have a state imposed like that, you strain the very fabric and dynamism of that society and culture. It is a tribal clan-based society, it is so dynamic that alliances are made and un-made all the time, but the state tries to stabilise that situation. That is harmful in the long run, as it appears.

Moving from there, I think perhaps we encounter in the Somali situation, and in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, what Mazrui called the 'privatisation of the state'. You have got a small elite, Siad Barre's group and allies, for example, which did not only privatise the state, but also militarised it, and made it accessible to a few people only who could share in what he pretentiously called 'scientific socialism'. And Africa is very much rife with such pretentious kinds of things: 'scientific socialism', 'African socialism', beautiful but shallow.

This situation leads, in the long run, to what has happened in Somalia. I think it will be repeated in many places in Africa. So I think what is happening in Somalia is not the Somali people at war with themselves, or clan war, it is the Somali people at war with the state, with the concept of national state. They have managed to shake it off, and I think the world should not try to impose it again onto them. That is my conviction. The world can help them, but it should not help them to reinforce that kind of thing on them. Some people are carrying the state's burden - Basil Davidson has called it the "black masses' burden" - resignedly because they do not have any alternative. I think this kind of thinking should be a part of the ongoing discussion on the Somali situation and the African situation in general.

**Mr. Hassan Abdi Keynan:**

I have several comments, but first I must say that this has been an unusually peaceful panel, and according to Somali tradition, this has an air of unreality. One must find ways of disagreeing with it.

My first comment is about aid agencies. They are enormously powerful in Somalia, and as everybody has mentioned, their role is very crucial. But I would like to point out that the aid agencies are just as faction-oriented and as clannish as the Somali society. So the idea of a co-ordinated aid effort in Somalia is an illusion. It will not work, precisely because the aid agencies themselves are involved in a kind of internal war which is not unlike the war which has been going on in Somalia. The only difference is that they carry out their warfare in a more civilised way.

The other comment is about the Somali identity. I believe that the Somalis have, as everybody has mentioned, multiple identities. There is without any doubt the clan element, the clan identity. There is an Islamic identity. There is also a national identity and a regional identity. All these four identities intermix and influence each other dialectically. I think it is very premature to eliminate any one of them from the Somali equation at this stage. It is highly probable that there will be a resurgence of Islamic forces in Somalia, with enormous political power base. There may be a resurgence of Somali nationalism in a different form, or in multiple forms. So I think the suggestion that should focus only on one identity and ignore the others in the Somali multiple identity complex is, in my opinion, not in line with the current realities in the country.

The third comment is about discourse. I believe that since the collapse of the Somali state, and the intervention of the UN, a unique discourse on Somalia has emerged. This discourse has been dominated by the outsiders, and the

Somalis have been marginalised. Everything is being concocted outside Somalia. And these ideas have enormous influence on what actually happens in Somalia. Just as has been mentioned several times, a warlord may not be a warlord, but when you use the warlord you have taken a position. But in fact there may not be a warlord as Professor Lewis has suggested this morning. The individuals that are referred to as warlords may in fact turn out to be legitimate political leaders. I am very much concerned about the 'predatory discourse' that has recently emerged, and which international agencies used unwisely and irresponsibly, with enormous implications for Somalia and its people.

**Mr. Odd Iglebæk:**

The issue or the question I would like to raise has to do with aid and geopolitics, or the interest of external forces. I think that when one looks at Somalia one can, up until the end of the 1980s, see that the external forces' main interest in Somalia has been for military reasons. Of utmost importance to the foreign powers was the control of the Suez Canal and the huge oil resources in the Gulf. That continued to be the most important strategic objective until the end of the Cold War. The majority of the aid which actually went into Somalia until the end of the 1980s was also partly related to that scheme. Then the aid suddenly stopped when the civil war broke out in Somalia in the 1980s. Now foreign aid has started to pour into Somalia again.

I would like the distinguished experts in the panel to comment on the external powers' hidden agendas in Somalia this time. Why did the United States suddenly decide to intervene in Somalia militarily and then withdraw? Was it because there was somebody at the Pentagon who thought that Somalia was still important to the United States' military interests? Was it because there was fear that the world might disintegrate into 300 to 400 small nations as Boutros Ghali, commenting on the events unfolding in Somalia, reportedly warned a few years ago? Were there other reasons? I would like the panellists to try to answer these questions.

**Dr. Ken Menkhaus:**

I will try to give an answer. I have just finished some research on that question, and I have had the opportunity to interview quite a few American decision-makers who were involved in it. The question is a bit academic so I will be short. A lot of people blame President Bush for looking for some

glorious exit from his presidency to go into the history books. My conclusion is that there was a growing realisation, not at the highest level, that the whole problem of failed states in the post cold war era was indeed a serious problem. It appears that more of the pressure was at a secondary level in the US government to try to come to grips with this problem. There was a real move among those decision makers to try to strengthen the UN, so that the US would not have to do it in the future. Somalia was attractive because it was not Bosnia. That is the most consistent answer I have got. There were loads of conspiracy theories, and incompetent theories as well, but that one is the one I have got which is the most satisfying. But while you brought the question of interests up, it might be worth underscoring that the US military is not the only one that had interests in an intervention. I guess what I wanted to do is answer Professor Mukhtar's question that he raised earlier, and that was the Somalis all say that we have interests, that the outsiders have interest in Somali wealth, that they have come to exploit. He said that was not true, the Somalis, he was quoting, were quite close, they were not interested in Somali wealth, they were interested in Somali poverty. That is were they make their business. It must be said, that whether we think we can co-ordinate donors or not, we must put pressure on donors, not maybe at the highest level where the pressure comes from, but the institutionalised pressure to put aid into areas even if it causes more trouble than it is worth. Refugees and deprivation are big business in Somalia and elsewhere, there are lots of Somalis who make millions off of it, and there are lots of the rest of us who make a handsome career off of it. We have got to find a way if we are serious about implementing many of the proposals that have been raised today: keeping aid small, keeping it focused, knowing what is going on on the ground, ensuring that it does not coincide with big institutionalised interests.

**Mr. Jama Ali Mohamud:**

I have got something which is bothering me, and I would like to ask some of the experts here why it was excluded from the discussion so far. As some of you might know, we are a nation that uses a drug called *qat*, and our discussions always depend on what kind of mood we are in. My question is: why did we not discuss this matter? It is estimated that almost 90 percent of the people in the country consume *qat*. It is a drug that gives you a variety of moods. You can sit days and days, discussing all sorts of things. But the day after, when the stuff gets out of your system, you forget everything.

**Dr. Said S. Samatar:**

I can definitely testify to the deadliness of *qat* as a drug. I fully agree with you that its effects are quite devastating. I must say that the people who consume, of course, do not think that they are consuming a drug. I will cite myself as an example. Years ago I was in the habit of chewing *qat*. I recall one afternoon when, after five hours of ingestion trying to get up at ten o'clock, one of our party tried to hang his shirt on what he thought was the head of a nail on the wall. As he tried to hang his shirt on it, the nail moved and he followed the nail, and the nail moved again. It turned out that he was trying to hang his shirt on a fly. I know from experience that this is a drug, and the fact that 90 to 95 % of the people in the urban areas are in the habit of consuming it on a daily basis is quite alarming. In the mornings the users are either suffering from withdrawal symptoms or from craving for another round of chewing. And if they have guns, they can be extremely dangerous. The international community will have to pay serious attention to this problem. Mr. Abby Farah was talking about the same issue this morning, maybe he wants to address himself to that question.

**Amb. Abdulrahim Abby Farah:**

Recently I was in Hargeisa, and I have been told that about USD 100,000 worth of *qat* is consumed in Hargeisa alone every day. This means that Hargeisa spends USD 3,000,000 per month, USD 36,000,000 a year on *qat*. The *qat* culture does not only ruin our economy. It also adversely affects our health, work ethic as well as the social and economic well-being of our families. This is a problem that needs urgent attention. The international community must make every effort to help the Somalis combat this costly and destructive habit.

**Mr. Martin Zak:**

I would very much like to ask the panellists, in particular Professor Lewis, to perhaps expand on the idea of targeting the limited amount of aid, and perhaps using it much more wisely than organisations have been doing in the past. I know we will come back to this tomorrow, but I think it would be quite important if the panellists could perhaps give us some ideas about what they mean by it. Who actually decides on this? Has any serious research been done on this topic?

*Dr. I. M. Lewis:*

First of all, as various people have pointed out, it is very difficult to get aid agencies to co-ordinate their activities. But it is not impossible, because, after all, governments can exercise some leverage on aid agencies, and most of the aid agencies get at least some governmental support, as well as what they may raise through charitable appeals. I think there could be some international attempt to really try to encourage what one might call the professionalisation of aid agencies. It seems to me, at least in Britain, that you get people who are much more professional in collecting money than they are in disbursing it in Third World development projects. They are often very poorly informed, very poorly prepared, but they are motivated by good intentions and they have a strong, even arrogant, sense of their own superior wisdom and knowledge, which is often very insulting to the people they are supposed to be helping, whom they do not really know or understand, but they think they know better. They are often much younger, and there is a whole sub-culture of aid. It is quite true that there is a very extensive inter-aid agency sub-culture, which, it seems to me, would benefit from self-examination and scrutiny.

There is a case for aid agencies discussing much more how they might collaborate in situations like Somalia. We know that the UNDP and the European Union, and I suppose USAID and other large funding agencies have a co-ordinating committee of a kind in Nairobi in their aid programmes for Somalia. It is quite a recent thing, I believe. That seems to me a positive step. One would hope that the NGOs could do the same. In fact, they did do the same to some extent, at least in Britain, at the beginning of the Somali crisis in 1991-92. But then it all fell apart, and as somebody who was involved with them as a non-aid person myself, I was very struck by the rivalry between these outfits, Oxfam, Save the Children, Action Aid, and by the very great difficulties they manifestly had in collaborating even in such a small thing as having a meeting of about ten or twelve people, discussing aid to a crisis stricken area of the world like Somalia, as it then was. It was disappointing to a non-aid person to see how factionalist they were, but of course it makes sense because they have careers, they have economic structures, they have political structures, they have their own agendas. But I really think that there is a case for attempting to do something about this nationally and internationally. One would hope that the Scandinavian countries, which after all have perhaps the best external image for humanitarian aid and humanitarian

support towards the third world, might perhaps give some leadership and influence to other countries in this direction.

*Dr. Ken Menkhaus:*

Just very briefly, a specific response to your question. Two weeks ago there was a meeting in Boston of researchers who are collecting success stories of NGOs, specifically how NGOs can, not directly, but indirectly foster peace and reconciliation through their operations. There were two cases from Somalia that have been and are being written up, one of Save the Children US that has been in the Lower Shabelle for 25 years, and how they worked. Another, the Irish NGO, Trocera, was new to the Gedo region, but worked very effectively without the use of technicals and so on. We encouraged those NGOs to pull their resources. What we need are far more case studies written up by those people who have seen how things have worked and how they have not worked, to share the information. It is out there, there are success stories, but they are frequently missed, in part because they are not written up and in part because NGOs have notoriously short institutional memories. These are things that could be fixed. The information is there, as are the people.

*Dr. Nancy Smith:*

It is true that we cooperate in relation to the day-to-day problems with security, but we are in many ways very similar to Somali clans. We are fractious, we fall apart immediately, any kind of agreements that we make disappear the next day, or it changes when ex-pats go out, and the whole programme shifts and changes direction. I think if we are going to do something in a united way in this next year, this very critical year, we are going to have to work very, very hard at it. One of the things we are going to have to do is to be very closely in touch with the institutional and political pressures on us, from donors, from headquarters, to be perceived to be doing something. It is very, very difficult to resist that imperative. I am afraid I am not very optimistic at this point in terms of those agencies who have been successful. In my experience, they are the ones that nobody in this room has ever heard about, the programmes and projects are tiny, involving very small sums of money, and involving long, long periods of time working with the community until they learned who it was in the community who could move things along, and who was responsible and who had the respect of local people. I think that many of the larger agencies, like Oxfam, have not done that despite having been in Somalia since the late 1960s. I do not think we have learned how to do that, unfortunately.

*Amb. Mohamed M. Sahnoun:*

I would first like to say that I share somebody's feeling expressed earlier that we do feel Norway somehow has had this kind of understanding of the opportune time to move things. I have been associated with Norway on a number of issues and I remember that we had a very important meeting on southern Africa here, both on South Africa and the former Portuguese territories which became somehow a very important date in the history of the struggle in these parts of Africa. Somebody also referred to the role of Norway on the Palestinian/Israeli question, and this is why we came, hoping that this Norwegian sponsored conference can produce something useful. I was very happy to listen to Professor Lewis. I always tell him when I meet him that I consider him as my mentor in the whole issue, because as Mr. Sture Normark has reminded us, one of the first meetings we organised was to have some of the best scholars we could reach to come and meet with us so that we could learn from them, all kinds of the specific parameters in the Somali society and the Somali history, so that when we start moving we will make as few mistakes as possible, although we are always bound to make some. Dr. Lewis could not come to that meeting in Uppsala, so straight from Uppsala I went to London. I met him in his home and spent a couple of hours with him, and learned from him at that time already some of the things he has told us today, and a few other things which were useful to me.

However, I think we should not reach the conclusion that there is some kind of fatality in Somalia, that the clan system, and that maybe clanism somehow dramatically hampered the chances of Somali society to recover. We should certainly look at the specificity, we should certainly try to draw lessons as we go along. But they should not be perceived as being a fundamental handicap. In fact, to some extent, I myself come from a nomadic culture. Part of Algeria is largely of a nomadic culture. And not very far from Somalia there are other societies which share this kind of culture. In fact the Prophet of Islam used to talk about clanism, and he said: 'Clanism, beware of clanism, it is a calamity'. Whether he said it or not, I do not know, but it was attributed to him. So this was said already in the 7th or 8th century. Clanism, not really the clan system, because after all that is given, that is the way, but the culture of clanism seen as being above everything, is certainly a calamity.

We have these problems, but there are other problems which are not necessarily bonded clanism in Africa today. We have other issues. To some extent they are sometimes even more complex, Sierra Leone, Liberia for

example. I have been dealing recently with Congo, I have been there on a mediation process. Here is a country which has so many more resources than Somalia, much smaller population, and yet divided in a terrible way. I had to spend weeks there doing some mediation and shuttle diplomacy. Thank God with the OAU we tackled the problem early enough, and we were able to arrive at a solution.

With Somalia the problem is that we intervened very, very late. We allowed the society to dislocate, we really allowed the problem to magnify. I think today what we should look at is the question: What are the factors of stabilisation? Where are they? We should try to identify them. Professor Lewis himself pointed out some of the things. We can approach problems on a regional basis, and see how we can enhance. First of all, look at these factors of stabilisation. The role of merchants, the role of the elders, the role of women in a social aspect. The role of trade. How can we enhance these factors of stabilisation? How can we get the faction leaders, if we do not want to call them warlords, to understand that if they want to play a national role, they first have to play a regional role. Can you stabilise the situation in your area, before you claim to be a national leader? Show us that you can stabilise. I used to argue with Aydeed and say to him: "But you can not even have law and order in your own area. How can you claim to be able to take charge of the whole country?"

Mr. Sture Normark has referred to district councils, and he and I and a couple of people have been trying to promote that approach. There have been criticisms of that approach, but one of the reasons was because the UN did not want to help. We had the meeting with Mr. Sture Normark in Uppsala only a couple of months ago, working on that exact time to assess the situation, and UNOSOM people were there and they told us very frankly that whenever there was a move, to have a meeting of the faction leaders, like in Nairobi or something like that, instructions were sent to the UNOSOM people in charge of the district councils: "Stop it! Do not do anything because war leaders are not happy with these things, so we have to satisfy them." You can not achieve results if you have these kinds of interferences and contradictions and antagonisms. So really to conclude, and I do not want to be long, I do not want to touch on the question of aid assistance since we are going to discuss this tomorrow, but really we should try, and we have done it to a large extent today in our discussion, to look at these factors of stabilisation and see how we can enhance them, and see how we can strengthen them.

## Summary and concluding remarks to session I

### *By Dr. Bernhard Helander:*

I am not sure that Norwegians are aware that there are certain parts of Somalia where the most honoured speaker always gets to speak the last, and I am not sure that they would like a Swede to have that position, actually...

There is no way I could even very briefly go through everything that has been said, but just let me highlight a few themes that have emerged during the day. Sven Mollekleiv began his talk today by asking the rhetorical question whether it was not time for foreigners to leave the Somalis to sort out their own problems, and I think that we have seen some of the political reasons why that may be so, but in a more subtle way. We have approached the issue of conditional aid, of minimal aid being given, we have already covered some of the themes that were set up for tomorrow, that is only because they are so inter-linked with the problems of politics, of security. Ioan Lewis took us on a very fascinating tour, a very vivid tour through Somalia, least to say very turbulent political landscape. Given the Somali version of the answer to the very famous request "take me to your leaders", which has turned out to be something like "take me to your cleaners", where foreigners actually have been taken to the cleaners of the Somali society.

He highlighted some landmarks of the political landscape of the clan and inter-clan alliances, the level of society which today seems to be the only thing which at least now actually functions as a society, what Ken Menkhaus called "the radical localisation of Somali politics", which has really broken down the Somali state into little clan fiefdoms if you like, they are small emerging sultanates, sometimes allied with neighbours, sometimes not. Professor Lewis pointed to trading patterns as something which may well be what eventually will tie up these different communities with one another. We know from the works of both Professor Mukhtar and Professor Menkhaus and by Dr. Marchal that this is in fact what is happening. Professor Lewis saw some possibilities for an optimistic scenario to emerge out of this. He said that the developing trade among these different clan polities may well serve to further inter-clan understanding, and that we would have the flag following the trail of the trader.

However, there is one sort of very big problem which may emerge here, and that is the resumption of uncoordinated international large scale aid, for all sorts of well meaning purposes, which may well end up recreating a chaos

as the one Somalia now seems to have a chance of getting out of, particularly where aid levels are fairly low at the moment. Somalis are addicted to aid, professor Lewis pointed out.

Professor Mukhtar gave a very interesting and personal reflection on the breakdown of Somali nationalism. He gave us some examples of Somali views on their own self-importance in believing that US troops are there to extract their riches, a view which he pointed out contrasts brutally with the extreme dependency on foreign aid which Somalia has developed over the years, it started a long time ago during the Siyad era.

Ken Menkhaus gave us some very concrete and down-to-earth examples of the way that the patronage system has built up small, seemingly functional, political entities all over the country, how local communities have instigated among themselves systems for taxation which sort of borders upon what we might call extortion, yet creating seemingly stable units, units that are far from perfect, but yet sort of are able to provide them with a certain amount of stability, a sense of security. Ken Menkhaus raised the question in that context whether NGOs are prepared to work in a climate of this radical localisation, and whether they are prepared to do that both in that situation, and also whether they are prepared to face the criticism which they might well be given. They may be seen as stimulating a process of fragmenting the Somali state, although it was fragmented a long time ago.

He also graciously addressed himself to the tendency to generalise. We have called academics here to speak to NGO people, and you were expecting perhaps to get some general points here: This is the blue print, this is the way we should do, but unfortunately I think that everything that has been said here only serves to further complicate things, and that is in itself, I believe, perhaps a lesson. The international NGO staff working in Somalia would really need a very thorough briefing of what they are going to do. That is one thing which has been popping up in the various meetings I have been going to over the past few years, that some form of central briefing mechanisms should be set up, perhaps in Nairobi, where both administrators and staff of international NGOs and other organisations could be given some basic training in Somali political culture.

Sture Normark went on to give us some details about his involvement and the Life and Peace Institute's involvement with UNOSOM, remarking that not everything that UNOSOM set up was a failure. We have heard some debates over that.

The issue of political Islam popped up, I think that is very interesting, and

one of the best experts on that, Roland Marchal gave us a very illustrating point about the way that political Islam now seems to play a very non-unified role in Somalia. It is not like there is a single force behind it all, but the shariah court in North Mogadishu seems to have popped up for very different reasons than in other parts of the country, and I know also from Professor Mukhtar's study of the interriverine regions in the middle of last year that one reason that the Shariah was introduced into some local courts, was because there was no copy of the Somali penal code around, so there can be all sorts of reasons for the introduction of Shariah.

I think perhaps I should call it a day there. You have to bear with me two more times during this conference.

## **SESSION II**

### 12 IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS; NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND PRIORITIES

## **An Overview of Humanitarian Aid Needs in Somalia**

*Key-note speech (session II) by Sam Engelstad,\* formerly Chief of Humanitarian Relief - UNOSOM II*

### **Introduction**

I have been asked to speak about the humanitarian requirements in Somalia, and about the order of humanitarian priorities. In doing so, I have organized the paper into three parts: the first addresses some of the elements necessary to carry out humanitarian assistance in Somalia under the prevailing circumstances. They include (a) security, (b) the relationship between the humanitarian community working in Somalia and the elusive, often nefarious authorities claiming to speak for the Somalis, (c) the role and constraints of local NGOs and women's groups, and (d) the relationship between UN agencies and NGOs. In this context, I have excluded the Red Cross/Red Crescent family of organizations, since they emphatically do not regard themselves as NGOs. In the second part, I will give a brief overview of Somalia, including demographics. Then follows a region-by-region breakdown of the humanitarian needs and priorities. The third, and final, part is a conclusion, including recommendations.

### **Security and Humanitarian Assistance**

The task of providing humanitarian assistance to Somalia must first and foremost be seen in the context of security, or rather, the lack of it. It touches every aspect of public and private life, as well as humanitarian assistance, whether short- or long-term. As Douglas Higgins, UNOSOM's former

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\* With additional information provided by former UNOSOM II Humanitarian Affairs Officers: Esther T. Benjamin (Bardera; Baidoa), Peter Stamm (Bardera; Jowhar), William Bergquist (Bosasso; North Mogadishu), Peter Krakolining (Hoddur; Galcayo)



Political Affairs Officer in Hoddur writes in his final report from Bakool in the Spring of 1994: "There is no shortage of armed civilians in Somalia who can pull a trigger for any passing reason, regardless of wider consequences and repercussions." Having recently returned from Mogadishu where I worked with the United Nations' Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, I can only endorse this distressing sentiment, which in part was colored by the killing of Mr. Higgins' good colleague, George Gleptis of MDM-Greece in Bakool in March of 1994. Despite implicit penalties imposed on the region by the international humanitarian community, often by withholding services, the regional and district councils, many of whose members undoubtedly regretted the incident, so feared the clan-based militia in Wajid who allegedly had perpetrated the crime, that they failed to bring the assassin to justice. This loyalty to nebulous clan relationships, and the fear of offending their leaders, take priority over almost everything, including material gains such as humanitarian aid.

Previous to, and frequently after, the establishment of the recent UN missions to Somalia, both public and private humanitarian agencies hired local protection from clans. In a bizarre Mad Max scenario, supply convoys were escorted by technicals, hired at great cost and manned by young men in running shoes and mirrored glasses who would provide escort services during the day and loot supply warehouses at night. UN peacekeeper services were supposed to remedy this situation, but as time went by, the effectiveness with which they carried out this escorting role declined. Provided by the Security Council with vague rules of engagement, military contingents were not always clear about when they were allowed to defend themselves and when they were not. As a result, Somali criminal elements, whose abilities in these matters no one should underestimate, not infrequently took advantage of the peacekeepers' confusion, holding up convoys and running off with truckloads of emergency supplies. On one memorable occasion in the late summer of 1994, a WFP food convoy en route from Mogadishu to Baidoa, protected by more than eighty well-equipped Bangladeshi troops in armed personnel carriers, was held up by two young men equipped with what was later described as "handguns." When the troops failed to assert themselves and protect the convoy, all the trucks, save one, which made it to Baidoa, were stolen. In a dreadful irony, as this event was unfolding on the Airport Road, a Brown and Root convoy, protected by local militia and technicals, drove unmolested by the scene of

the crime.

Nevertheless, with all its limitations, UNOSOM did provide a protective umbrella of sorts. But as it leaves, private organizations and UN agencies have no choice but to revert to the costly practices of negotiating security agreements and pay scales with local authorities and Kalashnikov-toting kids alike. It is going to be expensive, and it is not going to look good to the financial auditors, but the fact is that expensive security is a must in many parts of Somalia and will in all likelihood remain so in the future.

While the security circumstances are considered more stable in Somaliland, events there have amply demonstrated that it is far from being immune to many of the problems engulfing Somalia proper. The traditional mediation process is often, but not always, successfully observed in Somaliland. Nevertheless, the conflict between the factions loyal to Messrs. Egal and Tuur are perfectly capable of generating sufficient instability to insure instances of civil disorder, particularly among the region's well-armed, volatile, and unemployed youth. The overall picture has not improved in the wake of Tuur's alliance with General Aideed, a master of political and violent intrigue — nor by last year's suspension of UNOSOM's support of the Somaliland police force.

### **Humanitarian Community vs. Somali Authorities**

As guests in Somalia, the international humanitarian community must make every effort to work through local authorities, which in Somalia are usually clan-based. However, whenever possible, humanitarian agencies should favor regions and districts where there is a degree of collaboration among the clans and where NGOs therefore can be seen as rewarding such collaboration. This is not a moralistic argument, but a pragmatic and necessary step in an era of declining resources and increasing demands for greater organizational accountability and transparency. On this note, it has been amply demonstrated that, in spite of considerable differences, some factions can, and do, seek common ground in working with the international community. Examples include factions in Galcayo and Jowhar, both areas in which the humanitarian community for some time has had a growing dialogue with cooperating local power structures on issues ranging from security, program selection, labor and wages, to local input. Almost without exception, they include groups of elders who have re-instituted traditional community mediation efforts. As for the UNOSOM-imposed district and

regional councils, these have often failed. Ignoring the traditional mediation systems, such well-meaning efforts have by and large been rendered ineffective, or, in some cases, become a tool of exploitation.

### **Local NGOs and Women's Groups**

In many countries, local NGOs and community groups can be of considerable value as partners in development. Under Siad Barre, however, such private initiatives were seen as a threat to the regime and therefore banned. But it goes deeper, as John Drysdale points out in *Somalis Through the Looking Glass*: "They are," he argues, "prisoners of their old, nomadic environment and culture." Having developed a fine sense of the opportune, Somalis who constitute community groups often regard international humanitarian efforts as vehicles for clan prosperity, not community development. As a result, the country now sprouts ad-hoc NGOs, created overnight to present international donors with "development partners." Such clan affiliated efforts are, of course, both political and commercial and thus incompatible with the very concept of impartial NGO activity. This complicates the work of the international NGOs looking for Somali implementing partners. If three clans are prominent in one town, an international NGO working in the community must generally negotiate with representatives loyal to all three. Each group will expect to be provided with resources commensurate with their clan's perceived strength. And when things go wrong, as they always do — when "promised" resources don't materialize — death threats and kidnappings often follow.

Esther Benjamin, who served as a Humanitarian Affairs Officer in both Bardera and Baidoa during much of 1994, and who implemented dozens of Small-Scale Projects in partnership with local NGOs, suggests an exception to this rule, proposing that international NGOs look to women's groups, of which there are growing numbers. Arguing that too many local NGOs headed by males are nothing but clan-cum-business fronts, and that women's groups are frequently less political, less commercial, and more reliable, she herself favored such groups whenever feasible. On our part, the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM encouraged the establishment of a local NGO consortium and its adoption of guidelines similar to those ruling international NGOs, particularly those prescribing that they be non-commercial, and non-political. Nevertheless, after lengthy discussions among themselves, the local NGOs always failed to reach these key provisions.

### **NGOs and UN Agencies in Somalia**

Now that UNOSOM has left Somalia, the UN agencies working in the country have requested special funding to support their own activities, and those of the international NGOs, in and around the largest population areas. Underlying the request is the recognition that given the withdrawal of UNOSOM, and the likely continued political uncertainties in much of Somalia, the UN agencies' and NGOs' ability to collaborate must be strengthened.

The proposal calls for a negotiated common front between the agencies and the NGOs, particularly with respect to access to the ports and airports, transportation tariffs, standardization of salaries and benefits for national staff, and rental rates for offices and residences. It would also facilitate the establishment of common systems for services such as the procurement of essential commodities, transport coordination, air transport services, communications network, medical support for staff, and storage facilities. To accomplish this goal, it was proposed that the agencies, in collaboration with the international, and hopefully, emerging local NGO consortia, create a coordination team, composed of senior representatives of UN agencies active in Somalia, and chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative.

While I believe this integrated scenario is somewhat unrealistic, I believe that a small team responsible for consolidated appeals and reports has considerable merits. Most importantly, such a team should also collect, analyze, and disseminate reliable and standardized data concerning relief requirements. Too many costly efforts in Somalia, and elsewhere, have been generated in the absence of reliable information. On this note, it has been persuasively argued that many of the famine-related deaths that occurred in 1992 might have been prevented had relief agencies had access to a humanitarian early warning system. In the case of Somalia, such a system would have provided them with credible data demonstrating the need for widespread, but relatively simple public health strategies required to drastically lower the mortality rates.<sup>1</sup> During 1992, intervention by organizations such as ICRC, CARE, CRS, World Vision, WFP, and UNHCR, focused largely on food distribution at the expense of water, sanitation, essential drugs, public health out-reach programs, and the monitoring of malnutrition in the general population and in the camps. NGO decisions about what intervention to undertake were often based more on their organization's past activities than on a coordinated review of needs in Somalia.

## **Somalia — An Overview**

Many of Somalia's 5-6 million people have strong nomadic traditions. In the northern and central areas, where drought is an ever present threat, nomadic clans are accustomed to grazing their livestock on the Ethiopian side of the undefined border. At least 30 per cent of the population are settled farmers, living mainly in the rich agricultural areas between the Shabelle and Juba rivers. The balance of the population is urban. Due to the civil war, the overall population pictures have been greatly distorted, with large groups of Internally Displaced People, or IDPs, residing in and around the capital of Mogadishu, normally a city of about half a million people.

According to UNICEF, in 1988 literacy rates among Somali women were about 6 per cent, and 18 per cent for men. Only one in 10 children of primary school age was actually enrolled. Secondary education was faring much worse. Lacking a viable public health structure, health standards before the war were among the worst in Africa, with low life expectancy, and high infant mortality. According to UNICEF, 72 per cent of the pre-war population had no access to health care. In 1992, the UN Development Report ranked Somalia 151st of 160 on its human development index.

The main economic activity has always been agriculture, with a heavy focus of livestock rearing. More than 30 per cent of the country is semi-arid rangeland, and of the 8 million hectares that can be cultivated for crops, only a million are under cultivation on a regular basis. After disastrous drops in the cereal production between 1969 and 1980, which forced Somalia to import large quantities of cereals, the government dropped its many controls, causing a steady growth in production in the years before the civil war. As a result of the war and the accompanying disruption of the rural economy, production fell disastrously, prompting large infusions of emergency food. The unfolding famine is estimated to have doomed at least a quarter of a million people.

### **Immediate and Long-Term Humanitarian Requirements**

It is worthwhile reminding ourselves of two facts: First, with bumper harvests and large amounts of food aid, there is no current famine in Somalia. And second, while northern and central Somalia experience occasional droughts, these areas are largely populated by nomads who for generations have lived under recurring droughts and other natural constraints, herding their camels, sheep and goats through the semi-arid regions in search of nourishment. In the face of this, we must show extraordinary care not to interfere needlessly with a complex social and economic system which we do not fully under-

stand, and which, in fact, we may only have the ability to destroy. Their particular circumstances do not by and large call for massive relief, but for longer-term efforts to rebuild housing stock and an infrastructure shattered by war, and the provision of animal-health efforts.

In the populous urban and agricultural regions to the south, on the other hand, the problems are closely associated with the ongoing civil war, and with the displacement of people. The situation has been exacerbated by the absence of a functional Ministry of Health and by the range and complexities of endemic diseases. UN Agencies, NGOs and the Somali Red Crescent are almost alone in their attempts to care for vulnerable groups. Not until the establishment of a working government to provide sectoral backstopping will the current efforts move from emergency relief to a development phase.

## **Region-by-Region Sectoral Assessment**

### **SOMALILAND**

In 1988, Somaliland was devastated by General Morgan. Tens of thousands of civilians are said to have died, and the shelling destroyed innumerable buildings throughout Somaliland. Half the population of Hargeisa fled. Some have started to trickle back, and reconstruction of housing and other buildings is a priority for the Government. Somaliland once had a thriving livestock industry, much of it for export. The civil war led to the destruction of tanneries and meat processing facilities in Hargeisa, and to a disastrous drop in the level of exports. After the declaration of independence in 1991, exports have rebounded somewhat, but much remains to be done. Having the advantage of working with a Government, the Italians and the European Community are working to rebuild the livestock industry, including animal health and rangeland development programs. At this time, the top priority in Somaliland is to secure full international recognition. Without it, additional bilateral aid, the most important component of any development assistance, will be slow to arrive and help rebuild the widespread devastation.

### **BARI AND NUGAL**

Livestock is the economic backbone of both Bari and Nugal. Large numbers of camels and goats have traditionally been exported to the Gulf States.

Recently, two factors have seriously undermined this valuable activity. One is the lack of a banking system to issue letters of credit and a stable currency. Another is the absence of veterinary services and agencies to issue the animal health certificates required to export livestock and livestock products. As a result, thousands of heads have been refused into the Gulf State market, particularly Saudi Arabia. In Bosasso, where GTZ and the NGO Africa 70 have both worked to resuscitate a sustainable veterinary health system, work has also been hampered because the Somalis, after decades under Socialist rule, refuse to pay for veterinary services. Obviously, close attention must be paid to this sector if the regions are going to create employment opportunities to the many thousands without jobs — particularly members of the unskilled, armed militias roaming the north-east.

The fishing industries in both Bari and Nugal have traditionally provided both subsistence income and export earnings. But without improvements in transport, storage, and marketing infrastructure, the sector is bound to remain marginal for the foreseeable future.

Some observers argue that the health sectors in Bari and Nugal have improved since the civil war, with UNICEF and several NGOs providing repairs and equipment, health posts, health care workers, and potable water. However, whether this system is sustainable is questionable given the absence of a government. In Bari, some schools have been rebuilt, and UNICEF and WFP both assist in the process of training teachers. Koranic schools, with help from UNICEF, proliferate.

The port town of Bosasso has a considerable number of IDPs, constituting as much as two-thirds of the total population. UNOSOM's former Humanitarian Affairs Officer to Basasso, William Bergquist, suggests that most are content to remain in the city, and that the urban population generally has accepted them. However, their economic opportunities are severely limited, and, as in much of Somalia, many occupy public buildings. Those who wish to return home should therefore be assisted and adequate housing for those who wish to remain must somehow be provided.

## **MUDUG AND GALGADUD**

Mudug and Galgadud largely consists of flat, rocky plains. In spite of the frequent hijacking of commercial trucks, a small percentage of the population remains urban traders, taking advantage of the paved highway running north to Bosasso and north-west to Hargeisa through Galcayo, the largest town in

Mudug. The highway, which stimulates considerable economic activity, needs repairs after years of neglect. The rest of the population are nomads raising and exporting livestock, occasionally taking a stab at cultivating fruit and vegetables. Since the Mudug Region Peace Agreement of June 1993, when the three dominant clans divided Galcayo into three distinct sections, an uneasy peace has reigned, greatly benefiting economic activity.

Mudug and Galgadud's greatest constraints are a severe shortage of water. Shallow and contaminated, most wells are non-functional due to lack of maintenance, diesel, and spare parts for the pumps. UNICEF has installed several hand pumps in and around Galcayo and elsewhere solar-powered irrigation systems have proved effective and durable. International organizations promoting agricultural development have no presence in either region. Fertilizer and seeds are generally not available, nor are extension services to advise farmers experimenting with a variety of irrigated horticultural cash crops. Excessive tree felling has led to serious soil erosion. The looting and ravages of the civil war, the lack of adequate grazing lands and water points, and the lack of veterinary services and drugs, have resulted in a severe depletion of the region's livestock population. The FAO has assessed the possibility of rehabilitating the previously existing veterinary infrastructure in Mudug, but the agency has few resources. In the short and medium term, top priority should be given to rebuilding the veterinary infrastructure. Given the importance of livestock in Mudug and other regions of Somalia, long-term plans should include provisions for rangeland development, aimed at providing adequate water and supplementary fodder crops.

The public health infrastructure of Galgadud has never been much developed and the region remains isolated. In Mudug, the deep decline of the sole regional hospital in Galcayo is symptomatic of the total breakdown of that region's health system. In spite of UNICEF's considerable efforts, the shortage of potable water in and around Galcayo poses a serious risk for the urban dwellers. Infant dehydration, malaria, pulmonary diseases, anaemia among pregnant women, and gastro-intestinal diseases, proliferate.

Koranic schools are the main educational vehicles in both regions. Mudug has few formal primary schools, and many are in need of reconstruction. The only secondary school was destroyed in the civil war. School materials are in extremely short supply. Teachers are commonly paid through unsustainable food-for-work programs operated by WFP. The regions' limited infrastructure makes relief operations among target groups extremely difficult to carry out. The IDP population is insignificant in both regions.

Somali Women's Concern, an extremely effective NGO and a frequent collaborator with UNICEF, is headquartered in Galcayo. It provides potable water, private non-koranic schools, orphanages, women's education, small-income producing projects, and even a library. Their efforts should be supported in any way possible.

#### **HIRAN**

Hiran suffers from many of the same humanitarian problems experienced by the rest of the North and the North-East. When Belet Weyne, the regional capital, and a center for the Hawadle sub-clan, was overrun by the Haber Gedir in the summer of 1994, the regional UNOSOM office was forced to evacuate along with members of the Zimbabwean contingent, at least one of whom was executed by the invading Haber Gedir while the rest were robbed and stripped to their underwear. In the wake of this, international efforts in the region were interrupted, and the flow of information dried up. Despite the unstable security situation, some agencies, including IMC and SCF-UK, did return to the region. It is estimated that a relatively large number of IDPs, currently huddling in the Middle Shabelle, Mogadishu, and Bakool, come from Hiran and would like to return.

#### **MIDDLE SHABELLE**

Middle Shabelle is doing relatively better than many other regions. Working in relative harmony, the factions have invited a broad spectrum of international organizations to work in the region, and by and large they do so with good results. The region has, for the most part, adequate supplies of water for both human and animal consumption. The health infrastructure is also relatively well taken care of with several NGOs operating two well-run hospitals and several clinics. Medical problems such as malaria, respiratory diseases and diarrhea are not uncommon, but are not of epidemic proportions. This situation, however, may only be sustainable as long as the many NGOs remain, or until the Somalis themselves resolve their political situation and produce sufficient income to take the programs over.

The region's main income comes from agriculture, both rain-fed and irrigated, from livestock, and from some fishing. Flooding frequently devastates many of the fields around the Shabelle river. Vital parts of the flood control systems that were originally built to control the flow of water during the rains were looted during the civil war, resulting in extensive flooding as late as 1994. Top priority should be given to the repair of these

dams. Lacking seed and inputs, and with machinery, equipment and storage facilities destroyed or looted, too much of the rich land lies fallow. In the absence of veterinary facilities and drugs, livestock mortality is high and the productivity of the surviving animals frequently low. Formal schools were looted and are run on shoestrings, with NGOs providing some help and the WFP paying the teachers under food-for-work programs. Meanwhile, koranic schools are fast becoming the choice of most parents.

#### **LOWER SHABELLE**

Just about the richest agricultural region in Somalia, Lower Shabelle shares many production and transportation constraints with Middle Shabelle. Here, too, flooding is a critical problem, and priorities should be given to dam repairs, canal rehabilitation, pest control measures, and the renovation of water wells and reservoirs, both for human and animal use. Even with considerable acreage under flood water, the region produces great quantities of food, sufficient, under normal conditions, to guard against both hunger and malnutrition. Banana exports, which have traditionally been an important income producing activity both here and in the Juba Valley to the south, have encountered steep declines due to security problems at the country's two main ports in Mogadishu and Kismayo.

As in many other parts of Somalia, livestock breeding, another important income producing activity, is severely constrained due to lack of veterinary services and drugs. Fishing, poultry, sugar, tanning, and other industries have suffered severely from the effects of the civil war, with equipment and facilities looted and destroyed. Currently, cooperative industries, most of which are run by women's organizations, have become an important source of income for many women. Construction, energy, and infrastructure sectors are crying out for attention and unused skilled labor are plentiful. In all, Lower Shabelle has a rich and varied economy, which, under normal circumstances acts as a locomotive for the rest of the country.

Many of the region's public health problems are associated with water. The Shabelle River is an excellent breeding ground for vectors carrying the parasite responsible for malaria. Cholera, diarrhea, dysentery, typhoid, and eye and skin diseases are common. UNICEF, with several NGOs, run a variety of health programs to combat these serious public health problems. Their efforts, including the immunization of vulnerable groups, should be augmented.

Education faces the same problems as in the rest of the country — destroyed

facilities and lack of teaching aids. Teachers are paid through unsustainable WFP food-for-work programs. UNICEF, and UNESCO, with its limited resources, do what they can to remedy the shortages by training principals and teachers, and rebuilding shattered facilities. With the entire sector on a life support system, both agencies actively support the flourishing koranic school system.

The number of IDPs in Lower Shabelle is estimated at around 60-70,000. The return, as soon as feasible, of these people should be a priority, since the fluctuating security situation only intermittently allows IDPs to return to their homes. Their presence is not only painful to the camp population, but also causes political instability. The International Organization on Migration, or IOM, should be provided with additional resources to assist private organizations in this very difficult, and, from a security perspective, highly volatile task.

#### **LOWER AND MIDDLE JUBA**

Along with the Lower Shabelle and Gedo, much of the Juba regions constitute the bread basket of Somalia. More than half the population of the Juba regions are nomads. The livestock sector, second on the scale of economic activities after agriculture, is deeply troubled, with the oxen population at less than half the pre-war levels. Veterinary care and supplies of animal drugs are virtually non-existent. There are widespread shortages of seed, fertilizer, and tools. The effects of the civil war have left many productive areas, including industrial and irrigation facilities, destroyed or looted. Exceptions are the airport and a crucial deep-water port at Kismayo, both of which are likely to be the subject of future clan fighting. The widespread lack of potable water has produced a predictable circle of health related problems.

One of the short-term, if unsustainable, benefits, of UNOSOM was the medical services and hospitals run by the military contingents in many parts of Somalia. In the wake of their withdrawal, health care availability will drop significantly. It is not clear what combination of organizations, if any, will take their place, but MSF, the Somalia Red Crescent, UNICEF, IRC, and others cannot be expected to fill their shoes.

With formal education decimated, the Juba regions too have seen a proliferation of koranic schools.

The IDP and refugee problems in the regions are significant, and the organizations working in the area should be encouraged to continue, and

improve, their work to alleviate the problems. Again, the IOM should be given the resources to address the problem in collaboration with the UNHCR and NGOs. Many of the IDP camps are filthy, overcrowded, and a repository for disease. Voluntary self-repatriation schemes must be encouraged and assisted.

#### **BAKOOL**

The thinly populated region of Bakool is largely nomadic, with humanitarian requirements common to many poor pastoral regions in Africa. Traditionally neglected, the region only has two doctors, and no veterinary services. Hoddur, the regional capital, also has a relatively large number of orphanages, and a fluctuating IDP population, with its share of children requiring supplementary feeding. There is little international presence in the region. WFP operates food-for-work programs among farmers and teachers, and UNICEF's national staff provides some health services. The elders of Bakool understand that the relative isolation of the region in part is related to their inability to produce the assassin of a MDM-Greece administrator in March 1994. Nevertheless, international organizations are welcome to the region, which generally is considered calm and stable. Humanitarian priorities run the gamut from health services for women and children, support of formal and koranic schools, seeds, tools and agricultural inputs, veterinary drugs, safe water, and the improvement of roads, particularly the road to Baidoa, the most important trading link.

#### **GEDO**

Located on the Juba River, Bardera, the regional capital of Gedo, has traditionally received considerable international attention. Despite periodic and intense harassment, the terrible plight of the population in the wake of the civil war only increased NGO activities in the region.

Before leaving the region due to security problems late in 1994, the International Rescue Committee, or the IRC, which has a long history in Somalia, described the health care situation as "teetering on the brink of collapse." Most prominent among the diseases are anaemia, diarrhea, and worm diseases. TB, malaria, and pneumonia are endemic. Along with the IRC, several other NGOs, many of which helped to run the health care system, have also left, victims of a deteriorating security situation. As a result, there are few adequately staffed health facilities and a considerable shortage of medicines, particularly in Belet Hawa and El Wak. Immunization campaigns are said to

be urgently due.

Agriculture, both irrigated and rain-fed, is the most important income producing activity in the region, which has always been among Somalia's poorest. Wind and water erosion wash away much top-soil, and the region lacks seeds, inputs, and traditional farm tools. The decline of livestock populations might well be reversed given sufficient quantities of drugs and vaccination programs. Nevertheless, recent nutritional screenings indicate that serious malnutrition is mainly a problem in the IDP camps, which houses a population of around 50,000 people. Feeding centers for IDP children are urgently required.

Gedo, the home region of Siad Barre, was badly hit during the most intense fighting of the civil war and the housing infrastructure suffered badly. Looting was, and continues, to be widespread. Assuming a more stable security situation, the rehabilitation of public and private buildings, including storage facilities, as well as bridges and roads should be given priority. The extent to which the construction and rehabilitation of temporary shelters is appropriate should be addressed on a case-by-case basis, but with the refugee and IDP agencies having to cope with returnees, such shelters are certainly in demand. As a major provider of valuable survival and relief commodities, WFP has suffered considerably from the difficult security situation, and their presence is often interrupted. As always when WFP is forced to leave, a myriad of unsustainable food-for-work programs are affected, forcing the suspension of much of the areas' economic and social activity, including programs paying health workers and teachers. Several agencies and NGOs have tried to bring some sense to the secular educational system, which, even before the civil war was in shambles. Many school buildings have been rebuilt with the help of the international community, but in one of the peculiarities of Somali society, many are being kept locked and unavailable at the order of the local militias. Not surprisingly, koranic schools, supported by UNESCO and UNICEF, are growing in all the towns, villages, and IDP camps.

## **BAY**

Bay region has a tremendous agricultural activity. 1994 has seen bumper crops, and self-generated seed supplies are fairly abundant. So is the population of camel, goats, and cattle. The Bay livestock markets are very active and serve as a magnet for Somalis everywhere. The people of Bay have long experience in livestock and livestock health, but drug supplies are low.

Health services are well developed by Somali standards and, with the exception of periodic outbreaks of typhoid and TB, malaria is the single greatest health threat. Additional support for immunization, mother and children health programs, and additional supplies to community health workers and traditional birth attendants are all needed. Bay has relatively modest IDP populations, but where they exist, supplementary feeding of children remains a priority. UNICEF and the NGOs operate well-digging programs, but their sustainability is uncertain given the lack of fee-based systems to pay for maintenance. Now that the Indian Contingent has left Baidoa and taken its hospital with it, the remaining hospital in Baidoa, and the town's pharmacies are without sufficient external support.

UNESCO, and several large NGOs, have helped to re-build schools, train teachers, and provide educational aids.

The security situation in the region is described as being fairly stable, no doubt fueling the relative prosperity seen in the region. The civil war caused much destruction of infrastructure, and a long-term development goal must be to assist the communities in their efforts to rebuild public buildings and roads.

The civil war and the accompanying famine probably hit the Bay region harder than any other region in Somalia. As a result, it has also attracted the most international attention, with a profusion of UN agencies and NGOs now running just about every social sector. This high level of international intervention, however, is not sustainable, and any additional international presence should focus on the creation of programs providing sustainable economic activity and employment.

## **MOGADISHU NORTH AND SOUTH**

It is hard to predict what will happen to Mogadishu. Tensions runs high, fighting is frequent, and lawless elements roam the streets. International humanitarian assistance is difficult to deliver under such circumstances. In general, though, the tension in North Mogadishu is less than in the South. Large parts of Mogadishu, particularly in the areas around the Green Line separating the turfs of General Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi, lie in ruins reminiscent of Berlin in 1945. Factories, warehouses, power plants and lines have been looted. There is only a partial water distribution system, and no telephone, except for mobile ones proliferating among the city's business community. The crucial sea and airports, having been refurbished by the UN, may well be held hostage by looters and battling militias now that

UNOSOM has left. This is a tragedy, not only for Mogadishu, but for many other parts of Somalia which rely on the seaport, in particular, for their economic activity. A great many public and private buildings have either collapsed, requiring a massive rebuilding campaign, or are housing a sprawling IDP population of 200,000 or more, most of whom either must be relocated if they wish, or be found housing and economic opportunities. Many IDPs, including women and children, also live in camps, suffering malnutrition and disease from lack of potable water, medical care, and acceptable hygienic standards. Any humanitarian priority in Mogadishu, north or south, must include programs to reduce the sufferings of IDPs, particularly the children.

North Mogadishu has ten hospitals, perhaps the most well-run being Keysaney, a former prison with a hundred-bed plus surgical facility. Established by the ICRC and administered by the Somali Red Crescent Society, Keysaney, like most other hospitals in Somalia, experiences severe shortages of blood products, since Somalis generally refuse to donate blood to strangers. Other hospitals, in both parts of Mogadishu, are badly equipped and understaffed. Held together by WFP food-for-work programs and receiving direct support from UNOSOM, it is questionable what will happen to many of them once the UN leaves. Several NGOs will probably continue to operate mobile health clinics, visiting orphanages and IDP camps. In general, though, Mogadishu will suffer a grave setback when UNOSOM and its military contingents leave, taking with them their hospitals, staff, and drug supplies. The remaining medical services are not nearly sufficient for the city's approximately 500,000 people.

Employment generating activities are critically needed, particularly in the wake of UNOSOM's withdrawal. Supported by WFP's food-for-work programs, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNESCO stitched together a formal primary educational system, including curriculum development and textbooks. The many qualified teachers and principals available in Mogadishu worked heroically under this plan. With the UN gone, it is prudent to consider how such programs can continue to be supported in the future. In the meantime, the support of koranic schools should be encouraged.

Since no one can quite predict what the shake-out of the UN's departure will produce, Mogadishu is a wild-card. But one cannot, as many wish,

ignore Mogadishu and withdraw to the other regions. As many international staff continue to leave the city, reliable national organizations, such as the Somali Red Crescent, will continue to require staunch support.

## Conclusions and recommendations

Somalia has a plethora of critical needs. By far the most important is to provide employment to the tens of thousand Somalis who are desperate for legitimate ways in which to make a living; without it, any humanitarian intervention will be unsustainable. In the aftermath of the civil war, large numbers of former militia are roaming the countryside, the towns, and the cities. Much of the lawfulness encountered in Mogadishu, for example, is directly related to unemployed, armed militia who kidnap, loot, and terrify everyone, including the civilian population.

In the rural areas, investments should focus on livestock and agriculture, traditional income generating sectors. In the livestock sector, attention should be paid to the rehabilitation of veterinary services and the supply of drugs, a system of animal health certification, rangeland improvements, and such related economic activities as abattoirs, meat processing facilities, tanneries, and export facilities. The trade and export of livestock and livestock products were once critical to Somalia's economy, and the considerable sectoral expertise should be encouraged. In the agricultural sector, the focus should be on the provision of simple tools and inputs, including seeds, and the rehabilitation of flood control, storage and marketing systems. When security permits it, agricultural areas blossom. This trend should be encouraged.

In the urban areas, particularly in Mogadishu, humanitarian and income generating efforts continue to be severely complicated by the intransigence of the political factions and well-armed criminal elements. When, in spite of these formidable obstacles, support is possible, it should focus on the rehabilitation of small and medium-sized industrial and infrastructure facilities. However, such support must be provided through partnerships in which the operators, whether through fee-based systems or other modalities, assume the responsibility for the sustainable operation of these undertakings.

No long-term development can function in a society plagued by excessive levels of disease and malnutrition. In looking at Somalia on a region-by-region basis, a picture of priorities for action emerge, including the reduction of disease related to unsafe safe water, as well as the elimination of childhood



diseases through immunization campaigns. Organizations already supporting such programs should be encouraged to continue this work in an effort to rebuild the national capacity. UNICEF has built an enviable nationwide network of local staff, both in Somalia proper and inside the regions known as the Republic of Somaliland. When security concerns cause the international staff of many organizations to temporarily or permanently relocate, UNICEF's local staff remain working. Eager to continue its health and education related work in the country, their activities should be supported unstintingly. The same can be said about the Somali Red Crescent.

A country is only as productive as its investments in education. Somalia has traditionally not invested much in this sector, but in the anticipation of a different, brighter, future, the patchwork of educational support which is currently being carried out inside Somalia should be strengthened. Whether or not formal, secular education is on a collision course with the sharp increase in the number of koranic schools is debatable. My own feeling is that there is no particular connection between the fundamentalist revival in some parts of Somalia and the increase of koranic schools which are mostly expanding as a result of the parents' desire both to provide education and to impose a certain degree of discipline in a country where discipline often seems a forgotten virtue.

Finally, the International Organization on Migration, together with the UNHCR, must be provided with the resources to address Somalia's very serious displaced persons and refugee problems. The immense logistical challenges inherent in the voluntary resettlement of hundreds of thousands of potentially productive citizens should not be underrated. The issue goes to the very heart of Somalia's rehabilitation; unless the IDP and refugee populations, too many of whom are children, are liberated from their festering camps or shattered ruins of public buildings, Somalia may never escape her dependency on the foreign community.

This paper has placed a strong emphasis on the rebuilding of Somalia's productive sectors. However, such a restoration can never be accomplished unless the pools of existing Somali human resources are harnessed. Today, thousands of Somali civil servants, doctors, teachers, and other critical elements of the Somali professional ranks are scattered about, working abroad, or eking out a living inside Somalia. I often thought it was the UN's greatest shame that it did little, if anything, to plan for their reintegration. While professors

and medical doctors of Somali nationality swept UNOSOM's floors, highly trained statisticians and other civil servants, many with advanced degrees from some of the greatest universities in the world, acted as low-ranking interpreters and clerks, one step away from the pink slip. Men and women alike were mistrusted, ignored, and humiliated by a fearful UN whose obsession with security became an end to itself. In the future, agencies and NGOs wishing to work in Somalia must, security concerns notwithstanding, make serious efforts to put trained Somalis into responsible, indeed leading, positions.

## Panel commentaries Session II:

### *Amb. Mohamed M. Sahnoun:*

The presentation from Mr. Sam Engelstad has been a comprehensive one and it reflected in a sense the kinds of dilemmas with which the humanitarian organisations, NGOs and agencies, are confronted with. The dilemmas are, as he himself introduced them, first of all related to the question of security. To some extent we discussed this topic yesterday, but we might have to look at it a little further. We should not be totally pessimistic, although I agree it is very difficult not to be in the Somali context. Yesterday I also expressed some hopes, and somebody in the audience told me later that I was an incurable optimist. To some extent this is true, although when I am with myself I have my own doubts.

How can we create a relatively secure environment? We are not proposing that we can resolve the problems of security. With two billion dollars and thirty thousand strong army, the UN has not been able to resolve that problem. In fact, if it has done anything, it has probably compounded the security problem. The security environment with which we are dealing today is probably much worse than the one I had to deal with when I was in Somalia. I always give this example which, I think, illustrates my point: In the almost eight months between my arrival in Somalia in March and my departure in October, not a single expatriate lost his/her life in Somalia. When you look at the situation much later, you see how many people, including the UN peace keepers and so on, who died in Somalia. The situation was worse then, particularly in relation to the terrible tragedy and chaos caused by the famine. At the same time somehow we were able to bring some stability into the situation by working with the people and by being catalysts. We tried to improve the security issues with modest means, we tried to make the Somalis themselves responsible. We had fifty unarmed military officers. They arrived in Mogadishu in May/June 1992 to monitor the cease-fire agreement between north and south Mogadishu. They did not do much of that because people were crossing along the dividing line all the time. There were problems sometimes and they went and tried to resolve them. But we used them for many other things. They were used to escort convoys going from the port of Mogadishu to the north of Mogadishu. They were used as catalysts and facilitators for resolving inter-clan disputes in Mogadishu. These unarmed officers had done a fantastic job, although many people had already forgotten them.

I would also like to underline the fact that we are dealing with many complex legacies in the Horn of Africa, and I want to broaden the discussion in order to place the security issue in a proper historical perspective. Among the serious legacies in the Horn of Africa is the widespread degradation of the environment, maybe worse than any other part of Africa. It is a region which is prone to successive droughts and soil erosion. It is a harsh area without much resources. As I said yesterday, I was recently in a mediation exercise in the Congo, and I mentioned that Central Africa, Congo in particular, has much more resources than the Horn of Africa. So we have to realise that the question of resources has far-reaching implications for peace.

The second legacy concerns the colonial history. The colonial legacy in Somalia has been quite complicated. The main point is not whether the claims of the Somalis for Greater Somalia are justified or not. This is in a sense irrelevant. The important point is that the colonial legacy in Somalia was much more complicated than in any other part of Africa, causing protracted conflicts and instability in the region. For that we also have to pay the bill.

The third legacy is the cold war legacy. Maybe more than any other region of Africa, the Horn of Africa was an area where the big powers fought each other fiercely and for a long time. The biggest station the Americans had had in Africa, probably the only one, was Kagnew Station in Asmara. Ethiopia was a very important political and strategical base for the Americans during the cold war era. Then the Soviets came in and established a base in Berbera. The cold war politics has allowed the super powers to exploit and manipulate the deep-seated sentiments and disputes in this region for their own end.

The fourth and final legacy relates to the timing of the UN intervention in Somalia. The UN came very late. It was too late to provide effective, life-saving assistance to the Somali people. We knew that Somalia was without a government for a long time. It was well known that the Somali society was steeped in a bloody civil war and that the economy of the country had collapsed completely. Yet the UN and the international community decided to intervene only in January 1992. We are now paying for that error of judgement.

With regard to security we must ask: how can we deal with security? How can humanitarian organisations tackle the issue of security? I think it is an illusion to believe that humanitarian organisations can be totally neutral. We should try to be neutral, of course. One should always try to be neutral. But the truth of the matter is that in dealing with a complex emergency, humanitarian organisations become overwhelmed by the sheer immensity of the needs that require urgent attention. Nevertheless, there are different ways

in which you can use your potential. As I have said before, you can be a catalyst, a facilitator who is available and accessible to the people. What is important is to be able to show the people that you are not coming to impose a solution for security, but you are there to help them talk to each other, and to provide a framework in which they can meet, and discuss and exchange views and experiences. I think people would appreciate this kind of approach. As you know, many Somalis have become suspicious and mistrustful of the UN. They felt that there was a hidden agenda. Probably there was no hidden agenda, but that was the perception of the local people. The problem was that the UN's approach created a feeling of suspicion and mistrust among many Somalis. I think we can do better. We can create an environment that promotes trust and co-operation with the local people. We can achieve this if we are more discreet, less spectacular, and less preoccupied with quick-fix solutions. With this approach we can enhance what I call the stabilisation factors.

But what are the stabilisation factors? First of all, I think it is useful to think in terms of the stabilisation of the regions. We should aim at stabilising the whole of Somalia at once. Stabilisation should be seen as a gradual, step-by-step process, in other words, a long-term objective. There are regions which offer better opportunities for stabilisation. Let us start with these areas, let us help the people who have managed to establish a semblance of peace and security. Let us focus on making this regional approach a model for the other regions in Somalia. That means we have to help the social groups such as women who are working, give them the means they need to do things to stabilise the situation. We can sometimes even work through them to enable them to create local NGOs so that they can also enhance their own power. Work with the merchants. When I was there, I tried to promote the idea that some of the relief assistance should be discussed with the merchants. I suggested that a percentage of the humanitarian assistance should be channelled through the merchants, that it should be sold to them so they can themselves promote a local market. This was not done. It was rejected. What happened was that the merchants largely paid looters to go and loot the goods for them. Then they easily put the looted food items in the market and made huge profits. That was the deal, and we knew about it. It was possible to break that vicious circle, but that was not done.

I think we should help build local NGOs, and there are many people who are willing to participate in the process. It is of course not going to be a flawless process. There are many defects and many shortcomings. There might even be corruption. The international NGOs themselves have many problems and

inadequacies. You can not expect to achieve complete operational precision, transparency and accountability overnight. Nevertheless, we should make every effort to build the local NGOs and enhance their capacity.

How can we go about the continuation of the relief work? There are many people who still need help, and not necessarily always in the areas where we have been working in. There are internally displaced people in Bosaso and in Garowe and in other areas, and they received very little assistance for a long time. I think we should pay attention to the provinces that have so far received little or no aid. This would enhance the stabilisation process. The returning of refugees, the victims of the civil war, the children in particular, the people who have suffered from landmines also need help of course. I think most people would welcome and appreciate this kind of work.

The fourth is the rehabilitation and reconstruction. I think someone has really described the various problems that are there, among them the need to help the farmer communities with tools and seeds. Have some of the UN agencies who provide logistics to the NGOs working in the field involved themselves more in that area? I remember that one of the big problems we had in 1992 was the little involvement of the big UN agencies in these areas, FAO, WHO and so on. And I was not the only one who made this observation. One of the reasons why I left was because I was outspoken on this issue. People who came and visited Somalia at the time saw that. In fact Douglas Hurd made a press conference after he came back to Nairobi, and really blasted some of these agencies. He did not name the agencies as I did, but he criticised them severely, because he saw that in the different health centres basic medication and basic medical tools were not available at all, and people really had to struggle to try to cope with the situation. We should therefore urge the big UN agencies to get more involved, despite the complete withdrawal of the UN forces. I do not want to discuss the armed intervention here, but I would like to say that UNOSOM's departure might turn out to be a blessing.

When aid resumes again, we should give the utmost priority to the livestock sector. We should help the cattle raisers, provide them with veterinary services and enable them to slowly resume livestock export. I think we should also target assistance to the minority farmers, they are very poor people and have suffered immensely as a result of the civil war. We should therefore try to focus on that and also focus on community development programmes. Where they have vested interest, the elders can sometimes be helpful in the stabilisation process.

Finally, it is important to encourage former government officials and civil servants to participate in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. They can play a fundamental role in the reconstruction of important sectors including education, health, water resources and overall infrastructure. Some of these professionals are in exile and some are living in the refugee camps in neighbouring countries. It is crucial that we locate them and make them an integral part of their country's reconstruction.

***Mr. Erling Dessau:***

In 1993 I sat far away in India, and, of course, followed Ambassador Sahnoun closely, as special representative, and his many problems, and what happened since. The following year I got a phone call from the UNDP administrator from Addis Ababa. That was during the December 1993 conference, and Somalia was very high on the agenda. There was some hope and scope for peace and reconciliation. The country had to be rebuilt. I was asked whether I would like to take charge of the UNDP office in Somalia. And not knowing much about it I jumped on it. I went around to the capitals, Washington D.C. and London and elsewhere, and everywhere I was well received. I was told that Somalia was highest on the world agenda, and money was certainly no problem. If I could do a good job I would get all the money I would be asking for. I was told to just go ahead and do the job. Nobody told me how to do it, but anyway, I tried. I realise now after fifteen months that perhaps I am a little bit more clever.

Probably Somalia will gradually disappear totally from the world. Last week we had a special media event with the final withdrawal, but I am sure that in a few weeks time people would not even remember where on the map Somalia is. But of course, some of us will be left behind and will try to do what we can for Somalia. I have listened very attentively to Sam and also to Ambassador Sahnoun on what to do and where do we go from here. I also listened yesterday to Professor Lewis saying involve the Somalis, do it with the Somalis, and I think we have to realise that there has to be a Somali solution to the problems of Somalia. Where do we go from here, how do we help to rebuild this shattered economy, this destroyed country, and how do we prevent Somalia from sliding back into emergency and starvation? That is where we stand now. I think many of you here in this room have shared responsibility to help the Somalis, but again with the underlying principle that it has to be a Somali solution, with the Somali people deciding their own priorities. As Sam has said in his paper, the economy is reasonably good at

this very moment. The crops have been satisfactory. Food is still imported both commercially, which is good, and through food aid schemes. The World Food Programme (WFP) is now buying some of the surplus crops in Somalia in order not to disrupt the market. I think we are economically at a very important juncture, and perhaps the prospects for political reconciliation and economic recovery in Somalia are beginning to look good.

What are the conditions? When the UN agencies met last October in Nairobi, and also with the NGOs, and the international donor community, we reconfirmed that our intention to continue work in Somalia as most of the UN agencies have done for thirty, forty years, that after UNOSOM we will take up the task of helping Somalia in our more or less traditional manner. The main issue, as Ambassador Sahnoun has brought up, is the security. How do we work in Somalia? For that reason we have first and foremost tried to convey the message across the country to all the leaders, whether those are the elders or the faction leaders or political leaders, that we are in their hands, we are their guests. They have to look after us, they have to live up to international standards of how we can operate in the country. The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body, SACB, has recently endorsed the so-called "code of conduct", which is a guideline which has been circulated to all donors and the NGOs, and is now being distributed in Somalia. I believe that we should go around now and tell the leaders in Somalia that we look forward to continue our collaboration, but you have to follow certain basic rules, which first and foremost provide us with security. Sam also referred to the high cost of security and suggested that it is probably better to be protected by the local community. Of course we do not mind paying something if we have a guard at our buildings or to look after us, but it has to be a reasonable amount. We do not want to use technicals, we have made this point very clear. We have said that we want to bring, if necessary, our own vehicles etc. We want to operate in a normal way. This is easier said than done, but I have realised in my modest contact with Somalis throughout the country that it is possible.

We now operate in fourteen areas in Somalia outside Mogadishu. The international community as you know withdrew last week from Mogadishu, but we are able to continue our activities in many parts of the country, and amazingly has been quite calm. All the prophecies that there would be a disaster and factional fighting would restart when UNOSOM disappears from the scene, have not materialised, fortunately. There has been fighting here and there, like in north-western Somalia, in November and December, which now seems to be settled to some extent. We are very pleased that we can continue

working in Somalia. We are back in Kismayu, and we will go back to Mogadishu in a few weeks time depending on the findings of the security assessment mission currently underway in the capital. If conditions permit, we will certainly make a special effort to return there.

We are, of course, up against many practical issues. It is a very costly operation as Sam Engelstad highlighted. In a country where there is no communication of any kind, no air services, everything has to be provided at a very high cost, plus the security, if we are going to pay for that still. That is something we have to look into.

We are now working on a reconstruction plan for Somalia, and I will certainly take into account many of the ideas which have been included in Sam Engelstad's paper, and that will help us. We will go around in the country, I will start in a few weeks time meeting with Somali leaders, starting in Baidoa in early April and onwards, and then discussing their own future, and then say we are here, we do not have much means but we would like to help you and if you tell us what your priorities are, we would like to discuss what perhaps the international community can do.

In order to respond to that we have formed something called the UN Co-ordination Team, which I chair. All of the UN agencies are members, we have had the most extraordinary good co-operation in the UN system, for the past four, five months. It has been excellent in all respects, we meet almost every day on specific issues, and once a week, under my chairmanship, we meet and discuss all the important operational and practical matters. We also have close contact with the NGOs, there is a regular meeting with the NGOs where people from the UN attend, we discuss matters, we invite the NGO consortium to come to some of our meetings. We had them the other day. And we have the international donor community representatives through SACB, where the UN agencies and the NGOs also are members. I think we now are on the right footing in terms of bringing all the parties together and discussing matters. I am working very hard with all of my colleagues from the international and national bodies to try to strengthen even further this kind of co-operation.

I would just bring up a couple of critical issues. The airport and seaport in Mogadishu have been the subject of a lot of discussion. We advised the faction leaders, Aydeed and Ali Mahdi, that we could leave some equipment behind and keep the airport and seaport functional, if they could agree on a management. It took them considerable time, and only last Sunday, three days before the final withdrawal, did they come up with a committee of twenty-six people, I think, which then met with the special representative. Now we are going to

meet the chairman and some of the members of this committee in Nairobi next week. We will see how well the committee can function. The equipment in the meantime has been shipped out of Mogadishu, but marked for return, and the UNDP will look after it, so we hope that if the administration of the airport and seaport materialise, we can bring it back and re-establish the functioning of the airport and seaport.

We are planning to pay more attention to the areas outside Mogadishu. Sam Engelstad also emphasised this point. I think it is important that this hang-up on Mogadishu should not continue. Mogadishu is an important place but certainly not the only important place in Somalia, and I am working as hard as I can to ensure that we strengthen our activities outside Mogadishu.

Ambassador Sahnoun mentioned governance and strengthening of public administration. This is a very critical area. We have established something called UN Development Office which is an offspring of the Addis Ababa Conference in December. It has now been put into operation as a UNDP programme, jointly with the international donor community SACB. We have been a bit slow in putting it on the right track, but we hope that from now it will be able to function, and to build up the basic planning structures for Somalia, including regional profiles etc.

We are working on education together with UNICEF and UNESCO. On employment issues, the biggest next to education, which is an area that has to be addressed, goes hand-in-hand with what we call demobilisation. We have had some activities and we are launching within the next few weeks the major demobilisation programme, but of course that has to go with economic activities, and employment of the militias, and how do we get them back to gainful employment. It is not so easy as when you read the document, but at least we are trying it.

We have a very successful ongoing rural rehabilitation programme, mainly in the northern part, the north-west and north-east, and the Middle Shabelle area, we have more than two hundred community based programmes going at this very moment. We ask the local people to identify the highest priority, then give them a little funding, give them a little technical advice but let them do it on their own, with us backing them up. That seems to be functioning, it has been highly appreciated. Fisheries and agricultural development in Lower Juba is among the areas where we have some activities going on. The return of the IDPs and refugees is a major issue. You know perhaps that President Moi has announced that all refugees must leave Kenya immediately. This will affect some two hundred thousand Somali refugees. This issue is being

discussed with the Kenyan authorities. It is hoped that the President's decree would not be implemented immediately. But still bringing all the refugees back is not an easy task. UNHCR, as you know, has begun repatriating several thousand refugees to Kismayu and Berbera. This has been going on for several months, it goes on but of course the pace is a little bit slow.

We agree fully with Ambassador Sahnoun on getting the Somalis involved. We have a programme which is called TOKTEN, which I think you are familiar with. TOKTEN is a new initiative aimed at bringing back expatriate nationals to support their own economy. We hope that we can bring back some of the excellent Somalis who live abroad and let them be part of the development of the country. There has been some tension around that, because the Somalis in Somalia do not always like the people who have created a better living abroad. Therefore we have to think about how to tackle this problem. And when we bring them back to the country, where do we place them? Again the question of clans, who belongs to what clan, becomes an issue. It is not so easy, but it is an area where we can perhaps work something out.

In essence we are a bit optimistic about the future, we think there is scope for development and bringing further the so-called continuum from relief to rehabilitation, and reconstruction. You can see it in Baidoa, you can see it to some extent in Hargeisa where roofs are coming on the houses. One of our immediate objectives is to start upgrading the Berbera harbour sometime next week following the meeting in Djibouti. We hope to do something for that particular area. There is considerable international interest in supporting this region. We have a problem with the north-west (Somaliland), because President Egal insists, since he has been victorious the past few months, that he wants international recognition. But this is an issue which is not so easy to settle. I am sure that the very good collaboration we have had so far with his administration will continue, even if that issue perhaps can be side-tracked a little for the time being.

We will help, as has been said, as catalysts. Funds are very short, there is no money around at this stage, each dollar has tripled its value. In the meantime we are trying to at least help the Somalis to help themselves, and I think this is the basic message and I think there is scope for doing it. I am quite optimistic. We also hope that Mogadishu will not fall back into fighting, it is still too early to predict what would happen, because it has only been five or six days since the last UNOSOM left, but there is some hope that it may not happen.

### *Mr. Alard du Bois-Reymond:*

I would like to take up some of the critical remarks of Mr. Engelstad and also some of the remarks of Ambassador Sahnoun. I feel very much concerned by the critics on food aid because it was at the time in 1991 and 1992 when it was mainly the NGO community and the Red Cross movement which was active in Somalia. It was in fact the Somali Red Crescent together with the ICRC who decided to embark on a massive and large-scale food assistance programme. I think this kind of food assistance has attracted a lot of criticism, particularly in relation to the negative effects that food aid can have on the recipients and on local economic structures. I also feel that assistance has been very much focused on food aid only and has neglected other sectors like medical assistance, rehabilitation of economic assets and the like.

I share to a large extent this criticism, and I feel it is justified to a large extent. I also feel that, as humanitarian organisations, we have to understand that we can learn valuable lessons from this criticism. However, we should not forget that this massive food assistance, which has been built up by the Red Cross movement, and which amounted to sixteen thousand metric tons per month in 1992 and reached some one point five million beneficiaries, was in the end a success story. In spite of all the negative effects which it might have had, I feel that in the end it enabled us to stabilise the famine situation and to bring down the suffering of Somali people. In my view this is a remarkable achievement.

But in a conference like this it is more stimulating to discuss mistakes than to discuss success stories, and to see what lessons we can learn from our mistakes. I think the bulk of the mistakes can be attributed to what Professor Lewis yesterday referred to as 'lack of professionalism' among many humanitarian organisations. I feel this is at the very centre of the problems that we have. I am somewhat less concerned with the fact that there are a lot of young, arrogant people running around in Somalia during huge relief operations. This is a problem of course, but to a certain extent it is a problem that is difficult to avoid. When you start a large operation from zero and on short notice, you can not expect all your field workers to be highly qualified and experienced people. Most emergency operations have a core group with sufficient training and experience in relief and development activities. This core group can guide and supervise the less experienced members of the staff, and can execute the whole operation fairly smoothly.

However, I feel that what we in a situation like Somalia are lacking is an understanding of the local situation. We often have a very rough and primi-

tive idea of how the local society might function, how the local economic structures are built. I think it is important for us to understand and appreciate how the local structures operate and how local coping mechanisms function.

A further lesson for me is that organisations have an approach in humanitarian aid which is often not adapted to the local complex. I would like to take two examples of mistakes of the ICRC, which might serve as examples for what lessons humanitarian organisations could and should draw from the experience that we have in this massive food assistance.

The first point concerns the identification of needs. That means at what point the humanitarian organisations perceive that there is a problem. This is not as straightforward as it might seem at the moment because perception is something which might vary very much from organisation to organisation. The instruments at our disposal to identify such a situation, are rather rough, I would say. We still rely very much on rough indicators like nutritional situation, mortality. I would like to take a concrete example from the Bakool and Bay region, where mortality rates developed in a surprising and very drastic way. You find this chart in our paper which I think will be distributed at the end of the conference. You can see there that in 1991 mortality rates were still quite acceptable. Excess mortality rate was only around ten or so per ten thousand per month above the normal level. And then by the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992 you see a sky-rocketing of the mortality rates in the Bay and Bakool regions. Within only two or three months, these figures nearly increased by a factor of twenty. By early January 1992 the mortality rate reached hundred and seventy per ten thousand per month. Within an incredibly short period you have a full scale famine which reaches its peak within four months. Of course, if you use this as an indicator for deciding when to intervene, you will soon discover that you are five to six months late. The famine is already there full blown, and as a result the assistance you provide will be of diminished value.

Assessment of the situation of local coping mechanisms, of local economic structures is not straightforward at all. I would like to take an example of another area in the north of Somalia where there was not catastrophe, although all the delegates in the field expected it. It was in 1990 when fighting continued in the north, fighting between the government and SNM, and you had a total disruption of food assistance in this area, food assistance which went to the refugees, and added to this, a lot of displaced people because of the fighting between the SNM and the government. At the moment the food assistance was disrupted we all expected that a major crisis was about to unfold, but it

did not. There was no real famine developing in this area, and I feel the reason for this is that we did not understand what were the local coping mechanisms. How did the Ogaden refugees manage to live reasonably well? What were the local systems of mutual assistance among the displaced people? If we had this understanding we would have been more accurate in our assessment of the situation, and we would not have been alarmed by a catastrophe which existed only in our imagination.

The basic message is that we have to enhance our understanding and knowledge of the local environment and culture. We must be able to accurately judge how and when local communities can or cannot cope with disasters such as famine or civil war. This would hopefully enable us to organise effective and timely humanitarian assistance.

The ICRC has tried to learn from its experiences in 1991 and 1992. As a result ICRC is about to set up a system of monitoring in Somalia which will collect a wide range of socio-economic indicators, with the SRCS offices and ICRC field offices forming the foundation of the system. The principal objective of the system is to assess and continuously monitor the local situation and try to establish some form of early warning regime. Furthermore, we involve qualified experts who understand what is going on and who might give us a clue as to how local communities respond to disaster-like situations and what mechanisms and structures they use to execute their response.

We hope that this monitoring system, which is built up by ICRC field officers through the network of the SRCS officers who are Somali, will enable us to know when crisis-ridden communities need assistance, what kind of assistance they need, and the best way to deliver that assistance.

Humanitarian aid is frequently associated with huge convoys of trucks and giant cargo planes transporting and delivering large quantities of food, medicine and other essential supplies. This approach may be relevant in some emergency situations, particularly in large communities or countries in which everything has virtually collapsed. What happened in Somalia can be a good example. What is often ignored is that small scale, well targeted and focused humanitarian assistance can be just as effective. This approach aims at enhancing the local community's capacity to sustain itself and gives utmost priority to the rehabilitation of the vital economic assets and survival mechanisms of the community. The main point is to ensure that the community does reach a stage from which it cannot go back.

I would like to give you a concrete example of what we have done in this respect. While we were distributing food, we realised that the country's most

important economic asset, livestock, was facing a serious threat, mainly due to lack of basic veterinary care. We therefore embarked on a major vaccination scheme for cattle and other livestock. We vaccinated some two million livestock during this period. But we did not stop there. The ICRC established a veterinary laboratory in the north to treat livestock and to issue health certificates which were essential for exporting livestock.

Such kind of interventions which, if you look at the input, are very much cheaper than any large-scale food assistance, can be remarkably successful, and can even make large-scale food assistance completely unnecessary. It is important to realise that emergency and rehabilitation are inseparably linked. The two go hand in hand. Early and timely rehabilitation helps us avoid a prolonged emergency.

We have learned a lot from our experience in Somalia, particularly in relation to the understanding of the dynamics of the local communities, the identification of needs, and the development of effective, flexible and adaptable intervention strategies. The problem is that we have learned the hard way, which is quite costly. In the future we must try to learn how to do it right without making mistakes.

***Ms. Deborah Saïdy:***

I must confess that I am not in any way an expert on Somalia. In fact, as the Liaison Officer in Geneva responsible for Africa, it is only very recently that I have been involved in Somalia at all, so I feel very humble to be sitting here with this distinguished panel.

I do feel the timing of this meeting is extremely important and I think the significance of it extends even beyond Somalia, because I think that what is very clear is that the set of concerns which Somalia presents us with, is a set of problems which we are confronting today and will confront in the future in other complex emergency situations. As my colleague from the ICRC mentioned, the issue is early warning information and what we do with it. I think the interpretation of that information is fundamentally important. There is sometimes a tendency to look at the technology or the quick fix in terms of how one gathers information, but certainly the interpretation of that information is equally important, and I would say on two different levels. One, we would hope that when there are indicators of a deteriorating situation, effort would immediately get under way if it is a conflict situation, with initiatives of preventive diplomacy as Ambassador Sahnoun was mentioning yesterday with reference to his own efforts in the Congo. This is fundamentally impor-

tant. The theme came up yesterday that we are finding ourselves in more and more situations, I mean the agencies are becoming overwhelmed, the donors are overwhelmed, our capacity collectively to be able to provide assistance is being very much strained by the multiplicity of very serious emergency situations simultaneously. We have got to start thinking how we can take actions at the front end to really try minimising the human toll, the economic toll, and the levels of intervention that will be required. On another level, beyond preventive diplomacy, clearly agencies then have to start looking at operational contingency planning, and as was pointed out just before the break, I think what is critical and indeed very difficult, is to determine both the type of intervention which should be forthcoming and also the timing of that intervention, so as to not make a bad situation worse.

Certainly another issue which Somalia has presented us with and which we are looking at in other parts of the world, is the relationship between the humanitarian, military and political operations. The security of relief workers in Somalia is not a unique situation at all. There is the problem of mobilising resources once a particular emergency falls off the front page and is no longer a lead story on CNN. It is extremely difficult in a situation where there is so many competing interests. Then, of course, the difficulty of how to extricate ourselves from the emergency situation, to really be able to get back on the track to sustainable recovery and development activities which is then a theme that we certainly have been hearing from all these speakers here.

I think the presentation which Sam Engelstad has given is very thorough indeed, and in fact the strength of it is that it acknowledges that the conditions in Somalia are very different from region to region, and that we must adapt our relief interventions accordingly and seek maximum flexibility, as well, I think, from donors in terms of providing their relief assistance. Talking to a number of the UN agencies in situations such as Somalia or Rwanda, it is fundamentally important that to the extent that it is possible, and I know it is difficult because donors are under increasing pressure to earmark their contributions, but to the extent which contributions can be made to individual agencies with a minimum of earmarking, to allow for flexibility, redeployment of resources, for target population for any given situation, it gives the capacity to be able to redeploy and shift gears as necessary based on different changing situations on the ground.

I would like to thank Mr. Dessau for correcting what I think has been a common misperception which has plagued the UN ever since the Security Council voted on 4 November to end the UNOSOM mandate: that is that the



UN was going to abandon Somalia after the departure of UNOSOM. Contrary to the many reports in the media, including one that the United Nations was cutting off the life support system to Somalia, the UN agencies are, as you heard, continuing to carry out relief assistance throughout the country, including Mogadishu, where dedicated professional national staff is continuing to monitor programmes, and trying to ensure that targeted relief assistance is still delivered. But I think that, as other speakers have noted, it is vitally important that without the pro-active support of Somalis themselves, it is unlikely that the humanitarian programmes envisioned for 1995 will meet their objectives. And it is also very likely that even some of the gains that we have achieved in 1994 through the combined efforts of international relief partners and committed Somalis, will be undone.

I will not go into any sort of detail in terms of the UN programme because I think that between the overview which Sam Engelstad has given and certainly Mr. Dessau's comments today, you have a good sense of where we are operating and what we are doing. I think that certainly we have to go back, as Ambassador Sahnoun has mentioned, to look at the context in which the assistance has been provided up until now, and where we go from here. I think that when the UN military contingent first arrived in Somalia, expectations which were perhaps completely unrealistic in retrospect, were that by the end of the military intervention Somalia would have in place some form of national government, that reconstruction and institution building would be high on the agenda, the textbook notion of the continuum would at least be somewhat materialised if not completely concrete. But the political and security realities have meant that little in the way of sustained development has taken place in Somalia, and the challenges in front of us are indeed still great. The humanitarian agencies do expect that for the foreseeable future they will continue to operate in a context of political unrest and against a backdrop of uncertain security. In the absence of national institutions capable of coping even with minor emergencies, this makes Somalia all the more vulnerable to future disasters. Humanitarian relief needs will almost certainly remain visible in the near future, none the less the UN agencies are indeed cautiously optimistic that with the direct support of the Somali people they will be able to assist in terms of moving into some sustainable recovery activities to try to ensure that their country does not flip back into a situation where the emergency needs really dominate all of the funding that is available.

The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs has launched an inter-agency consolidated appeal for Somalia at the beginning of this year

for a six month period in recognition of the fact that situations on the ground would be shifting and there would be a need to reassess what exactly the priority interventions would be. Mr. Dessau has certainly outlined the major initiatives being undertaken through that appeal, and Sam Engelstad has in his paper underscored the need for donor attention. Certainly the funding today has not been anything that we are pleased with, it is less than nine percent of the total requirements. And I think that one of the real challenges in front of us in this post-UNOSOM era is really to convince donors that activities are being undertaken, are essential and implementable. We have seen this in some other situations, as in Angola at one point in time, that there is a tendency to really take a sort of reserved look, to wait and see whether in fact the activities for which funds have been sought, can actually be carried out. And I think that the next two months are going to be really critical for Somalia in terms of future resource mobilisation efforts. We have certainly been talking to Mr. Dessau about how to bring the issue of Somalia back in a more visible way with donors and considering in addition to his normal meetings with the donor community in Nairobi, trying to hold some sort of follow-up, conference or meeting with donors in Geneva to try to really focus our attention back on the situation, to explain what is being done and what further needs to be carried out, and to try to establish a set of priorities. This will have to be very well co-ordinated with the UNDP in terms of the development priorities that they are identifying. I think that in Sam Engelstad's paper the point that everyone wants co-ordination but no one wants to be co-ordinated, is probably the theme of and the inherent dilemma for DHA and all of its activities. However, I believe that in Somalia we are in a new period in time, and UN agencies and many of their NGO partners recognise that in the absence of the UNOSOM structure, basically they are no longer having the logistical support in security that was provided to some degree under that framework, and they must revert to the traditional system where they are fully responsible for their own operations. I think the harsh realities of Somalia make it clear that the UN agencies cannot operate in an unco-ordinated fashion. To do so would be unrealistic at best and actually dangerous at worst. The agencies have therefore agreed to work together to ensure that the necessary communication transport capacities and security arrangements required for their continued survival in Somalia are in place. And as Mr. Dessau mentioned, the UN co-ordination team meets under his chairmanship, and we are sure it will take on an increasingly active role in the year ahead.

I think a relatively recent development that benefits of a co-ordinated

approach in consensus among the relief agencies, became apparent after the kidnapping in December of French NGO worker Rudi Mark. After a month in captivity he was released, but this release was greatly assisted by the co-ordinated efforts of NGOs, donors and UN agencies who in a singular and collective move really sent a clear signal to the Somalis that they were going to suspend non-emergency humanitarian assistance, in particular to various militia and factions, and that the humanitarian partners would in fact take direct action when staff engaged in providing humanitarian assistance are in danger or placed under direct threat.

In terms of the discussion yesterday about inter-clan rivalries among the agencies in competing for funds for Somalia, there is indeed intense competition for scarce donor resources. Yet, I think it is worth noting that in complex emergency situations it has really become standard practice now to issue UN consolidated inter-agency appeals. These documents not only place all UN requirements in one document side by side, but they also provide a coherent overview of how the relief interventions that are being proposed by one organisation relate to the activities of other partners working in the same sector or geographic area. While the funding through the appeals is predominantly for UN agencies, NGOs in some countries are also using the appeals as a mechanism to mobilise resources. I think the important step forward is that the preparation of the appeal is just a reflection of a process which is now more and more in place in situations that are confronting complex emergencies that require the involvement of a large number of actors. The ICRC and the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies do not in any way seek funds through these documents or appeals, but very often their activities are reflected in a sort of annex, but I think more importantly, their actual activities on the ground in a specific country are reflected so that one can see the division of roles, responsibilities in a solid overview in any given country. I think that in the longer term, in terms of mobilising resources for emergencies, this is a positive move. The short term difficulty that we have got is just the incredibly large number of situations we have appeals for, currently about fifteen countries, I think. So it is important always to keep in mind the context in which we are seeking funds for Somalia, it is against the backdrop of many other compelling emergency situations.

Going back to Mr. Engelstad's scepticism and the outright pessimism of some of the other speakers about the potential for co-ordination, I think that it is worth noting that there are some concrete examples of country situations where in fact collaboration has occurred. Strong partnerships have evolved

among UN agencies and NGOs, such as in Angola where there are very active sectorial working groups which bring together all the partners, and in Rwanda where the relief organisations from the UN and NGOs have pulled staff and other resources to create an integrated operation centre which is dealing specifically with the problem of the internally displaced. Because in every emergency situation the problem of IDPs really is one where an effective collaborated approach must be put in place. There is no single agency with responsibility for the displaced, as there is for the refugee populations, and the kind of pooling of resources, the matching of availability of some sorts of imports and transport capacities of different organisations is something that really has to happen to make us more effective.

I think we need to bear in mind the message conveyed so well yesterday by Professor Lewis and several other speakers about the importance for relief workers to have an understanding and appreciation of the society and culture in which they operate. I would just point out that a programme beginning in December last year, was put in place in Rwanda trying to provide a country specific orientation to newly assigned human rights and humanitarian personnel. I would never argue that a kind of crash course approach to a country of assignment is a good alternative to being able to identify a core or a substantial number of staff who have an ongoing relationship or involvement in the country. However, as was pointed out by the ICRC, we really do not have options, and then when we have to gear up quickly there is absolutely no possibility to be able to ensure that we will be able to find the number of staff with the previous experience in a specific country. The Rwanda example is far from ideal because it was actually put in place months after human rights workers and other relief staff were already on the ground. At least, I think, this is an indication of the fact that some thought is being given to this area, perhaps for the first time. We have a responsibility to ensure that this sort of planning and orientation becomes part of the standard response to a new emergency situation.

Whether any of these, what I would call encouraging developments, in any way reflect lessons learned from Somalia, is impossible to tell. However, I do know in fact that on the UN side there are a number of experienced emergency people who have worked in Somalia during the early 1990s, who are now on the ground for various UN agencies in places like Angola and Rwanda. I would certainly like to think that we have demonstrated some potential to be able to carry forward some lessons that we have learned in Somalia and elsewhere, and that hopefully these will be integrated and we

will be able to make our response for Somalia through the rest of this year, and other emergency situations more effective.

***Amb. Abdulrahim Abby Farah:***

First of all, let me begin with a quote which I feel is so pertinent to the situation we face in Somalia. It is written in the London Observer, August 23, 1992, and this is what the reporter said:

“Emergency-type organisations are not going to be here forever and, (he was speaking about Somalia) when they go, who will take over?” Then he goes on to quote T.E. Lawrence: “Better to let them do imperfectly what you can do perfectly yourself for it is their country, their war and your time is short.”

UNOSOM has gone and with it an array of organisations, agencies and NGOs. What have they left behind in terms of viable or self-sustaining structures? Did they adopt a policy of training Somalis to take over from them when they left? How many international relief agencies allowed or even encouraged local professionals to be involved at the senior level in the planning, preparation and execution of their programmes? How many? I am convinced that many of the problems encountered and mistakes made by international agencies, and many they were, over the past four years would have been avoided if experienced local personnel had been on hand.

I am a Somali. I have had a long career in Somalia. I have had a long career on the international side, so I have seen both sides of the fence. I have also been exposed to many disaster situations in the whole of Africa. First of all I think it is important to realise that Somalia is like an iceberg situation. What you are seeing is just the tip. Many of you do-gooders who have gone there to help the Somalis, you have only seen the tip, you have not gone to the base. As professor Lewis said yesterday, Somalia is a very complex society. And there is no way that any of you, whose exposure to Somalia has been limited, will ever get to know the intricacies of Somali thinking. In fact, I remember one traveller in the 19th century who said “The Somalis are predictable in one thing: their unpredictability.” I suppose it is always nice to have someone whom you can never guess what he is going to do tomorrow, but of course it is not good for planning.

When I say Somalia is an iceberg situation, I mean it is very important to know what has brought about the current situation, because what you are trying to do now on the humanitarian side is quite confusing. It is not possible to draw clear lines between humanitarian emergency, rehabilitation,

reconstruction and development. In fact I think it has been the experience of the international community that in the least developed countries, when you have a disaster situation, that disaster depends a great deal on the strength or weakness of their structures. Somalia's structures were always weak. In fact, I hope later on in the course of the discussions, that maybe Mr. Dessau can let us know how much money has been accumulated in UNDP for Somalia over the past six years, because no money has been spent on development there, and then I think the last thing I heard one time was that he had about seventy million dollars locked up in IPF funds. This is a controversial issue, but it is interesting to know what is available, because nothing has been done on development in Somalia since 1988.

I have been several times to the northern part, I have not been to the southern part since 1990. I was appalled by what I saw in the northern regions. The disaster, and the feelings of the people about their future were quite shocking. Today there is a national debate taking place within Somalia. Should we have a unitary state, as we had before? Should we have a federal state? Should we have a confederate state? Or should we have two separate entities? That is the debate. You can not ignore these political realities, and these political discussions, because your work is very much hinged upon the reaction you get in the relationships established in the different parts of the country. Mr. Dessau told me the other day that he was in the north-west. I am surprised that so little has been said about what the north-west has done, because first of all, there is no way that Somalia is going to go from this state of chaos to a state of normalcy overnight. Not even a miracle can bring it about. Aydeed and Ali Mahdi shaking hands and kissing in Mogadishu is not going to bring peace and stability in the country overnight. We have to build upon those areas of stability, areas where the local people have said enough is enough, we are now going to take the affairs into our own hands. We are going to make things move.

In a democratic society, even this country here where you have your debates, you all do not vote the same way, you all do not think the same way, maybe the way you resolve your problems is different from the way Somalis do. But as I remarked yesterday to professor Said Samatar, we Somalis have lost our moorings. We are in a wilderness, social discipline in the country has broken down. The questions: how can we recover? how did it break down? should be in your minds. From 1960 when Somalia was persuaded to accept a western style type of democracy based upon the Westminster model, one man one vote, we immediately excluded the traditional elders and dignitaries

from the whole process. Their influence, their authority which they have built over the centuries, was wiped out overnight. They were replaced by a group of young men who had the gift of the gab, had the microphone, and a political party. They were the ones who ascended to power overnight. That was the beginning of the lessening of the influence of the Somali traditional leader.

When Siad Barre came to power, he came there with the one-party idea where he wanted everyone in the country to be obedient and subservient to the one-party state system. For in the process here was a calculated policy of destroying whatever institution competed for the loyalty of the population. He started off with whatever experienced politicians we had, he started off with the intellectuals, with the civil servants, with religious groups, with the merchants, so that when he himself was ousted there was nothing to fall back upon. In that same policy he was also advised, I believe, that you should not invest yourself in anyone over thirty because they have already got formed opinions and formed values. Go for the younger generation, so the younger generation was seized upon and indoctrinated and today we have in the country a lot of young people who have been denied the advice and counsel of the elders, of their families, and of any a type role model within government. He destroyed the civil service. When I am reading Mr. Engelstad's remarkably good paper, he speaks about the country needing this and needing that. Who is going to do it? It presupposes that you have a civil service, a public service. We do not have a public service. I do hope that when the UN takes up the idea of trying to send us a public services advisor, make sure it is a Somali. The Somalis have been marginalised in the whole process. We need the Somalis, let us leave the political problems to the Somalis after you have made a mess of it. But also, bringing in the Somalis, let them co-pilot your agencies. Have them up as high as possible in the field.

Four years ago when I approached the UNDP, I said; we need two things here, we need first of all to draw up a data retrieval bank. All of our records, all of the research which has been done on Somalia and Somaliland, all the expensive reports written, whatever was in the country, have been trashed, or stolen, or destroyed. This is our base for development, for rehabilitation. I said let us spend a little money, and at least get together this documentation, because we need it, every piece of discipline, we need something upon which to work. I was told that this was being done. It has been done, but where is it?

The second thing was we should know where our professionals are. Through the grapevine I got information from the refugee camps in Ethiopia,

in Kenya, refugee groups in Europe and North America and elsewhere. We should compile what we call a directory of Somali professionals. Because I was hoping that when the UN and other international agencies looked for a professional to do a job in Somalia, if they could not find someone on the spot, at least they would be able to know if he was outside the country.

Just imagine my surprise when I went to Hargeisa in August last year, and I was joined by a very nice fellow. I said where do you come from? I come from Nepal. Nepal, I said, that is a long way away. Yes, he said. What do you do here? I asked. Oh, I am a veterinary officer. Bringing in a veterinary officer all the way from Nepal to tell the Somalis how to look after their livestock! I just could not believe it, because we do have scores of people who have got high professional qualifications in veterinary science. But why bring in someone from Nepal? When we speak about unemployment as being one of the biggest problems here, if we do not use what we have at home, then why should we lament about the Somalis not being involved in rebuilding their country?

Mr. Engelstad's paper, and I must say it is a very comprehensive paper from what I have read, has invaluable findings and assessments. He speaks about security. We all understand the grave risk which humanitarian agencies face when they operate in Somalia. I have seen it for myself, and I think one should not minimise that. Of course the UN, and even before UNOSOM went there, this practice grew up whereby agencies bought their own protection. But the more money they paid out, the less protection they got. Eventually even they themselves became hostages in situations. In my view, and this is based upon my experience in the north, you have to work through an established community. I was very happy to hear Mr. Dessau saying that recently the UN people and the NGOs and others in Nairobi have agreed that they would take a firm stand. It is about time that we try to drive home the fact that aid is a partnership arrangement. There are obligations, and there are responsibilities on both sides, on the part of the giver and the receiver. We have a problem in the North-west, and I really feel sincere about this, you see I used to be a civil servant in Somaliland for many years, I also became the ambassador for Somalia as a whole for many years, both in Ethiopia and at the UN. So I really have a problem because I want to help both sides, I do not want to take sides. But in my view, unless you can build upon a community which is only trying to pull itself up by its own boot straps, unless you give it assistance, where are you going to start? As I said, nothing is going to happen overnight.

I was in the north, and there was this passing remark about fighting in Hargeisa. What was the fighting about? As I have said, there has been a complete lack of social discipline within our society since 1988. We have an authority now which commands a wide support in that part of the country. They are trying to establish law and order. There was the problem over the question of the airport. I used to pass that airport on many occasions, and I can tell you it was a nightmare, because you were completely at the mercy of the thugs who were there. It is no question of what kind of suit you wear or whether you wear a necktie or not, you had to hold the line and give whatever they wanted.

The government has now decided that enough is enough, we are going to take control of public facilities like this, because no government worth its salt can allow its highways, its seaports, its international airports to be in the hands of clans or private groups. Otherwise it has no right to claim that it is a government.

I mentioned that because no one has tried to mention the fact that in the north, which could be a pathfinder for the rest of Somalia, you also have a bicameral parliament. You have a house of elders, in other words, they are recognised. It has corrected the mistake of 1960, and have now created an assembly of elders whereby the traditional, religious, and the civic dignitaries mainly deal with problems of peace and security. And then you have a house of representatives which deals with the normal administration of a country. Nothing has been mentioned about this. Even the UN reports, and I am very sorry, I have great belief in the UN, but the reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council has never made any mention of the fact that the Somalis are trying to do things according to what they consider to be the best. Not one mention of this! What do you have instead? You have those three or four days of fiascos in Addis Ababa, and in Kenya, where they looked for the best hotel in which to hold a conference! The problems of Somalia must be discussed in a Somali context on Somali territory.

Normally, the Somalis take their time with discussions. We are not like the UN or like the Norwegians. Ours is not a one day agenda, we have a three months agenda. We sit down and we discuss, and when we reach an agreement we honour it.

I am hoping that what has happened in the north-west will be copied by other areas of Somalia. But let the Somalis handle matters themselves. As Ambassador Sahnoun said, facilitate a conference, help with the transportation, but do not for heaven's sake involve yourself with the agenda. The agenda must be done by the Somalis.

I am very glad that our distinguished UNDP representative from Somalia has mentioned the fact that he is going to pay some thought to introducing this concept of TOKTEN. TOKTEN is the acronym for Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals. Nationals who are outside the country, who have specialised training, can be engaged on medium or short term contracts and help out in the country if that expertise is not available locally. We have lost so much brain power from our country. When I see the people who are here... If we could have these people back in the country instead of them teaching in foreign universities! They do not do much good for their country, but they help themselves. Of course, I am also included. I am glad that this is going to be brought about.

Mr. Engelstad's paper speaks about unemployment. The unemployment in our country stems from two sources: the army of civil servants which were engaged, which used to work for the previous government, the police, the military, the civil service, and the technicians, and those tens of thousands of herdsmen. These people you see with the guns are primarily people who have been brought in during the civil war. They have no skills, no education, their only profession was herding cattle and camels. So you have on one hand a disciplined unemployed workforce, and an undisciplined unemployed workforce on the other hand. What to do with these and with the unemployed unskilled workforce? That is going to be the problem. Of course, if we had the money, one could very well say do what you are doing in the north-west, try to put them in some training camps, try to put them on some public work programme. But you will not get them to go back to the interior, and they say do not go back to the interior, they are going to be a perennial problem for the town.

I wanted to speak about women because I was very happy to see that two of our delegates here are women, and came all the way from Mogadishu and Galkayu. If there was one thing that impressed me when I was in Hargeisa, it was the role that women were playing in trying to save the family. The energies of our men have been vitiated by the war, and the whole burden of life has been placed upon the shoulders of our women.

I was standing near the airport in Hargeisa, and there was a woman selling a few things under a tree; she had a small box, I looked at it and saw she had a few biscuits, a few cigarettes, a few old oranges, it totalled to about ten dollars in all. I said: "What time in the morning do you come here?" "At six o'clock every morning," she said. "And what time do you return to your home?" I asked. She said: "I return at sunset." "Are you married?" I asked.

"No," she said, "I am a widow, and I have three children." "How much do you earn?" I said. "If I can get one dollar fifty cents out of these ten dollars, that will keep body and soul together." Just imagine! And this is the lot of many, many women. They are scraping to survive.

I was approached by a number of women groups in Hargeisa, and they came to me for help, they thought maybe having company in New York I would know how to get assistance. What did they want? They wanted women instructional centres to be set up. They wanted help in the form of a revolving fund where they can get an advance of two hundred, three hundred dollars to start a small business. I consulted with the former president of the Somali Development Bank, and I said: What was the record of Somali women who took up loans in the bank? He said they were 99 percent true in returning the money. It was the men who were not paying, but the women, what they borrowed they repaid. I think, my God!, we could make such a difference in the lives of these poor women, if only they could have access to small loans. Small loans, which the women's groups themselves could manage in co-operation with the donor agencies. Small things like this could get them off the ground, and they are self-sustainable.

I was attending another meeting and we were talking about the displaced and the refugees. You have several hundred thousands in Kenya, in Ethiopia you have about two hundred thousand, also in Djibouti. They all want to return home, but return to what? On the one hand you have the donors saying there must be light at the end of the tunnel, we can not keep these people forever. If you return them, return them to what? I had a meeting with the UN agencies and other groups in Hargeisa, and I said: Look, the Somali government here are prepared to have them back, but what they want you to do is to let them know what you are going to do for them on their return. I said: First of all, do you have any statistics about the breakdown of the refugees in the different camps? How many are over fifty, how many are widows with children, how many are skilled, how many are handicapped? Unless you have this information, unless you know where they want to settle, how can you arrange for their repatriation? This work can be done by any NGO and I am hoping maybe we have someone here interested enough to get the UNHCR to do their job.

Talking about refugee camps, about refugees, I was listening to Mr. Bois-Reymond who said there was no drought, no food shortage in the north. In the north two thirds of the population has fled the country. We survived because of two things: we have livestock, and we have a very much developed

sense of extended family responsibility. So the result was that in the camps across the border, if you go to a place called Hashim, and places like that, you will find a number of graves. The people did not die in Somalia, they died across the border. Statistics do not show this. In fact I am very much sceptical of statistics in so far they relate to Somalia and Somaliland. But everything is guesswork aimed at embellishing reports.

The question of women: I do hope that we can get something going for the women, they need help. And through them you can get to the children, and through them maybe you can make our menfolk a little ashamed of themselves, and get them working.

On the question of social discipline: Imagine the tens of thousands of students who have not had regular schooling since 1988, boys and girls in the best time of their youth, what do we do with these children? I have seen a lot of them in Hargeisa. It is pathetic. They are going to be our problem of tomorrow, compounded by the young men of the interior. I would suggest first of all that we have to have a new concept of Somalia. Before independence Somalia used to be able to sustain itself, no matter how meagre it was, through all kinds of catastrophes. We never looked for a handout. Unfortunately, since 1960, we have been offered aid, and we have become dependent on aid. Someone in the north said that the good thing about the north is that when they say we do not want anything from you people, maybe to them it is developing a sense of self-reliance. But help we do need, we need technical help. We need capital for these young people, these youngsters. I discussed with the mayors of Hargeisa and Berbera and I said: Look, supposing we take two to three hundreds of these young men and girls, and set up what we call a vocational training school where for four days they will receive vocational instruction, for two days they will be required to undertake community service, because we have got to inculcate in the minds of people that there is nothing for nothing. You have to give back what you receive. It was so enthusiastically received by the mayors, and they were quite happy. Nothing lavish is required, we will rehabilitate some old buildings there, and the students themselves will do the rehabilitation. But there is so much work to be done in the towns and the villages, repairing this and repairing that. We would get these youngsters at least motivated. We have to get the youngsters off the streets, we have to have recreational, cultural centres for them.

At the moment every one of them is a willing victim for that terrible vice we have, *qat*-eating. *Qat* is destroying the fabric of our society, unless our people wake up to this fact, we will have a real problem for the future. No

one wants to talk about it. Every community has its problems, in Norway you have the drinks, and in some other countries you have the drugs. In Somalia we have *qat*. But in the old days there was always a time and a place for eating *qat*. At the moment it reduces the productivity of individuals. I run a small centre in Hargeisa for amputee victims, and the whole centre was built by handicapped people, 99 percent. What I did was that I made it a rule that not one of them could eat *qat* on the premises; in other words trying to instil upon them a sense of self-discipline. Eat outside or in your own homes. But at the moment, if you go to Somalia, I am sure everyone will see how this terrible leaf is destroying our country. We can do this, but we have to give the Somalis an alternative activity. We need social, recreational, and cultural activities.

One last point, and this concerns priorities and assessments. I think it is wrong for any outside group to tell the Somalis what they should have and how they should have it. I was in Mozambique about six years ago. While we were discussing assistance, the President said to me: "I have about 140 international organisations and agencies here in the country. All of them came to help Mozambique, but they came with their own agenda, their own priorities, and they are unco-ordinated. And what they consider to be the priorities of Mozambicans, do not accord with the priorities which I as president feel our people should have. There is no reconciliation." I certainly hope that when the UN undertakes any assessment or evaluation of our country, they use Somalis to the greatest extent possible. We have had fifty years now of our Somalis going to higher institutions of education, we have got highly trained people in every field. Utilise them! We are not the people whom you see on the videos, on the films, people just begging for food to survive. We also have got people who have got brains. Use them!

## General discussion Session II:

### *Mr. Erling Dessau:*

I just want to say two things. Someone, during the coffee break, asked me what I meant when I said that the UN agencies would return to their traditional way. What I meant was we (UN agencies) will work without the military. That was what I meant, not that we are going to repeat our earlier mistakes.

Now about the TOKTEN. It is a scheme which has been extremely successful world wide, and I think it is very wise that we also have applied it in Somalia, and brought back the skilled people, but as I have said before, it may create some problems.

About the media; I will just repeat that what we have in mind is to ask the Somalis at various locations to organise meetings among themselves to discuss their priorities for the immediate future. When they have had a chance to discuss that we would like to sit in and listen at the end and get their conclusions and ideas and recommendations. Then perhaps, as I mentioned to Mr. Farah, we might organise a synthesis meeting somewhere, if we can not go to Mogadishu it might be in Nairobi. We will invite some of the leaders from those various groups to sit together to get the total picture and then involve some of the key donor agencies also, but this is a little bit more in the future. The first round is really to talk with the Somalis and let the Somalis talk among themselves first. I hope that will lead to getting more involvement.

### *Dr. Abdi Gaileh Mirreh:*

There were some problems in the Republic of Somaliland between UNOSOM and the government of President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. Could you tell us or give us an idea about what the foundation of the conflict was? There was an idea to build a peace force, and as far as I know, it started and functioned somehow, but I do not know what happened to those recruits who were stationed in Mandera between Hargeisa and Berbera. Could you say a few words about that?

To comment on a few things which have been said here, the problems in the north or in the Republic of Somaliland were neglected totally by the international community. There was peace for so many years in Somaliland, yet it has not received much aid. The question is; why? We were saying we now have learned a lesson not to come too late to help people who face serious economic, social and military crisis. Why was the international com-

munity standing back and waiting? It could have been a very good starting point, it could have been an example for many parts of the south of Somalia. But nothing came. So as said by Professor Lewis and Mr. Farah, the Somali society is more than complex. It is very difficult for me, even as a Somali myself, to understand the real functions of our society. In the history of the northern people we had traditional institutions which we have used before the colonial powers came to the country. The colonial powers came, occupied the country, took their administration with them and we had unwritten laws locally known as *xeer*, which has been used to settle conflicts between disputing groups through persuasion, not force. The colonial powers trained certain elite groups, and gave all the power to them. What did this group do? They threw away our traditional laws, and continued to rule the country through alien institutions and laws. Mr. Farah mentioned that today there are two parallel assemblies or houses. I think this is the correct way to solve future problems in the north and the south, actually. We can not mix two systems, they can not go together, they have to be separated. Religion, tradition, cultural and so forth, should be tackled by the elders. Technical and administrative matters that are related to governance should be the responsibility of those who have the required expertise and experience. Then perhaps we could succeed in developing Somalia and Somaliland.

When targeting aid, the donors must first study the conditions which prevail in different parts of the country. You cannot grow bananas in the central or the north-east regions, for example. It might grow there, but it would take a lot of investment. So when the characteristics and needs of each region are properly identified, the NGOs will probably have a better opportunity to earn the understanding and cooperation of the local communities. The communities will always have to be consulted as already mentioned. Otherwise, there is no way a project could succeed.

I come from the Republic of Somaliland, and I am more acquainted with the problems of Somaliland than those of the South. In Somaliland aid should focus on the development of livestock, the backbone of the economy. We earn our foreign currency from livestock export to the Gulf states and Yemen. Aid agencies should not pay attention to the urban areas only. Sixty-five percent of the people in Somaliland are engaged in pastoral activities. This factor should be given the utmost consideration, so that the rural communities could also contribute to the social and economic development of the country, development of water resources for example. The water reservoirs dug by the British colonial administration in the areas bordering

Ethiopia are filled with silt to the rime. The rehabilitation of these important resources should be taken into consideration, because they are essential to the progress and well-being of the rural areas. Somalia is an unfortunate country, because although it has received a lot of aid, the bulk of the assistance came in the form of lethal military hardware, which was totally irrelevant and unnecessary. This tragedy can be attributed to the rivalry of the super powers in the Horn of Africa. The Russians were there first, and when they were kicked out in 1977, the Americans came in. This did not happen only in Somalia. The same tragedy befell many other countries in Africa. Since the Cold War now has ended, it is important that export of arms to Africa should be stopped completely, and the UN should take the initiative. Why do we need big arms? All that we need is a police force. One of the deadly legacies of the cold war is that our country is littered with mines. This is an area that needs urgent attention.

#### *Dr. I. M. Lewis*

I was very moved, of course, and pleased to hear Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah appeal for the much greater utilisation of professionally qualified Somalis, of whom there are so many who are refugees in Western Europe, in North America and other places. One of the problems is that these refugees, at least in Britain, if they go back to Somalia for an extended period, they lose their refugee status. It would really require some change in the legislation regarding refugee status in Britain. I am not sure what the situation is in Scandinavian countries, to enable this huge pool of talent which has been so rightly emphasised by Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, and also by Mr. Dessau, to be adequately tapped. I think if there is any way, I do not know what the situation is legally in Norway, but if there is any way in which the Norwegian government, if it feels sympathetic to this issue, could perhaps pressure other Scandinavian and other European governments to have some arrangement for refugees whereby they could go back temporarily to work in the country that they have come from, in a development or reconstruction capacity. This would be immensely helpful. I approached our Minister of Overseas Development, Lady Linda Chaulker, and I must say I found it extremely unprofitable approaching her because I got an answer from some little minion in her office referring me to the Home Office, but I knew it was a Home Office matter, I had already said that to her. I asked her to see whether she could do something about it, but of course she did nothing. I wonder what the situation is in Scandinavian countries, really I am asking a question and I think trying to urge some action.



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**Ms. Inger Egeberg:**

I just want to say that we are quite aware of the problem which Professor Lewis is talking about here. I cannot say anything, of course, about what will happen, but we are aware of the problem and we are looking into it.

**Mr. Hassan Abdi Keynan:**

I will try to be very brief. I must admit and agree with the panellists that Somalia is a very difficult place. There is no question about that.

I will mention a few things about aid; I think aid is more than giving food to people, it also has other aspects that we should not underestimate:

Aid completely defines, redefines, even invents Somali reality and Somali identity on a continuous basis.

- ✓ Aid agencies have a complete monopoly of all information about the country. They determine when there is a famine, when there is not a famine, when the famine peaks, when the famine un-peaks.
- ✓ Aid agencies tend to claim the success, even if it does not belong to them. When there is a failure, all is blamed on the Somalis. I think this is very unfair to the Somalis.
- ✓ Aid can easily contribute to the destabilisation of the already strained Somali society.
- ✓ In many ways aid agencies are at ease with warlords and anarchy because it suits them.
- ✓ Some aid agencies quickly transform themselves into powerful and corrupt "aid-lords".

Another important thing is this notion called emergency. I think aid agencies should try to examine and define what emergency is. When does it start, when does it end? In places like Somalia, if there is a war in Mogadishu but there is peace in the rest of the country, would we classify the country as an emergency area? I think it is very, very important that we should define what emergency is before we intervene in a country.

Another point that I would like to make is that there are other things that are happening in Somalia which I think all of us have a moral duty to address. That is plundering of the Somali resources. Since there is no central government in Somalia, Somali marine resources are being poached on an enormous scale by foreigners. There are also stories of European companies dumping toxic waste into Somalia. I think that is also another important issue that we should raise. Even UNOSOM forces have reportedly caused enormous harm

to the local environment, the destruction of the barriers erected to curb the expansion of the sand dunes in the Lower Shabelle region, for example.

Finally I will comment on education, which I have been associated with. I believe education is an area of utmost importance to Somalis for the time being, and it should be given consideration. A few things: First, the definition of educational priorities should be left to the Somalis, as Ambassador Abby Farah has said. Aid agencies should not try to define educational priorities, and they should not create distortions. I have visited Mogadishu and other parts of the country, and I was amazed by how aid ended up creating and funding fictitious schools, schools that did not exist. For example, before the war there were 85 schools in Mogadishu. But through the World Food Programme's Food-for-Work scheme, over two hundred and forty schools suddenly popped up in Mogadishu. At the same time, other regions, the north-west and north-east for example where there has been some important local efforts, have been ignored. I think this is unfair, wasteful and harmful.

And lastly about the Koranic schools. I think the main speaker this morning has mentioned a lot about Koranic schools. It is very important that we give sufficient consideration to the Koranic schools. The proliferation of Koranic schools, as has been mentioned, is not due to UNICEF's or UNESCO's help. That is not accurate at all. Koranic schools have always worked independently of the state and UN agencies. This is why I say some agencies have a tendency to just credit claims. Koranic schools have been working to the benefit of the Somali community for a long time, and it is the Somali community that has sustained and developed and are responsible for the proliferation of the Koranic schools. In fact I have observed myself that some of the help that has been mentioned, actually distorts the Koranic schools and undermines the authority and legitimacy of the Koranic schools, because they are giving some educational materials that are not found in Somalia, and that can be unsustainable in the long-term.

## Summary and concluding remarks to Session II

### *By Dr. Bernhard Helander*

Let me try to put this panel in relation to some of the topics which came up yesterday. I think that one of the things which came from the panel yesterday afternoon, was that some people believe that these massive levels of foreign aid and foreign development assistance to Somalia since the middle of the 1970s and onwards throughout the civil war, has not served to alleviate the Somali people out of their problems. It may even have been one of the factors that led to the civil war. The influx of food aid and various other forms of assistance throughout the civil war may even have made it worse.

The response from this morning's panel is sort of looking at that problem from the other end because through Sam Engelstad's very detailed presentation, we got a view of what some of the needs are, the needs to which the international donor community has been addressing itself during the past four years of the civil war. We saw some of the perennial needs that have risen throughout the Somali country, the need for security, the need to create a secure environment, reformulated very sharply by Ambassador Sahnoun. He claimed that what we are after is not perfect security, we are striving to achieve islands of stability within perhaps a generally chaotic situation.

There are some general problems which seems to come up in each of the regions that Mr. Engelstad took up in his speech; the need for schooling, the need for security and the need for health care. Perhaps we could, just as a personal response to that, look back to the situation in the middle of the 1980s where schooling and health care to a very large extent and even in the major urban centres, was handled by private initiatives. In every district of Mogadishu there was a fully equipped private health centre with X-ray machines, laboratory facilities, combined with pharmacies and so on, that seemed to work very well, while the public health sector did not. Let us hope there will be no more Ministry of Health in Somalia, at least not in the same way. Let us extend that hope to the Ministry of Education as well.

It was slightly distressing to hear the UNDP speaking of the resumption of community-based peace and development activities in Somalia. To me it seems a little like now we are going back to business as usual. We have two hundred community based projects running, spread all over the country, and I would very much like to know what these communities are, what they look like, who is running these communities, and who is sitting on the money. I

think that this kind of large scale/small scale projects can potentially be very dangerous. I am not saying that they are, but they can potentially be. Perhaps the call for a detailed knowledge of the communities where you look could be kept in mind here.

Several of the speakers in this panel displayed an air of optimism, and I was very reassured to listen to Ambassador Farah's more cautious approach towards the end. I was particularly enlightened by his observation that needs can be very different depending on whether it is determined by a Somali or by an international aid expert. I think that one of the comments which came from the floor also sort of sat back on the presentation of the need for schooling, and in particular which has been touched upon by Sam Engelstad's presentation, that we are told that with the Ministry of Education operating and with the public schooling system around, there were 85 schools, now there are 240, a chaotic situation. It seems that Somalis may have gained very much from the war, but unfortunately we all know that that is not the case.

In the afternoon we are going to look, in a more detailed way I hope, at the various responses to the needs situation. The theme for the afternoon is the efforts of the international aid organisations. This was a look at the needs. Let us hope that we can do that in a more concrete manner, that we can come back to the perennial problems: Is aid destructive? Is aid helpful? On what level could aid be resumed and on what level can we practise it in Somalia?

### SESSION III

#### THE EFFORT OF INTERNATIONAL AID ORGANISATIONS IN SOMALIA: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR A CO-ORDINATED EFFORT BETWEEN THE AGENCIES

## International Aid Organisations in Somalia Today

*Key-note speech (session III) by Ahmed M. Hassan, President, Somali Red Crescent Society*

It is extremely opportune and appropriate at this stage in the recent history of Somalia that such a distinguished conference nominates the subject of the humanitarian efforts in Somalia and the co-ordination between the international aid organisations as one of its main themes. For it is precisely this area which requires our deepest attention when we speak of the victims of conflict in such situations as the one prevailing in Somalia today. Indeed, it was at the behest of certain humanitarian actors in November/December 1992, that a military intervention force was sent to Somalia by former president George Bush.

Before looking at the future challenges of aid organisations and their role in post-UNOSOM Somalia, I would like to briefly reconstruct some of the main themes of humanitarian intervention in Somalia over the last five years. These include the following:

**The relationship between the international aid organisations and the Somali community, the requirements of Somalia in terms of humanitarian assistance, the role of the military in relation to humanitarian operations and the realisation and constraints on various humanitarian mandates.**

If we begin today by examining the relationship between the international aid agencies and the Somali community, we must take as a starting point what Somalia today means for all actors. For the international aid community, Somalia has represented, at various periods in the last four years, the largest overall humanitarian tragedy in national terms as well as a context in which delivery of assistance was plagued and rendered more than difficult by the context and by the Somalis themselves. Let us recall that in 1991-1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared that the whole population of Somalia could be considered as victims of conflict and consequently needed both protection and assistance.

Undoubtedly, the level of frustration as well as the level of the humanitarian tragedy were powerful motivations for international aid organisations during the last four years of Somali history. How was such a context viewed by the Somalis themselves? For Somalis, the euphoria that was felt after the overthrow of the regime of the late president, Siad Barre, was quickly replaced by an overwhelming sense of shame at the tragedy that followed. The rapid disintegration of the infrastructure of Somalia, the erosion of strong moral and cultural values, the domination of careless and indiscriminate lawlessness without sanction, not only caused untold human suffering, but also forced more than 700,000 persons into exile as refugees.

Somalia, which had a great tradition of pride, self-dignity and independence, lay shattered and broken, the dreams of its people and their wishes for a better future for their children lay around them in disarray. If I express myself in this way, it is to reflect to you how we, as Somalis, felt ashamed, hurt and misunderstood in a tragedy for which we also seek an understanding.

Within these two perceptions of the international aid community and the Somali community, there clearly lay an opportunity for a lack of understanding, for exploitation and for opportunism from those who had power and weapons and, critically, for harsh judgements from those who came to help and assist.

As we know, animal is at his most dangerous when under attack and threatened. How much more is this not the case when the animal has an injured pride and a declining self confidence? It was this situation that prevailed the most strongly during mid to late 1992 when the majority of aid organisations came to Somalia, and were confronted with a society whose open wounds were being exposed publicly. One cannot be an apologist for the indiscriminate looting and lack of respect for property shown by various militia and armed thugs that have roamed through the country, but neither can one limit the explanation to that alone.

The forging of links and acceptance by aid organisations and Somalis is like any other human relationship, one that must be based on a level of trust, understanding and shared responsibility. Within the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, this challenge was perhaps the greatest single underlying task that had to be resolved throughout the operation. The ICRC, as the leading member of the movement, had to assume a responsibility not only towards the donors and towards its own mandate, derived from the Geneva conventions, but also towards those it tried to help in close collaboration

with the Somali Red Crescent Society. At the height of the operation, more than 25,000 people were directly involved in this operation, wherein we jointly struggled for non-judgmental and open operations and guidelines. Each member of the movement had his or her role to play. The success, if identified, was due also to being able to transmit a confidence to local Somali communities that they take responsibility and their name stands over the implementation of humanitarian operations. Constant dialogue and confidence building between the Somalis, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS), the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, and the Norwegian Red Cross ensured a certain level of shared responsibility.

It is precisely this incorporation of victims and local community into the decision-making process that is so important, not only in Somalia but in all complex emergencies. No victim wants a hand-out, he wants to be recognised and given the responsibility of a person in his own right and not to be pejoratively judged as helpless and incompetent because he happens to be a victim of conflict.

The second theme I would like to touch upon is one that has been very competently addressed in the last session. Allow me to add but a few comments. The limitations of Somalia assuring a self-sufficient recovery are essentially two-fold. Firstly, on a political level, the process of reconciliation and evolution into a political state are likely to take more time. The damage to confidence, to trust and to capacity will take time to heal. Secondly, the infrastructure of Somali society, both the administrative and the less formal structures, has been undermined and destroyed to such an extent that its recovery in economic terms for a country with such modest resources is a long-term developmental issue. Without guarantees of household security in terms of food, shelter, health and education, the task of rebuilding is a daunting one.

Thus, if we link this context with the role of international aid organisations, we face a responsibility and challenge that must be shared and jointly set as an objective. True, the humanitarian emergency is currently a recent memory of the past, but external assistance at all levels, be it humanitarian, technical or commercial, is a need and is recognised to be a need. The reciprocal support between the aid organisations and Somali communities is again a bridge which must be central to our efforts to rebuild this country.

Somalis will need to regain the confidence it has had with the various components of the international community and international organisations. The SRCS, as a local Somali organisation, can continue to offer support,

intervention and crucial hope for Somalis but under conditions of support from its international partners. This support is less important in terms of finance, although that, too, is important, and more in the acceptance of the limits of Somali society and being able to play a positive and constructive role in the Somalis efforts at bringing assistance and development. As a member of the society, and on behalf of SRCS, I would appeal to the commitments, not just for an emergency, but also for medium and longer term strengthening of the relationships we need to bring self sufficiency and independence back to our people.

Throughout Somalia, there are many groups of people and many individuals who are ready to defend the longer term humanitarian interests of their people, given that they have a level of support for doing so. In this respect, I would like to commend the Norwegian Red Cross society for its gallant efforts and tremendous support given to the SRCS during the last four years, a period in which we, too, sometimes felt lost and alone. To know that our international colleagues were present and stayed by us has been more than an inspiration for our own efforts in this difficult context.

The third area I would like to relate to is that of the role of the military in humanitarian operations, be it in terms of protection, as was the case in Somalia, or be it in terms of logistics as was the case in Goma, Zaire. Within a complex and conflictual environment, I would necessarily wish to echo the sentiments expressed by the ICRC with regards to independence and impartiality of humanitarian assistance. The strongly motivated missions of UNITAF and UNOSOM in Somalia tragically became involved in certain conflicts with Somalis themselves, those they came to assist. The dangers inherent in partiality when one considers military support in a conflict environment are always present, given the nature of the military and despite the strong humanitarian motivation of the missions themselves. Humanitarian assistance must necessarily be independent and not identified with military intervention to avoid the risk of partiality. Once an accusation is levelled at an international aid organisation, it will be not only be harmful to the organisation, but by direct implication, it will be harmful to those whom the organisation is trying to assist.

The final theme before turning to the efforts and challenges for aid organisations, is that of realisation and constraints of the various mandates of humanitarian organisations. Today's post cold war society has generated conflicts of a dimension and character not known in the past. The breakdown of civil society, the blurring of roles between perpetrators and victims, and

the physical insecurity for humanitarian workers are still very much commonplace in today's humanitarian environment.

Mandates that in the past focused on helping the poorest of the poor, on specific socio-medical objectives, even of protection of victims of war, must be re-examined and re-analysed. Can we accept or align ourselves with political mandates in humanitarian operations? Was the United Nations correct in sending a humanitarian co-ordinator to Somalia in April 1992 who also had a political mandate? Is humanitarian assistance being, albeit inadvertently, used as a tool or influence on civilian society?

I believe that there exists an increasingly politicisation of aid to countries. International aid organisations play more and more the role of spokespersons and commentators on humanitarian and thus, political contexts. There is a challenge to us all to address the politicisation of aid. Perhaps most importantly, it is the responsibility of the states and political bodies to shoulder this crucial political responsibility and not to expect or, by default, allow aid organisations to assume this role. One of the principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is that it is not political. To be able to work in situations of armed conflict means that we must be perceived of as non-political. While we must continue to strive for and to work for this objective, we trust that those who have a political mandate can fulfil it with the sensitivity and delicacy required in view of complex emergencies and the need to give the independence to both our movement and to all organisations.

The future involvement of international aid organisations in Somalia is one that we must both welcome and be wary of. We must welcome the hope and support that they can and should bring to the Somali people. We must welcome because they are the reflection of compassion in a world or in a country like Somalia where one today learns to doubt human values. They can help us to help ourselves. At the same time, we must be wary for there are dangers, they can create an aid dependency which Somalia has experienced already in the past, during the 1980s. They should not replace the responsibilities of the community itself and eventually of the state. During the 1980s the entire Ministry of Health service outside Mogadishu was supported by external donors. This should not be the case and it is not what Somalia needs. I believe we need the greatest efforts, not in the delivery of assistance, but in Somali and international aid organisations learning to live with each other to share responsibility effectively, to accept each other's limitations and to overcome human hesitation.

I strongly believe that the challenge that the international community is

facing in Somalia is humanitarian and perhaps political. It is not a military one. The task is to provide humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to all and every Somali, in all localities where the minimum requirements for such assistance are met. Moreover, the challenge is to work out minimum conditions that the Somalis must fulfil to get humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance and to promote the re-establishment of civil society.

I would like to add at this stage my own perception of the beauty and strength of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. Notwithstanding different mandates, this movement has the capacity through its essential spirit and unitary structure to reflect to the world community a shared approach. I believe it has been successful in Somalia and will continue to be so.

I would now like to turn to my final comments on the possibilities for a co-ordinated approach. Insofar as one of the main challenges in any emergency and particularly a conflictual one is co-ordination, I would like to introduce a slightly different prioritisation on the question of co-ordination with regard to two aspects. Firstly, co-ordination must be viewed primarily as a means for information sharing and problem solving and not as joint action whereby each organisation and actor brings in its own input. Co-ordination is of value in itself and must contribute towards an overall understanding of the humanitarian context and of respective roles and responsibilities of organisations. Through this, we can build a shared basis for our own individual actions and interventions.

Secondly, and perhaps more important, is the challenge for international aid organisations to incorporate local and indigenous structures in their planning and operations. This is not purely out of a respect for the need of such involvement, but out of a recognition that it is through being part of a process that Somalis can assume their own responsibility for their country, its communities and the successful implementation of humanitarian operations. When I recommend this, it is not without knowing the difficulties and challenges this represents for all partners in humanitarian operations and the view that each has of the needs and the situation. However, if we do not aim towards this, then ultimately the Somalis cannot take responsibility and lead their own people and the cycle of dependence, helplessness and external aid will prevail.

### Panel commentaries Session III:

#### *Ms. Halima Abdi Arush (delivered in Italian):*

More than four years have passed since the popular revolt against the dictatorship that by misfortune, and for various reasons upon which I do not wish to dwell, turned into a civil war bringing a whole range of pain and humiliations to my people. Moreover, two years and a few months have passed since "Operation Restore Hope", created to protect the humanitarian convoys.

The army of the dictator killed my husband, one brother, close relatives, all persons who did not believe in a philosophy of violence. With my loved ones I also lost much of my property.

I have not left my country but for brief periods such as this, to participate in conferences and meetings on the subject of Somalia. And I do consider myself somewhat fortunate in having made this choice and for having lived through, moment by moment, the development of the sad history of my country, having shared the suffering and the hope of my people, because in this way I have been able to alleviate my strange pain and to forgive.

I founded the association IIDA, together with a dozen professional and non-professional women, who were driven by the common idea of preparing the ground for a new society based on solidarity and civil rights, and to fight the system of imposture and privileges for the few that had been commonplace for so many years.

In order to make our ideas more concrete, we chose to serve the poorest, such as the tuberculous and the mental patients that were abandoned in the hospitals, robbed even of their beds, the wounded in the war, the refugees and the homeless arriving from all corners of Somalia.

Our endeavour was in part interrupted by the war of November 1991, which lasted for four months and led to the division of the city into two parts.

Subsequent to this event, although we were handicapped by the division of the city into a northern and a southern part, we opened two centres, one on each side. The connection between us was kept alive, by the messages carried by expatriates and sometimes even by the more courageous women of the groups who clandestinely crossed the border to the opposite side.

With the cease-fire in March 1992, we were physically separated but united in spirit, and we initiated a process of sensitisation in order to realise the proposals for peace and in particular to attract the attention of the world, by

organising demonstrations, and by asking for a speedy assistance for the first children arriving from the southern and northern regions into Mogadishu and who were dying of hunger in the streets of the city.

We were not in favour of the military intervention, but the passing of time, the harsh and cruel circumstances and above all the realisation that our leaders were unable to find a solution to the problems, brought us to the conclusion and the hope that a positive assistance could come from outside.

The world, represented by the heads of states, representatives from various nations, artists of international fame and other persons of good-will, came to see us showing solidarity and weeping with us. Finally, it arrived with a remarkable force and power, both in material and in human resources.

We met with nearly all envoys of the different countries, of the UN, not to mention the general of the military contingents, and we contributed with ideas, counselled and collaborated with them. We wished to counterbalance the image that the opinions of the different factions were contributing to and that did not agree with the cruel reality that we had before our eyes every day.

Many of our ideas that we feel could have contributed at least to partial solutions of some of the problems were not considered. But collective projects such as the ones which we implemented with some of the UNITAF contingents will be remembered in the history of true co-operation and will remain in the heart of those individuals who contributed to the idea. One of these was the rehabilitation of a sports arena, where approximately 30.000 people attended on the opening day.

These days people no longer die of hunger, this cannot be denied and we Somalis should not ignore this, unless we want to appear ungrateful.

UNOSOM has left the country in a negative balance, particularly in light of the resources employed.

The problem of the militias was never addressed and now it emerges as urgent as ever. The adolescents who were rescued from death, now roam the streets living from hand to mouth. They have learned to chew the remnants of the *qat* that the adults throw on the ground and in the more extreme cases they handle weapons mimicking the older boys. Others are handicapped, both physically and mentally.

The refugees from different regions of origin, live on the margins of survival in refugee camps. Some emerged in destroyed buildings, formerly of government property, such as schools, or even in private houses deserted by those who had left the city because of the war.

With the passing of time many of these have adjusted to the new situation, which, however miserable it is, may still be superior to the situation they would find at home. Therefore few intend to return. But many other times they are hostages of immoral individuals who go to the humanitarian agencies and in their name claim food and other assistance, which later is sold on the market.

Many persons have lost their jobs with the departure of UNOSOM and these will have adjustment problems because they were drawing wages that were out of proportion, considering the resources of the country and the standard of living.

The number of weapons has increased, as has the number of "warlords", who are the new rich, enriched by managing the business for UNOSOM. They are now the owners of technical cars that roam the streets of Mogadishu and they are convinced that they, by virtue of their power, will emerge as the new spokesmen. It is sad to realise that an operation which arose in order to save human lives should leave behind such a number of arms and ammunitions.

The schools currently in operation are not true schools but sources of wealth for some groups who obtain funds from humanitarian organisations. Often these people are not real teachers, but even when they are, the poverty and misery have undermined the moral sense which they should be instilling in their pupils.

The sanitary conditions are precarious and the health institutions and structures still operating barely address the emergencies due to the many shot wounds. Infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis and venereal disease, are rapidly spreading, due to lack of hygiene and considerable population movements both within the country and across the boundaries.

The presence of highly salaried expatriate personnel has enticed many young women in extreme difficulties to prostitution. Many of them have had illegitimate children from these encounters, and as a consequence been socially marginalized, which has worsened their already difficult conditions.

With these not too reassuring conditions, Somalia is now at a cross-roads, at the risk of being forgotten by the rest of the world. It would be better if the Somalis were able to solve their own problems, as many of us indeed wish. But unfortunately, in light of the existing circumstances, Somalia will never manage to free itself from this calamity without counting on the solidarity of the international community.

So far no social association based on common interest and the ability to

organise has emerged, although there are signs that some groups, such as those of the merchants, are starting to develop. However, they need time to consolidate.

The international community has to stand by us, but it has to review and correct the policy on aid.

My vision for attempting to improve the Somali situation with humanitarian assistance, is as follows:

#### **Militias:**

Among the problems previously listed, the problem of the militias deserves priority and we as an organisation have always indicated it as a top priority. The only way to restore peace and prosperity in Somalia is to find an arrangement for the armed boys. Often these are youngsters below the age of thirty, without education, with desperate stories. Many were brought to the city armed, lured by false promises, and were used by people without scruple for personal motives. We should not envisage an immediate disarmament, because the gun has been their companion for a long time and without it they feel insecure and clumsy.

One solution would be to integrate some of them into the police force. For the more difficult ones, those who are prone to relapses, it would be appropriate to create centres of rehabilitation where they could spend the whole day and receive at least one hot meal a day and have an opportunity to receive professional training. Persons who function as social assistants would be useful, and in the absence of these, women of a certain age and whose morals are above reproach, could be used.

#### **Health and Education:**

In order to improve the sectors of health and education it is necessary to encourage the formation of a professional directory in order to eliminate the many who improvised as teachers and medical doctors during the war. We should encourage debates on possible models that are appropriate for our needs and organise updating courses. As far as health care is concerned, we should give priority to preventive medicine such as campaigns to eliminate malaria and instruction on basic hygiene.

#### **Women:**

We should pay particular attention to women because they have shown a positive response to the negative effects of the war, and in Somalia these days it is they who are responsible for the family wages. They should be given the opportunity of instruction and should be made aware of their own potential. They should also be encouraged to follow a political career, con-



sidering their practical approaches. Additionally, meeting centres would be a necessity, where the marginalized women could also participate.

#### **Displaced people:**

The only solution to the problem of the internally displaced is to give priority to the regions and penalise Mogadishu for a while. In the meantime we should do some field research in the refugee camps where they live so we can map their needs and the causes of their movements.

#### **Social activities:**

We should promote all social activities such as sports, theatrical performances, and neighbourhood gatherings in order to encourage social encounters and facilitate life together.

Finally I would like to suggest to the NGOs, to the donor countries and to all who are interested in co-operating in Somalia, that they co-ordinate their work and to collaborate with each other.

Not the least should they be selectivity in the choice of the personnel they are sending. The selections should not be made solely on the basis of a spirit of solidarity, but above all on professionalism and on moral values.

#### ***Mr. Paolo Dieci***

I could not agree more with some of the ideas expressed in the paper presented by Dr. Ahmed Hassan, particularly where he appeals for an effort oriented to transmit confidence to Somali communities in their capacity to take responsibility for the rehabilitation of their country. Dr. Ahmed Hassan suggests also the necessity of incorporating the victims of the war and the local communities into the decision-making process. Considering part of this process also the decisions regarding the technical orientation of both emergency and rehabilitation programmes, I feel that, unfortunately, in Somalia the decision-making process has been, to a large extent, in the hands of international organisations. A number of foreign agencies, that have been and are at the present actively providing humanitarian aid in other countries, in the framework of national or regional plans, in co-ordination with public or private bodies, national or international, have in Somalia been acting also as decision makers and planning bodies, covering the roles usually belonging to central or peripheral sector bodies (i.e. health, agriculture, education, etc., as well as regional and district bureaus).

We can give three main reasons to explain this situation:

a) lack of internal institutional framework, which has meant also the absence of guidelines from Somali authorities for the implementation of humanitarian actions;

b) lack of monitoring from the donors, which has left, in many cases, to the implementing agencies the role of carrying out not only programmes, but also to determine the institutional frame in which such programmes were to be included;

c) unclear definition, from the aid givers, of their mandate and their methodological approach in the context of the Somali society.

I will concentrate on this third point. In few words, we can say that in Somalia two major problems co-exist: first, a number of people are suffering because of deprivation of basic means to survive; and second, the indigenous skilled persons and organisations are not usually given any opportunity to actively participate to the rehabilitation of their country. I strongly support the idea that the mandate of the foreign aid givers should concentrate on looking for solutions to the two problems simultaneously. I have personally observed, in Somalia, cases of successful programmes carried out by Somali technicians assisted by a limited number of international staff, who have been the key actors in consulting their people, fixing the priorities, designing the programmes and, of course, implementing them. Unfortunately, my perception is that such programmes constitute positive exceptions, since in many other cases, the same international experts design the projects to be implemented by themselves, with three negative consequences:

- ✓ foreign aid runs the risk of marginalising and frustrating the local expertise. In other words, while war lords have been given attention and credibility by the international community, the Somali technicians, professionals and associations have been sometimes neglected;
- ✓ the meaning of international co-operation itself is lost if the planning role is completely incorporated in the context of aid givers with possible negative future impact on the Somali planning capacities;

- ✓ foreign aid givers are unable, in many cases, to really know the internal social and economic stratification of the society, including the extent, the location and the needs of the most vulnerable groups.
- ✓ avoiding the implementation of programmes that are not based on a serious need assessment and "ex ante" evaluation. It is in fact a prejudice that "ex ante" evaluation is applicable only to long term development projects and not to humanitarian and rehabilitation work.

I feel that, despite the difficulties and the inadequacy of aid agencies, there exist positive experiences that can lead the future actions. I would like, in this regard, to indicate the role which ICRC has had in the definition and the monitoring of a national veterinary programme, largely based on the exploitation of local knowledge and human resources and implemented in the country by several agencies following the same methodological criteria.

I wish to express my thanks and congratulations to the Norwegian Red Cross for having organised this conference, that I like to consider as a component of a battle aimed at avoiding the vanishing of Somalia from the agenda of international institutions and the interests of world public opinion. Paradoxically enough, while right now in Copenhagen Heads of State are asked to deliberate actions for the world social development, Somalia runs the risk of disappearing from the world political map.

I have deliberately avoided to comment on UNOSOM performances, for two good reasons. the first one is that I have not been asked to do it; the second one is that we have to look ahead, thinking and planning what to do in post-UNOSOM Somalia.

In any case, the idea that the political situation of Somalia could have been solved from outsiders, regardless if it was in principle right or wrong, has been demolished by the events. Outsiders can only support insider peaceful and capable persons and groups to build, starting from the grass-root level, a suitable frame for rehabilitation.

In order to reach this goal, foreign agencies need to co-ordinate their roles, their mandates and their actions, in the framework of long term planning.

### *Ms. Asha Gelle Dirie*

In his paper, Dr. Ahmed Hassan spoke of the principal point for a practical approach to humanitarian operations in Somalia. In particular, he emphasised the need for and importance of:

- a) The forging of proper working relationships between the Somali community and international aid organisations;
- b) Ensuring the co-ordinated approach of aid organisations in Somalia whether on national or regional basis; and
- c) The need for incorporating local and indigenous structures and values in an integrated socio-economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Dr. Ahmed high-lighted the success of ICRC/SRCS and Norcross in both their emergency and rehabilitation activities in the country. I share Dr. Ahmed's analysis and views of the humanitarian scene in Somalia.

However, since Dr. Ahmed ably covered the humanitarian aspect, I would like to make a few remarks on the political, humanitarian, economic and security mess left behind by UNOSOM - an enormous mess that will require tremendous costs in time and money to clear it.

UNOSOM has left Somalia without achieving any significant progress in the humanitarian, political, security and economic fields, thus utterly failing in its mandate to make peace, to effect political reconciliation among Somalis and to restore national socio-economic institutions. Because of UNOSOM's general presence in all regions of the country and its military, political and financial leverage, its communication and transport facilities, most Somalis initially trusted the UN and placed much reliance, to a degree of total dependence, on UNOSOM in that it would solve all the Somalis' ills.

UNOSOM has left, but this does not mean that the entire UN family is leaving. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR and others will remain as an indication to Somali people that they are not forgotten.

If we accept the fact the UNOSOM was a complete failure, we must at the same time acknowledge the fact that the salaries of thousands of local employees of UNOSOM in Mogadishu, the rent from the hundreds of vacant and sometimes non-existent villas and houses (which were rented to UNOSOM at astronomical rates), the blind stealing of UNOSOM which went on in Mogadishu and the blackmail type payments to various faction leaders

in Mogadishu, will be missed by their beneficiaries. These groups are the real losers from the UNOSOM departure. The rest of Somalia will, in my reckoning, let out a sigh of relief.

Conversely, the overwhelming majority of Somalis will likely be much better off now that they have left. For one thing, the regions will be able to turn their attention to the development of their own institutions by themselves without any longer waiting for a UNOSOM that never comes. Self-reliance will be created and real sustainable programs and initiatives may spring up. In addition, many of the international (UN and other) development agencies who waited for UNOSOM to take the lead or sat back in order to avoid clashing with the all-powerful UNOSOM will now, most likely, feel free to act. These agencies will hopefully and logically invest in those areas where there is stability and a reasonable administrative structure. With that the hitherto distorted approach of rewarding disorder, lawlessness and extortion while punishing and castigating peace, stability and responsible stances, will hopefully be corrected and reversed.

UNOSOM has not spent more than five percent of its overall expenditure in Somalia during the years from 1992 to 1995 on its mandate for rehabilitation, reconstruction, development and institution building activities. Worse than that, it hindered all initiatives and ideas which did not come from them, no matter who proposed them. Many donor countries and agencies left the scene disappointed and disgruntled with the heavy-handedness of UNOSOM and its blindness.

Much of the funds and resources of donors went into wasteful military operations. It will now be possible and indeed desirable for those donors to use the funds now freed for actual development work and institution building. Whether, when and under what circumstances these donors will want to come back to Somalia, now that UNOSOM is no longer there, remains a major question mark. The simple conclusion is that UNOSOM had been a disservice, a bad dream for Somalia.

In the all-important area of national reconciliation and of working consistently at bridging the gaps that existed between the various areas, regions and ethnic clans in Somalia, and in bringing them together in peace, UNOSOM's failure is unforgivable. Their work had been a continuous movement from one plunder to another. There is clear and irrefutable evidence that they have tried to play one group or one faction leader against others. There is proof that they have alternately supplied fuel, ammunition, money and other logistic support to one side of the equation and then later to another

side. Future research and closer examination of their operations will prove beyond doubt that UNOSOM spent more time, energy and money on spoiling things than on trying to get opposing parties together. Somalia has paid dearly for this plunder imposed upon them. Let us hope that at least the International Community will learn from these mistakes in their work in other countries.

If there is any one single success story to be told in this colossal operation which must have cost the International Community very dearly, it is that it has helped stop the alarming deaths of thousands out of starvation and neglect at the beginning of its operations. The killing fields of Baidoa are in every Somali's mind and one must remain grateful and appreciative of the work of the International Community in this regard. Saving thousands of Somalis, perhaps hundreds of thousands, from certain death is a good enough reason to forgive UNOSOM and to forget all their failures.

There is now a need for a new approach:

**a) Somali participation in decision-making and execution:**

It is essential that Somalis fully participate in all the political, security, humanitarian and developmental deliberations on Somalia. They should be a party to decisions affecting their lives and country. Somalis feel that UNOSOM, UN agencies and some NGOs treated them as second-class citizens in their own country. Effective Somali contribution and support is required in new initiatives in problem-solving and in implementing successful Somali participation. This could be done in four parallel ways:

1. Establishment of effective communication with the Somalis;
2. Close consultation with the Somali elders;
3. Employment of Somalis in positions of responsibility by agencies/NGOs;
4. Establishment of a Somali Advisory Council (SAC) to work with SACB/UNDP/UNDOS in advising on all the issues, and together develop regional and national institutional and development plans. SAC would be an effective link between the International Community and Somali authorities.

**b) A federal system of government:**

From the point of view of clan security and for practical rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes, most Somalis in most regions believe that a five-state federal arrangement is the only choice available in Somalia at present. They feel it is the nearest route to national reconciliation. The five-state proposal is also considered to be the best compromise approach to the

breakaway issue of Somaliland (North-West region).

**c) Regional or state institution building:**

Most of the proposed five states (North-West region, North-East region, South-West, South and Central), which now operate independently of each other, are in various stages of administrative development and seem determined to consolidate the progress made so far in this regard. Some of the priority of these new regional civilian administrations, operating separately from political fronts or factions, are:

1. Expertise for institution building, primarily for the establishment of institutionalised security (police-force), finance (revenue generating), social services (health and education) and infrastructure rehabilitation.
2. To develop criteria and terms of aid disbursement, as well as appointment, recruitment and training of administration officials and personnel.

**d) Making regional/state budgetary allocations**

It is vital that regional planners know what funds, no matter how limited, are at their disposal to be able to make plans. It would therefore greatly help if donors and implementing agencies would consider the allocation of specific budgets for the individual "states". Such budgetary funds could be an incentive and generate matching funds would, of course, be in the hands of donors/agencies and be released on basis of satisfactory progress, accountability and transparency.

It is understood that donors and multilateral agencies are so far used to dealing with governments. There is no government in Somalia; governments are supposed to be of the people and for the people. The International Community should find ways to deal with the people and also extend viable and timely assistance to these fledging local administrations before they lapse into oblivion again.

**e) Consideration of the business sector:**

Private enterprises is recognised to be the most active and effective vehicle for development and is widely encouraged in the Third World. Like all other sectors in Somalia, the business sector was destroyed and most Somali businessmen and businesswomen lost everything. The setting up of a Somali business recovery fund to extend loans to viable business projects should be seriously considered. Donors could perhaps channel such funds through the UNDP or IFC/AEF (the African Enterprise fund of the ICF).

**f) Humanitarian:**

In view of the extensive socio-economic disruption, humanitarian assistance will be needed on a short, medium and long term basis. A comprehensive

regional programme, worked out with the regional civilian administrations should be developed. A popular "ready-made" solution for donors to deal with humanitarian problems in countries like Somalia seems to be over-reliance on expatriate NGOs. Some of the NGOs are good, other behave like little governments, and still other are commercial opportunists. Many NGOs antagonise their employees and the public through show of high living, obvious mismanagement and corruption. Hence, reactions of looting and kidnapping occurs.

There is a great need for co-ordination, supervision and integration of NGO activities within the overall regional plans. In a country without a national government and formal economy, aid distribution is politically sensitive and watched closely by all the regions and clans. Balanced and equitable distribution of humanitarian aid among all the "states" or regions is very important and would go a long way to ease tension between regions, communities or clans. The Somali refugee case is also a key humanitarian issue in countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen. The tens of thousands of Somali refugees now being repatriated to the south and northern regions by UNHCR without any rehabilitation programmes, will add to the immense shortage and problems already in these regions.

***Dr. Nancy H. Smith***

Dr. Hassan's paper touches on a number of difficult, important and interrelated issues. In the interests of time and brevity, I can only talk about one or two.

I want to comment first on his idea of the difference in perception between the international aid organisations and the Somali community. There is a central discrepancy between how aid is perceived by aid organisations and how it is perceived by many Somalis, and this discrepancy affects how we work together.

Many of us who work in the aid business often forget or are naive about the politics that start the aid machine running, and we have a tendency to believe our own public statements. We want international assistance to be seen as an expression of humanitarian compassion and concern, as a gift. And although this is never expressed, we hope the beneficiaries would be grateful and give us thanks. We are dumbfounded, then, when recipients complain they have not received enough or demand their share of what has been given to others. We want to be heroes and good guys, not targets of angry accusations, pressure, extortion and threats.

The experience in Somalia has led many of us to question our practice; it has raised issues about accountability not only to donors, but also to recipients. We have been pushed to examine our cherished myths of impartiality and what we like to call "partnership".

For Somalis, ideas of international aid were shaped by the experience of the 1980's when aid poured unabated into Somalia, right into the pockets of government officials. Anyone who was near the aid tap was enriched, and donors never looked carefully at how aid money was being used. Aid, then, became a means to personal wealth, having little to do with improving the quality of life for poor people or improving social conditions for the majority of Somalis.

The perception that aid agencies had unlimited funds was reinforced during 1992-93 when huge sums were paid for housing, vehicles, transport and security.

So the idea emerged of the aid organisation as milk camel. We are managed, manipulated, coaxed and cajoled in our hiring practices, selection of projects, exaggerated budgets and our efforts to monitor our work. I venture to say that those who have benefited most are those who have been closest to our organisations; these are not necessarily the groups who have been targeted.

I think these perceptions are the basis for what Dr. Hassan has called the "harsh judgements of those who came to help and assist."

How do we narrow this gap in perception? Dr. Hassan suggests another set of ideas I think are useful here. These ideas have to do with how international aid organisations relate to the women and men in the villages, towns and neighbourhoods where we work. (I am avoiding the word community because it carries with it connotations from Western contexts and blurs the reality of complex Somali social organisation.)

Can we learn to share responsibility effectively? Can we risk the much longer lead-time it takes to understand local leadership and, as Dr. Hassan says, incorporate indigenous structures in our planning? I am convinced that the effort to do this will narrow the gap between Somalis and aid organisations, but I am less convinced that we know how to do this. It is much more difficult to help others discover and strengthen their own capacity to rebuild than it is to do it for them.

We all know what it looks like: any one of our organisations could get a village school built in a week. We also know that school will always be known as the UNICEF school or the Oxfam school, that the village will never truly own it as theirs. But what do we say to our headquarters and donors when

they ask us why we've been there for a year and the school still isn't built? or how do we write a monthly report that says, "Well... we haven't spent any money, but we've been doing a lot of talking."

The departure of UNOSOM brings Somalia to a critical juncture: there will be a lot of pressure for international organisations to take over some of the responsibilities of government, at the village level as well as at a national level. It already comes up in discussions about payment of salaries for teachers or health workers or the much-discussed Somali police. Health workers and teachers in some villages are now beginning to work for what the residents can pay them. Those villages are already a step ahead in breaking that cycle of dependence Dr. Hassan talked about. It remains to be seen whether or not aid organisations can invent new ways for strengthening Somali capacities and resist our own political and organisational pressures to be seen to be doing something. We will move a long way toward closing that gap in our perception of Somalis if we can do that.

### *Mr. Roland Marchal:*

As I have been asked to make a few comments on the key note speech delivered by Dr. Ahmed Mohammed Hassan, I would like to do it on a very provocative way because Somali reality is a quite tough and very gloomy and diplomatic statements are not relevant to such a situation. What is at stake, for me, is two-fold: one is related to the predicament of the Somali people and the other deals with necessary reforms of international NGOs and agencies in front of crises as deep as the one we got in Somalia. I hope the latter get a better memory than the UN apparatus in order to take into account elsewhere the lessons learnt from the Somali experience.

I want to address three different issues that Dr. Ahmed raised. I am going to disagree slightly or largely with what was said in his presentation.

**1. International and Somali aid communities in face of co-ordination**  
The situation in Somalia has been discussed extensively in this two-days conference. One key issue should be raised again and again: the involvement of Somali experts and people in the aid effort. From what I have witnessed, the role given by the NGOs to the Somali experts and staff has actually increased while the security has worsened. Indeed, the strategy adopted by both international NGOs and UN agencies has been to pull out or to reduce dramatically the number of expats and to empower the local staff to do the job by moving their own from Nairobi to Somalia from time to time. This change started around a year ago when insecurity increased specially in the

Mogadishu area and motivated some of the NGOs to modify the way they used to organise their activities in the field.

Anyway, it seems sure that their number went down. According to UNOSOM humanitarian sources (which may not be completely accurate), 52 NGOs were claiming to be active in Mogadishu in January 1994, but they were around thirty by summer and have now reached a number which might be less than ten. Although this figure is related to Mogadishu, the description in the countryside is not so different because of the security and the increasing collateral costs of staying in Somalia (renting of cars and houses, guards, etc.) to implement non-emergency projects.

Roughly speaking, after months and months of contacts and experiments, the main humanitarian actors have hopefully got contact with Somali teams, which are the most often honest, effective and share the need for accountability. However nobody knows what will happen to them in a few months. The resources have decreased because of UNOSOM's departure and these people will be under more and more pressure to provide the *reer*, the clan or the faction with means their own salaries cannot provide. Risks will grow for them and affect the humanitarian work because nobody can expect them to become heroes for a few thousand US dollars. This point must remind us that the economic situation should be borne in mind when trying to understand what is going on.

Another positive element has been a process of standardisation of salaries, requirements for certain jobs, description of projects and so on. This evolution is unequal. The UN has had a wage policy, which is a bit too surrealistic for Somalia : how is it possible to pay a judge a fair salary according to the resources a Somali State will mobilise if a cleaner already earns USD 350 a month. The rhetoric on self-sufficiency and sustainability is pure nonsense in such a context. One would wish that some UN officials or international bureaucrats could learn more and change the rules, although that is going to put them in trouble.

The common front which was set up when an AICF (Action Internationale Contre la Faim) aid worker was taken in hostage in December 1994 is also a good sign of shared concerns after UNOSOM pulls out. However nobody knows how long this consensus would have lasted, had Marc Rudy not been released a week after this decision had been taken. Moreover, it should be underlined that this happy ending was only marginally a consequence of the NGO's and UN agencies' freezing all non emergency-activities.

Although, it is not possible to dismiss that despite all these rather positive changes (and many others should have been underscored), the situation looks still very precarious for at least three main reasons. The first one is that competition and rivalry among NGOs and UN agencies is not over in the field. Such a situation is related to several factors at various levels and it would be unrealistic to pay attention only to the nice part of the reality. As there is less money and interest but more difficulties, many aid agencies are more flexible and keen to compromise in order not to give Somalia up too quickly. If by chance CNN came back, the struggle would start again. No hope, then, for any improvement. The humanitarian market is still a very big market. Now, it is fair to mention that these differences are not always purely artificial but often rooted in the history of the NGOs, their culture and the way they understand or fail to understand the issues concerning mainly the role the Somalis should play, the accountability they have to ask and provide, and so on.

There is another factor of utmost importance. It is widely known that the UNDP Co-ordination Team is not accepted by many humanitarian actors, NGOs, donors or the European Union Office for Somalia. The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body has more or less the same duties and may appear as a rival of the UNCT. The effects of such tension between these two institutions could sometimes affect, if not disturb, the work in the field. Again, we should bear in mind that the causes are only very marginally related to individuals, but rather come from differences in the balance of the UN agencies capabilities during the Somali crisis and on fund-raising issues. I do not want to elaborate more on this topics, but a good advice to the international NGOs would be to keep this problem under strict scrutiny.

A third problem is also emerging now. The donors feel destabilised by the current situation in Somalia. Many wished to get any kind of government in order to solve their main problem, which is to have a defined interlocutor. Diplomats and aid bureaucracies may not be very keen to be involved in micro-projects which need a lot of time and talks to be accepted by local (real or dreamed) communities and which will be affected by many setbacks. This dissatisfaction could bring problems. One is that the donors will push again for big projects with strong conditions. The other one will be to see experts sent in again and again in order to make sure that a project can be implemented, although the local authorities will be more and more impatient and disappointed with prolonged delays that produce no tangible results.

In conclusion (if it is possible), I would like to reiterate that the content of

co-operation or co-ordination should be discussed in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Information sharing will be at stake, but the international NGOs should also accept to deal with priorities and long term expectations on the part of the Somali people. To what extent that will be possible is still very much a matter of will rather than of habit.

## 2. What priorities ? What state ?

Most of the NGOs and international humanitarian bodies stress at any time their neutrality plus their commitment to humanitarian purposes and their opposition to any kind of political involvement. It is very easy to criticise the UN peace-keepers protecting the humanitarian convoys not only in Somalia, but also in Bosnia and later on in Mozambique and Rwanda, for playing politics very quickly. But we should remember the situation the NGOs and UN agencies faced in 1991 and 1992. Were the militias employed by ICRC more neutral than the blue helmets? Did we know the whereabouts of the guards and technicals rented by the international NGOs during the battle of Mogadishu in 1991-92 or during some fights here and there afterwards?

What is suggested here is that in cases like the Somali crisis the political involvement of humanitarian actors is unavoidable, although it does not take a direct form and is very often most a product of the situation than a clear choice. The NGOs usually react strongly by denying or dismissing the argument because of many reasons, the most important being the humanitarian ethics. I believe that such blindness is out of touch with the harsh realities of humanitarian interventions. Again, it is worth dealing with the reality positively rather than by reaction. To put it in a nutshell, the NGOs should try to act as humanitarian actors that want to cool down tensions and help peace efforts, and not like financial institutions which provide food and ammunition to local militias.

I do not want to raise again the discussion about the militias and the economy of war, where the very neutral NGOs and ICRC or UN agencies were key-players. I would like to be more operational and provide some ideas for developing a new mechanism for assessing projects by the NGOs and other UN international bodies. Every NGO seems, after the Humanitarian Conference of December 1993, convinced that security is the number one issue. At the same time, the assessment of the situation urges more and more attention to be given to the unemployed youth, displaced people and the rehabilitation of the pastoral economy, among other things. The problem is that there is no comprehensive policy (and it is a policy although it is not related to the factions) to link these various needs in a framework, which

could provide a solution for the rural youth who have migrated to the town in order to fight for the clan or the faction. A traditional project in pastoral economy does not address their grievances and expectations although everybody is convinced that there will not be law and order in this country without first solving the problem of the young militiamen. Why should the NGOs and the others go back to their irrelevant "business as usual", while the situation is still full of confusion and beyond control?

The question is not to avoid getting involved in politics. What is important is not to repeat the considerable mistakes made by the UN agencies in the 1980s and all the humanitarian actors in 1991-1992. Too often, aid agencies have a step by step attitude and seem to believe that everything could be reversible when a government finally evolves out of the current mess. They are far from the reality because such a new state apparatus will have to bargain with people or regions which will be determined to keep most of their power prerogatives.

There is a second point that is also raised unconsciously or consciously by the aid agencies in Somalia. Many experts have pointed out that the Somali State is to a great extent a product of the Cold War because of the international aid it got due to its location in the Horn of Africa. Now, unless we expect to see this experience repeated or Somalia becomes a new Mozambique where more than 70% of the state budget is provided by the international community, we should try to think about the consequences of the humanitarian action in this area. UNITAF and UNOSOM have been completely blind, to say the least. The salaries they were paying were inconsistent with any kind of state apparatus in this country. Now the UN has gone, but the problem is still there.

Most of the international NGOs are convinced that aid should be implemented through decentralised and labour intensive projects, which means that quite a good number of Somalis are going to be employed in monitoring the projects or being directly involved as nurses, teachers or clerks. Although I fully endorse this policy, I strongly believe that we should be aware of the effects on the long run. What is at stake also, is a new configuration of Somalia and the basis of a new civil service, at a time where nobody (Somalis and non-Somalis) has any idea about the resources of this state. It is pretty evident that this problem should be discussed first of all by the Somalis themselves, but the aid system is clearly involved, too, though on another level with another kind of legitimacy.

### 3. Towards new peace-keeping operations ?

I would like now to discuss another point. Somalia and Yugoslavia have provided new experiences of interventionism after the Cold War. Optimism about the new world order is now over, but there is a strong need to assess what has been done within all UN peace-keeping operations. It would be very superficial and unsatisfactory to suggest a clear and definitive balance of UNOSOM. I am not saying that the UN is the only good solution. What I want to point out is that we should not rewrite the history in order to reduce the responsibilities or dangers and ambiguous behaviours of the international NGOs during the Somali crisis. I have discussed elsewhere this point but I would refer myself to the fact that many NGOs workers prefer a situation without any kind of state apparatus, although they have to bargain on everything because their freedom and powers as individuals are much more important and their status as member of a international NGO is higher, regardless of the risks they face.

The international NGOs want to keep away from politics and as, Dr. Ahmed has written, disagree strongly with any kind of military-humanitarian intervention (although they supported very much such a position for the Rwandese refugees in Zaire). If we look at this problem in a very realistic or perhaps cynical way, the question is no more to support or not an UN military intervention with part of the mandate concerned with the humanitarian situation. What is at stake is to push the UN and the main donors to organise on a much better and efficient way, as very few people have been impressed by the UN management, both civil and military, of the humanitarian issues. At least, the UN agrees now on a very ambiguous finding: the operation may be closed, although the mandate has not been fulfilled. The Angolan mission is going to be a good test of this new understanding because the UN General Secretary is putting conditions on the two parties before the real operation starts.

Some people and even states would like to go back to the traditional role of the UN missions, that is the ordinary peace-keeping under chapter VI. Whatever results the discussions within the American Congress produce, this approach is over for two reasons. The first one is that, except the optimism shared by some states and the scare of the UN bureaucracy, crises as deep as the one in Somalia are going to be repeated and we have already a few names on the lips: Burundi, Cameroon, Zaire. The second is that the main actors in the international community are now very committed to this new interventionism: the USA, France, Russia, England believe that they could provide a solution or the time to build up the conditions of a solution. Just

remember that in the last two months the UN started operations in Haiti and Angola, with a clear support from the American side.

Now, among key problems that must be discussed not only by states or the UN, two are very relevant to the humanitarian actors: one is the formation of the peace-keepers, the other is the practical connections and rules between the NGOs and the military. Let me just remind that the NGOs operating in the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire asked the international community to provide security. But when it became clear that no state would provide troops, not only because of the reluctance of President Mobutu, and that renting a private security company would not be accepted by public opinion, everybody did accept to deal with the presidential guard who killed tens and tens of students a few years ago on the Lumumbashi compound.

Largely because of the UN's failure in Somalia, discussions have started at the UN of Peace-Keeping Operations to improve the training of the blue helmets. Some States have even published manuals describing the way their soldiers are prepared to cope with this mission. The USA military apparatus, which is not the most flexible, has put that on its agenda and some Staff colleges do start teachings on this topics. But, I would remain a bit sceptical still for some time, mainly because this training is concerned with people who are already real soldiers. When you look at the troops which are provided for the UN operations, you will be quite reluctant to describe them as contingent of an army. Everything is missing from the shoes to the minimal military capabilities. Therefore, you have to start from scratch. But it would be quite wrong to assume that the training is only a military matter. I strongly advise the international NGOs to discuss it according to their needs or perceptions with the ministries they are in touch with.

The second issue could be another concern for the international NGOs. It is crystal clear that the military universe and the humanitarian world have little intersection, to say the least. While contacts will have to develop, it would be better for both to try to understand the differences, to accept them and to deal with each other despite them. For example, the French army did create a position for a military officer who was kind enough to listen to the recriminations of the NGOs in Rwanda and to help them with logistics. Propaganda and indirect control were certainly among the purposes of this initiative, but it was very useful when the cholera epidemics broke out. Again, I would advise the NGOs not to ignore this issue, but to handle it in a way that allows them to maximise their own independence and security.

Somalia is at a cross-roads as the UN and the NGOs are. Expectations for



a new Somalia are still unrealistic and the next months will be very difficult. But we can assume that Somali people have now an understanding of the war and of its price, which may convince them not to repeat the same mistakes. The UN and the NGOs need to address the lessons of Somalia (and Rwanda, Bosnia,...). If the NGOs do not achieve an *aggiornamento*, they will again and again become the blind instruments of policies decided without their consent by states (as it was the case in Rwanda) or by local factions (as it was the case in Somalia).

*Ms. Danielle Coquoz:*

I shall try to focus what I want to say on the challenges and perspectives that are facing the humanitarian organisations, not in terms of content of programmes, I think that has been treated a lot this morning, but on how to conduct operations and programmes, also in relation to co-ordination. In order to tackle this, I have to rely on the experiences that we have made in the ICRC, and why we should do that, especially within the ICRC.

Maybe first of all because, as I think you know, the ICRC in 1991-92 and part of 1993 was probably the biggest humanitarian operator in Somalia, not only in terms of sheer emergency assistance and in food assistance, with this enormous kitchen programme for example, but also in terms of immediately linking the emergency programme with a rehabilitation programme. It gave us a lot of experience of the whole country, in a very tough period. I think what maybe makes it interesting as an experience to share with you, is the fact that the ICRC did not come into Somalia dropped into an unknown land, if I may say so, because as part of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement we have in Somalia our natural partner, which is the Somali Red Crescent, and all their people of the different branches in the field. This means that we immediately took the angle of discussing all the programmes as well as their implementation with Somalis, mostly with the persons of the Somali Red Crescent, but also with the local communities which we were involved with.

To summarise rapidly: it is clear that we are now at a cross-roads, there is no doubt about it. I will rapidly go through a lot of things that have already been said, I do not think I will say anything new, but I think that now is a very proper moment to make a kind of new deal - a deal within the humanitarian organisations and between the humanitarian organisations and the Somalis. I think it is the right moment, firstly because we are out of the sheer emergency phase, famine

is over, there is a level of commercial activities throughout the country and in many places the herds have been largely rebuilt. There is a minimum level of, I will not say wealth because it will not be an appropriate term, but there is a minimum acceptable standard of living in most of the places again. And secondly, because of the departure of UNOSOM, of course. I am sure it also represents something very important in a symbolic way. I guess that many Somalis at the moment fear or have the feeling that they are being abandoned, and say: okay, the International Community is leaving and we are going to be left on our own. But there is also a consciousness I could observe inside the country, of Somalis saying: okay, so now what are we Somalis going to do, and maybe it is a new question. I think that we have to build on these two main things.

I also think that among humanitarian organisations something should be very clear from now on, and I will not come again on what Professor Lewis told us so brilliantly yesterday about what you need to know about the Somali society. I am very well aware that expatriates will never master the subtleties of Somali society, and I do not think this is the point, but I think they have to be aware of a certain number of very important facts about that society and also important facts about its history. It is very clear that it is not all the regions and not all the clans who have lived through this civil war in the same way. There are certain things you have to know, and I think that humanitarian organisations and their personnel should from now on very clearly commit themselves firstly to give and transmit a level of knowledge about that in order to start anything in Somalia..

Secondly, I think that the humanitarian organisations should establish, in all parts of the country, an extended dialogue with the Somali society. I am not sure that it will be so difficult to convince donors, but you have to sit for days, because after all, we have been doing that during two or three years. It has not prevented us from working, it has been helping us to work, we have seen that the results were better. I think that this deep dialogue, this non-western way of sitting and talking and listening for hours and maybe for days, should not be considered as a waste of time, but as a way to get things achieved. I think that in Somalia the proverb time is money is the other way around, I mean it is applied the other way around.

Maybe most important of all, and that is maybe where I think a new

deal is most important, is that there not only has to be a dialogue with the Somalis, but also the frame and the programmes themselves have to be designed together with, and really together with, and partly implemented by the Somalis. When I say implemented partly by them, I mean by the communities or the regions. I am very sure it is possible to find a kind of deal where you can design together what is very basically needed by the communities, and then decide who is going to do what. I am convinced that international humanitarian organisations can bring a lot in terms of expertise in some fields, but not in all fields. In the veterinary field, for example, the Somalis have much of the expertise that they need. One can bring in technology, one can bring in some technical staff that is needed in the country, but a lot of manpower is there. I think we should sort of make new contracts because during the emergency, every little task that was performed on the spot by Somalis, had to be paid. Even if it was for the sheer survival matter of their own children.

I think it has to be clear now that we have to pass this stage, and that we have to be there to help the Somalis help themselves. And helping themselves means that they have to give services also. There is also a measure of sacrifice for the communities into this deal, otherwise I am afraid we will keep on developing something very unsound. I think it was okay during the emergency phase because in sheer emergencies what everybody wants is to ensure that lives are saved. That is the goal. Now this alone is not the goal anymore, and I think it is a mentality that needs to be slowly but very clearly changed. We have to have a very straightforward dialogue, we have to talk about that expressively and very clearly. I am sure it is possible. We have already started to do it, and the response is encouraging. We have already started a small programme to test this new approach a bit, for example telling a community that we can refurbish and bring things for your small hospital, but you must pay the nurses yourself. I think we should abandon the systematic way of giving food for work. Food for work was certainly very useful, it was certainly a grand way of dealing with things in an emergency period, but now I think we have to make deals in a different way and make the Somalis get this responsibility for themselves. I am sure they want it.

Now, I will come to the question of management because I think this is another very big challenge awaiting us. How are we going to

manage the question of finance and administration, when all these points are linked with security, as we know. I think that what is needed there is in fact transparency. Transparency, and again making a very clear deal with the communities. I think that when you have designed a programme with the elders, with the different components of a community, you also have to make it very clear what this programme will require. How many persons it will need, how long it will take, and you have to come down with precise things. I am not sure at all that Somalis are reluctant or particularly negative towards a very transparent and clear definition of what we can do together, things like salaries, contracts, what is their responsibility and what is ours. If all this can be put very clearly and very pragmatically on the discussion table, I think we can achieve a lot. It is true that during an emergency, time is often lacking to talk things through, to be very clear, and a lot of security problems arise from a measure of confusion that we certainly also are bringing in.

There is a kind of paradox, because we know there will be a lot of pressure, an enormous pressure to get salaries, to get jobs, to get something, because after all, UNOSOM is leaving behind thousands and thousands of unemployed people. So we know we are going to have a big pressure, we have to deal everything very transparently with the communities, and be economical with money. This approach seems to be paradoxical, but I am not sure it is. I think also in a way many Somalis are fed up with being kept in rather secondary and passive roles, and the experience we are starting now, over the last few months, with Somali collaborators we have in every region who are responsible for surveying, for assessment, for feeding information and material, and then discussing with us, has proven very, very useful up to now, as I am sure it will continue to be. But we have also have to be very strict, because if we can achieve a real dialogue, it will give us much more credibility when for example security problems arise. Then we can go in front of the elders and in front of the community and say: look, this is your programme, do you want to protect it, can you protect us? We have to do something about it. I think there is more credibility in getting a good level of protection of the programmes and of the people who want to implement them. I would advocate something that again looks like a paradox. It is both a very deep dialogue, a very big level of sharing, but also very, very rigorous management of adminis-

trative and financial assets of the operations.

I will say the my last words on co-operation. I think that it is important for the different humanitarian organisations to share their views on what kind of programmes they are going to have, in what regions and for how long. I think that what we have to do even more from now on is to collaborate on procedures, on salaries, on employment policy. We need consensus in these areas. Otherwise we may in one region have several NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross, with vastly different policies, procedures and approaches. So there is a very big need now to focus on co-operation in these particular aspects.

### General discussion Session III:

#### *Mr. Hassan Abdi Keynan:*

First I would like to thank Norcross for inviting Halima and Asha to this conference. Their presence and contribution have been valuable and inspiring. One short question to Roland: Could you expand on the competition between the UNDP and the European Community?

#### *Mr. Roland Marchal:*

I do not want to elaborate very much because what is going on is very much related to the nature of the humanitarian agencies and the aid they provide. It is more personnel matters. The problem largely relates to questions of power and influence in the aid industry. Each of the two groups I mentioned wants to exert as much influence as on the management and distribution of aid in Somalia. What is happening in Somalia has nothing to do with Somalia. The same thing has happened in Mozambique, Haiti or El Salvador. It has all to do with the nature of aid and the powerful bureaucracies that dominate the aid industry, UN and NGOs in particular. I know that I am very undiplomatic saying that, but I know very well that this kind of competition is going to create a lot of problems, and I want to make it very clear to you.

#### *Mr. Hassan Abdi Keynan:*

Two short comments. First, we all agree that co-ordination is needed and that we must make every effort to achieve it. I am not sure whether it is possible to achieve meaningful co-ordination, because effective co-ordination will cause many NGOs to perish. Small NGOs and some big ones will resist any effort aimed at achieving effective co-ordination.

And the other point is about resources. Of course, resources are very important, and money is very important, but it is not everything. A lot can be done with small money and sometimes without money at all. I think we should not focus too much on resources all the time.

#### *Dr. Said Samatar:*

I want to make two comments if I may, and then ask a couple of questions. One comment is that the international community has been subjected to harsh criticism. To be fair we must bring out the other side of the picture, too, that

is the Somali side. There is no question that we Somalis, especially the intelligentsia, myself included, have failed ourselves and our country. People like Professor Mukhtar and myself are educating American teenagers who do not need us, while our own teenagers are growing up confused and largely unprepared for the world. If the international community has neglected us, it is because we are partly to blame, because we have discredited ourselves in the eyes of the world. If one intellectual is consulted, he tells the international community one thing, another one comes in and completely erases what the first has told and the process has continued until the international community simply got fed up with us and delegated us to a position of irrelevance.

The second question is the question of elders that has come up off and on. A number of us, including Professor Lewis and myself, have talked a great deal about the importance of elders in the Somali political scene, and for years we have been accused of promoting clanism, of being tribalists. Now our position has been vindicated. The institution of elders has more or less been destroyed. First by the colonial administrations and then by nationalist governments. I am glad to have learned from others who just have come back from the field, especially Mr. Abby, that the institution of elders is alive and well. That is very encouraging. I must also say that he, Mr. Abby more than anyone else, to me, epitomises the ideal of what I see as the hope of Somali society. A distinguished elder in the true sense of the word, both in the traditional sense and in the modern context. After a long distinguished career, in the Somali service and overseas, he could have retired peacefully, but he has not. He has chosen to go back to help his country and his people. I think he stands as a shining example of what an elder could be. And by the way, I must say that he has not bribed me to say that.

Finally, my two questions which I will direct to Halima [in Somali]: 1) Is your NGO one of the many NGOs that have recently proliferated in the country, or has it been in existence for some time? How did you manage to work in and serve a divided city?

***Ms. Halima Arush: [in Somali]***

Our organisation was one of the few organisations that existed in the country prior to the collapse of the previous government in 1991. We have given our organisation the name IIDA. IIDA is the name of a girl who is born on a festive occasion. As to the second question, we managed to work in a divided city, because we were serving the city long before it became divided. Following the division of the city, we established two operational units, one

in north Mogadishu and the other in the south. We have managed to find people who were able to work on both sides of the fence without much difficulty. We were a close-knit group and we managed to transcend the deep divisions that characterised most of the local organisations in the country.

***Mr. Mohammed Hassan***

The day the American forces landed in Somalia, I was interviewed by the Norwegian television broadcasting company, the NRK. I was asked to comment on the intervention. My answer was that I was very sceptical about the wisdom and intention of the intervention. I was proven right. Today we are talking about the intervention of the aid agencies. Most of you said that you would consult the Somalis, the clans, and the tribes. I have a problem with this approach because it is fundamentally flawed. If one NGO associates itself with one clan, the other clans will see it as an enemy, and will not cooperate with it. This is not the right way. Forget about the clans and tribes, and focus on the Somali nation. We have to find the Somali nation.

***Dr. Mohamed H. Mukhtar:***

I have one comment and perhaps one or two suggestions. My first comment is that today we have gone through what went wrong in Somalia, and the pain and anguish the Somali people have experienced. There is a deep sense of shame among the Somalis, and this has led many Somalis to hide or disown their Somali identity. Furthermore, we blackmailed and demanded bribes from those who came to feed us, to clear the mines that litter our country, to clean the huge piles of rubbish and dirt in our streets. Today we are clans who were once Somalis. I hope that tomorrow we will become Somalis who were once clans.

My suggestion is that we must realise that we are dealing with a situation about which we know very little. Somalia is a complex entity. So is the Somali society and culture. We have established institutions like Ergada to provide both the Somalis and non-Somalis a suitable forum in which they can debate and disentangle the complex nature of the Somali society and the difficult problems it faces. I urge the donor community to encourage these efforts, and to provide funds for seriously studying the complex dynamics of the Somali society.

We are now at a cross-roads. UNOSOM has left Somalia, and many donor agencies may leave soon. It appears that the international community has

decided to leave the Somalis alone to sort out their problems. This is quite positive. I hope that we will be able to cope with the situation. Perhaps we will learn to rely on ourselves and our meagre resources.

**Mr. Torkild Skallerud:**

It has definitely been two tough days, I am exhausted, and I also, I must say, still confused, but as they say; now confused on a higher level. What I have heard and learned has told me that we need to have a humble attitude towards the size and the difficulty of the tasks ahead of us, towards the need for deeper knowledge of what we are going to do, the necessity to plan and to act in accordance with realities, the realities on the spot. We have not arrived at a single and easy recipe or one master key which will open for numerous success stories in the future, we have received lots of food for thought, for reflection and a better basis for doing a better job. But it has also set in front of me, at least, a lot of questions. You have criticised yourselves very heavily, you guys from Somalia, and hearing of all the difficulties that you describe, it has raised questions such as; since we all realise, or at least most of us realise, that our accepting the principle of development must be based upon local resources and reliable partners, where do we find these reliable partners? If the Somali nation does not really exist, all the Somali people, who do not really exist, according to what we have heard, where do we find the reliable partners in such an environment? People or groups who have a sufficient will to look outside their own inner circles, who are not dominated by criminal elements with too heavy weapons, who are not constantly under the influence of *qat*, or whom we can trust to do their part of the job the next day, that part which is necessary for us to do our part of the job. It is true that most of us think that the Somalis need our help. Do they see it the same way? Do they really feel that they need our help? Do they want it? They have survived for ages without us. We have made them dependant on aid. I think these are rather relevant questions. One more question. Will the elders accept that we are working heavily with and through women's groups? Is that realistic in a society of Muslims? Well, it goes without saying that my answer to these questions is not no, it is yes, we will still go on, but I think these are the kind of questions that we need to think through, if we are going to proceed in a realistic way, if we think we can and want to succeed.

**Mr. Ola Skuterud:**

Now we have heard a discussion or a communication between two Somalis, the one from Mogadishu, the other one from abroad, and that reminds me very much of Somalia, what is Somalia about? Somalia is a country on the Horn of Africa, but there is a great Somalia outside the country. What about the Somalis outside the country of Somalia? We have quite a few of you here, and you have a big responsibility for the future of Somalia. I know this special communication system between Somalis world-wide, whenever anything happens in Somalia, all the Somalis outside Somalia know about what has happened, and the other way around. You know how to deal, how to send messages back to Somalia. So there is a great responsibility on you, that you can influence positively in the future.

Another concern is that we always talk about money and we are obsessed with it. It is true that we were able to raise a lot of money, particularly during the emergency period. But we must realise that money is not everything and cannot solve every problem. Let us try to do it without this focus on the money. And I am really glad to see we have two Somali women in the panel today. They are able to do activities with little money. But we are putting a big burden on the ladies, on the women, let us help them. Is it too big? Men, we are also responsible for doing activities without a lot of money.

Regarding security in the field, what do we do? Is it possible to reduce all the technicals, or the gunmen protecting us? I think it is, I think we can reduce quite a bit. Let us discuss it. Co-operation, yes, I should hope we could have a group sitting together after this conference to continue to discuss co-operation. Co-operation is absolutely necessary for the future.

**Ms. Halima Arush: [in Somali]**

First, I would like to share some thoughts with my Somali brothers and sisters who live abroad. Most of you send money to Somalia, to your families and relatives. I want you to know that some of this money is used to perpetuate the civil war that has destroyed our country, and to prolong the pain and anguish of our people. I urge you to ensure that the money you send home is spent on the welfare of your families and relatives, on the reconstruction of schools and hospitals, or on the economic rehabilitation of the country, but not on war and destruction.

Responding to the question raised by CARE's representative, I would say that the Somali women are a powerful force in Somalia today. As you know our country and society underwent a protracted and costly social and political

turmoil. This crisis brought about fundamental changes in the way the Somali society operated. A new Somalia has slowly been emerging, and with it a new Somali woman. Women are now powerful and respected actors in the country. We want the international community to help the Somali women to play an even more active role in the reconstruction of the country.

***Ms. Asha Gelle Dirie:***

To answer the question from Mr. Skuterud, it is true we are a Muslim community, and as women we cannot do something our elders do not want us to do. But the elders are always positive to our work and aspirations. As Halima said, women are strong and active in Somalia today, but they get little assistance and no encouragement from the international community. And our elders accept and respect the work that we do. They understand that these days the breadwinners are mostly women, not men.

***Dr. Nancy Smith:***

I have two comments to make, but first let me respond to the question about security. I think we have an opportunity to view the level of expense that we have been making for security considerations now, certainly in Mogadishu. I think other agencies have had an opportunity to do that in the regions. Oxfam has made some moves to what we call normalisation. We have moved house, and that gave us an opportunity to examine the kind of security we had been paying for, and to shed some of those costs. I think we also have to keep in mind with all of the security expenses that basically that security is to protect expatriates. The other thing that we have done has been to systematically over the last two years replace expatriate staff with senior level Somali staff. Our Somali staff do not need to ride around in vehicles with guns sticking out of the windows, those kinds of vehicles are to protect me. I think we have to question how much value there is in those kinds of expenses. I do not know what the coming months are going to be like, and I do not know what the security situation will feel like back in Mogadishu at this point, but I know that we will be unwilling to pay for security at the same level that we have done before. I do not know what the consequences of that will be, the change has been very dangerous and time-consuming, and very, very difficult. But we have got through part of it, and I am hoping that will be a path into the woods as I said before.

The second comment really is to Mr. Bernhard Helander who asked about the attitudes of donors. One of the things that has struck me in the last six

months or so, as people have begun to talk about what happens to Somalia post UNOSOM, has been a kind of vacuum in policy towards Somalia. I think many donor countries do not know what to do now. My guess is that for their own various political reasons, there are some funds that are dedicated to Somalia, that the world is not interested in simply cutting off Somalia now that UNOSOM has gone, but I do not think people know what to do with that money, or how to spend it wisely. I think they are aware that a lot of it has been mis-spent, that it did not get to beneficiaries they thought it was going to, but I do not think the party is over. I think there is a great deal of willingness to contribute to Somalia, to rehabilitation and reconstruction in Somalia. But I think that on our part, UN agencies as well as NGOs, have not offered viable plans that represent the kind of learning we have done over the last year or two, and I think it falls on us to present a coherent and new and more creative way of dealing with the specificity of the Somali situation. We have to demonstrate that we are willing to close that gap in the perception of what aid is all about and that we have the will to do that.

***Dr. Ken Menkhaus:***

One of the themes that emerged from both this morning and this afternoon's panel, has been co-ordination between international donors and local implementors. I have heard lots of statements reaffirming the need for Somalis to be in control of the development process, to be brought in at the highest level in development agencies and NGOs, lots of words like co-ordination, input, control, ownership of the process, partnership. On the one hand this is indisputable, no one would want to see a process in which Somalis did not control their own fate in terms of their own development economically. But it is also a bit problematic if it is taken too far at this point in time, and I wanted to raise one practical problem and one philosophical problem.

The practical problem as everyone who has been in an NGO in Somalia knows, is that if this partnership involves resources, you come across two different problems. Either your Somali partners are not honest and say, divert the money, or they are honest, and in the course of trying to get those funds to the appropriate needy population, you put them at great risk. In fact you can very easily get them killed, and that is not something to take lightly. Those are the practical problems, and I know just from my own time in southern Somalia that those were the dilemmas that faced even the Somali Red Crescent.

Then there is the philosophical problem. I know that NGOs see themselves,

especially humanitarian NGOs, as alleviating pain, but they have to make policy at the end of the day, and policy for us political scientists is the calculus of pain. Who gets what, and who does not get what? What I am essentially saying is that as long as you hold the purse strings, as long as you are the funders, conditionality is unavoidable. Choices are unavoidable, either an idea is appropriate to make it funding or it is not. Please make sure in the course of your legitimate concern not to impinge on Somali ownership of the process, that you try to abdicate responsibility for the impact of your aid.

**Amb. Abby Farah:**

First of all, I have been listening very carefully to all that has been said this afternoon, and the fact that you have four women on the panel has made life much more interesting for us, and even very constructive.

You wanted to know how you can reach the people. Did you know that every Somali in order to know what is going on in his own backyard has to listen to BBC London? You have a whole country hostage to one radio station outside the country. Sometimes the information creates problems, tensions, sometimes it is not all correct, and that leads me to what you, the do-gooders are trying to do. How do you get your ideas and messages over to the Somalis? If you want to get your message across, you have to reach the nomad, the rural farmers, and the town and city dwellers. And the only way you could achieve this goal in Somalia is by the radio. Without the radio you are handicapped in peace-keeping efforts, in developmental work, and in educational and mobilisational activities. And how much does a radio cost? I used to be head of the radio services in Somaliland, so I know the value of the radio. A major problem in both Somaliland and Somalia are rumours, false rumours, and they spread very quickly, and they destabilise societies. The only way we can tackle this problem is by putting out the news as it happens. Radio Hargeisa, for which I have a very close affection, was destroyed in 1988 by the Siad Barre forces. Radio Mogadishu was destroyed by the UNOSOM forces. There are six or seven radio stations in the south, but they rarely put out useful, relevant and constructive information. I hope that we will be able to set up a radio station in Hargeisa as soon as possible.

Secondly, we heard that many people are willing to encourage the establishment and consolidation of local NGOs, with a view to creating a better link between the international and Somali NGOs. What we need is capacity building courses, materials and technical advice. Then you can weed the genuine NGOs from the bogus ones.

Thirdly, and I know it has been done by some agencies, but they have held the courses in Addis Ababa. What is wrong with Somaliland? Is it because they do not have a four star hotel?

Then you have the question of mines. Tens and tens of thousands of mines throughout the whole country. In the northern regions there is over a million mines. No one has ever tried to ascertain what has been the impact on the Somali population who has had the misfortune of stepping on the mines, of being hit by shrapnel. I work in a small centre in Hargeisa, we built it in four months, and in five months we fitted four hundred people with legs. We got them walking. Now this can be done, by Somalis, one hundred percent Somali operation without external funding. Somalis can do the job. In the centre I want to thank the Norwegian Red Cross because they have for several months been wondering how they can help the northern part, and they have decided to help the rehabilitation centre. I am hopeful. First of all I am not a politician, I have seen enough, I have had enough, I am hoping that with humanitarian activities there are no borders. I have been invited to go down to Mogadishu, I have been invited to go down to Kismayu. There are Somalis in our communities who are acceptable to all. There are many Somalis who are capable and honest. The problem is that you people, I say you aid-givers, do not know how to identify them.

Lastly, a question of resources. In the northern part they have learned to live without UNOSOM's help. This they have done through very hard efforts. It has been a slow task, but they are getting on. When this morning we heard about people putting roofs on houses, it is from their own hard savings, often of what people abroad have sent them. But for heaven's sake do not encourage people to be eternally dependent on aid. Finally, some said that we should not support hospitals. My view is that hospitals are a high priority area, and we should make every effort to assist them, at least until the country gets back on its feet again.

**Mr. Jan Haakonsen:**

Thank you again for a very useful set of constructive suggestions, and I feel obliged to let some people respond to a couple of the points. Regarding use of radios, both Somali Red Crescent and ICRC have some experience there, and I would like them to just briefly explain what that is. I would also like the representative for the Norwegian People's Aid, which is a Norwegian agency that has been involved in the mine question in Somaliland, just comment briefly on that. And on my own I just want to attest to this incredible success

of the rehabilitation centre in Hargeisa which I think is a very good example of what can be achieved with very little means, particularly so since we in Norcross have had our own struggles with another rehabilitation centre. It really proves that it is possible to achieve something.

***Dr. Ahmed:***

We have made some radio broadcasting through the BBC, and we also used some local radios like Mogadishu radio, or Hargeisa radio, and other Somali local stations. And now we are really in the process of making a kind of evaluation. We would like to find out what was the impact of the radio in helping the Somalis make use of the humanitarian messages that are frequently broadcasted on the radio. But it is too early now to give you any feedback about this evaluation process which is going on.

***Ms. Danielle Coquoz:***

Just adding that we have also used the radio a lot to re-establish the links between the families who have lost each other, so the role of the radio throughout the country has been strong and effective. This scheme has been going on for a few years, and it has served two thousands families. We have used BBC, because it is the only radio that reaches everybody, both inside and outside the country.

***Amb. Abby Farah:***

What I am saying is that it is wrong for the Somali nation to be hostage to a foreign radio station. I have the greatest respect for the BBC, but we cannot rely on the BBC for every communication and at all times.

***Mr. Jan Haakonsen:***

Jens, could you tell us a few words about the de-mining programme in Somaliland?

***Mr. Jens Kraft-Strøm:***

Yes, that is a very short story actually. We came to Hargeisa and we had a discussion with the government up there, and we were asked to go to Las Anod to do de-mining. But down in Las Anod there was no big problem with mines, so that is the whole story actually. So the de-mining programme was changed into a health programme.

***Mr. Finn Nanseth:***

I am representing the Children's Village in Norway as part of the SOS Children's Villages International. After two days of shall we say turning between hope and despair, I would like to just point out one light of hope, however small, like a candlelight, but it is there. It is the SOS Children's Villages Operation in Somalia, which started in the middle of the 1980s within regular SOS Children's Villages, and I would like to remind you that it operated under Somali supervision. This is important, it was operated by the Somalis themselves during the whole of the civil war, 1991 -1992, and were also able to create a small mothers and child clinic and an SOS emergency paediatric clinic which is, as far as I know, the only one operating in the country. In 1994 this small clinic served some 83 000 patients.

***Mr. Martin Zak:***

I thought it would be useful since I am one of the last to take the floor, to perhaps draw your attention to a few points I have learned from the past two days. Not being a Somali and not being an expert on Somalia, short of having lived in the country in the middle of the 1980s for a while, it has been extremely useful for me. The few points I want to raise are from the operational planning perspectives. Some of us are involved at different stages in the decision-making process as to what we should support where and how, and it has been very, very useful to me. The Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, contrary to the UN as we have heard earlier on today, is in a peculiar position. At the moment we do not have any immediate plans, or any concrete plans on how to move forward, but we have considerable resources to call upon. I understood that those in the opposite position have lots of plans, but no resources. I do not think this is a bad position to be in, I have noted with quite a lot of interest the whole concept of a new deal, the fact that we are at a cross-roads at the moment, and perhaps it is important to introduce some new thinking into the debate with regard to the future.

The first point I have retained is the time frame. We have been told again and again that one needs time in Somalia, it takes time to negotiate things, it takes time to move forward. Well, let us learn a little bit from that, let us take our time as well. Let us not rush immediately into the country now that UNOSOM has withdrawn, let us sit down, think it through, consult our Somali partners in this respect, the Somali Red Crescent, before we actually make decisions as to where and what we do in the future.



The second point I have retained is the whole issue of the geographical areas of possible operations. It is important to note that there is a Somalia beyond Mogadishu. We have certainly taken that point into consideration very early on in our programming. Where I am not so sure of agreeing with some of the previous speakers is the notion of operating in areas that make progress politically. I think we need to be extremely careful from our Red Cross perspective, I would certainly like to retain Dr. Ahmed's point, which I think is very important, as long as you are involved in provision of humanitarian assistance, I think you need to be extremely careful and try to provide it to wherever the needs are and the beneficiaries are, if it is to cure.

My third point has to do with the needs. I think we have got a very impressive summary of the different needs in the country, we will certainly use that. From the Red Cross perspective, though the acute emergency seems to be over, and people are not starving, in my view Somalia is still an emergency case. There is no government to speak of, we have heard that the health system has, to all practical purposes collapsed, there is very little education going on. To me it would therefore seem to be logical to suggest that perhaps we should look at the medical field as something which you can not really do on the local community basis. Regardless of how well organised you are, you will not be producing penicillin or vaccines in Somalia in the immediate future. This is perhaps an area where organisations such as the Federation could be of use. And I take very much the point of the Ambassador here that this must include hospitals, perhaps not complicated issues on medical evacuations, but certainly the district level hospitals such as we are supporting in Garowe.

My fourth point has to do with involving local partners, absolutely crucial, we have been doing it from the outset of the operation, and that is very much linked to the question of security. I very much agree with the Oxfam point, we have thought of it very similarly; an approach where we try to minimise the presence of expatriate staff, use the Somali colleagues as much as possible, and I am sure that we will do so. The problem with that armament of course is that in some instances this is perceived as withdrawal from the country, and therefore we will need to do that very carefully. I have also taken very much the point of better briefing our expatriates. The problem has been throughout this operation that at least we found it extremely difficult to attract experienced delegates that would be willing to work in Somalia, and I think we should acknowledge that this is a problem.

My last point has to do with co-ordination. Yes, of course, we need to co-

ordinate the ICRC intervention with regard to making sure that we set certain standards with regard to various administrative elements, security elements and so on. This is extremely important. I think standards of assistance, in particular when you work in the medical field, need to be taken into consideration as well. The one area where I perhaps disagree with some of the speakers yesterday, is that we certainly would not allow the Federation to be co-ordinated by other organisations, certainly not by the United Nations at this point in time. We do not mind talking to the UN, we do not mind attending meetings, but we will certainly not start operating under the blue flag, and the same goes of course for our donor government. One of our principles is independence and in the Federation we perhaps have the privilege of being able patiently to tell donor governments to go to hell if they are trying to impose things that we may not particularly wish to do.

## Summary and concluding remarks to Session III

### *By Dr. Bernhard Helander*

My comment this time is really more a question. There was a proverb which came to mind. It goes like this: "a man who wants a goat will ask for a camel", and it comes to mind because I see a kind of convergence of ideas coming out of the talks I have been hearing this afternoon, and a good convergence I should add. I think that many of you seem to favour a new type of small scale approach to humanitarian assistance to Somalia, regionalised, decentralised, a federal type of approach, and perhaps in such an environment, it is very wise to remember Dr. Ahmed's words that one essential element of co-ordination would be information sharing because it would essentially mean that humanitarian aid to Somalia would be broken up into small, I hesitate to use the word fractional, but very small units operated by charities and NGOs and UN agencies. The need for information sharing in such an environment would be immense, I imagine.

The question that comes up here is really how would some of the NGOs that are dependent on the home constituencies in the west, how would these organisations be able to sort of bring out this rather new message about their involvement in Somalia that now, we are getting involved in Somalia in a slightly different fashion than before. We will not need as much money as we have needed in the past, but we still need some support from the UN. Too much assistance from the west could perhaps even be harmful to this development in Somalia. That is a rather mixed message to bring home to an audience in countries like the Scandinavian ones or the UK, I suppose. So you would have to think very hard, I believe, on the sort of pedagogical aspects of how to raise funds for that type of involvement. That is my comment to this panel, and the question.

## Closing Remarks

### *Sven Mollekleiv, Secretary General, Norwegian Red Cross*

Dear guests and participants.

A two-days working session has come to an end and I would like to start my closing remarks by expressing a strong appreciation for the contributions and commitments you have given to the humanitarian challenge that Somalia represents.

In three sessions we have tried to analyse the social and human requirements in order to better understand the role of the aid agencies and their interaction with the Somali community. I will not try to sum up the many recommendations given, but rather concentrate on a few points that I find of importance.

First of all I think the conference has managed to create an open and critical, but also constructive debate over lessons learned in Somalia, and thereby meeting one of the intentions the Norwegian Red Cross had when we invited you to this conference.

The key-note speakers and panel commentators have covered a wide range of subjects. Regardless of the theme which came under discussion, there was one word which always came up as a part of the conclusion: complexity. The complexity and lack of understanding of the relations inside and between clans in Somalia has led to many mistakes in both the relief operations and in the attempts to settle the conflict.

The need for knowledge has been underlined. I fully agree with this, and would like to add that this knowledge must not be limited to history and socio-economic relations, but first and foremost an understanding of how the Somali community is functioning today after four years of civil war. To achieve this kind of knowledge I think it is extremely important for aid organisations, not only to share their experiences, but to have reliable counterparts in the field able to guide them through a very rough landscape.

For the Norwegian Red Cross this local partner has naturally been the Somali Red Crescent Society. Without this organisation, rooted in local communities all over Somalia and Somaliland, it would have been impossible for the Red Cross movement as a whole to succeed in one of the biggest operation ever established by ICRC.

One example will illustrate what I am talking about: during a very critical period with many problems in food distributions, such as the question of giv-

ing every clan in a certain area rations according to their numbers and to avoid security problems related to unequal distribution. Dr. Ahmed Hassan, president of SRCS, spent two weeks of painful negotiation with all the local clans and assuring a fair and safe delivery of the food.

Even if we have rightly focused on the many problems in Somalia and the Somali operation, we must not forget that we have also achieved some good results to the benefit of the victims of the disaster.

During the most difficult time of the past four years, the Red Cross and Red Crescent managed to keep 1.5 million people alive through daily supply of food and medical care. Other organisations have done a very good job, too. This represents one third of the estimated population before famine had killed hundreds of thousands and sent other hundreds of thousands out of the country as refugees. However, this massive food aid was not given without thinking of long term consequences to local production and the question of people becoming "addicted" to aid.

Parallel to the food distribution, seeds and tools were handed out and displaced persons assisted back to their place of origin where many could cultivate their land. I think it is relevant to bear this in mind when we are looking towards the challenges ahead of us.

Many of the speakers have mentioned the need to build on women's organisations as local factors of stability and I think this is a very valid point to make. The activities of IIDA Women's Development Organisation and Somali Women Concern represent such varieties of programmes which are needed to create community awareness: schools and orphanages, vocational training, small handicraft projects, and even a library.

Somalia has gone through four years of civil war. The ordeal of the Somalis is not yet over and they are facing many problems in the time to come. However, I want to conclude this conference by joining those that have voiced an optimistic view. The discussions have shown us that there are important activities going on that might constitute the fundamentals for the reconstruction of Somalia.

We all know it will take time, but with co-ordinated efforts from the Somalis themselves and from the international community, it can be done.

I, and all of us in the Norwegian Red Cross, thank you all once again for your very valuable contributions, everyone of you, and I wish you all success in your future work, and remember: Take care, you are and we are all needed.

Thank you.

## APPENDIX I

### Somalia after UNOSOM

#### *Bibliographical notes on invited contributors to the conference*

##### **Halima Abdi Arush**

Chairperson, IIDA Women's Development Organization (Mogadishu); formerly inspector at the Ministry of Education before joining the family business.

*Discussant, panel III*

##### **Anne M. Bauer**

Director of the Norwegian Red Cross International Dept.; formerly asst. director general at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with human rights, humanitarian aid, refugee questions and development aid.

*Chairperson, session I*

##### **Danielle Coquoz**

Deputy Delegate General for Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); trained as a sociologist, worked as a delegate for many years in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

*Discussant, panel II*

##### **Erling Dessau**

UNDP Resident Representative, Humanitarian Co-ordinator and Chairman of the United Nations agencies' Co-ordination Team (UNCT) to Somalia.

*Discussant, panel II*

##### **Paolo Dieci**

General Secretary of the Comitato per lo sviluppo dei Popoli (Italian NGO), member of the Life and Peace Institute's international informal group of consultants on the Somalia crises, co-editor of two books on the Horn of Africa

*Discussant, panel III*

##### **Asha Gelle Dirie**

Executive Director, Somali Women Concern (Galkayo); former Head of Service, Women's Education Department in Mogadishu.

*Discussant, panel III*

**Alard du Bois-Reymond**

Desk Man for Somalia, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); worked with GTZ in 1988/89 before becoming a delegate, mostly in Africa, including a year in Berbera.

*Discussant, panel III*

**Jan Egeland**

State Secretary of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs, formerly director of Norcross' International Dept. and Information Dept., former Head of Amnesty International in Norway, author of *Humanitarian initiative against "disappearances"* (Henry Dunant Institute).

*Opening Statement*

**Sam Engelstad**

Independent consultant; formerly Chief of Humanitarian Relief at UNOSOM (1994); formerly consultant for the World Bank, the African Academy of Science and various UN agencies.

*Key-note speech, panel II*

**Abdulrahim Abby Farah**

Former Under-Secretary General at the UN, now with the Centre of International Health and Co-operation and heading the NGO Somaliland Lifeline; former Somali ambassador to the UN and representative at the Security Council; former ambassador to Ethiopia.

*Discussant, panel II*

**Ahmed Yusuf Farah**

Independent researcher and consultant; former Director of the Social Science Department at Somalia Academy of Sciences and Arts; author of *The Milk of the Boswellia Forest* and *Somalia: the Roots of Reconciliation* (on the 1993 peace process in Northern Somalia).

*Discussant, panel I*

**Jan M. Haakonsen**

Desk Officer, Norwegian Red Cross; has worked for more than ten years in Africa (SAREC, UNICEF, FAO), including 5 years in Somalia; has written *Scientific Socialism and Self-Sufficiency: the case of Somalia's "instant" fishermen*.

*Chairperson, Session III*

**Ahmed M. Hassan**

M.D. and President of the Somali Red Crescent Society; formerly Discussant Executive Board World Health Organisation and Director of Medical Care Department, Somali Ministry of Health; former director of Digfer Hospital.

*Key-note speaker, panel III*

**Astrid Nøklebye Heiberg**

President of the Norwegian Red Cross and professor of psychiatry at the University of Oslo; formerly Minister of Administration and Consumer Affairs, State Secretary of Social Affairs, Member of Parliament and Norway's Representative to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CPT).

*Welcome address*

**Bernhard Helander**

Associate professor of cultural anthropology, Uppsala University, founder & editor of Somalia News Update (SNU), author of *The Slaughtered Camel: coping with fictitious descent among the Hubeer in Southern Somalia* as well as numerous articles on Somali issues.

*Commentator, all three sessions*

**Ioan M. Lewis**

Emeritus professor at the London School of Economics, where he has taught anthropology since 1969, honorary director of the International African Institute and Chairman of Africa Educational Trust; has published numerous articles and 20 books, including *A Pastoral Democracy; Somali Poetry; A Modern History of Somalia; Understanding Somalia* and *Blood and Bone: The call of kinship in Somalia*.

*Key-note speaker, panel I*

**Bente A. MacBeath**

Head of Africa/Americas Section, Norwegian Red Cross; formerly Head of Asia/Europe section; has worked four years in Africa (Swaziland & Botswana)

*Chairperson, session II*

**Roland Marchal**

Senior Research Fellow at Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques and active in Somalia with Action Internationale Contre la Faim, (AICF), author of several academic articles

*Discussant, panel III*

**Ken Menkhaus**

Asst. professor of political science at Davidson College, currently visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping Institute and Head of Somali Task Force; has published several articles on Somalia, including *Getting Out Versus Getting Through: U.S. and U.N. Policies in Somalia*  
*Discussant, panel I*

**Sven Mollekleiv**

Secretary General, Norwegian Red Cross; has had leading positions in the Norwegian Football Federation and the Norwegian Sports Association; formerly President of the Norwegian Students' Union. Visited Somalia twice in 1992.  
*Closing statement*

**Mohamed H. Mukhtar**

Associate professor of African and Middle Eastern History at Savannah State College (GA) and member of the steering committee of ERGADA; his publications include *Islam in Somalia History: Fact and Fiction* and *The Emergency and Role of Political Parties in the Inter-River Region of Somalia*.  
*Discussant, panel I*

**Sten Sture Normark**

Director of Horn of Africa Program at the Life & Peace Institute (Uppsala) and publisher of Horn of Africa Bulletin; was a priest and missionary (Eritrea) and later became NCR Resident Representative in Khartoum.  
*Discussant, panel I*

**Deborah Saïdy**

Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer at the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in Geneva.  
*Discussant, panel II*

**Mohamed M. Sahnoun**

Pearson Fellow at IDRC; formerly Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Somalia; Deputy Secretary General of the League of Arab States; Deputy Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity.; Ambassador to the Morocco, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany; permanent representative of Algeria to the UN; member of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission); author of *Somalia: the Missed Opportunities*.  
*Discussant, panel II*

**Said S. Samatar**

Professor of African History at Rutgers University (N.Y.), author of numerous articles and books on Somalia, including *Somalia: a Nation in Turmoil*, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism* and, together with D.D. Laitin, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*  
*Discussant, panel I*

**Nancy Smith**

Oxfam Country Representative to Somalia; formerly Regional Representative in West Africa; formerly professor of psychology & anthropology at the State University of New York.  
*Discussant, panel III*

## APPENDIX II

### Somalia after UNOSOM

#### List of Participants

(resource persons listed in appendix I not included)

| <i>Institution</i>                        | <i>Name</i>                  | <i>Position</i>                               |
|---|------------------------------|---|
| Swiss Red Cross                           | <u>Felix Fellmann</u>        | Programme Manager                             |
| Swiss Red Cross                           | <u>Urs Stuedeli</u>          | Somalia Representative                        |
| British Red Cross                         | <u>Paul Anticoni</u>         | Desk Officer                                  |
| International Federation<br>of Red Cross/ |                              | Senior Officer, Operations,<br>Management and |
| Red Crescent Societies                    | <u>Martin Zak</u>            | External Relations                            |
| Norwegian Somalia C.tee                   | <u>Jakob Aano</u>            | Member of Parliament,retd.                    |
| Norwegian Somalia C.tee                   | <u>Arnfinn Nygaard</u>       | Co-ordinator                                  |
| Directorate of Immigration                | <u>Berit Solheim</u>         | Head of Section                               |
| Directorate of Immigration                | <u>Grethe Neufeld</u>        | Advisor                                       |
| SOS-Childrens' Villages                   | <u>Finn Nanseth</u>          | Organisational Chief                          |
| NORAD                                     | <u>Arthur K. Sydnes</u>      | Advisor                                       |
| Oslo Red Cross                            |                              |   |
| International Centre                      | <u>Jama Ali Mohamed</u>      | Head of Operations                            |
| Oslo Red Cross                            |                              |   |
| International Centre                      | <u>Ingeborg Denne</u>        | Head of Depratment                            |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs               | <u>Thormod Eriksen</u>       | Consul  |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs               | <u>Kjell H. Dalen</u>        | Advisor for Africa                            |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs               | <u>Jens Petter Kjemperud</u> | Executive Officer                             |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs               | <u>Bente Bingen</u>          | Advisor for Refugees                          |

| <i>Institution</i>                                 | <i>Name</i>                     | <i>Position</i>                   |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs                        | <u>Bård Hopland</u>             | Executive Officer                 |
| Ministry of Justice                                | <u>Inger Egeberg</u>            | Head of Section                   |
| Ministry of Justice                                | <u>Trond Øystein Vetleseter</u> | Executive Officer                 |
| Norwegian People's Aid                             | <u>Egil Wisløff Nilssen</u>     | Head of International Dept., a.i. |
| Norwegian People's Aid                             | <u>Jens Kraft-Strøm</u>         | Co-ordinator                      |
| Norw. Institute for Urban<br>and Regional Research | <u>Berit Aasen</u>              | Research Supervisor               |
| Norwegian Refugee Council                          | <u>Pål Nesse</u>                | Programme Co-ordinator            |
| UNESCO Commission                                  | <u>Hassan Abdi Keynan</u>       | Consultant                        |
| Min. of Labour & Local Govt.                       | <u>Magne Holter</u>             | Advisor                           |
| Min. of Labour & Local Govt                        | <u>Hanne M. Myrvold</u>         | Executive Officer                 |
| Norges Assco. for the Disabled                     | <u>Jens Mjaugedal</u>           | Head of Dept.                     |
| Ethnographic Museum                                | <u>Abdi Gaileh Mirreh</u>       | Research Asst.                    |
| Norw. Institute<br>of International Affairs        | <u>Torunn L. Tryggestad</u>     | Research Asst.                    |
| Norw. Institute<br>of International Affairs        | <u>Åge Eknes</u>                | Researcher                        |
| CARE-Norway  | <u>Torkild Skallerud</u>        | Secretary General                 |
| Centre for Development<br>and the Environment      | <u>Simon Rye</u>                | Research Fellow                   |
| VG (newspaper)                                     | <u>Geir Terje Ruud</u>          | Journalist                        |
| Vårt Land (newspaper)                              | <u>Øystein Franck-Nielsen</u>   | Journalist                        |
| UNHCR  | <u>Odd Iglebæk</u>              | Information Officer               |
| Centre for Development<br>Studies, U. of Bergen    | <u>Dr. Sharif Harir</u>         | Researcher                        |
| Norwegian Red Cross                                | <u>Anne Bjørneby Sæther</u>     | Physiotherapist                   |
| Norwegian Red Cross                                | <u>Rune Nilsen</u>              | Orthopaedic Engineer              |
| Norwegian Red Cross                                | <u>Ola Skuterud</u>             | Resident Representative           |

| <i>Institution</i>                          | <i>Name</i>                   | <i>Position</i>                |
|---|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Brynjulf Mugaas</u>        | Special Advisor                |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Liv Ronglan</u>            | Information Officer            |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Ole-Jørgen Krohn-Nydal</u> | Chief of Staff                 |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Gro Flatabø</u>            | Head of Information Dept.      |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Anne D. Nilsen</u>         | Head of Section                |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Anne Elise Oppedal</u>     | Organisational Secretary       |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Elin C. Johansen</u>       | Assistant                      |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Reidun Andreassen</u>      | Member of Executive C.tee      |
| Norwegian Red Cross                         | <u>Oddbjørn Røys</u>          | Vice-President                 |
| Sandvolden Asylum Centre                    | <u>Mohammed Osman Farah</u>   | Social worker                  |
| Medico-info                                 | <u>Jan Kjekstad Onshuus</u>   | Mediacal consultant            |
| Norwegian Project on<br>Conflict-solving    | <u>Graham Dyson</u>           | Project Director               |
| Norw. Organisation for<br>Asylum Seekers    | <u>Bjarte Vandvik</u>         | Organisational Secretary       |
| Tromsø Municipality                         | <u>Abdi Said Aden</u>         | Translator/Information Officer |
| Schools' Action for<br>Developing Countries | <u>Holger Susort</u>          | Head                           |
| Somali Relief Association                   | <u>Mohammed Hassan</u>        | Executive Officer              |

## APPENDIX III

### Somalia after UNOSOM

*Oslo, 9 - 10 March 1995*

#### Programme

##### *Thursday, 9 March:*

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| 11:00 - 13:00 | Arrival and registration of participants  |
| 13:00         | Welcome, by <i>Dr. Astrid Nøklebye Heiberg, President of the Norwegian Red Cross</i> (read by Mr. Sven Mollekleiv)  |
| 13:15         | Opening statement, by <i>Mr. Jan Egeland, State Secretary, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>  |
| 14:00         | Coffee break  |
| 14:30         | <b>Session I: The Political and Security Situation in Somalia: Situation analysis and Prospects for the Future.</b><br>Chairperson: <i>Ms. Anne M. Bauer</i><br>Key-note speech by <i>Professor Ioan M. Lewis</i> |
| 15:15         | Panel commentaries<br>Discussants: <i>Dr. Ahmed Y. Farah, Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Dr. Mohamed H. Mukhtar, Mr. Sture Normark, Dr. Said Samatar</i>   |
| 16:00         | Short break   |
| 16:10         | General discussion  |
| 17:30         | Summary and concluding remarks to Session I.<br>Commentator: <i>Dr. Bernhard Helander</i>   |

*Friday, 10 March*

- 09:00      **Session II: The Immediate and Long-term Humanitarian Requirements: Needs assessment and priorities.**  
Chairperson: *Ms. Bente A. MacBeath*  
Key-note speech by *Mr. Sam Engelstad*
- 09:45      Panel commentaries  
Discussants: *Mr. Erling Dessau,*  
*Mr. Alard du Bois-Reymond, Mr. A. Abby Farah,*  
*Amb. Mohamed M. Sahnoun, Ms. Deborah Saidy*
- 10:30      Coffee break
- 10:45      General discussion
- 12:00      Summary and concluding remarks to Session II.  
Commentator: *Dr. Bernhard Helander*
- 12:30      Lunch for all registered participants at  
Restaurant Holbergs
- 13:30      **Session III: The Effort of International Aid Organizations in Somalia: Challenges and Prospects for a Co-ordinated Effort between the Agencies.**  
Chairperson: *Mr. Jan M. Haakonsen*  
Key-note speech by *Dr. Ahmed M. Hassan*
- 14:30      Panel commentaries  
Discussants: *Ms. Halima A. Arush, Ms. Danielle Coquoz,*  
*Ms. Asha G. Dirie, Dr. Paolo Dieci, Mr. Roland Marchal,*  
*Dr. Nancy Smith,*
- 15:00      Coffee break
- 15:15      General discussion
- 17:00      Summary and concluding remarks to Session III.  
Commentator: *Dr. Bernhard Helander*
- 17:30      Closing of the conference, by *Mr. Sven Mollekleiv,*  
*Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross*



# The fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent

## ***Humanity***

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours - in its international and national capacity - to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

## ***Impartiality***

It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

## ***Neutrality***

In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

## ***Independence***

The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subjects to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

## ***Voluntary service***

It is a voluntary relief organisation not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

## ***Unity***

There can only be one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

## ***Universality***

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is world-wide.

