

THE SCRAMBLE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

History of Somalia

(1827-1977)

Mohamed Osman Omar

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Physical and Political Geography

The British Somali Coast Protectorate extends from Lehadu, or more properly Loyada, on the west—situated about half-way between Zaila and Djibuti—to Bandar Ziade on the east, that is, from $43^{\circ} 15'$ to 49° east longitude.

Though the extent of the Protectorate of the Somalian coast in terms of its inland spread has not been defined, it includes the territory usually occupied by tribes such as half of the Esa, Gadabursi, numerous Habr Awal tribes, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala and Warsangali.

It is bound on the north by the sea, on the west by the artificial line of demarcation between the French and English Protectorates which runs from Loyada to Abbaswain, Biyo Kaboba, and Gildessa. Its southern boundary is demarcated by Somali tribes under Harrar and, roughly speaking, the 8° of north latitude as far as 47° east longitude, whence, treading north-east, the eastern boundary is defined by the extent of the Warsangali territory up to the 49° east longitude.

The maritime plain is of varying extent: on the east and as far west as between Karan and Berbera (longitude $45^{\circ} 30'$). The lofty mountains approach the sea: south of Berbera and Bulhar the Golis range of mountains may be said to run parallel to the coast at a distance of about 40

to 50 miles. Parts of the south-west Habr Awal country and the Gadabursi country are mountainous. The Esa country is flat, gradually rising to Gildessa where the mountains are entered.

To the south of the main ranges, on the south-west lies the great waterless plateau called the "Haud" which running south-west, loses itself in the Nogal valley. The highest ranges appear to be on the east where they approach 7,000 feet. The highest point of the Golis range is Tawawur Feet. The general level of the Haud is about 4000 feet above sea level.

There is not one real river in all this vast region. Broad, dry, sandy river beds with low banks are frequently met with, and these carry off the rainfall which falls at uncertain intervals and are, generally speaking, dry in a few hours, although very many of them hold a good supply of water below the surface.

The country, on the whole, may be said to be a very rugged, arid one and unfit for cultivation, although there are large tracts which, had they a continuous rain-fall for a few months of the year, would be covered with crops, for in these portions the soil is good.

It cannot be said that the Somali Coast protectorate is, as far as it has been explored, a well-wooded or a densely jungle-covered country. Some of the eastern range and parts of the Golis Mountains are well covered with vegetation and large trees are found in parts of these ranges. In other parts of the country there is often found dense thorn jungle, but the general aspect of the country is open with scattered bush-mimosa trees. In places there are much aloe and the "hig" or *Sansevieria Ehrenbergii*. Along the banks of the dry river beds the tree-growth is frequently fairly luxuriant.

The local terms given to the maritime plain, ghausts, and high plateaus, are as follows:

The maritime plain "Guban".

Above the ghauts "Ogo".
 Between these two "Ogo-Gudan".
 The waterless plateau between
 the Ogo and the Ogaden tribes
 below 8° 30' south latitude. "The Haud".
 South of that "The Ogaden".

The area of the Protectorate may be very roughly estimated at about 75,000 square miles.

The Protectorate is certainly a dry land though heavy rain falls at times and especially far inland. There is no regular rainy season unless this may be said to exist in the Haud. In the maritime plain rain may be expected in two or three heavy falls of a few inches between November and April.

The higher ranges of mountains experience more frequent rain.

About May and June fairly heavy rain may be expected in and about the Haud.

The following description of the seasons is taken from Captain Swayne's Reconnaissance Report of 1891:

1. *Jilal*—January to April—The driest season—Great heat.

2. *Gu*—May, June—The heavier rains (little felt on the coast).

3. *Haga*—July, August, September—The hot weather—The kharif or south-west monsoon blows furiously. Cold above the Ghauts, hot in Guban with sand-storms.

4. *Dair*—October, November, December—the lighter rains—Heavy on the coast.

5. *Jilal* is a season of great heat just before *Gu* called Kalil".

The climate of the country may be briefly described as very pleasant, though with a hot sun, or for six months of the year, very hot in the plains for three or four months, especially when the strong "kharif" wind is blowing with clouds of dust and sand, and generally very healthy.

During the cold season the range of temperature is great and the cold on the higher lands trying at night. The Somalis seem to suffer more from the chills, due to insufficient clothing, than from any other complaints.

If by the term “chief staples” is meant “important products in a particular region” the subject may be dismissed with the assertion that there are practically none. The “principal products” are gums, skins, hides, ghee, and the live-stock consisting of cattle, sheep and goats. Coffee, waras (bastard saffron), ivory, &c., pass through the protectorate from remoter districts but are not really products of the country.*

MINERAL DEPOSITS, CROPS, AND ROADS

As far as mineral deposits in the country were concerned, the British in a Handbook prepared under the guidance of the British Foreign Office on Somaliland and Sokotra reported that sample obtained from a locality 53 miles east of Berbera and 30 miles south of Karam was examined by the Imperial Institute. They reported as follows: “If the specimen now reported on is fairly representative of the coal obtainable from this deposit, the latter can be of no immediate value except for local use, as the coal could not compete even in the nearer Mediterranean and East African markets with better coal available from other sources. The deposit may, however, be of great economic value to Somaliland later on, and should be thoroughly examined.”

As for gold, the report said:

“Gold—Statements are to be met with, especially in older accounts of the country, to the effect that gold-fields exist in British Somaliland. It has been suggested that

* Foreign Department Somal Coast Protectorate, March 1893, NAI, New Delhi. (National Archives of India, hereafter cited as NAI)

the gold-producing district, known to the ancient Ethiopian Empire as Sasu, may be located in the north-eastern corner of Somaliland, stretching southwards in the direction of Obbia in Italian Somaliland. Attempts have also been made to prove that the gold-bearing country known to the ancient Egyptians as Punt is identical with those part of Somaliland. There is, however, no evidence of the existence of gold-fields in the country. The ranges of the Somali hinterland are Archaean gneiss, schists, and granites, but notwithstanding their resemblance to those of Egypt, they do not, so far as is known, furnish auriferous deposits. Recent expeditions into the interior of Italian Somaliland, such as those of Bricchetti and Robecchi, make no reference to modern gold-washing or even to gold occurrences. It is true that alluvial gold has been found in British Somaliland; but on the whole it seems unlikely that the country possesses any rich deposits of the minerals."

The Handbook "*British Somaliland and Sokotra*"* states: "The existence of mineral oil in the Protectorate has been investigated by the Colonial Office, whose experts reported that oil had been found about 28 miles south of Berbera. Their report was considered to justify preliminary boring on a considerable scale, but owing to the war these have not yet been undertaken.

"Salt—It is stated that the salt-pans which exist behind the town of Karam can be worked at a profit. The exact commercial prospects of the undertaking are, however, not ascertainable at present. Samples of salt from various parts of Somaliland have been submitted to the Imperial Institute for examination. It was reported that refined salt of good quality could be obtained therefrom.

"Lithographic stone is found at Eilo, and apparently elsewhere also; limestone is widely distributed; gypsum

* British Somaliland and Sokotros, Foreign Office, London, March 1919.

is found at Kirrit and many other places; lead, silver, cinnabar, and talc are reported from the Warsangeli country. Natural hot springs are known to exist in various places, but their waters have not been analysed.”

Roads—According to the British document of March 1919, there were no roads in British Somaliland in the European sense of the word. The only road which could be considered suitable for wheeled traffic was constructed during the operations against the freedom fighter, whom the British called “the Mad Mullah”, in 1902-4 and ran from Berbera to Bihendula and on through the Sheikh Pass to Burao and Kirrit. From the pass there were two branches, one to Wadamago and the other to Bohotle. It was a rough military road. But the British believed that the roads fit for wheeled traffic could be constructed on the maritime plain at no very great expense.

A railway was projected and surveyed between Berbera and Harrar (276 miles) with a branch line from Argan to Burao (97 miles). The first was thought to be of commercial as well as strategic value but the second was recommended solely on military grounds.

The British found that the agricultural products were at that time insignificant and the Somalis, for their food grain as well as for rice and dates, depended largely upon imports. But the competent authorities made the following suggestions for the possible development of the country.

The Handbook recorded: “It is suggested that the Golis range of the mountains offers excellent prospects for the cultivation of coffee, the conditions being somewhat similar to those existing in the Harrar province of Abyssinia, which produces some of the finest coffee in the world.

There are said to be very good prospects for the cultivation of the date-palm on the coast; this matter has been already taken in hand by the Government of the Protectorate.

The country produces various types of fibre, but the only one which seems to offer any commercial prospects is known as *Sansevieria Ehrenbergii*. This fibre has always been used by the Somalis in the manufacture of their camel ropes. Even when cleaned by hand, after the rough and ready native methods, it fetched a good price on the London market. It is classed with the best sisal hemp, and when properly cleaned should command from £34 to £35 per ton. The plant is very common throughout the country and the supply is practically unlimited. An attempt was made to exploit it, but owing to the trouble in the interior, the project had to be abandoned.

The Handbook observed that "Myrrh is obtained from the didin tree (*Balsamodendron myrrha*), which is found in the eastern part of the coastal region and also in the Warsangeli country and southwards thereof. There are two kinds of frankincense, loban dakar, which comes from the mohar (*Boswellia Carteri*), a tree common in the maritime mountains south of Berbera and in the Warsangeli and Mijjerten countries, and loban maidi, which is obtained from the yehar tree (*Boswellia Frereana*), found in the north-east of the country. The wood of the deyib (*Juniperus procera*), a large cedar, is suitable for making lead pencils; the tree is specially abundant on the top of the scarp of the interior plateau.

Tobacco—It is said that tobacco grows well both on the coast and in the interior. The locality most suitable for its growth would probably be the foot-hills of the Golis range.

Live Stock—The great bulk of the wealth of Somaliland consists in live stock belonging to the natives. There is good grazing in most parts of the country. The camel is by far the most important domestic animal. It is kept mainly for its milk, which is a principal food of the Somali; and its flesh, which is highly esteemed by the natives, is occasionally eaten. The Somali camel is an excellent beast

of burden; it can carry a load of 300 lb. for several successive days, travelling nine hours a day. The natives never ride their camels, though they would make good mounts.

“There are considerable herds of cattle, which are confined to the Golis range and the neighbouring hills. They are of the small-horned or hornless zebu variety, and give fair milk, but are not nearly such fine animals as the Abyssinian breed. They are kept to provide the ghee, or clarified butter, which is consumed in considerable quantities by the inhabitants of the coastal region. Live animals and ghee are exported to Aden, and hides are sent to the United States of America. In some years lack of water and of fodder during the dry season causes a good deal of mortality from starvation among the cattle. In all years this disability reduces the animals to poor condition, and on this account they will never be able to compete in the production of meat with the Arussi cattle of Abyssinia.

Sheep are of the black-faced, fat-tailed variety, and constitute the chief food of the Somalis. They are also exported in considerable quantities for the use of the Aden garrison. They have little wool and are never shorn, but their skins, being thin, fetch a good price on the American markets for glove manufacture.

Along with every flock of sheep a few goats are found; they give poor milk, and are of no particular value, although their flesh is eaten when mutton is not available. There is also a trade in goatskins, which are exported for the manufacture of glace' kid shoes and for book-binding.

There are large numbers of hardy small ponies, especially in the east, but their numbers are said to have been diminished greatly by the constant fighting since 1900. They are used solely for riding.

Ostriches are almost domesticated in the interior, but their feathers are less valuable than those from the Cape.

Irrigation—Agriculture is usually said to offer poor prospects owing to the scantiness of the water-supply. It may, however, be pointed out that the country is by no means waterless; numerous permanent springs exist, especially in the more mountainous parts, but as the water is only required for domestic needs it is commonly allowed to flow away and disappear beneath the surface. At Dubar in the maritime hills, hot springs exist, and the water from these, before it was required for the town of Berbera eight miles away, disappeared in to the sand emerged from the rocks. To-day the water is collected in tanks and is carried on to Berbera in pipes, where it supplies the entire population. In the same way the springs at Bihendula, Armaleh, Daraas, Shamahelah, upper Sheikh, and Harawa in the Gudabirsi country, to mention only a few, might easily be utilized, and at no very great cost. In localities less favoured, dams could be made, especially in stock-raising areas such as the Arori and Toyo plains, and the great plains In the west and the Nogal valley. It is possible that with careful preservation and regulation of the existing water-supply, agriculture production, now virtually negligible, might attain considerable dimensions.”

SOMALI LANGUAGE

The Somali language was only spoken and not written. However, in 1885 the British authorities issued order in accordance with which passing in the Somali language was made obligatory for the officers of the Aden Residency who had to work also in Somalia. In 1889 the authorities proposed a reward of Rs. 360 to be given to military officers for passing a colloquial examination in Somali.

In 1898 the Political Department of the British authorities in Bombay received a letter from Father Evangelist

de Larjasse of Berbera together with eight copies of a Dictionary and Grammar of the Somali language. The Aden Residency said the Dictionary and Grammar would form "a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Somali language." Therefore, the Government authorised to spend Rs. 1,000 for the purchase of copies of the Dictionary and Grammar.*

In 1905 the British authorities decided to conduct a written test in the Somali language as it was necessary for the officers in the Somali Coast to learn the Somali language. According to First Assistant Resident, Aden, the examination was mainly colloquial, i.e. the candidate was required to converse on general subjects with a Somali. But the candidate was given two papers containing ten simple sentences each for translating English sentences into Somali; and Somali into English; the Roman Characters being employed in writing Somali. The maximum number of marks obtainable was 100 in the colloquial test in each of the written tests, and number of marks required to pass was 50 per cent in each of the tests and 60 per cent of the total.**

The examination in Somali language was classified as an elementary standard, and the reward admissible to those passing it in future was R.180.

* Political Department, Bombay, Feb. 1898, N. 8, NAI.

** Military Department Aden Residency, 19 Jan.1905, NAI.

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A Brief History

The chapter is not a chronological account or analysis of the history of Somaliland. It tries to illuminate the history of the Somali people by highlighting a few historical landmarks through documentary evidence.

One can find the names of some of the towns on the the coast of Somalia mentioned in the records of ancient texts. The origin of Zaila, formerly called Avalites and subsequently Audal is lost in the fogs of Phoenician fable. But it appears to have been the capital of a large kingdom ruled by Amirs of Abyssinia. Tradition states that the town was originally built on present day island of Saad-uddin.

Approximately; at around 1500 A.D., the Turks took over Zaila. In July 1516 the town was seized and burnt by the Portuguese. Subsequently, it became subject to the Prince of Sanaa. And after the decay of the authority of that kingdom, Zaila passed under the authority of the Sheriff of Mocha.

In 1840 the British entered in to a commercial treaty with the Governor of Zaila in which the latter also bound himself not to enter into any treaty or bond with any other European nation or person without bringing the same to the notice of the British Government & c.

In 1848 Zaila was farmed out to Haj Shermarke by the Turkish Governor of Mocha and Hodeida.

In July 1875 Zaila was ceded to Egypt by the Porte. When the evacuation of Harrar by the Egyptians became necessary, Zaila was occupied on August 18, 1884 by a small British force of half a camel battery, 50 sabres of the Aden troop, and 150 rank and file of the 4th Bombay Rifles. Lieutenant Peyton was appointed Vice-Consul.

Major Hunter, First Assistant Resident, was deputed to Harrar with Lieutenant Fullerton in February 1884 to report on the garrison and general condition of the town. They returned in April. In November Major Hunter submitted his proposal for the future Government of Harrar. On his recommendation, Abdillahi, a son of the last reigning Amir, was chosen as its ruler.

On April 3, 1885, Major Hunter, the then British Consul for the Somali Coast, sent to the British Consul-General in Egypt, Major Sir E. Baring, the following Agreement made by the Ameer of Harrar with these nine tribes (1. Nonno; 2. Nolay; 3. Abaddo; 4. Mettah; 5. Fiddish; 6. Bubbassa; 7. Babillay; 8. Jarso Geri; 9. Manatayo):

The agreement was as follows:

“Whereas it has been decided that the Province of Harrar should be evacuated by the Egyptian Government, and that the surrounding Galla and Somali tribes should return to their former autonomy and independence, Harrar reverting to the rule of the descendant of its former Ameer, we, the undersigned Akils of the tribe, bind ourselves and successors to observe the following conditions, and to retain the relations herein set forth with the Ameer of Harrar and his successors:-

1. We promise and agree to keep open the trade routes passing through our territory, and that all *kafilas* and individuals using such routes shall be free from molestation of any kind. Any loss

accruing to such *kafilas* or individuals while in our country shall be made good by us.

2. We promise to respect the independence and property of our neighbouring tribes, and to prevent our people from raiding, looting, or with injurious intent entering their territory.
3. We bind ourselves to maintain a firm friendship with Abdillahi, Ameer of Harrar, and his successors, and recognizing the benefit we receive from the city of Harrar as the market for our products and source of many of our supplies, we promise never in any way to attempt to molest, injure, or disturb the peace of the said city or its environs.

We agree to pay to the said Abdillahi and his successors the small yearly tribute comprised under the terms “*Zecca*” and “*Arifa*,” which tribute was always paid by us to the former Ameer before the Egyptian occupation.

It being agreed that on our bringing in and presenting such tribute we shall receive from the Ameer of Harrar such recognition of our having preserved, the conditions of this Treaty in all its terms as will be commensurate with our faithfulness in doing so, and proportionate to the value of yearly tribute collected and paid by us.

Signed at Harrar this 21st day of March 1885”.

(Signatures of the Akils of the tribes mentioned in letter of the 3rd April 1885, from her Majesty’s Consul for Somali Coast to Her Majesty’s Consul-General at Cairo.)

Following is the letter from Haj Abdullahi, son of the late Ameer Muhammad bin Ali bin Nasr Abd-Shakur, to Major Hunter, Her Majesty’s Consul for the Somali Coast, dated 5 Jamadi II, 1302 (22nd March 1885):

“After compliments—After inquiring about your health, we hope that you are perfectly well.

“We have received your letter and understood its contents. We are thankful to the great British Government for the assistance they afforded in restoring to us

the right of our late father, which God decreed to be done by the hand of your Government.

“We hope in God to pacify our part, and to lead it on the right way. As regards Lieutenant Peyton, he has done nothing but good since his arrival. Hereafter, no such thing will take place as will not please you as directed by you.

“As for the subjects (God willing), no oppression or molestation will be practised against them according to our Muhammad sacred law “*Shariyah*”. We solicit the almighty to pardon us and grant health, which is necessary. In respect to the foreigners, we will do our best endeavours to promote their welfare, which is important for trade. In the same way we will reduce taxes which would be a burden on the people. This is what is necessary to inform you at present.”*

Lieutenant Peyton was sent to make the necessary arrangements. Major Heath, British Officer of the Somali Coast accompanied him in order to expedite the removal of the Egyptian garrison. They left Harrar in June 1885 when the last detachment of the Egyptian garrison sailed from Zaila.

The French occupied Jibuti in December 1887. In February 1888, the British concluded a convention with French by which the boundary line was fixed. Since that date the exclusive British administration of Zaila has continued and a small garrison occupied the town. These districts (Berbera and Bulhar) and those lying to the east have always been, as far as is known, independent. The British Government, as far back as 1827, recognised the independence of the Somalis and entered in to treaties with them.

In February 1885 the establishment of a British Protectorate from Gubbet Kharab to Ras Galweni and the

* Foreign Department, Secret-E 1885, No. 55/190, NAI, New Delhi.

conclusion of agreements with the several Somali tribes was communicated to France, and in July 1887 to the other Powers.

The Foreign Office document, *British Somaliland and Sokotra* dated March, 1919 describes British Somaliland's Position and Frontiers as follows:

"BRITISH SOMALILAND, which has a area of about 58,000 square miles, lies between 11°27' and 8° north latitude and 42° 35' and 49° east longitude. It is bounded on the north by the Gulf of Aden, and on all other sides by land. The great sea-routes leading from the Suez Canal to the East, to Australasia, and to East Africa pass close to its coast. Its land frontiers march with Italian Somaliland in the east and south-east, with Abyssinia in the north-west, and with French Somaliland in the west. Almost all its boundaries are artificial lines, which have not been demarcated. In the east the line follows the meridian of 49° east (a short distance east of Bandar Ziada) from the sea to its junction with 9° north latitude. From this point the line goes south-west to the intersection of 48° east longitude with the eighth parrallel of north latitude, which it then follows as far as 47° east longitude. It then turns west-north-west to Arran Arrhe (about 9°4' N, and 43°53' E), whence it goes in a north-north-westerly direction to the mountain of Jifa medir (about 9°42' N43°15' E). Here it turns almost due north and runs for about ten miles to mount Egu, next west-north-west for about the same distance along the Sau range, and then north-north-west via Bia Anot to Mount Somadu. From here it follows the caravan-route from Bia-Kaboba to Zeila as far as Abaswein, and then a straight line, passing a short distance west of Jallelo (about 10°59' N, and 43° E), to Loyi Ada on the Gulf of Aden . The seasonal migrations of the nomadic tribes compel some of them to cross and recross the south-west frontiers at least once a year, but in practice this custom occasions no trouble. The only

remedy would be a vast readjustment of boundaries, which would add enormously to the area of the Protectorate.

The Protectorate owes its origin to the capture and occupation of Aden by the British in 1839. In the following year the East India Company made treaties with the Sultan of Tajura (now in French Somaliland) and the Governor of Zeila, binding each of them, in effect, not to enter into treaty relations with other Powers, and securing the cession of small islands off these two harbours.

On September 7, 1877, an agreement was concluded between the British and Egyptian Governments, which recognized Egyptian jurisdiction over the Somali coast, subject to the following condition, embodied in Article V:

“The present Agreement shall definitely come into operation soon as His Imperial Majesty the Sultan shall have given a formal assurance to Her Majesty’s Government that no portion of the territory of the Somali coast, a territory which, together with all other countries incorporated with Egypt and forming an integral part of the Empire, shall be the countries placed under His Highness’ hereditary rule, be ceded on any pretence whatever to a foreign Power.”

According to the Handbook this assurance was never given, and the agreement remained inoperative. The Egyptian Government, however, exercised *de facto* jurisdiction over the whole Somali coast till 1884, when in consequence of the collapse of Egyptian authority in Sudan, it was decided that the Egyptian should retire from the whole of the coast, between the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Ras Hafun, on the Indian Ocean, south of Cape Guardafui.

MOGADISHU

Mogadishu, the capital of the Somali Republic, inde-

pendent since 1960, comprising the former Italian and British Somalilands.

Although it is not specifically mentioned in the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (ca. A.D. 106), this Alexandrine report attests the presence of Arab and Egyptian traders on the coast. The principal exports were cinnamon, frankincense, tortoise-shell and "slave of the better sort, which are brought to Egypt in increasing numbers." Recent excavation at Ras Hafun by H.N. Chittick, as yet unpublished, disclosed Egyptian pottery of Roman Imperial period, probably 2nd to 3rd century A.D. Apart from some ruins of uncertain date that are possibly South Arabian, Makdishu is stated by a 16th century *Chronica dos Reyes del Quiloa*, preserved in a summary form by Joao de Barros, to have been founded by the "first people of the coast who came to the land of Sofala (q.a.) in quest of gold."

This date is uncertain, but it was at some time between the 10th and 12th centuries A.D., when the Sofala gold trade became the monopoly of Kilwa (Port Quiloa) (see Kilwa). It is not to be thought that there was any single immigration of Arabs; rather, they came in trickles, and from different regions of the Arabian peninsula; the most remarkable one came from al-Ahsa on the Gulf, probably during the struggles of the caliphate with the Karmatians. Probably at the same time, Persian groups emigrated to Makdishu, for inscriptions found in the town refer to Persians from Shiraz and Naysabur dwelling there during the Middle Ages. In the 10th century A.D. a federation was formed of 39 clans: 12 from Mukri tribe; 12 from the Djid'ati tribe; 6 from the 'Akabi, 6 from the Isma'ili and 3 from the 'Afifi. Under conditions of internal peace, trade developed; and the Mukri clans, after acquiring a religious supremacy and adopting the nisba of al-Kahtani, formed a kind a dynasty of '*ulama*' and obtained from the other tribes the privilege that the kadi

of the federation should be elected only from among themselves. It is not known at what period Islam became established but the earliest known dated inscription in Arabic in Somalia is an epitaph at Barawa of 498/1105.

In the second half of the 7th/12th century, Abu Bakr b. Fakhr al-Din established in Makdishu an hereditary sultanate with the aide of the Mukri clans, to whom the new ruler recognised again the privilege of giving the kadi to the town. In 722/1322-3 the ruler was Abu Bakr b. Muhammad. In that year he struck billion coins in his name, but without title. During the reign of Abu Bakr b. 'Umar, Makdishu was visited by Ibn Battuta, who describes the town in his *Rihla*. The relationship of this Sultan with his predecessors is not known but he was probably from the family of Abu Bakr b. Fakhr al-Din and under this dynasty Makdishu reached, in the 8th/14th and 9th /15th centuries the highest degree of prosperity. Its name is mentioned in the *Mashafa Milad*, a work by the Ethiopian ruler Zare'a Ya'kob, who refers to a battle fought against him at Gomut, or Gomit, Dawaro by the Muslims on December 25, 1445.

In the 10th /16th century, the Fakhr al-Din dynasty was succeeded by that of Muzaffar. It is possible that one copper issue refers to a ruler of this dynasty. In the region of the Webi Shabella, the true commercial hinterland of Makdishu, the Adjuran (Somali), who had continued there another sultanate which was friendly with and allied to Makdishu, were defeated by the nomadic Hawiya who thus conquered the territory. In this way, Makdishu was separated by the nomads from the interior, and began to decline from its prosperity, a process which was hastened by Portuguese colonial enterprise in the Indian Ocean and later by the Italian and the British.

When Vasco da Gama returned from his first voyage to India in 1499, he attacked Makdishu but without success. Similarly, in 1507 Da Cunha failed to occupy it.

In 1532 Estavao da Gama, son of Vasco came there to buy a ship. In 1585 Makdishu surrendered to the Ottoman Amir 'Ali Bey, who came down the coast in that year with two galleys as far as Mombasa; all along the coast, the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan was recognised. In 1587, however, the Portuguese re-asserted their authority with a strong fleet but no attempt was made to attack Makdishu. Their wrath fell on Faza, where large number of people were slaughtered and 10,000 palm trees destroyed. 'Ali Bey returned with five ships in 1589, but although the coast again declared for the Ottomans, he was himself defeated and captured in Mombasa harbour, from where he was deported to Lisbon. Although this was the end of Ottoman attacks on the eastern African coast, at Makdishu new copper coins were issued by no less than eleven rulers.

In 1700 a British squadron of men-of-war halted before Makdishu for several days but did not land. After the 'Umani Arabs had taken Mombasa from the Portuguese in 1698 Makdishu and other towns on the Somali coast were occupied at uncertain dates but after a while their troops were ordered to withdraw to 'Uman.

The Sultanate of Makdishu continued to decline and civil wars divided the town into two quarters, Hamar-wen and Shangani. Little by little the nomads penetrated into the ancient Arabian town and clans of Makdishu changed their Arabic names for Somali appellatives. The 'Akabi became rer Shekh, the Djid'ati the Shanshiya, the 'Afifi the Gudmana and even the Mukri (Kahtani) changed their name to rer-Fakih. In the 12th/18th century the Darandolla nomads, excited by exaggerated traditions of urban wealth, attacked and conquered the town. The Darandolla chief, who had the title of Imam, set himself up in the Shangani quarter.

In 1823 Sayyid Sa'id of 'Uman attempted to assert his authority over Makdishu and arrested two of its notables.

It was not until 1843 that he was able to appoint a governor. He chose a Somali but the new governor shortly retired inland to his own people. It was only at the end of the century, during the reign of Sa'id's son Barghash (1870-88), that Zanzibar authority was finally established over Makdishu, only to be ceded to Italy along with Barawa, Merca and Warsheikh, for an annual rent of 160.00 rupees, in 1892.*

Said Barghash died on March 27, 1888. The Acting British Consul in Zanzibar, Mathews, tried to help the fourteen-year-old son of the deceased Sultan to succeed the father but on the same day, Said Khalifa, the brother of Barghash, supported by Arab forces, proclaimed himself as the Sultan of Zanzibar.**

Giuseppe Caniglia, in his book *Genti di Somalia* (1921) (The Peoples of Somalia) stated: "The population is divided in tribes with each one with its own Chief and an organisation, all special, which deserves careful examination:

Following tribes are the inhabitants of the Shingani District: Jacub, Asceraf, Amudi, Bafadal, Rer Sceek, Sedda Ghedi, Mursola.

Following tribes are the inhabitants of the Hamar Wen District: Scianscia, Calmusciua, Gudmani, Dauar Uena, Morscia, Iscasciat, Baidabo.

The two tribes of Rer Magno and Rer Fachi inhabit part in one and part in the other sector.

IBN BATTUTA'S VISIT TO SOMALIA

The date of arrival of Ibn Batuta at Mogadishu is most probably after mid-January 1330 (1328). M. Guillain (II,

* Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. VI, pp. 128-9.

** Somalia, Vol. I, Dalle Origini al 1914—Ministers della Guerra, Comando Del Corpo di S. M. Ufficio Storico. Roma 1938-Roma 1938· XVI, p. 53.

548-9) on the other hand believes that the violence of the north-east monsoon in December and January made communication with the coast at Mogadishu practicable only in September-October and after February.* The Arab explorer wrote:

I traveled from the city of 'Aden by sea for four days and arrived at the city of Zaila', the city of the Barbara, who are a people of negroes, Shafi'ites in rite. Their country is a desert extending for two months' journey, beginning at Zaila' and ending at Maqdashaw. Their cattle are camels and they also have sheep which are famed for their fat. The inhabitants of Zaila' are black in colour, and the majority of them are Rafidis. It is a large city with a great bazaar but it is the dirtiest, most disagreeable, and most stinking town in the world. The reason for its stench is the quantity of its fish and the blood of the camels that they slaughter in the streets. When we arrived there we chose to spend the night at sea in spite of its extreme roughness, rather than pass a night in the town, because of its filth.

Ibn Battuta sailed from Zaila for fifteen nights and reached Maqdashaw, which he said was "a town of enormous size." He said: "Its inhabitants are merchants possessed of vast resources; they own large numbers of camels, of which they slaughter hundreds every day (for food), and also have large quantities of sheep. In this place (is) manufactured the woven fabrics called after it, which are unequalled and exported from it to Egypt and elsewhere. (The continuing importance of the cotton industry at Mogadishu is confirmed by Guillain)."***

Mogadishu was founded in the tenth century as a trading colony by Arabs from the Persian Gulf, the principal group being from al-Hasa. The fidelity of Ibn

* H.A. R. Gibb, et.al. (eds.) *The Travels of Ibn Batuta*, AD. 1325-1354, Vol. II.

** *Documents Sur l' Afrique Orientale*, Paris, 1856, Vol.II, p 531.

Battuta's account of this place is attested by Guillain.*

The Arab Geographer remarked: "It is the custom of the people of this town that, when a vessel reaches the anchorage, the *sumbuqs*, which are small boats, come out to it. In each *sumbuq* there are a number of young men of the town, each one of whom brings a covered platter containing food and presents it to one of the merchants on the ship saying 'This is my guest,' and each of the others does the same. The merchant, on disembarking, goes only to the house of his host among the young men, except those of them who have made frequent journeys to the town and have gained some acquaintance with its inhabitants; these lodge where they please. When he takes up residence with his host, the latter sells his goods for him and buys for him; and if anyone buys anything from him at too low price or sells to him in the absence of his host, that sale is held invalid by them. This practice is a profitable one for them."

Ibn Battuta continues: "When the young men came on board the vessels in which I was, one of them came up to me. My companions said to him 'This man is not a merchant, but a doctor of the law,' where-upon he called out to his friends and said to them 'This is the guest of the *qadi*.' There was among them one of the *qadi*'s men, who informed him of this, and he came down to the beach with a number of students and sent one of them to me. I then disembarked with my companions and saluted him and his party. He said to me 'In the name of God, let us go to salute the Shaikh.' 'And who is the Shaikh?' I said, and he answered, 'The Sultan,' for it is their custom to call the sultan 'the Shaikh'. Then I said to him 'When I am lodged, I shall go to him,' but he said to me, 'It is the custom that whenever there comes a jurist or a sharif or a man of religion, he must first see the Sultan before taking a

* Ibid. II, pp. 531, 539.

lodging.’ So I went with him to the Sultan, as they asked.”

“Account of the Sultan of Maqdashaw. The Sultan of Maqdashaw is, as we have mentioned, called only by the title of ‘the Shaikh’. His name is Abu Bakr, son of the Shaikh ‘Omar; he is by origin of the Barbara and he speaks in Maqdishu, but knows the Arabic language. One of his customs is that, when a vessel arrives, the sultan’s *sumbuq* goes out to it, and inquiries are made as to the ship, whence it has come, who is its owner and its rubban (that is, its captain), what is its cargo, and who has come on it of merchants and other. When all of this information has been collected, it is presented to the Sultan, and if there are any persons (of such quality) that the Sultan should assign a lodging to him as his guest, he does so.

Ibn Battuta said:

“When I arrived with the *qadi* I have mentioned, who was called Ibn al-Burhan, an Egyptian by origin, at the Sultan’s residence, one of the serving-boys came out and saluted the *qadi*, who said to him ‘Take word to the intendant’s office and inform the Shaikh that this man has come from, the land al-Hijaz.’ So he took the message, then returned bringing a plate on which were some leaves of betel and areca nuts. He gave me ten leaves along with a few of the nuts, the same to the *qadi*, and what was left on the plate to my companions and the *qadi*’s students. He brought also a jug of rose-water of Damascus, which he poured over me and over the *qadi* (i.e. over our hands), and said ‘Our master commands that he be lodged in the students’ house,’ this being a building equipped for the entertainment of students of religion. The *qadi* took me by hand and we went to this house, which is in the vicinity of the Shaikh’s residence, and furnished with carpets and all necessary appointments. Later on (the serving boy) brought food from the Shaikh’s residence. With him came one of his *Viziers*, who was responsible for (the care of) the guests, and who said ‘Our master greets you and says

to you that you are heartily welcome.' He then set down the food and we ate. Their food is rice cooked with ghee, which they put into a large wooden platter, and on top of this they set platters of *kushan*. This is the seasoning, made of chickens, fleshmeat, fish and vegetables. They cook unripe bananas in fresh milk and put this in one dish, and in another dish they put curdled milk, on which they place (pieces of) pickled lemon, bunches of pickled pepper steeped in vinegar and salted, green ginger, and mangoes. These resemble apples, but have a stone; when ripe they are exceedingly sweet and are eaten like (other) fruit, but before ripening they are acid like lemons, and they pickle them in vinegar. When they take a mouthful of rice, they eat some of these salted and vinegar conserves after it. A single person of the people of Maqdashaw eats as much as whole company of us would eat, as a matter of habit, and they are corpulent and fat in the extreme.

After we had eaten, the *qadi* took leave of us. We stayed there three days, food being brought to us three times a day, following their custom. On the fourth day, which was a Friday, the *qadi* and students and one of the Shaikh's *Viziers* came to me, bringing a set of robes; these (official) robes of theirs consist of a silk wrapper which one ties round his waist in place of drawers (for they have no acquaintance with these), a tunic of Egyptian linen with an embroidered border, a furred mantle of Jerusalem stuff, and an Egyptian turban with an embroidered edge. They also brought robes for my companions suitable to their position. We went to the congregational mosque and made our prayers behind the *maqsura*. (The enclosure in the congregational mosque reserved for the ruler).

When the Shaikh came out of the door of the *maqsura* I saluted him along with the *qadi*; he said a word of greeting, spoke in their tongue with *qadi*, and then said in Arabic 'You are heartily welcome, and you have

honoured our land and given us pleasure.' He went out to the court of the mosque and stood by the grave of his father, who is buried there, then recited some verses from the Qur'an and said prayer. After this the *Viziers*, *Amirs*, and Officers of the troops came up and saluted him. Their manner of salutation is the same as the custom of the people of al-Yaman; one puts his forefinger to the ground, and then raises it to his head and says 'May God prolong thy majesty.' The Shaikh then went out of the gate of the mosque, put on his sandals, ordered the *qadi* to put on his sandals and me to do likewise, and set out on foot for his residence, which is close to the mosque. All the (rest of the) people walked barefoot. Over his head were carried four canopies of coloured silk, with the figure of a bird in gold on top of each canopy. His garments on that day were a large green mantle of Jerusalem stuff, with fine robes of Egyptian stuffs with their appendages underneath it, and he was girt with a waist-wrapper of silk and turbaned with a large turban. In front of him were sounded drums and trumpets and fifes, and before and behind him were the commanders of the troops, while the *qadi*, the doctors of the law and the Sharifs walked alongside him. He entered his audience-hall in this disposition, and the *viziers*, *amirs* and Officers of the troops sat down in a galley there. For the *qadi* there was spread a rug, on which no one may sit but he, and beside him were the jurists and Sharifs. They remained there until the hour of the afternoon prayer, and after they had prayed it, the whole body of troops came and stood in rows in order of their ranks. Thereafter the drums, fifes, trumpets and flutes are sounded; while they play no person moves or stirs from his place, and anyone who is walking stands still, moving neither backwards nor forwards. When the playing of the drum-band comes to an end, they salute with their fingers as we have described and withdraw. This is a custom of theirs on every Friday.

On the Saturday, the population comes to the Shaikh's gate and they sit in porticoes outside his residence. The *qadi*, jurists, Sharifs, men of religion, Shaikhs and those who have made the pilgrimage go in to the second audience-hall, where they sit on platforms prepared for that purpose. The *qadi* will be on a platform by himself, and each class of persons on the platform proper to them, which is shared by no others. The Shaikh then takes his seat in his hall and sends for the *qadi*, who sits down on his left; thereafter the jurists enter, and the principal men amongst them sit down in front of the Shaikh while the remainder salute and withdraw. Next the Sharifs come in, their principal men sit down in front of him, and the remainder salute and withdraw. If they are guests, they sit on the Shaikh's right. Next the Shaikhs and pilgrims come in, and their principal men sit, and the rest salute and withdraw. Then come the *Viziers*, then the *Amirs*, then the Officers of the troops, group after group, and they salute and withdraw. Food is brought in; the *qadi* and Sharifs and all those who are sitting in the hall eat in the presence of the Shaikh, and he eats with them. If he wishes to honour one of his principal *Amirs*, he sends for him, and the latter eats with them. The rest of the people eat in the dining-hall, and the order of the eating is the same as their order of entry into the Shaikh's presence. The Shaikh then goes into his residence, and the *qadi*, with the *Viziers*, the private secretary, and four of the principal *Amirs*, sits for deciding cases among the population and petitioners. Every case that is concerned with the rulings of the Divine Law is decided by the *qadi*, and all cases other than those are decided by the members of the council, that is to say, the *Viziers* and *Amirs*. If any case calls for consultation of the Sultan, they write to him about it, and he sends out the reply to them immediately on the reverse of the document as determined by his judgment. And this too is their fixed custom.

Concluding his journey to Somalia, the Arab traveller said:

I then sailed from the city of Maqdashaw, making for the country of the Sawahil (Coastlands), with the object of visiting the city of Kulwa in the land of the Zinj people.

3

Turkey v. Britain

In 1517, Sultan Salim I annexed Egypt to the Ottoman Empire. Forty years later the Portuguese were driven out of the Red Sea. The Turks occupied Zeyla but not Berbera. Their garrison was however withdrawn in 1633 and Zeyla came under the rule of Imam of Sanaa in Arabia. Throughout this period, Berbera remained independent.

In 1871, the Egyptians made an appearance at Berbera, and an Egyptian vessel had anchored at Bulhar in 1871.

Reporting the incident, the British Political Resident at Aden wrote that the Commander of the Egyptian vessel is stated to have given “considerable presents to the chief men among the Somalees” (sic). His assessment was that one thousand dollars had been given.

In 1827 a British vessel allegedly trading at Berbera was attacked and plundered by the Habr Awal tribe. A vessel of war was sent to punish the tribe for what the British called the outrage which they had allegedly committed. On the 6th February 1827 a Treaty of peace and commerce* was signed by the elders of the tribe.

* Aitchison’s Treaties, Vol. VII, Calcutta 1865-NAI, New Delhi, India.

(Appendix One) Berbera is a port to the east of Zaila and Tajowra and nearly opposite to Aden.

An expedition was sent in 1854 to explore the country between Berbera and Zanzibar. On the 19th of April 1855 the party were suddenly attacked by Somalees of the El Moosa tribe; two British Officers were wounded, one was killed, and the entire property of the expedition was carried off. A demand was at once made on the Habr Awul tribe for the surrender and punishment of the chief offenders and the demand was enforced by blockade of Berbera.

According to the Aitchison's Treaties, the elders of the tribe did their best to comply with the demand, but were unable to apprehend the alleged murderers, who took refuge in the interior. The British Government at last consented to withdraw the blockade on the Somalees binding themselves by a Treaty to use their utmost endeavour to deliver up the murderers, to allow free trade with their territories, to abolish traffic in slaves, and to treat with respect any British Agent who might be deputed to see that the conditions of the Treaty were observed. (Appendix Five)

Berbera was the chief port and livestock was provided through it for the garrison as well as for the inhabitants of the settlement in Aden. According to the reports of the British officials, it was not a permanent town but a collection of huts which housed a large Somali population during the trading season. One of the reports stated: "In its normal condition of Somali rule it owns no particular master, each member of the community assembled has a voice in the administration of affairs; hence broils are incessant." It further stated that, "Berbera affords a safe and commodious harbour to shipping."

The British described Bulhar not as a harbour, but an open roadstead, which afforded no shelter to ships being exposed to every breeze. As a rule it was only used as a

trading station when on account of inter-tribal disputes the roads to Berbera became dangerous to travelers.

Tajoura and Zaila were of interest to the British Government, largely because in 1840 Her Majesty's Government purchased the islands commanding the approaches to these two harbours. These islands had never been occupied and Tajoura and Zaila have long been noted emporia for the purpose of the slave-trade.

As mentioned earlier, Zaila and Tajoura were the principal outlets of trade of southern Abyssinia. The British had developed a special interest in these ports. In 1840, rumours about an expedition from Bordeaux (France) heading for the port of Zaila reached the Court of Directors. The Court directed the British Political Agent at Aden to establish and ensure Great Britain's influence amongst the inhabitants of the African coastline near Aden, as the settlement of any other power on that coast would be "highly detrimental to British interests." The Court especially directed the Political Agent to purchase a station which would secure the command of the harbour of Tajoura. Two officers, Captain Moresby and Lieutenant Barker, were entrusted by the Political Agent with the task of ensuring that the Sultan of Tajoura signed a treaty whereby he ceded the Mussa Islands to the British. The treaty was signed on August 19, 1840. (Appendix Two) The British formally took possession of these islands on August 31, 1840.

The Treaty of 1840 had two important articles, according to which, Sultan Mahomed bin Mahomed of Tajoura agreed not to enter into any treaty or bond with any other European nation without consulting the British authorities at Aden (Article 2). He also agreed not to acquiesce in any bond or treaty detrimental or injurious to British interests (Article 4). There was some doubt with regard to the right of the Sultan of Tajoura to enter into treaty stipulations with foreign powers. Captain Moresby

wrote, "The Sultan of Tajoura pays annually from 1,200 to 1,300 German Crown, called head-money, to the inhabitants of Zaila. When I mentioned that this showed they were tributary of Zaila, the Sultan and headman said no, it was a very old standing custom, and that they were perfectly independent of Zaila."

At first, establishing the British influence at Zaila proved to be difficult. Captain Moresby reported that it was entirely dependent on Mocha, from where a Governor and an armed force were sent for its protection, the inhabitants paying an annual sum of 500 dollars for their services. "There are," he wrote, "no independent Chiefs at Zaila or about it." Subsequently, with the consent of the Shereef of Mocha, Captain Moresby concluded a Treaty dated 3rd September 1840 with the Governor of Zaila. (Appendix Three) This Treaty, similar in its terms to that concluded with the Sultan of Tajoura, ceded to the British Government the island of Aubad.

The position at that time was as follows: The Shereef of Mocha held the port of Zaila by virtue of an annual payment to Mahomed Ali Pasha. The Egyptian Government had ousted the Imams of Sanaa from a considerable portion of their ancient holdings. Zaila therefore appeared to be tributary of Mocha, and the latter was dependent on Egypt. Thus there was some doubt about the legality of the Zaila Treaty. The Government of India sought information from the Bombay Government whether the Shareef of Mocha and the Government of Zaila had authority to act independently of Egypt; and if they had, it was suggested that the Zaila Treaty should be re-drafted so that while it stipulated for all proper advantages and facilities to British commerce, it should nevertheless omit any provision of exclusive nature directed against the trade of other European nations. An attempt was also to be made to procure the cession of the island of Sad-du-deen in lieu of Aubad, the latter being a mere sand bank

situated at some distance from shore. Pending the result of the necessary enquiries, the British Political Agent at Aden was to "be careful that by no act of his the rights of the British Government over Aubad obtained by the first Treaty are disclaimed or abandoned."

Hardly had these instructions been issued when the province of Yemen and its dependencies were thrown into a state of anarchy by an attempt by the Imam of Sanna to regain possession of Mocha. Consequently no change was made in the Zaila Treaty. The question of the right of the Governor of Zaila to negotiate a treaty therefore still remained a matter of doubt. Captain Playfair in his *History of Yemen* is clear on this as well as on the Tajoura Treaty. He wrote: "While these events (the purchase of the islands) occurred, the whole province of Yemen, to which this portion of the Coast of Africa had formerly been, and has since become, a dependency, was in a state of anarchy; it had been evacuated by the Egyptians, the Imam of Sanna had lost the Tahama, which was usurped by the Benee Aseer and the Shereefs of Aboo-Areesh, while they had not extended their arms to Africa.

Towards the end of March 1852 an Aden bugla flying British colours was attacked and pillaged off Berbera. The British blamed the squadron belonging to Sheikh Ali Shermarke, Governor of Zaila, for the attack. The Governor was asked to compensate the owner of the bugla, and further to pay a fine of Rupees 500 for the "insult offered to the British flag." Shermarke asked for the fine to be excused. The Assistant Political Agent at Aden, Lieutenant Cruttenden expressed a fear that the Pasha of Yemen would resent the fine as Shermarke was a Turkish subject. The Political Agent Captain Haines observed that Shermarke was no subject of Turkey, but a Somali by birth, and that the "outrage was purely of his doing and without the knowledge of any other authority."

On the other hand, Lieutenant Burton and Generals

Coghlan and Tremenhere were of the view that Zaila and Tajoura were not independent territories when the treaties were concluded. Lt. Burton was in command of the Somali Expedition of 1854. In a report dated February 22, 1855, Burton stated that Shermarke had “rented” Zaila and “its dependency Tajoura” from the Porte. He added that the Chief was anxious to fly the British flag at both Zaila and Tajoura.

General Coghlan, Resident at Aden, in the same year (1855) spoke still more strongly on the point. Having carefully studied the available correspondence on the subject in the Aden Residency records, he wrote:

“On the whole, it appears to me that Captains Haines and Moresby were deceived by the Ruler of Tajoura, who was a mere farmer of his Government, and who sold to the British what did not belong to him; nevertheless our object (namely, to prevent the French purchasing the same places) was probably effected as well as if the sale had been valid.”

In 1855, Coghlan and the Habr Gerhajis and the Habr Toljaala Tribes have signed a Treaty prohibiting the exportation of slaves from any part under latter's authority. (Appendix Four)

General Tremenhere observed in a memorandum on the subject on July 13, 1874:

“Some doubt may be entertained regarding the validity of the sale of the Islands of Mussa, Aubad, and Bab. Both Tajoura and Zaila were tributary to Mocha; the purchases were made in 1840, the year in which the Egyptian forces were entirely withdrawn from Yemen, and the whole country was thrown into a state of the utmost confusion. They (Tajoura and Zaila) now, I understand, both fly a Turkish flag. The possession of these islands might be given up in return for concessions on the part of the Egyptian Government.”

Whilst on the subject of these Treaties, it may well be

mentioned that in 1873 Her Majesty's Consul General at Alexandria had a conversation with the Viceroy of Egypt in which the latter suggested that the British should resign the islands obtained by her in 1840 from the Sultan of Tajoura and the Governor of Zaila. The Viceroy responded that the French Government had purchased from one Sheikh Ahmed some land near Zaila, and had then represented to the Viceroy that no menace was intended towards Egypt, but that with reference to England's strong position in the Red Sea, it would be as well for Egypt to have a strong neighbour at hand in case of need. The Viceroy gave the Consul General to understand that he did not at all agree with the views of the French. He entirely denied, however, the right of Sheikh Ahmed to sell the land, and said that if England would consent to abandon the islands she had bought from the same Sheikh, on the illegality of the purchase being represented to him, he would warn the French that their purchase was illegal, and ask them to withdraw from it in the same way he had successfully induced the Italian Government to withdraw from a similar acquisition. But if England maintained her right of occupation and the legality of her title, he should be obliged to give way to both her as well as to France.

Her Majesty's Government presumed that Little Aden was the territory referred to by the Viceroy. The Government of India therefore pointed out that the Mussa Island and Aubad, and not Little Aden, were the possessions alluded to, and that the legality of their purchase was unassailable for the reasons advanced by Captain Playfair in his *History of Arabia Felix and Yemen*, viz., the fact that at the time of the purchase "the Governments of Zaila and Tajourra were in the hands of their hereditary Chiefs, who owned no subjection to any foreign power, and consequently were perfectly competent to cede any part of their territories."

The Government of India also objected to any abandonment of the claim of Her Majesty's Government to the islands on two grounds: first, that there was no certainty that the French would follow the example, and second, because of the importance of the islands consequent on the opening of the Suez Canal had increased. Ultimately Her Majesty's Government desired the Consul General to allow the matter to drop and not revert to it unless the Khedive should do so.

"We are not," said the Government of India, "disposed to share the apprehensions expressed by the Viceroy of Egypt as to French designs in the Red Sea at present; but we cannot think that, in the event of the British Government relinquishing the islands in question, there would be any certainty that the example would be followed by the French Government."

BURTON'S VISIT

In 1854 a mission, which was known as the Somali expedition, was sent to explore the area between Berbera and Zanzibar. Lieutenant Burton headed the expedition. In his despatches to England, he had described the port of Berbera as having great value. On April 19, 1855 the mission was attacked and a Lieutenant Croyan was killed. In response the British blocked the port. They hoped that as a result of the blockade the chiefs would be forced to surrender those who were guilty of killing Lieutenant Croyan. The sheikhs did not respond to the pressure tactics. After more than a year, the blockade was lifted. On November 7, 1856, a fresh treaty was concluded with the sheikhs. (Appendix Five)

The terms of this treaty permitted all vessels trading under the British flag to trade with Berbera and any other ports of the Habr Awal tribe. Slave trade was barred for ever and the British Resident at Aden was to send an Agent to live at Berbera, which was *de facto* and *de jure* independent.

In 1859, an inter-tribal dispute at Berbera about the right of possession of a small fort revealed the value of the port to Aden. The authorities at Aden settled the dispute quickly but not before its regular supply of provisions had been somewhat affected. In reporting the matter to the Bombay Government, General Russell remarked: "Berbera to Aden is of the greatest value, and this chronic state of disorder and unrul[e] [for there are no rulers; every man has his share; the assembly is a democracy without laws and regulations of any kind] is much to be deplored. We are at any time liable to have our supplies stopped. I am of (the) opinion that for the protection of trade (a) native as British Agent should be at Berbera during the trade season. The existing treaties with such various tribes who are without Sheikhs or heads are of little or no avail."

General Russell's views were received in January 1870. He felt that the presence of a Native Agent at Berbera would be highly desirable, though not unattended with danger, as the Somalis had no responsible Government. Considering that there was little by way of safety; it was quite possible that the Agent might be killed during the frequent inter-tribal brawls. The town, he observed, was attracting the attention of foreign powers; the French had been visiting it frequently. It was also rumoured that the Turks were about to send their troops and vessels to seize the town. Therefore General Russell felt that it was a matter of vital importance to Aden that Berbera should be an open and good mart.

Earlier in 1847 the Imam of Muscat too sent an emissary to Berbera to claim that port as his by right, but the Somalis did not accept his claim

Lieutenant Burton stayed at Zeyla from 31st October to the 27th November 1854. In his book, "*First Footsteps in East Africa, 1856*," He wrote: "The Governor of Zaila, El Hajj Shermakay bin Ali Salih, is rather a remarkable

man. He is sixteenth, according to his own account, in descent from Ishak El Hazrami, the saintly founder of the great Garhajis and Awal tribes. Originally the *Nacoda*, or Captain of the native craft, he has raised himself, chiefly by British influence, to the chieftainship of his tribe (a clan of the Habr Garhajis). As early as May 1825, he received from Captain Bagnold, then our Resident at Mocha, a testimonial and a reward for a severe sword wound in the left arm, received whilst defending the lives of English seamen. He went afterwards to Bombay, where he was treated with consideration; and about fifteen years ago he succeeded the Sayyid Mohamud El Barr as Governor of Zaila and its dependencies, under the Ottoman Pasha in Western Arabia.”

“In July 1855, the Hajj Shermarkay was deposed by the Turkish Pasha of Hodeida, ostensibly for failing to keep some roads open, or, according to others for assisting to plunder a caravan belonging to the Dankali tribe. It was reported that he had been made a prisoner, and the Political Resident at Aden saw the propriety of politely asking Turkish authorities to ‘be easy’ upon the old man. In consequence of this representation, he was afterwards allowed, on paying a fine of \$3,000, to retire to Aden.”

About Zaila, Burton wrote: “this place called Audal or Auzal by the Somalis, is a town about the size of Suez, built for 3,000 or 4,000 inhabitants, and containing a dozen large white-washed stone houses, and upwards of 200 *Arish* or thatched huts, each surrounded by a fence of wattle and matting. The situation is a low and level spit of sand, which high tides make almost an island. There is no harbour: a vessel of 250 tons cannot approach within a mile of the landing place; the open roadstead is exposed to the terrible north wind, and when gales blow from the west and south, it is almost unapproachable. Every ebb leaves a sandy flat, extending half-mile southward from

the town; the reefy anchorage is difficult for entrance after the sunset, and the coralline bottom renders wading painful.

“The public edifices are six mosques, including the *Jami*, for Friday prayer: These buildings have queer little crenelles on whitewashed walls, and a kind of elevated summer house to represent the minaret. Near one of them are remains of a circular Turkish *minar*, manifestly of modern construction. There is no *Mahkameh*, or *Kazi’s* court; that dignitary transacts business at his own house, and the festival prayers are recited near the Saint’s tomb outside the eastern gate. The north-east angle of the town is occupied by a large grave-yard with the usual deleterious consequences.

“The climate of Zaila is cooler than that of Aden, and the site being open all round, it is not so unhealthy. Much spare room is enclosed by the town walls. Zaila commands the adjacent harbour of Tajurrah, and is by position the northern part of Aussa (the ancient capital of Adel) of Harar, and of southern Abyssinia. It sends caravans northwards to the Dankali, and south-westwards through the Easa and Gadabursi tribes, as far as Efat and Gurague. It is visited by *Kafilas* from Abyssinia, and the different races of *Bedouins* extending from the hills to the sea-board. The exports are valuable slaves, ivory, hides, honey, clarified butter and gums: the coast abounds in sponge, coral, and small pearls, which Arab divers collect in the fair season. In the harbour I found about twenty native craft, large and small; of these, ten belonged to the Governor. They trade with Berbera, Arabia, and Western India and are navigated by “Rajpoot” or Hindoo pilots.

The origin of Zaila is lost in obscurity, but it is supposed to be the *Avalites of the Periplus* and Pliny. “About the seventh century, when the Southern Arabs penetrated into the heart of Abyssinia it became the great factory of the eastern coast, and rose to its highest of splendour.

Taki-el-Din Makrizi includes under the name of Zaila a territory of forty-three days' march by forty, and divides it into seven provinces, speaking about fifty languages, and ruled by Ameers subject to the Hatse of Abyssinia.

"In the fourteenth century it became celebrated by its wars with the Kings of Abyssinia; sustaining severe defeats, the Moslems retired upon their harbour, which after an obstinate defence, fell into the hands of the Christians. The land was laid waste, the mosques were converted into churches, and the Abyssinians returned to their mountains laden with booty. About AD 1400, Saud el Deen, the heroic prince of Zaila, was besieged in his city by the Hatse David the second; till his sons sought assistance from Ahmed bin el Ashraf, Prince of Sana who retrieved the cause of El Islam.

"About 1500 AD the Turks conquered Yemen, and the lawless Janassuries drove the peaceable Arab merchants to the opposite shore. The Turks of Arabia, though they were blind to the cause, were sensible of the great influx of wealth into the opposite kingdoms. They took possession, therefore, of Zaila, which they made a den of thieves, established there a custom-house, and, by means of that post and galley cruising in the narrow Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, they laid the Indian trade to Aden under heavy contribution that might indemnify them for the great desertion their violence and injustice had occasioned in Arabia."

Richard Burton went on to add:

"When the Turks were compelled to retire from Southern Arabia, it became subject to the Prince of Sana, who gave it in perpetuity to the family of a Sanani merchant.

"The Kingdom of Yemen falling into decay, Zaila passed under the authority of the Shereef of Mocha, who, though receiving no part of the revenue, had yet the power of displacing the Governor. By him it was farmed out

to Hajj Sharmarkay, who paid annually to Sayyid Mohammed el Barr, at Mocha, the sum of 750 crown, and reserved all that he could collect above that sum for himself. In 1848 A.D. Zaila was taken from the family El Barr, and farmed out to Shermarkay by the Turkish Governor of Mocha and Hodeida.

Captain Burton described the nature of the governance of the place in 1854 in these words:

“The Governor farms the place from the Porte: he may do what he pleases so long as he pays his rent with punctuality and provides presents and douceurs for the Pasha of Mocha. He punishes the petty offences of theft, quarrels, and arson by fines, the bastinado, the stocks, or confinement in an *Arish* or thatch hut: the latter is a severe penalty, as the prisoner must provide himself with food. In the case of murder, he either refers to Mocha or he carries out the *Kisas*, *lex talionis* by delivering the slayer to the relatives of the slain. The *Kazi* has the administration of the *Shariat* or religious law: he cannot, however, pronounce sentence without the Governor’s permission; and generally his powers are confined to questions of divorce, alimony, manumission, (release from slavery or servitude) the wound, mulct, (punishment of a person by fine or forfeiture) and similar cases which come within Koranic jurisdiction.”

“Hajj Shermarkay was afterwards reinstated in the Government of Zaila, but died in 1860 or 1861, as he was being taken to Constantinople to answer, at the instance of the French, for his alleged complicity in the murder of M. Lambert. Since then, Zaila has been farmed (governed) by a Dankali Chief, named Abu Bekr Shehem. This person afforded an instance of his foresight just before I was last at Massawah, in having made a present to the Khedive’s mother of a batch of Galla slaves, girls and boys, who were conveyed to Suez in an Egyptian man of war. Although the Khedive is well known to be an un-

compromising foe to the slave trade, it was never reported that the Captain was punished.”

Twelve years after the first Treaty with the Somali Sheikhs, Captain Moresby was ordered to proceed to Tajurrah, and on August 19, 1840, he concluded a Treaty with the Sultan Muhammad bin Muhammad. Trade was to be established with Tajurrah and its ports on payment of 5 per cent duties. The Sultan agreed to accept the British advice and not to enter in to any Treaty with any other power without consulting Britain, and moreover not to conclude any Treaty at all that was injurious to the British interests. The Sultan also sold to the British the Island of Mussa. Captain Moresby had been ordered to conclude a Treaty with Zailah also, but he reported:

“I found it useless to attempt anything as Zeyla is entirely dependent on Mocha, from which place a Governor and armed forces are sent. There are no independent chiefs at Zailah or about it, wandering tribes surrounding it.”

Sheikh Shermarki, the Sheikh of Berbera, who had accompanied Captain Moresby, advised him to wait till the great fair came on. But Moresby ascertained that the *Dole* of Mocha appointed the Sheikh of Zailah, and he was determined to proceed to Mocha. He learnt also that the Sultan of Tajurrah (whose territories were rather extensive stretching as far north as Assab Bey and well into the interior) was, in some respect, feudatory to Zaylah, to whose people the Sultan paid head money. The Sheriff of Mocha, whose authority over Zaylah was thus ascertained, had risen to importance when Ibrahim Pasha had withdrawn his forces from the province of Yemen. Sheriff Husain, the then Sheriff of Mocha, was notoriously hostile to the English, but Captain Moresby determined to overcome any objections he might raise. He therefore set sail for Mocha. He was greatly anxious to obtain the treaty with Zaylah as the East India Company laid stress on it,

because the French Government were looking in that direction. It happened that the Commander-in-Chief of the Sheriff's army at Mocha was Seid Muhammad Bar, who was the head of the Arab tribes inhabiting Zeylah. After conciliating the Sheriff, Captain Moresby entered into negotiations with this Arab Chief, and on September 3, 1840 concluded a Treaty with him which was not to be published until the Sheriff was out of the way. The Treaty secured for the British the right to unfettered trade on payment of Rs.5 per cent duty. It was agreed, as in the case of Tajurrah, that no Treaty should be concluded by the Government of Zeylah prejudicial to British interests without the previous knowledge of the British Government of Aden. A small island of Aybat was also made over to the British. Captain Playfair observed in his history of *Arabia Felix* that:

“By the year 1840, England had entered into direct agreement with the Sultan of Tajurrah, the Chief of the Dankali tribe, under which England acquired the island (of) Massarah, as well as the island of Mussa. The Sultan had also promised not to enter into any Treaty with any other power which might be injurious to England's interests, without bringing it first to the notice of the British Authorities in Aden. Said Muhammad Bar of Zeylah had also on September 3, 1840, concluded a similar agreement with England. With Berbera, which lay quite outside any possibility of Turkish influence, England had already on February 6, 1827, agreed upon articles of friendship and commerce with the Sheikhs of the Habr Awal tribe.”

Was Zeylah directly or indirectly under Turkish authority? It has been shown that it was a dependency of Mocha and Mocha was regarded as a possession of Turkey.

In 1871, the British Resident at Aden, Major General C.W. Tremenheere, reported that “A boat from Massowa brings the news that M. Munzinger has arrived there in

an Egyptian steamer, and has assumed charge of his Government which extends from Suakin to nearly as far as Edd, an inland over the Hibab country and Bogos. It is also said that he is to exercise general supervision over the Bar-el-Ajam or Somali country.”

In 1859 the French Government accused the Governor of Zeylah of having instigated a native to murder M.Lambert, the French Consular Agent at Aden. British officers deputed to enquire found it to be a case of shipwreck. But France appealed to the Porte for redress, and the latter paid an indemnity of 30,000 dollars. Thus France by her action recognised the authority of Ottoman Porte over Zeylah. Therefore it appeared that there were grounds for regarding Turkish sovereignty over Zaylah as a fact. In 1864, complaints were made against the interference of the Turkish Governor at Zaylah with native vessels trading with Aden. The Porte claimed sovereignty over the whole coast, but, according to British records, they actually occupied only Zeylah, and they ordered all boats to come there to be taxed. In 1838 Seid Muhammad El Bar (the man who concluded the Treaty with Captain Moresby) obtained possession. He sold his right to Sheikh Shermarke but afterwards recovered it and shook off allegiance to Mocha. In 1847 Zaylah came back under Mocha with Shermarke as the ruler. Shermarke was deposed and then reinstated by the Turkish Governor of Hodeida, who had succeeded to the position of the Imam of Sanna as far as Mocha was concerned.

After the French affair Shermarke was removed and Abu Bakr was appointed Governor. Through all these revolutions Tajurrah still remained dependent on, or at least tributary to Zeylah. But the British were unwilling to follow the French precedent of admitting Turkish sovereignty over Zaylah. By their Treaties with the Chiefs of Zaylah, Tajurrah and Berbera, the British had acknowledged their independence.

4

The Portuguese Expedition

In July 1516, a Portuguese fleet under the command of Lopez Suarez Alberguiera seized Zaila and burned the town. *The Book of Duarte Barbosa* has thus recorded this historic event.

“After the destruction of Zaila in 1517, Lopo Soares d’Albergaria had intended to attack Berbera also, but owing to the heavy losses he had incurred, he was not able to do so. Next year (1518) Antonio de Saldanha was sent from Portugal with a fleet in order to attack the Arabs at the entrance of the Red Sea. Soares d’Albergaria, who had now become Governor of India, sent Saldanha to the Gulf of Aden with six ships, and he took Berbera without resistance. These events are related in full by de Barros in Dec.III, I, Cap.I0. He distinctly states that these events took place the year after the taking of Zaila, but as Saldanha did not arrive in India till September 1517, and was not despatched to the Red Sea until after the return of Lopo Soares from Hurmuz, which was not till a month or two later, it is probable that his attack on Berbera was really in the beginning of 1518.” The dates of the taking of Zeila and Berbera have been given by the editors of the Portuguese text as 1517 and 1518, instead of 1516 and 1518. It is probable, however, that the passages mentioning these events were added after the completion

of Duarte Barbosa's work and the writing of his preface in 1516 (although there can be (no) certainty of the correctness of this date).

Duarte Barbosa writes about Brava:

"Yet further along the coast, beyond these places, is a great town of Moors, of very fine stone and mortar houses, called Brava. It has no king, but is ruled by elders, and ancients of the land, who are the persons held in the highest esteem, and who have the chief dealings in merchandise of divers(sic) kinds. And this place was destroyed by the Portuguese, who slew many of its people and carried many into captivity, and took great spoil of gold and silver and goods. Thenceforth many of them fled away towards the inland country, forsaking the town; yet after it had been destroyed the Portuguese again settled and peopled it, "so that now it is as prosperous as it was before." It was an important town when the Portuguese appeared on the scene. The attack on it mentioned by Barbosa was that of Tristao d'Acunha, who proceeded thither after sacking Oja, and demanded payment of the tribute promised to Saldanha in 1503, by certain chief men of the town whom he had captured off Malindi. This contention was repudiated and payment was refused.

About Mogadishu, Duarte Barbosa wrote:

"Proceeding coastwise towards the Red Sea there is a very great Moorish town called Magadoxo; it has a king over it; the place has much trade in divers kinds, by reason whereof many ships come hither from the great kingdom of Cambaya, bringing great plenty of cloths of many sorts, and divers other wares, also spices; and in the same way they come from Aden. And they carry away much gold, ivory, wax and many other things, whereby they make exceedingly great profits in their dealings.

In this country is found flesh-meat in great plenty, wheat, barley, horses and fruit of divers kinds so that it is a place of great wealth.

They speak Arabic. The men are for the most part brown and black, but a few are fair. They have but few weapons, yet they use herbs on their arrows to defend themselves against their enemies.

The town of Makdashau was probably the first important settlement made by the Arab traders when they began to push southwards along the East Coast of Africa from Cape Guardafui. Although it is not mentioned by Mas'udi or Idrisi, it was found by Ibn Batuta in the early part of the fourteenth century, to be a wealthy and important place under a Sultan, who was, however, locally known as Sheikh. No doubt the gradual southern extension of the Arabs deprived it of its importance as an outpost of trade. The predominance of the darker element in the population, the lack of weapons, and the use of poisoned arrows, all point to the gradual absorption of the Arab element in the African. Nevertheless Vasco da Gama, who arrived here on his return from Calicut in 1499, found it according to the *Roteiro* a fortified town with fine houses. Cabral,* describes it in 1500 as "a very rich and beautiful town of Moors," but does not seem to have landed. Tristao d'Acunha passed it without landing in 1506, being eager to arrive at Socotra after his fighting at Brava. The Portuguese rule was never consolidated as far north as Magadoxo. It fell into the hands of the Turkish raider Ali Bey in 1586, but Turkish rule did not last long. Sayyid Sa'id of Maskat took possession of it in 1828, and the town continued to form part of the Maskat and Zanzibar dominion till modern times."

Then Barbosa's book talks about Afum (Hafun) and Cape Guardafui. He describes Hafun as a small village having plenty of flesh-meat and food. Further on along the coast beyond Hafun, he found the "Cape of Guardafuy" from which the coast folds backwards towards the Red

* Navegacao, Ed.1867, p. 116.

Sea. It is the mouth of the strait of Meca, so that as many ships as come from India and from the kingdom of Cambaya, and from Chaul, Dabul, Batical; from Malabar and all the coast of Bengala; also from Ceilam, Malaqua, Camatra, Pegu (Tancari and China); all make for it, and enter it from this cape with much merchandize. Some of them go towards the city of Adem and Zeilam and Barbora; and for these ships those of the King our Lord lie in wait at this spot and capture them with great booty, "and with the goods they carry, inasmuch as they go thither contrary to the prohibition of His Highness.

The modern Arabic name is Ras Asir. The name Guardafui seems to have been first used by the Portuguese, and belongs properly, not to the cape itself, but to a promontory sixty miles south of it, called by the Arabs Ras Hafun or Jard-Hafun. The name Hafun, the Opone of the Periplus, is still borne by the village of Hafun ...and it is most probable that this name applied originally to the whole coast, and not to any specific spot. Jard-Hafun was no doubt originally Gard-Hafun, following the well-known rule by which the g-sound of the Arabic has become j, except in Egypt, and some other African districts.

According to Barbosa, "there seems to be no Arabic word which gives any meaning corresponding to "cape" or "turning point." The writer added: "One possible explanation which has, I believe, not been suggested by any writer on the subject, is that the word is Persian and not Arabic. The expedition sent by Khusrau Anoshirvan along the coast of Hadhramaut to Aden, to re-establish a Himyarite prince in A.D. 576, show that the Persians under the Sassanian kings were accustomed to navigate these waters.* Gard in Persian is a common word, meaning "turn," and the meaning of Gard-I-Hafun would be "the turn or bend of Hafun." The name given in the

* See Tabari's Chronicle, trans. Zotenberg, vol. II. pp. 210-215.

Spanish version is Guardafun.”

As soon as the Cape of Guardafui has been doubled, turning inwards towards the Red Sea, there is a town of Moors which they call Metee (Modern maps show an island called Mait or Maid and a village of the same name on the coast of Berbera, and this is probably Barbosa’s Metee. Muller’s map identifies this place with the Mundus of the Periplus where “ships lie at anchor more safely behind a projecting island close to the shore”. Schoff however prefers to identify this place with Bandar Hais still nearer to Berbera)

Beyond this town of Metee, and further inside the gulf, is a Moorish town which they call Barbora, wither go many ships carrying much merchandize from Adem and Camabaya. They carry away thence much gold, opium, ivory and divers other things. The merchants of Adem take much provender, flesh, honey and wax, for that land is exceeding fruitful. “This town was taken by force by a Portuguese fleet of which Antonio de Saldanha was Captain-in-Chief. He destroyed the whole place in the year 1518, and then departed with the fleet for Ormuz, where the ships which stood in need of it were repaired.

Further on thence along the coast, in the inner part (i.e. of the Gulf), is a Moorish town which they call Zeila, a place of great traffic. Hither sail many ships to dispose of their goods. It is a well-built place with right good houses, many of them built of stone and mortar with flat roofs. The people thereof both men and women are black for the most part; they have many horses and rear much cattle of all kinds, so that they have butter in plenty, milk and flesh: also in this land is great store of wheat, millet, barley and fruits of divers(e) sorts, all of which they carry to Aden.

This place was taken and destroyed by the Portuguese, who were commanded by the Captain-in-Chief Lopo Soares.

According to Mas'udi, the Gulf of Aden is called the Gulf of Berbers (al-khalij al-Barbari).*

* The Book of Duarte Barbosa. Vol.I-Mansel Longworth Dames-
First published in 1812 by Royal Academy of Science in Lisbon.

5

Assessment of the Protectorate

W. Lee-Warner of the British Political and Secret Department, India Office, gave the following assessment of the British Protectorate in his report of November 25, 1856:

“The withdrawal of Italy from the Treaty of Ucciali, in consequence of which treaty we settled with Italy, as the protecting suzerain power in Abyssinia, the interior limits of our own Somali protectorate, is certain to revive the claims of Abyssinia to a large part, if not to the whole, of our Somali protectorate. The Political Agent and Assistant Resident at Aden has quite recently burned the Abyssinian huts at Alalo within the limits of our protectorate, and thus given emphatic notice to Abyssinia that so far we abide by the delimitation effected with Italy in 1894. But the success of the Abyssinians and the probability of their renewing their claims render it necessary to review the whole position, and to consider whether British policy continues to require the maintenance of the British protectorate in whole or in part.” This review is divided into six sections which deal with—

- 1st—The extent of the British protectorate;
- 2nd—The value and dangers of its maintenance;
- 3rd—The history of Somali Land up to 1884;
- 4th—Course of events between 1884-1886;

- 5th—The effects of the Italian withdrawal;
- 6th—The action proposed.

Extent of the British Protectorate

From Lahadu, a point just east of Ras Jibuti, in about the forty-third parallel of Greenwich longitude, to Bandar Ziada on the 49° longitude the coast line of the British protectorate extends as settled with France in 1887. The limits in the interior were only highly sketched in the letter which M. Waddington wrote on the 11th May 1887 to Lord Salisbury: "Le Gouvernement de la Republique Francaise reconnait le Protectorate de l'Angleterre sur la cote a l'est du Djebouti jusqu'a Bender-Ziadeh, ainsi que sur les habitants, le tribus, et les fractions de tribus, situees a l'est de la ligne ci-dessus indiquee." When this agreement was arrived at, an assurance was given to the Sultan of Turkey that we would abstain from any interference with the just rights of the Sultan. It was also agreed with France that the caravan route from Zaila to Harrar, passing by Gildessa, should be open throughout to the commerce of both nations. The further delimitation of the frontier in the interior was arranged seven years later at Italy's request with that country. According to the protocol, dated Rome, 5th May 1894, the boundary, starting from Gildessa, runs towards 8° north latitude, leaving Gildessa and Milmil on the right. It then follows the 8° parallel till it is intersected with 48° longitude, thence running to the intersection of 9° latitude with 49° longitude, which meridian it follows to the sea. Our neighbours therefore are the French on the north-west, Abyssinia and Harrar on the west and south-west, and the Mijertain Somalis on the east and south-east supposed to be under the protection of Italy. Our southernmost limit is on the eight degree of latitude north of the Equator, and the territory of the late British East Africa Company bound by the Webi Ganana and River Juba was

not far removed from the point where the Somali protectorate approached the Webi Shabehli in its south-westernmost corner.

The chief value of the protectorate centres in the ports of Zaila, Bulhar, and Berbera for the country behind them is mostly a sandy plain up to the Golis mountains with the waterless Haud plateau on the south-west behind them. But through Zaila the Abyssinian market is tapped via Harrar. The total area is some 75,000 square miles and the nomad tribes which usually occupy it are half of the Easa, the Gadabursi, numerous Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala, and Warsangli. Our earliest treaty was with the Habr Awal made in 1827. A British ship trading to Berbera had been plundered and a man-of-war was sent to exact reprisals. The treaty then concluded secured an indemnity, peace, and commercial privileges.

With Sheikh of Zaila and Tajurrah we made treaties in 1840, and with the other tribes in 1884.

The value and dangers of its maintenance

As stated above, British trade with Berbera existed before 1827. Since the establishment of the protectorate this trade has increased so much that notwithstanding French competition at Jibuti the Customs receipts pay the whole of our expenditure in Somali Land.

The total volume of trade was of course much larger, at Zaila alone the total value of imports exceeded a value of 28,00,000 rupees.

The export of live-stock (over 73,000 animals in 1892-93) is considerable and benefits the Aden garrison. The chief imports are country grey shirting, American grey shirting, cotton piece-goods, glass-ware, and rice and jowari. The exports are ostrich feathers, ivory, hides and skins, shells, gum Arabic, fibre, ghee, and live-stock.

Besides the extent of this trade, which may increase

to very large proportions when the interior gets settled, it is of no small value to commerce that shipping is protected by our control over tribes who in former days made profit of shipwrecks. It tends moreover to peace that the coast opposite Aden should be in the hands of British officers, and not be held by European powers who might be hostile to us. The prevention of the slave trade is also secured by our occupation.

Under British protection the country attracts a number of sportsmen and explorers whose exploits have created a public sentiment in favour of maintaining our inexpensive protectorate which is a point not beyond notice.

Lastly, there is always a possibility of good ports like Berbera taking a high position in the future of Africa. As African distances go, the protectorate is not far from the limits fixed by the Anglo-German Agreements of 1st November 1886, and 1st July 1890, for the British East African sphere, part of which lies on the river Juba. Even from Uganda over which a protectorate was declared on 19th June 1894 the distance to the southern limit of the Somali protectorate is not much greater than Zanzibar. Our position in Somali Land is therefore a possession not lightly to be surrendered. Our rivals, the French, are established at Jibuti and at Obokh 120 miles from Aden. The fact that the East India Company secured treaties with the tribes in 1827 and 1840 proves that, in their opinion, exclusively Indian interests were involved in the maintenance of British influence on the Somali Coast. That opinion has been held by many Viceroys of India in succession. The Somali Coast is certainly not less important to us in 1896 than it was seventy years ago. On the other hand, one risk overshadows all these advantages however substantial. Abyssinia is flush with success, and it needs ports for trade and for arms. It has claimed the Somali Land as part of its empire. If India

has to defend this outlying protectorate, the Government of India must now recollect that the Afghan question may at any moment entail heavy demands upon its military resources, whilst its eastern frontier on the borders of Siam and China is not free from danger. Trade, the protection of ships, the exclusion of foreign Powers from the coast opposite Aden, the food supply of Aden, the repression of the slave trade, and some control over the importation of arms into Abyssinia are objects of interest both to India and Great Britain. But if they entail a serious risk of conflict with Abyssinia, whenever it pleases Russia or France to embroil us, then their cost may be more than we care to pay for advantages that may be secured perhaps without the risk involved in occupation. We are awaiting from India a definite reply to our question as to the value of the Somali Coast to Aden and to India. Looking, however, to the anxiety of the East India Company to secure the Somali ports seventy years ago, and to the outcry raised at Aden when the Egyptian occupation and temporary disturbances on the coast raised the cost of Aden's food supplies from Africa, I cannot doubt that India's interests in the coast, or at any rate in the ports, are very substantial.

If the question of entire or partial withdrawal is to be considered, it becomes absolutely necessary to review the past history of British relations with Somaliland: otherwise the complicated questions of the rights, if any of Turkey, Egypt, or Abyssinia cannot be dealt with. The period of Somali history which closed in 1884 naturally falls into two divisions:

- (a) The period before 1877;
- (b) The period after 1877.

The period before 1877:

During this period, not without hesitation and dissent, the British Government acted upon the assumption

that the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte and of Egypt did not extend to Berbera or even to Zaila. As this theory was contested by France, repudiated by the actions of Egypt, not recognised by Turkey, and questioned by the Britain's own officers, it is probable that it may yet be contested in the future.

It is necessary for a moment to leave Zaila and look at the position at Berbera. In 1827 a man-of-war was sent to exact reprisals for the plunder of a trading brig, the *Marianne*, and in February 1827 the Government of Bombay entered into a treaty of peace and commerce with the Habr Awal tribes there, and obtained monetary compensation for the outrage. In 1854 an expedition was sent to examine the country between Berbera and Zanzibar and the party was attacked in the following year. Berbera was consequently blockaded, and a fresh treaty concluded with the tribes, securing free trade, the abolition of slavery, and the protection of British interests.

At Tajurrah, to the west of Zaila, a treaty of peace and commerce was negotiated by the British with the Sultan on 18th August 1840, of which one condition was that the Chief would not enter into any treaty with other European Powers without reference to the British Government.

Such was the position on either side of Zaila when British determined to conclude a treaty with Zaila itself. The action taken is significant. The head of the Arab tribes near Zaila, by name Seid Muhammad Bar, was Commander-in-Chief of the forces at Mocha. To Mocha Captain Moresby proceeded, and having entered into a treaty of commerce in respect of Mocha with the Sheriff of Mocha on 1st September 1840, he next negotiated on 3rd September an independent treaty with the Governor of Zaila, the aforesaid Commander-in-Chief of the Mocha forces, providing for British commerce and peace with Zaila, and binding the Governor to enter into no treaty with other European Powers without reference to Aden.

The island of Aubad was also to be made over to the British, and facilities for trade with interior through Zaila were promised. The French, however, looked to Turkey as the suzerain of Zaila, for in 1859 they charged the Governor of Zaila with having instigated the natives to murder M. Lambert, the French Consular Agent at Aden, and they obtained from the Porte an indemnity of 30,000 dollars for its subordinate's alleged outrage. But the British continued to act upon the assumption that the Chiefs of the tribes of Zaila, Tajurrah, and Berbera were independent, until other events occurred, which gradually culminated in the recognition of Egyptian control.

In 1848 Zaila was farmed to Haj Shermarke by the Turkish Governor of Mocha and Hodeida. In 1866 the Sultan granted a firman to Egypt under which Egypt claimed Somali Land as a dependency. In July 1875 Zaila was farmed to Egypt by the Porte for Pounds T. 15,000. Tajurrah was, all this while, tributary to Zaila. In February 1870 a Turkish man-of-war, the *Khartoum* landed troops at Berbera, and in 1873, the Egyptian corvette *Surka* treated Her Majesty's ship *Dalhousie* as if the country belonged to Egypt. The position got strained, and the Government of India addressed us in letter No. 184, Foreign, dated 9th October 1874, on the whole question. In their opinion, since "Egypt has openly committed herself to an assertion of authority by stationing garrison," and "serious differences are undesirable," whilst "our own interests and obligations contracted with the tribes have compelled us to oppose the proceedings of the Turkish authorities," an amicable settlement was required "in regard to the commercial and other advantages which we wish to preserve at Berbera and elsewhere." On April 23, 1875 Lord Salisbury replied, by Secret Despatch No 12, that Her Majesty's Government agreed as to the advisability "of coming to an amicable arrangement with the Khedive with reference to the claims of the

Egyptian Government to sovereignty over the Somali Coast." The claim of the Porte to the Somali Coast had been consistently disputed for many years, but the matter was settled by a Convention signed at Alexandria on 7th of September 1877, by which Her Majesty's Government recognised the Khedive's jurisdiction under the suzerainty of the Porte over the Somali Coast as far as Ras Hafun. The agreement was to come into operation under the terms of Article V, as soon as the Sultan should have given a formal assurance to Her Majesty's Government that no portion of the territory of the Somali Coast would be ceded on any pretence to any foreign Powers. One of its terms was that Berbera and Bulhar should be free ports, and that the duties at Zaila and Tajurrah should not exceed 5 per cent. on imports or one per cent on exports.

The assurance required to make the Convention operative was never given. But the settlement composed differences for the moment. The Egyptian occupation of Berbera commenced in 1873, and continued undisputed till 1884. Zaila was held by the Egyptians, who had also a garrison up country at Harrar. There were frequent complaints, whilst the Egyptian occupation lasted, regarding the revival of the slave trade, and the imposition of higher duties and restrictions upon commerce. The supplies needed for Aden became more difficult to obtain and more expensive, and the Egyptian occupation might have proved intolerable if other events had not brought it to an end.

As a result of troubles in the Soudan it was decided that Egypt should withdraw from the Somali Land; and on 17th July 1884 the British Ambassador at Constantinople intimated to the Porte that, if it was ready to take steps on the withdrawal of the Egyptians to maintain its authority over Tajurrah and Zaila, Her Majesty's Government would be willing on certain conditions to recognise

the authority of the Sultan over that part of the coast, including Zaila. The Porte took no steps, but the Egyptian Government notified on 19th November to the Porte its withdrawal from Zaila which had been effected by British help. The Egyptian garrison left Berbera in August 1884, and a British officer was sent to administer the place. Zaila was occupied on August 18, 1884 by a British force, and Harrar was evacuated in June 1885.

After the departure of the Egyptian garrison from Berbera in the summer of 1884 an Assistant to the Resident at Aden was sent there as a Vice-Consul and Colonel Stace taking this as the starting point of the British occupation, had submitted a first decennial report on the Protectorate for the period ending March 31, 1893.

The first steps taken were to secure peace by providing armed police and a small garrison, and to obtain revenue by imposing customs duties at the ports. These were fixed at one per cent *ad valorem* on all exports except cattle, sheep and goats, and five per cent on imports. At this time treaties had been entered into with the Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Esa and Gadabursi tribes by which they bound themselves not to cede or sell their territory except to the British Government, to give free permission to trade, to grant protection to British agents and subjects, and to abolish slavery.

On 18th June 1884,* the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, C. Grant wrote to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay informing him that her Majesty's Government have sanctioned the deputation of Major Hunter to the Somali Coast. The objects which the British Government had specially in view were to facilitate arrangements for the withdrawal of Egyptian control from the Somali Coast, and to anti-

* Foreign Department, Letter No. 1547E, dated Simla, NAI, New Delhi.

cipate the contingency of local disturbances or any attempt at Foreign occupation by entering into direct agreements with the Sheikhs of the local tribes.

According to the Secretary's letter, the part of the African coast, which was included within the scope of Major Hunter's mission, extended from the east of Zeyla to the headland of Ras Hafun.

The letter said:

"It is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to decline, as heretofore, to admit any Ottoman rights on the coast line from Zeyla to Ras Hafun, and Major Hunter may at once proceed to secure the objects of his mission by entering into direct negotiations with the local tribes. The most important of these tribes appear to be the Habr Owuls, the Habr-tel-Jaolis, the Wursungalis, (sic) and the Mijjerteyn Somalis. The chief ports are Bulhar, Berbera, Meyt, Bander Ghassem, Bander Khor, Bander Marayah, and Hafun.

The object of Major Hunter's mission, was, as the British Secretary, Mr. Grant, said, "to endeavour, on the retirement of the Egyptians, to renew and supplement on the lines of the agreement made with the Sultan of Socotra in January 1876, the agreements which were concluded with the local Sheikhs in 1827 and 1856".

In a Memo dated Aden, September 27, 1884, on the situation at Berbera, Major F.M. Hunter said: "The Egyptian garrison will leave as soon as the Abyssinia can take them away.

Mr. Walsh will then assume charge of the administration of the port on behalf of the Somalis.

Customs dues will be levied at 5 per cent, (except on live-stock) *ad valorem* on imports, and 1 per cent on exports (except on live-stock).

No other dues will be exacted.

Mr. Walsh has at his disposal about 45 armed police, besides 10 unarmed constables. He has also 30 spare

carbines, and 3,360 rounds of spare ball ammunition, with which on an emergency he could arm all the employees under him.

Mr. Walsh has order to consult the Officer commanding Her Majesty's ship in any emergency.

Major Hunter, who was the British Consul for the Somali Coast, sent the following instructions* to Mr. L.P. Walsh, British Agent and Vice Consul at Berbera and Bulhar:

“After the departure of the Egyptian garrison from Berbera you will be guided by the following observations in the performance of your duties there and Bulhar:

2. It has primarily to be borne in mind that both the above-mentioned ports are independent and owned by the Somalis. Your functions are those of an administrator in a Native State. You will arrange for the collection of the customs (at Aden and on the spot). You will keep the peace of the ports, exercising the power of a first-class magistrate. You have no civil jurisdiction, except over British subjects, and in regard to the latter, you will perform the various services usually required of a Vice-Consul.

3. It must be well made known and understood that you will afford to the subjects of all foreign nations the same protection and privileges as you accord to British subjects, and in the case of crimes of violence committed by foreigners (other than Arabs or Somalis) you will only use sufficient force to preserve the peace until an opportunity offers of ascertaining the wishes of the defendant's Consul at Aden.

4. Although you have the ample general powers of a first-class magistrate, you must avail yourself sparingly of the authority to punish by fine and imprisonment; whipping should not be resorted to. Your sentences should

* Foreign Department, dated Aden, 27th September 1884, NAI, New Delhi.

be regulated by your means enforcing them, and special heed must be had to the avoidance of exciting any undue irritation. In fact, you must not punish unless compelled to do so. Quarrels should be stopped by the police, and the offenders warned that they will not be allowed to enter Berbera if they cannot behave quietly.

5. The whole of the public buildings, water-works, and light-house, &c., are in your charge, and should be administered in reference to the special instructions you have received regarding each department.

6. Your salary, and that of all the subordinates under your control, should be drawn on abstracts in forms to be communicated to you.

7. In all cases of emergency, which you are unable to regulate with the force at your immediate disposal, you will consult the Officer commanding whichever of Her Majesty's ships may be at hand, despatching at once a special messenger by boat to Aden to the Political Resident, as well as to this Consulate.

8. It is impossible to give instructions to meet each particular point, but your own good sense and judgement should so supplement the foregoing remarks as to render you competent to discharge the admitted difficult and trying duties of British Agent and Vice-Consul at Berbera and Bulhar."

In paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned instructions, to Mr. Walsh, Major Hunter described the ports of Berbera and Bulhar as "independent" no allusion being made to the British Protectorates, Mr. Walpole of the India Office in London, reacted by saying, "in fact [Protectorate] has been established."*

In 1886 and 1887 civil administration received further impetus by a survey and map being made of a large part

* Foreign Department, Somali Coast and Red Sea Affairs, March 1885-NAI, New Delhi.

of the Habr Awal country; by the institution of civil suits; and by the opening of a school at Berbera. In 1886 Protectorate treaties were concluded with the Habr Awal, the Habr Toljaala and the Habr Gerhajis. With the Warsingli tribe a treaty, both of protection and for the objects of the treaties of 1884, with the Warsingli tribe was also concluded.

In 1888 a convention was made with the French (who had in the previous year occupied Jibuti) fixing the boundary between the British and French Protectorates. As the line fell to the west of Zaila, the French Vice-Consul who till then had resided there withdrew, and when later in the year the Egyptians also retired, the occupation of the port became from that time exclusively British. In the same year Berbera was burnt down, and the opportunity was taken to re-build it on a systematic plan with broad straight streets.

According to official documents, certain tribes had been giving trouble, and in some instances military operations had been necessary. The Jibril Abukr section of the Habr Awal tribe had repeatedly raided right up to the ports, and in 1885-86 the new Political Agent punished them by an invasion of their country and by carrying off a very large number of cattle and sheep. These were distributed among those who had suffered from the raiding. Again in 1888 the Ayyal Ahmed tribe who had been expelled from Berbera for continued bad conduct attempted to force their way into it. They were repulsed and submitted. In 1889 the Mamasan Esa tribe who were at war with Habr Awal suddenly attacked Bulhar in the night and massacred 67 people besides wounding many others. In consequence a small field force was landed at Zaila and invaded the Mamasan-Esa country. Only small encounters took place, but the Esa were driven from the country and sustained severe loss in flocks and herds. The sub-tribes subsequently submitted and agreed to the

terms imposed; and later on the Esa and Habr Awal tribes swore to permanent peace.

In 1890-91 a proclamation was made prohibiting all raiding within ten miles of the ports. A small camel corps was organized in the same year, and regular weekly steam communication was established with Aden.

In 1891-92 was a year of comparative quiet Captain Swayne, R.E., and his brother Lieutenant Swayne continued the survey of the country and prepared very useful map. A building was erected for the school at Berbera and a hospital was opened at Zaila in that year.

For the year 1892-93 a separate annual report was submitted. The cholera epidemic which broke out in Harrar and Abyssinia extended to Zaila and Bulhar and was of a very lethal type. Bulhar had the further misfortune of being burnt down again; but advantage was taken of the disaster to lay out and re-build the town on a better plan.

The neighbourhood of Bulhar was also ravaged by raids of the Aida Galeh section of the Habr Gerhajis. The sub-tribe was effectively punished by military force and a fine levied. In these operations the camel corps proved themselves most useful.

This expedition is said to have had a useful influence over other tribes among whom, on the whole, peace was successfully maintained. The conduct of the Sher Ali Ogaden, however, is reported to have been bad, and it is regrettable that the settlement effected between the Habr Yunus and the Ayal Yunus has not been fulfilled by Sultan Nur.

There is a decrease in the number of criminal cases tried during the year and a satisfactory absence of serious crime. The total number was 597 in 1891-92 and 429 in the year under report.

On the contrary the number of civil suits, which showed a large falling off last year, has risen considerably

and gives a total of 707 for the year.

The fluctuations of trade were thus summed up by the Political Agent:

“The value of trade at Berbera has increased largely, that at Bulhar declined slightly, whilst at Zaila there is a very large decrease.” The net variation appears to be an increase in value of Rs. 7,09,669, which is satisfactory. The decline at Bulhar is attributed to the cholera and fire mentioned above and that at Zaila to the cholera and the effects of the famine of the previous year.

The revenue rose from Rs. 1,84,606 in 1891-1892 to Rs. 2,19,781 in the year under report; and the expenditure rose from Rs. 2,67,295 to 2,91,208. This gives a considerable deficit of Rs. 71,427, a sum nearly equal to the total expenditure on public works during the year. But that expenditure includes large items for police quarters and camel corps lines, and Residency buildings, and it may be expected that when the station has once supplied with necessary buildings for all such purposes, the annual expenditure may be somewhat less.*

* Somali Coast: Administration Report of the Protectorate for 1892-93—Bombay Castle, 20th October 1893—Political Department—signed by G.C. Whitworth, Acting Secretary to Government—NAI, New Delhi.

6

Britain's Relations with other Powers

BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

In 1886 the French hoisted their flag at Dongarita, half-way between Zaila and Berbera and the Zaila police removed it. The French protested vigorously and claimed to have entered into engagements with the Jibril Abokr and other tribes and a long correspondence ensued. The matter ended in the Agreement of 1888 with France by which, as already stated, the limits of the British protectorate were fixed. As compared to the French the British protectorate on the west and on the coast stood on solid ground and was well defined.

The British also established their position vis-à-vis other European Powers by communicating to them their treaties with the following tribes concluded on the dates shown below:

(1) Habr Awal, July 14, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory save to the British Government; permission to British vessels to trade with all Habr Awal ports; protection of British subjects in Habr Awal territory; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents at Berbera or elsewhere in Habr Awal territories. (Appendix Nine)

Habr Awal, March 15, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty of Habr Awal tribe and territories; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers. (Appendix Sixteen)

(2) Gadabursi, December 11, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Ten)

(3) Habr Toljaala, December 26, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade, and protection of wrecks and crews of the same; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Eleven)

Habr Toljaala, February 1, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers. (Appendix Sixteen)

(4) Esa, 31 December 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Thirteen)

(5) Habr Garhajis, January 13, 1885. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agent. (Appendix Twelve)

Habr Garhajis, February 1, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence of treaty with foreign Powers. (Appendix Sixteen)

(6) Warnsingli, January 27, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers; assistance to wrecks and protection of crews of wrecked vessels; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents; assistance to British officers, and acceptance of their advice. (Appendix Fifteen)

The existence of these treaties was communicated to France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Belgium on

various dates in 1885 to 1887, in accordance with Article XXXIV of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin dated February 26, 1885, which required that acts of assumption of a protectorate on the African coast should be communicated to the other signatory Powers, in order to give them an opportunity of making good any claims of their own.

BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

W. Lee-Warner of the Political and Secret Department, India Office, wrote the following report:

“As regards Egypt and Turkey, I have explained that Zaila stands on a different footing from the rest of our Protectorate. Egypt communicated, on 19th November 1884, to the Porte its abandonment of the coast from Massowah to Zaila, and we rescued the Egyptian garrison from Harrar. The Egyptian flag continued to fly until 1888, and since then its abandonment may perhaps be regarded as final and unreserved. But we certainly offered Zaila to the Porte in July 1884. As the Porte failed to take possession, our title to occupy is good. But is it equally good to hold or assign to another? If we assign to another Power, might not the Porte urge that its reversionary rights are good? When the Porte claimed the annual payment of Pound T. 15,000 we declined to recognise it although our Government hesitated, and the Foreign Office (22nd November 1888) wished to propose a payment to the Porte “in commutation of the tribute.” So late as 25th October 1889, the treasury agreed to contribute 50,000£, in consideration of India contributing a similar sum, to the Porte, in order “to acquire a properly constituted title,” if it was thought essential for the public interest, that the title of Zaila should be secured for this country. When the Porte claimed arrears of rent from Egypt, Egypt failed to pay. It seems then that the Porte might have something to say if Zaila were assigned, for

instance, to Abyssinia; although it is true, as reported by India (letter 31st January 1888) that the sovereignty of Turkey over Zaila has “never been formally admitted, and that a British occupation has actually been established, with ample notice to the Porte.” But, if such occupation ceases, would not the position be altered? I need only add that, throughout the discussions on this point, the essential connection of Zaila with the rest of the Protectorate, and its importance to Aden, were insisted upon by the Indian authorities.”

The Lee-Warner report continued: “We have established Civil and Criminal Courts on the coast, have rebuilt Berbera in 1888, fortified the ports, erected jails, and in many effective ways established ourselves. Our garrison consists of barely 200 men scattered about. The duties we levy are one per cent *ad valorem* on exports and five per cent on imports. We pay stipends to headmen of the tribes in the interior, and have punished the tribes with small expeditions from time to time. Karam is a port from which a small trade is carried on with Aden, where the duties are levied. Besides this there are other ports capable of development. The revenue of Somali Land has increased so as to pay all expenses.”

SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA

The British Official said: “The main effect of the withdrawal of Italy is to leave our frontier in the interior exposed to attack by the Abyssinians, flushed with victory and irritated by our support of Italy, without any limit accepted by our neighbours. For many years we have declined direct negotiations with Makunan, and it must be confessed that the reed upon which we leaned for the external relations of the Protectorate has broken in our hands. We are at the same time firmly established on the coast, and have a nexus of agreements with the tribes

which we are bound to protect, with France our neighbour, and with the Powers that signed Berlin Act.. We have no force at Aden or on the coast which can resist Abyssinian incursions. If we remain, the settlement of our limits with Abyssinia seems an urgent and immediate necessity. If we retire, we had better do so in accordance with settled plan and without unnecessary appearance of compulsion. The failure of Italy to hold her African protectorate without collision with Abyssinia has its lessons. If we only want food supplies from the coast, we can still get them without asserting by force our right to the whole of the Protectorate as delimited with Italy. Three solutions are possible. Events will show which is the best of them.

(1) We can abandon not merely Biyo Kaboba actually held by Abyssinia, but also a considerable part of the hinterland, retaining the ports.

(2) If that will not secure peaceful occupation, we can give Abyssinia one of our ports.

(3) If events prove that we cannot remain on the coast without a strong military establishment there, we might retire altogether, making a treaty with Abyssinia that live-stock shall be exported free, that imports and exports from Zaila and Berbera shall not be charged more than the present, and that the ports shall not be given to any European power without our leave.

The action proposed—There is plenty of room for concession, and the question now arises as to what action we should take at once in the direction of amicable settlement.

I think that it should be our last, and not our first, step to send a mission to Harrar as proposed by the Government of India.* At present we should await events,

* Foreign Department, Secret letter No. 189, dated 28th October 1896, NAI, New Delhi.

allow Abyssinia's claims to formulate themselves and clear away difficulties that lie in the way of action. We want, for instance, to ascertain whether it is Makunan or Menelek with whom we have to reckon, and whether the surrender of Zaila to Abyssinia would call forth French or Turkish remonstrance.

I. The first step, I think, is to prevent Colonel Ferris writing any letters whatsoever to Makunan without our knowledge or the Resident's approval. This seems a trivial matter, but I submit it after ten years' personal experience of Aden and Somali affairs. Every Resident in that period has complained that, as he is not Consul-General, he cannot

II. Control the Consul. We have lately pointed out the fallacy of this reasoning, but the present Consul on the coast has written many letters to Makunan, and it seems to me that we should at this critical stage take the lead, and direct the

III. Resident to report by telegraph the purport of any communications he may receive from Harrar, and to send no answers pending instructions. The answer should go from the Resident and not from the Consul, thus emphasising the Resident's responsibility.

The next step, I think, is to follow the precedent of 1877, and address the Foreign Office an enquiry whether:

(1) We must deal in this matter with Makunan or with Menelek?

(2) We can assign Zaila to Abyssinia, if such a surrender seems desirable (a) without further reference to Turkey, (b) without reference to France our neighbour at Jibuti.

As to whether it is fair on the tribes, with whom we have protectorate treaties, to abandon them, that is a question which we must consider ourselves.

(3) The third step will be to send a mission, and the name of Captain H.G.C. Swayne, R. E., is suggested by

the Government of India. It will disappoint the local officers especially the Consul, Colonel Ferris, if an outsider is sent. Captain Swayne would in many ways be a good selection, I think, but much will depend on whether the mission goes to Makunan or Menelek.

By the time these preliminary points are settled, we shall be able to instruct the agent sent as to what he is to agree to. Probably his presence will be needed here. The value which India really places on the retention of the coast will meanwhile be known to us, and until we get the expected letter it would be premature to formulate other proposals for action. In particular it seems to me that, whether we retain Zaila or transfer it, the question of imperfect title must be settled for us by the Foreign Office. It will prepare the ground for a decision, which may have to be taken quickly, to get this matter discussed. I append in a note (of) a Minute recorded by the Political Committee in 1890 on this question.

W. LEE-WARNER
Political and Secret Dept., India Office
The 25 November 1896.

7

Turkey's Activities in the Horn of Africa

In 1870 the Turkish Authorities in Egypt occupied Berbera, and from that time claimed sovereignty over the coast outside the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The British never admitted the rights of Turkey to this part of the Somali Coast.

Major General Sir E. Russell, the British Consul at Aden, believed that Aden's occupation by the French might not be detrimental to the country and the people, but the possible occupation of Berbera by the Turks should be viewed with concern as the exacting character of their rule would soon reduce the place to a fishing village and drive away all the traders. The British Government, however, did not take Russell's apprehension seriously.

Soon enough General Russell reported that Turkish vessels had started for the Somali coast, and he intimated his intention confidentially to send an Agent to Berbera and Bulhar, in order to, if possible, prevent the two ports from being purchased by the Turks. The Government of India approved Russell's proposal directing him to state the reasons why he felt that the Turks would wish to possess Berbera. Russell was also asked about the best

course of action in the event of such a purchase. He was also to state whether circumstances had become such so as to make the immediate establishment of an Agency at Berbera desirable.

On February 11, 1870 General Russell reported that the Turkish man-of-war *Khartoum*, commanded by Mahomed Jemal Pasha, had landed troops at Berbera. In his report he further stated that the *Khartoum* had re-embarked and proceeded to Bulhar on hearing that the seasonal fair was being held at Bulhar. The Resident had no precise information of the action taken by the Turks on this occasion. Later on March 4, he intimated that the Bey of the Egyptian Government had returned to Berbera, that it was his intention to remain there and keep possession of the sea-coast territory of Berbera and Bulhar. *General Russell added that he was about to send Her Majesty's Ship Sind to the spot to keep a watch on the happenings and to prevent, if possible, the tribe from committing their kingdom to Moslem rule.*

The Bombay Government was instructed by the Government of India to ask the officers of the *Sind* to confine themselves simply to observing. They were not to interfere without authority.

On February 25, 1870 General Russell reported that the *Sind* had returned to Aden. On board was the Resident's Agent, one *Subedar* Mohamed, a member of the Somali Habr Gerhajis tribe. He stated that the Bey, Mohamed Jemal, had indicated that he had been deputed by his Government to settle the Somali dispute. "The Somalis", wrote Russell, "seemed to be much taken by the display made by the Bey, who paraded his men with band playing."

"I now write to urge that a vessel-of-war be sent to present British interests." General Russell also expressed in forcible terms the detrimental effect on Aden should any foreign power obtain a footing on the Somali coast.

The Government of India allowed for a British ship-of-war to cruise by occasionally, looking in at Berbera in an incidental way. It however felt that it would be both unnecessary and inexpedient to send an armed vessel to Berbera with the express purpose of countering the Turks.

On March 8, 1870 the British Resident at Aden once again sent Agent Mohamed on board the *Sind* to Berbera to watch the events, and to ensure that the Somalis continued to be friendly to the British. Mohamed was to tell the Somalis "that we (the British) did not want their country, but that they had an agreement for friendly relations with us, which it was not desirable to disturb."

The British Agent *Subedar* Mohamed landed on the evening of the 9th, and all went well with him and his party until the morning of the 15th, when they were attacked by the Somalis, and several were severely wounded on both sides. One Somali was among those who were killed. The Commander of the boat *Sind* quelled the disturbance, and tried to ascertain the cause of the "outrage", but owing to the difficulty in procuring evidence, he learnt little or nothing. Two rumours purporting to account for the outrage were current first that the Turks had incited the attack to get rid of the English, saying that the British desired to seize Berbera; and second that the *Subedar* Mohamed intended to set himself up as Governor.

On April 8, the Resident forwarded the report of *Subedar* Mohamed. He had learnt that the tribes had no intention of surrendering their country, and had indeed professed their readiness to fight for their independence. The Turkish Commander stated that he had no authority to purchase Berbera, or to take possession of it; but was merely there as Commodore of the Red Sea Squadron, and to look after Egyptian interests. He expressed himself as heartily sick of the Somalis, as they were continually quarrelling, and had told him that they looked upon the

Sultan and not the Viceroy of Egypt as the head of their religion.

Both the British and Turks scrambled for Berbera each one claiming that it belonged to them. The Bey distinctly stated that the country belonged to the Sultan, seeing that the Turkish flag flew over it. While General Russell informed the Bey in reply that he had no knowledge of Berbera being a Turkish possession. He pointed to the fact that the country was blockaded by the British in 1855-56, and that had the country belonged to the Sultan, the British Government would not have made an independent treaty with the Somalis, and the Sultan would have taken some notice of the blockade of his ports. The Resident requested the Bey to take no action at Berbera and Bulhar, until an understanding was arrived at between the British and Turkish Governments. The British claimed that no Turks ever visited Berbera prior to the year 1866; that the Pasha who then visited the place gave a flag to an old man, who with a few other was there on guard, the tribes having gone into the interior. The British Resident pointed out that "the fact of a Somali, or even one of the tribes of the Somali, having taken the flag did not render the country under the rule of the Porte, nor did the Somalis so understand it."

Russell suggested that the facts of the case should be laid before the Sultan's Government by Her Majesty's Government, who should protest against the country being taken under the rule of the Viceroy of Egypt. He also suggested the *Subedar* Mohamed should be stationed at Berbera with a small guard to watch British interests.

Russell wrote in a letter :

"The *Subedar* Mohamed belongs to the Somali Habr Gerhajis tribe, and has for the last twenty years been confidentially employed in dealing with the Somalis at Berbera and Bulhar and the African Coast. He is highly intelligent, and knows the people so well that I considered

he would be the best person to send, and I still think so”.

Describing the Somalis, the British official said in the same report: “As before reported, the difficulty in dealing with these Somalis is that each individual acts for himself and his family and friends support him in a broil without thought or consideration. They have no control over themselves or each other.”

He went on to say: “It has happened at Berbera that even child having been beaten, its cries have attracted notice, and the multitude rushed up; and the first action is a spear delivered, and then a general melee.”

In compliance with British Government Resolution No.1113 of the 7th April 1870, General Russell sent what he called “a confidential Native Agent” to Berbera in the Bombay Marine Steamer *Sind*, “to watch the action of the Turks, and to frustrate, if possible, the cession of the ports of Berbera and Bulhar to them, as they were, from information on which I placed some reliance, about to take these ports under their (Turkish) rule.”

According to Russell’s report,* “the Pasha in his letter declares that “the ports of Berbera and Bulhar, and surrounding Districts, are under the Government of the Sultan, and the people are his subjects; that there can be no cause for taking the country for the Turks, for the Turkish flag, it is known, is over the country; that he found the flag of the Porte with them,” and, finally that he visited Berbera and Bulhar at the request of the Somalis to settle their disputes.”

By despatch No. 104, dated 10th June 1870, a summary of the facts of the case was sent to the British Secretary of State by the Aden Resident with the following remarks: “Whatever the intentions of the Turkish or Egyptian Government may be, we are aware of no adequate grounds on which it can claim the Somali territory as part of its

* Foreign Department, No. 74-467, dated Aden, the 21st April 1870, NAI, New Delhi.

dominions. We have had relations with the Somalis as an independent tribe ever since 1827, in which year we concluded a Treaty of peace and friendship with them, under the terms of which any vessels bearing the English flag may enter and leave any of their ports for the purpose of trade without impediment, injury, or molestation. A similar Treaty was concluded in 1856, and we have in the meantime intimated to the Bombay Government our opinion that the rights and privileges which we have secured by these Treaties cannot be affected by any arrangements which the Turkish or Egyptian authorities may make with the Somalis.

“Pending the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government, we have issued strict injunctions to the Resident at Aden to refrain from any course of action which may tend to complicate affairs. We have desired that no direct correspondence with Turkish or Egyptian officials may be held in regard to this question, and we have thought it best for the present to withhold our sanction from the Resident’s proposal to depute *Subedar* Mohamed to Berbera.”

In 1870 it was rumoured that the Viceroy of Egypt had appointed Momtaz Pasha Governor of all the African Coast from Suez to Cape Guardafui, including Bulhar and Berbera.

In February 1871 the Egyptians again visited Berbera. In the following month the Egyptians visited Bulhar with a view to ingratiate themselves with the Somalis. They gave a number of presents to the Chiefs. The British Resident at Aden despatched *Subedar* Mohamed to the spot “to watch events and furnish reliable information.”

Towards the end of September 1873, the British Resident at Aden despatched Her Majesty’s Ship *Dalhousie* to Berbera having heard the Egyptians were again there. Captain Redhwan Bey, of the Egyptian Corvette *Arkha*, offered the Commander of the *Dalhousie*

assistance "as if the territory belonged to the Egyptians." And it was about this time October 22, 1873 a Reuters telegram stated that the Egyptian Government had amicably arranged with the natives to build and occupy a fort at Berbera. The Government of India on this occasion urged the Secretary of State to intimate the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the policy to be adopted.

There were no further instances during 1873 which showed the anxiety of the Porte to obtain a footing at Berbera. Redhwan Bey himself informed the Aden Political authorities that his Government intended to establish a permanent garrison at Berbera, and he himself had done much to settle the constantly occurring tribal disputes. The Ayal Yunis of Bulhar having plundered the Ayal Ahmed of Berbera, Redhwan Bey obtained restitution for the sufferers under threat that he would blockade Bulhar if the Ayal Yunis failed to give up their plunder. The blockade of a Somali port was a measure which had only hitherto been exercised by the (British) Government of India. By the end of the year 1873 the occupation of Berbera by the Egyptian was looked on as a *fait accompli*, and no secret was made of the intention of the Khedive to permanently locate troops there. An attempt was to be made by the Egyptian to supply Berbera with fresh water by the construction of an aqueduct from the Doobar Hill, seven miles off. The Egyptians were anxious to induce merchants to settle at Berbera under protection, and a careful registry of all exports was being made, so that its capabilities as a trading port might be ascertained.

In 1873-74 the British Government took up the minor question of the Egyptian interference at Berbera and also the larger one into which it had gradually merged, viz., the Egyptian claim to sovereignty over the Somali Coast from Suez to Cape Guardafui.

On July 7, 1879, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Layard, reported to his government that the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed him that the Porte had telegraphed to Tewfik Pasha "to take possession of coast between Zaila and Ras-al-Hafoon to hoist Ottoman flag, to constitute administration, to send functionaries, and not to permit any foreigners to settle there; and that arrangements as to the future government of coast will be made hereafter."

Nearly a week later, on July 13, 1879, the Ambassador again telegraphed from Therapia to his government that he received an answer on the Somali coast question. He wrote: "It states that Porte considers that authority of the Sultan should be established at once over that country, so as not to permit any foreign influence from taking advantage of present state of things. Consequently Tewfik Pasha has been directed by telegraph to take possession of it in the name of the Sultan, and to prevent any foreign authority from being established in it on any pretext whatsoever. Subsequently, as province of Somali has never formed part of possessions ceded to Egypt, an understanding will have to be come to with the Khedive for its administration. Minister for Foreign Affairs gives positive assurance that in coming to that understanding nothing will be omitted to satisfy intentions of Her Majesty's Government indicated in Convention and which have been referred to (the) decision of the Porte. Is this answer sufficient?"

But only a day later the Ambassador sent the following short telegram in which he reported: "Minister for Foreign Affairs says that note on Somali question, of which I telegraphed you yesterday, was sent (to) me by mistake, and has withdrawn it."*

* Foreign Department-Secret-E., December 1879, Nos. 197-217—Telegrams Nos. 529 dated 7th, 544 dated 13th and 548 dated 14th July, 1879-NAI, New Delhi.

Lord Salisbury forwarded a Memoranda to the Earl of Derby with special reference to the clauses of the Treaties with the Chiefs of Tajoura and Zaila, in which they promised not to enter into any bond or Treaty with other powers detrimental to British interests, adding that he “would not be disposed on a full consideration of all the circumstances of the case, whether as regards the suppression of the slave-trade or British Indian interests in general, to promote any measure which might encourage or facilitate the extension of Egyptian power along the African sea-board beyond the Straits of Babel Mandeb.”

In the meantime the Government of India by despatch No. 184 dated October 9, 1874,* had informed Lord Salisbury that “it appears to us advisable that some amicable understanding should be come to with the Porte or the Khedive in regards to the commercial and other advantages which we wish to preserve at Berbera and elsewhere, and that so long as these are maintained we should not oppose the extension of the Turkish or Egyptian power on the African Coast. Indeed, if the establishment of other European powers on the African Coast of the Gulf of Aden be deemed disadvantageous to our interests, there would, in our opinion, be less likelihood of such powers obtaining a footing on those coasts where the country is consolidated under the Egyptian rule, than while it remains parcelled out among a number of barbarous tribes.”

General Stanton, Her Majesty’s Consul General, in Egypt, gave an opinion similar to that of the Government of India. On September 15, 1874 he submitted a report reviewing the situation of the case and setting forth the advantages which would accrue from an Egyptian occupation of Somali land. He declared the Egyptian policy of the present to be an enlightened one, and that amongst

* Foreign Department, NAI, New Delhi.

the benefits to be derived from the Khedives' occupation of Berbera would be found the suppression of the slave-trade and the exclusion of other powers from the Somali territories. He therefore proposed "that both for political and commercial reasons, as well with a view to the suppression of the East African slave-trade, the right of the Egyptian Government to the Somali country should be recognised by Her Majesty's Government under the conditions that Berbera and the other ports on the coast should be declared free; that facilities should be given for opening up commercial relations between Abyssinia and the Egyptian ports, and that the Egyptian Government should enter into a formal engagement to prohibit the export of slaves and to use every endeavour to suppress the slave-trade within the territory."

Captain F.M. Hunter arrived at Bulhar on November 17, 1874 and next day visited Berbera where he found an Egyptian man-of-war lying there. The Egyptian flag was flying over little stone fort on shore. Berbera was under the control of Pasha Redhwan. Hunter was received by the Pasha and during the meeting he handed over a letter from the British Resident at Aden. The letter regarded the blockade of Bulhar by the Turks and Captain Hunter reported: "He read it out aloud to his officers, and at once said that it was solely for the benefit of trade that he had closed Bulhar, as it was an open roadstead, and good(s) could not be shipped without the risk of their getting wet; that now all merchants were pleased and conducting their business with advantage at Berbera. "I then pointed out" said Hunter, " we had Treaties of commerce with the Somalee tribes on that coast, who wished and were ready to trade at Bulhar as in former years, and that the closing of that place of export had affected the price of ghee at Aden"; and I added, "as directed, that the Resident had received no intimation that Her Majesty's Government acquiesced in the occupation by His Highness the Khedive

of the African ports and *bunders* eastward of Zaila”.

Hunter said: “Many Somalees, whom I conversed with, expressed much dissatisfaction at the present condition of things, and made offers of defying the Egyptian authorities if we would support them, but I had no authority to listen to such overtures and avoided discussing the matter with them at all.”

The British Assistant Resident at Aden, Captain Hunter, claimed that the following petition was sent to him by Derya Kallila (*sic*):

“Translated purport of a petition from Derya Kallila to Captain F.M. Hunter, Assistant Resident, Aden, no date, received 5th December 1874:

“We, Ayal Yoonus, have four sub-tribes, Hosh, Shirdone, Gedeed, and Mahmood. Know O friend, that our country is Bulhar, and since the last four months we have been oppressed by the Turks. We have committed no offence, nor have we taken aught from the Turks, nor from the English. Now these Turks have stopped our country and prevented us from going to Aden. Be it known to you that we have merchandise to bring to Aden, and all our necessaries are from Aden. Now the Turks have prevented all buggalows coming to us. We are in hopes that you would show yourself in our favor. You know all kafilas come from Abyssinia and Harrar and Ayadayu to Bulhar. When you came to us we were very glad, and thought that you would come to see us and ask about us. Your servant came to us, and we thought you would land in the morning, but we found that you had gone after we had collected to meet you. We sent some of the *Akkal* to you at Berbera, but they reached after your departure from that place. Now we send one of them to you to tell you all our important news. We have told him to take four more men from those of our tribe in Aden. We will agree to what these men say. We know that you wish only peace, and you know that in the time of Captain Playfair, he told

us to stop the export of slaves from our country, and by so doing we shall obtain honor and respect from the English Government, and have prohibited this trade. Now if the Government (head) of the Mussulmen people likes to do this (meaning if the Sultan of Turkey prohibits slave dealing), we also are ready to obey your commands, and we shall make an agreement to that effect.

“Now, *O Sahib*, until this matter is settled we wish to have a buggalow flying British colors, so that we may send provisions from Aden to Bulhar for our people and tribesmen, because we are in a retired place. May God settle the affairs soon. We are in your hands.”*

In 1875, General Schneider, the Resident at Aden, reported that “Hassan Bey, the Egyptian Commodore in the Red Sea, arrived at Hodeida a short time ago in the Khedive’s man of war *Suez* and has proceeded with some exports to Zaila to ascertain whether coal is to be found there. Zaila is, General Schneider says, supposed to have been recently ceded to the Khedive by the Ottoman Government. It is further rumoured that Redhwan Pasha has also arrived at Hodeida in the Egyptian corvette *Sarka* (properly *Za-i-ka*) and will shortly proceed to Zaila. It is also said that the Khedive contemplates an expedition against Harrar, a large town in the interior of Africa.

This is very interesting intelligence. The news of the cession of Zaila has been confirmed by the English press telegrams. The questions of Zaila and the Barr-es-Somal, or Somali Coast, must be kept entirely distinct. The Porte has a perfect right to cede Zaila, if it likes, it having been a dependency of San’a for some hundreds of years. The independent Somali Coast to the eastward is in a different position. This point should always be carefully borne in

* Foreign Department, Secret, June 1875, Nos. 45-68, NAI, New Delhi.

mind when discussing the Egypt-Somali question. In the *précis* prepared in the Aden Residency and lately submitted to Government, sufficient attention was not paid to keeping the two questions of right and no-right distinct.

Harrar is scarcely in the "interior" of Africa. It is a little over 200 miles from the coast and has hitherto always been independent. The inhabitants speak a peculiar dialect, resembling the Amharic of Abyssinia.

The cession rounds off the Egyptian possessions on the western side of the Red Sea nicely. The power of the Khedive is now uninterrupted and undisputed from Suez to the elbow of the Gulf of Aden.

The Resident in a further report dated August 18, 1875 stated that three Egyptian vessels were reported to be at Zaila. He further stated that a considerable number of the Khedive's troops are at Taghoosha, a fort on a headland about 12 miles to the westward of Zaila, and it is understood an Egyptian Officer of rank will proceed with some of them to Harrar and then return to Berbera (Captain Burton's route). Abu Bekr (the late farmer of the revenues of Zaila) has been appointed Governor, and Zaila has been declared a free port.

General Schneider's report continued: "It will be observed from the map that Ankobar, the capital of the Christian kingdom of Shoa, is only about 200 miles to the westward of Harrar. There can be little doubt of the intentions of the Khedive. With Massowah as a base of operations on the north and Harrar on the south, it will not be difficult to pour large numbers of troops into Abyssinia. The strange spectacle will then be seen of a country, whose Christianity dates from a time when four-fifths of Europe were wrapt in a pagan darkness, being absorbed at the close of the nineteenth century by a Mahomedan power, whose chief object in gaining possession of this magnificent country is to replenish the

slave markets of Mecca and Cairo with male and female victims.”

In 1877, the British concluded a Convention with the Turkish authorities in Egypt which conceded to Turkey jurisdiction as far as Ras Hafun, but the British secured the freedom of the ports of Berbera and Bulhar, and obtained fixed duties for Zeylah and other ports.

Hunter's Appointment

Direct British involvement in Somalia began in 1880 when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Granville sent a letter to E.B. Malet, HM's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, in which he said:

“The Indian Government (British Authority) are anxious that one of the Assistants attached to the (British) Resident at Aden should be furnished with a Consular Commission, which would give him jurisdiction over the territory from Tajurrah inclusive to Ras Hafoon, and enable him to visit the Somali Coast at frequent intervals, thereby obviating the necessity of employing a Native British Agent at Berbera, a system which does not appear to have succeeded.

“I have expressed myself in favour of this proposal, but before sanctioning the issue of a Commission to the officer who may be recommended for this duty by the (British) Government of India, I should be glad to learn your opinion as to whether such an arrangement will coincide with the views of the (Turkish) Egyptian Government.”

Malet replied to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs: “I have spoken to Moustapha Pasha Fahmy, Minister for

Foreign Affairs (of Turkish Authority in Egypt) on the subject and His Excellency, after communicating with the Khedive and Riaz Pasha, has informed me that the (Turkish) Egyptian Government has no objection to make the proposed appointment, but that they are anxious that in the letter notifying it no mention should be made of the fact that the nominee is an Assistant to the Resident at Aden, and that they hope that the person appointed will technically be under my orders."

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Earl Granville agreed to the suggestion and told the Consul General that Captain F.M. Hunter, Bombay Staff Corps, 2nd Assistant to the Resident at Aden, has been appointed Consul for the East Coast of Africa from Tajurrah to Ras Hafoon.

For the British, the appointment of some one who should work for their interests in Somalia, was very important as there were other powers which coveted the area. In fact, this was indicated in a letter sent by Major-General F.A.E. Loch, Political Resident at Aden to the Chief Secretary to the British Government at Bombay, C. Gonne. On February 8, 1881, Loch wrote:

"I would suggest the necessity of Captain Hunter being invested with Consular powers without any further delay, and that the (British) Home Government may be urged by wire, if necessary, to forward his *Exequatur* by the first mail.... This in my opinion is most necessary to enable us to keep up the prestige of Great Britain in those waters and in the Red Sea."

By the year 1884, the British were planning to take over the Somali territories in case of withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the coast. The Hon. J.B. Richey, Acting Secretary to (British) Government of Bombay, wrote from Bombay Castle on July, 4, 1884 in a letter marked confidential) to C. Grant, Secretary to the (British) Government of India, Foreign Department, that

“..... orders have been issued in accordance therewith for the deputation of Major Hunter to the Somali Coast.”

At the time of his appointment as Consul to the Somali Coast, F.M. Hunter was a Captain and three years later he was promoted to the rank of Major and became the architect of the British plan for the occupation of the Somali territories.

Prior to the eventual withdrawal of the Egyptian (Turkish) garrisons from the Somali Coast, Major Hunter, then officiating Political Resident at Aden, wrote to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, in 1884 (without date):

“I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's Secret No.2 of the 23rd May 1884.

“It has fallen to me in the absence of the Resident to furnish the remarks and suggestions desired by Your Lordship relative to the measures to be adopted in the event of the Egyptians being withdrawn from the Somali Coast.

“The accompanying memorandum nevertheless contains, I have reason to believe, the opinions and views of General Blair, V.C., who is now in England. Our neglect to temporarily occupy Berbera and possibly other Somali ports on their evacuation by Egypt will render their falling into the hands of France and Italy more than probable.

“In conclusion I have only to observe (as my name is especially mentioned in connection with the execution of treaties with the Somal(is), that from my knowledge of the race there will certainly be a difficulty, if not a total miscarriage, in the execution of our intentions, unless the inevitable be accepted in the form of a temporary occupation. In fact a reversion to the position of affairs which existed before the Egyptian occupation is not possible, because circumstances are entirely altered, and there are several novel considerations to be taken into

account, especially the extension of French influence in Abyssinia.”

In the 1884 Memorandum, Major Hunter pointed out:

“What has to be considered is the fact that the Porte was actually in possession of Zaylah in 1873. If Egypt is to be considered the vassal of Turkey, it might be argued that we have acquiesced in the Ottoman claim of Zeylah. If however the Khedive holds his African possession as an independent power, the Porte has no more right to Zeylah than the Portuguese or any other casual conqueror. The difficulty in the matter is, that if Egypt evacuates, and Turkey does not step in, there is no local chief who has any claim to the port.”

Major Hunter wrote in his memorandum: “Zeylah although situated in the Easa country is virtually as much Dankali as Easa—apart from the indirect interests of the Habr Awal and Gadabursi in the place. It is the port of Southern Abyssinia, Shoa, Harrar, the Galla country and to some extent Agaden (Ogaden) it possesses considerable commercial importance, although, owing to long periods of misgovernment, its popularity and usefulness have been sadly impaired. In 1883-84, the value of the trade of Aden with Zaylah and Tajurrah aggregated \$100,000, the imports and exports being about equal.”

“If the Turks go back to Zaylah they will eventually go to Harrar, and meanwhile they will make it impossible to develop trade. Egypt has had enough in this respect, but it is not possible to measure the evils which will result to general commerce from an Ottoman occupation”, Major Hunter said in his memorandum.

He added: “What therefore is to become of Zaila? Her Majesty's Government do not wish to occupy it, Turkey should not be allowed to return there; there is no local Chief who could advantageously be put in; France and Italy are anchored hard by, waiting their opportunity. Such are the facts on which a decision will have to be based.”

About 1500 A.D. Zeylah fell into the hands of the Porte as suzerain of Yemen. It was captured by the Portuguese early in the 16th century but does not seem to have been permanently occupied by that power. Zeylah eventually passed quietly under the Imams of Sanaa and during the period of their ownership the Treaty of 1840 was made by the British with Sayed Muhammad Bar.

“Tajourra is differently situated, and if need be its independence could possibly be secured by treaty; but in this, as in other cases, we may have to pay for the privileges attached to an engagement such as that entered into with Socotra”.

Hunter believed that any foreign establishment in the Gulf of Tajourra can only be viewed as a base from where foreign influences could be extended. He said: “This Residency has no knowledge of, or concern with, Abyssinian politics; but with France at Tajourra, Turkey at Zeila, and Italy at Assab, Southern Abyssinia will be pretty well dominated by the other European powers.”

Major Hunter came up with an anti-Somali idea as regards Tajourra and Zeila, “There is one alternative which can be suggested as regards Tajourah and Zeylah, “but”, he said: “it is not possible for this Residency to pronounce on its merits.”

He wrote:

“Let Tajourra and Zeila be offered by the British to King Menelek of Shoa on such conditions as Her Majesty’s Government think suitable. The local tribes, there is reason to believe, would not oppose such a course, and if we do not give Menelek a port, France or Italy will, for Obokh and Assab were acquired, we all think here, principally with the object of treating favorably with the King of Shoa.”*

* Letter No. 3478, dated Bombay Castle the 4th July 1884 (Confidential) Foreign Department, NAI, New Delhi.

From the earliest ages the African coast of the Gulf of Aden has been in the hands of Arabs from the opposite shores. In (the) 14th century, according to Major Hunter's memorandum, "the Arabs were frequently driven back on their harbor, and were even occasionally expelled therefrom by the Abyssinian Kings only to reconquer their port with greater slaughter. By this time the original Arab race had culminated in a half-African descendant. This type of race is noted for its endurance, courage and religious fanaticism, and is only equalled, perhaps, by the Soudanese of the Red Sea, whose antecedents are similar."

"At Berbera the Egyptians have done much to improve the port. A light-house has been built, an excellent pier has been run out into the harbour, and water has been brought in from a distance of eight miles, and is distributed all over, what may be called, a new settlement. Two musjids (masjids), besides barracks, a hospital, store-rooms and other public buildings have been constructed of a substantial nature, and would do credit to any administration."

He reported to the Government, "When the Egyptian occupation of the African Coast of the Gulf of Aden was impending almost all the Somali tribes, and specially the Ayyal Ahmed, implored the British Government to take them under its protection, and the Ayyal Yunus of Bulhar maintained a sort of half independence long after the Ayyal Ahmed had been completely brought into subjection." Major Hunter warned that "unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give the Ayyal Ahmed and the Ayyal Yunus some substantial guarantee that they will protect Berbera against all comers, those tribes, if opportunity offered, might seek French or Italian support."

Major Hunter sent the following telegram dated Aden, July 13, 1884, to the Secretary of State for India, through

the British Governor in Bombay in which he said among other things.

“Zeylah should be at once temporarily occupied by us with Khedive’s consent to overawe Somalis and treaty made with latter.”

The Secretary of State for India replied to Major Hunter in a telegram on August 2, 1884:

“Before taking steps you recommend, we have thought it right to warn Porte that, unless it take immediate measures for Turkish occupation of Zaylah, British troops will be sent. You are, however, authorised to make necessary preparations to reinforce Zeylah garrison from Aden as you suggest, and further to occupy it without reference home if you consider step cannot safely be deferred.”

Treaties with the Somalis

While the Turkish Governor was still in Berbera, the British Officiating Consul at Aden Major Hunter went there to work for the conquest of the Somali territory. Upon his arrival at the port, he claimed to have “collected nearly all the responsible elders of the Habr Awal,” numbering 29, and apparently, without difficulties, obtained their signatures to an agreement according to which the elders promised never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation save to Britain any portion of their territory. Major Hunter who secured the concession, told his government that: “on conclusion, I presented Rs. 1,400 to the various Somali elders and others.”

The Consul also signed treaties with similar content with other tribes in the territory. Besides the treaties, the Somalis also signed supplementary treaties, according to which the British Government “undertakes to extend to them (the tribes) and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress”.

The treaties signed by the British government were ratified. The treaty with Habr Awal was ratified on August 23, 1884, with Gadabusrsi on February 20, 1885, with Habr Toljaala, Habr Garhajis, and with Essa and

Warsangli on February 25, 1885. The British also signed treaties with the Sultans of Tajourra, with Syud Mohamed Bar, Governor of Zaila, with Sultan Mahmood Yusuf, Chief of the Mijerteyn and the Sultan of Socotra. (Appendices Seven and Eight)

The British official persuaded the Somalis to sign one-sided treaties. All the articles of the treaties favoured only Britain and gave nothing to the Somalis. The elders promised to do whatever British wanted. In some earlier drafts, it was stated that “no foreign nation shall have the right to appoint an Agent to reside in the territories of the Habr Awal without the consent of the British Government.” And as far as the revenues were concerned, “The Custom dues leviable at the ports of the Habr Awal shall not exceed 5 per cent *ad valorem* on imports, and one per cent on exports. All livestock exported to Aden were to be free of import duties of all kinds. No duty was to be charged on articles for the use of *bona fide* persons in the employ of the British Government. Major Hunter even asked his superiors “whether it is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to make the Somalis pay for our (British) agent and his guard, and other necessary administrative charges and if so, the customs can be fixed at a rate that will cover such expense, and yield a fair amount of profit to the Habr Awal.”

Following is the correspondence regarding the consolidation of the British occupation of the Somali territories:*

From—J.A. Godley, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for India,

To—The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

“I am directed by the Earl of Kimberley to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, on the subject of the Somali Coast.

* Letter No. 242: Dated India Office, London, and 15th July 1884, NAI, New Delhi.

His Lordship concurs in the measures which it is now proposed to adopt both at Constantinople and Cairo, and in Lord Granville's opinion that failing steps on the part of the Porte to hold Zeila, arrangements should eventually be made there, similar to those now contemplated at Berbera.

With regard to those arrangements, Lord Kimberley is of the opinion that, as already stated in my letter of the 8th May, the agreement to be concluded with the local Sheikhs should be drawn upon the lines of the treaties of 1827 and 1856 (with) the Habr Awal tribe, and of the agreement of 1876 with the Sultan of Socotra, (Appendix Twenty Seven) and he considers that, as suggested by Lord Granville, Her Majesty's Government should be prepared to guarantee Berbera against all comers and, if necessary, to send a small force there with a ship of war.

Letter No.243: Dated Foreign Office, London, 17th July 1884 (Immediate and Confidential).

From—D.P.W. Currie, Esq., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

To—The Under-Secretary of State for India.

With reference to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed by Earl Granville to transmit to you, for the information of Earl Kimberley, a copy of telegram which his Lordship has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, relative to the evacuation of Tajourrah and Zeila by the Egyptian Government.

"I am also to transmit a copy of a telegram sent to Her Majesty's Acting Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, relative to the agreements with the tribes, and instructing him to press the Egyptian Government to assist Major Hunter in the discharge of his mission, and to state what steps they contemplate taking with view to carrying out the policy of evacuation."

Further exchange of letters followed:

Dated India Office, London, the 7th August 1885.

From—The Secretary of State for India,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

“I forward herewith, for the information of Your Excellency’s Government, copy of the papers noted in the margin (From Foreign Office, dated 2nd July 1885; to Foreign Office, dated 29th July 1885; from Foreign Office, dated 6th August 1885) relative to the British protectorate, which has been established over the Somali Coast, and to the question of obtaining from the Somali Chiefs a more express recognition of that protectorate than is contained in the agreements recently concluded with Major Hunter.

“I request that, unless there shall appear to Your Excellency in Council, or to the Resident at Aden, to whom a copy of the papers has also been forwarded, any objection to re-opening the question with the Somali Chiefs, steps may be taken to obtain from them a declaration in the sense suggested by Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign affairs.”

Following is one of the letters mentioned above.

Dated Foreign Office, the 6th August 1885.

From—Sir J. Pauncefote., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

To—The Under-Secretary of State for India.

With reference to your letter of the 20th ultimo, on the subject of the British Protectorate over the Somali Coast, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to state that His Lordship concurs in the suggestion that the communication to the other powers of the Protectorate over the regions in question should be deferred until steps have been taken to obtain from the Somali Chiefs an express recognition of British protection in terms corresponding with those employed with recent treaties with West African Chiefs; and am to request you to move Lord Randolph Churchill to cause the steps proposed in your

letter above referred to, to be taken, to obtain from the Chieftains supplementary agreements recognising the fact of the British Protectorate over them.”

All that was done to have the Somalis under the British protection or domination was, in fact, a one-man—Major Hunter’s work, who was not even residing in the country. The Major was the British Consul-General at Aden, Yemen, and non-resident Consul for the Somali Coast. He was under the control of the British Governor in Bombay, India.

Major Hunter asked the Governor: “Do you think Her Majesty’s Government would object to a British officer residing at Berbera for a time with the title of Agent; he could have a few policemen as his guard, and practically he would keep the peace until some arrangement could come to. If that would be acceptable, I do not see why troops should be required at all, such would be in reality an occupation, in all but the name”

He complained: “I have no one to help me, and do not care to take more people into my confidence than is absolutely necessary.”

As far as arrangements with the Somalis were concerned, Major Hunter believed that there were no difficulties in making any treaty with the Somalis and in fact, he alone, made them sign the treaties according to which the Somali elders placed their territories and people under the British protection.

The British Government named and appointed Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, Political Agent and Consul for the Somali Coast, to conclude the treaties. Major Hunter and the elders of the Warsangali, have signed a Treaty.* (Appendix Fifteen)

On June 1, 1886, Major Hunter, now Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, wrote to the Political Resident, Aden, informing:

* Foreign Department, Secret -E., January 1889, Nos. 111-113-NAI, New Delhi.

“To secure our position and to avoid any possible question arising hereafter, I have arranged for the exhibition of the British flag at the ports (marginally noted: Ainterad, Karram, Ankor, Rakhuda,, Shellas, Hais, Mait, Hashow). I propose, with reference to the 15th paragraph of my letter No. 43 of the 29th January last, to appoint custodian on a salary of Rs. 10 at each *bunder* (Port). This will entail an expenditure monthly of Rs. 80 which should, I think be taken to have commenced on the 1st February, about which date the treaties were executed.”

This idea was approved by the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, W.J. Cunningham.*

The object of the treaty that Major Hunter had concluded with the Essa Somalis was “to check French from Obokh.” Giving the geographical location of the territory of the Essa, it stated: “The Essa Somali country is partly to the east and partly to the west of Zaila, and from the coast it extends south-westwards nearly as far as Harrar.” It evidently touches a bit of the coast east of Zaila, and is therefore within the limits set out in the treaty negotiated by Major Hunter in June 1884.

Earlier in 1827 a British vessels claiming to be trading at Berbera was attacked and plundered by the Habr Owul tribe. Although the British documents do not give any reason for the attack, it might have been because of a foreign vessel entering the port without the consent of the Somalis. Berbera is a port to the east of Zaila and Tajourra and nearly opposite to Aden. A vessel of war was sent to punish the tribe for what the British called “the outrage” which the Somali had committed. On February 6, 1827, the following Treaty of peace and commerce was signed by the elders of the tribe and the Captain of Her

* Foreign Department, See Letter No. 2177-E, dated Simla, the 18th September 1886, NAI.

Majesty's Ship *Tamar*, Gordon Bremer. (Text in Appendix-One)

The three Governments that controlled the Somali territories, the British, the Italian and the French, proposed to sign a draft Declaration regarding the restriction of importation of arms and ammunition

The French also claimed that they have signed an agreement with the Eesa Somalis in the year 1884. The treaty was for facilitating commerce on the coast. But the British claimed that they had already signed agreement with the Eesa tribe before the French. In fact, on December 31, 1884, the British claimed that a treaty was made with the Eesa by the British on February 12, 1885. (where as the French treaty was signed on March 26, 1885) Mr. Waddington intimated that the French Protectorate extended to Ghubbet Kharab. On February 24, 1885, the British Ambassador at Paris informed the French of the Eesa Treaty. He stated that on March 10, 1885, (a British official) Captain King visited the coast westward of Zaila and at Ras Jibuti obtained the adhesion to the treaty of the heads of the families residing between that point and Ghubbet Kharab. He distributed presents to the headmen of the Furlaba, Hurrone, Urweina, and others sub-tribes and flew the British flag on this occasion. The British suspected the French of having made an engagement with some of the Eesa occupying the coast west of Zaila and described the facts connected with this circumstance as follows:

“Abubekr Pasha and his son Burhan induced 17 of the Eesa from the west coast to visit Takusha, where they interviewed them, gave them presents, and asked them to assist the French. The Somalis were told to proceed to Dabalibah, near Ghubbet Kharab, where they embarked for Tajura. This was early in March 1885, and from thence they were conveyed to Obokh in a French steamer. On

the 15th September, a Council of the Easa was held at Ambadu, when five out of the 17 so-called signatories of the French Treaty were present. These latter denied having signed at all, but admitted having received presents. The Council came to the conclusion that the Pasha and his son were responsible for the alienation of Easa territory, and swore in the most solemn way that they would kill Abubekr and Burhan unless they left Zaila. The result of their determination ended in the deposition of Abubekr."

Major Hunter had earlier written to the Secretary of State for India in London that the first step after the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Berbera was to place there a British Agent with an armed police guard of 40 men. He proposed to nominate Mr. L.P. Walsh, Acting Second Assistant Resident in Aden, to the post of the Agent provisionally.

"No troops need be landed at all now that the agreement has been satisfactorily concluded," he said in his letter, adding: "And I am prepared to make similar arrangements at Zayla, so as to further the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from Harrar or to despatch an officer there, I should like to have an escort of the Aden troop, but that body could be looked on as a personal guard."

Major Hunter told his superiors that he presented Rs. (Rupees) 1,400 to the various Somali elders and others. "Hereafter it may be desirable to execute agreements with other tribes, but now that Berbera is safe, and our policy understood, the remainder of the Somalis will only be too ready to make treaties with us", he had written.

In the treaty the right (of the British) to seize slaves on land was introduced, and Major Hunter emphasised that "such a stipulation renders it extremely difficult for the traffic to be prosecuted, even if any inclination existed among the Somalis to carry on the trade in human being(s)."

The trade in human beings or slave trade existed well before the British and the Somalis signed the agreement. The British colonial office in Aden knew that the slave trade was continuing despite the agreement. But as the British did not want to offend the Turks, they chose to close their eyes.

The British Secretary of State for India told the British authority in Bombay that “whilst the negotiations respecting the sovereignty of the Somali Coast between the Red Sea and Cape Guardafui are pending, it will be expedient for Her Majesty’s cruisers to refrain from examining in those waters any dhows whatever on suspicion of being engaged in the slave-trade.”*

Robert Hall, Secretary to the Lords of the Admiralty, told Sir Luis Mallet, Under-Secretary of State for India, that “the Rear-Admiral in Command of the East India Station has been confidentially informed that Her Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that Her Majesty’s cruisers should not interfere with the traffic in slaves by sea supposed to be carried on by dhows sailing from African ports in the waters in question.”**

Sir Luis Mallet, wrote a letter in which he also stated: “I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to observe that whilst Major-General Schneider’s recommendations, and the order of the Admiralty base(ed) upon them, refer to a total non-interference, under present circumstances, with dhows sailing from the above coast, your letter appears to make an exemption duly in favour of vessels actually flying the Turkish or Egyptian flag.”

Berbera was at first free and unoccupied by either Turkish or Egyptian troops. Zeylah, on the other hand, owed an allegiance to Mocha, which was part of Yemen.

* Foreign Department, Letter dated India Office, London 17th June 1875, NAI.

** Foreign Department, Letter dated Admiralty 26th April 1875, NAI.

In 1875 the Porte conferred jurisdiction over Zeylah on Egypt by a *firman*, which British have never recognised.

In 1877, the British concluded a Convention with Egypt, which conceded to the Egyptians jurisdiction as far as Ras Hafun, but they secured the freedom of the ports at Berbera and Bulhar, and obtained fixed duties for Zeila and other ports. This Convention required the ratification by the Porte, which was never given.

The British claimed that the Egyptians had not performed their part of the agreement. The slave-trade had revived at Zeylah, and the Egyptian Government had been afraid to recall the infamous Governor Abu Bakr. The British did not secure free trade at Berbera etc.etc.

A secret letter in January 1886 (no date) described the British "Protectorate" on the Somali Coast as follows:

"Originally the term "Protectorate" was applied only to British relations with Bulhar and Berbera and the intervening coast, which were based upon the first of Major Hunter's treaties, namely, that made with the Habr Awal. Following the lines of the Habr Awal, four others have been negotiated with the following tribes:

- (a) The Easa Somalis between Ghubbet Kharab and Zeila;
- (b) The Gadabursis, to the east of Zeila and between that place and the Habr Awal who then carry on the line to Bulhar;
- (c) The Habr Gerhajis, to the east of Berbera;
- (d) The Habr Tol-Jaalis, to the east of the Habr Gerhajis, as far as Hais.

Major Hunter wrote:

"A British Protectorate has been established from Ghubbet Kharab to Ras Galweni. The tribes occupying the above coast line have entered into suitable engagement. Zeila and Berbera are garrisoned by the British troops; and former, though covered by the Ottoman flag, is administered by an officer under the control of the (British) Aden residency."

In 1887, Major Hunter, who started his career as a Captain, reached the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The main architect of all the agreements concluded with the Somalis relinquished charge of the Somali Coast Agency and Consulate in May 1887. Lieutenant-Colonel E.V. Stace was appointed Political Agent in November 1887 in his place. Later, on February 20, 1889, Stace was appointed Consul for the Coast from Tajurrah to Ras Hafun under the Agent and Consul-General at Cairo.

The Abyssinian Invasion of Harrar and its Cruelty

On July 10, 1883, Sir E.B. Malet, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, sent a letter (No.299) to Earl Granville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London. He enclosed with the letter, copies of despatches from Acting Consul Captain C. W. Sealy, dated Aden, June 26, and Cherif Pasha, dated the 7th instant, respecting rumours that King Menelek of Shoa had attacked Harrar. The Councul wrote:

“Cherif Pasha informs me confidentially that he believes that these raids have actually taken place, but he is inclined to think that they are the result of an intrigue got up by Abu Bekr Pasha, Governor of Zaila, to prevent the return of Nadi Pasha, the Governor of Harrar, who is at present in Cairo on leave of absence.”

But on August 7, 1883, Sir Malet, again wrote to Earl Granville contradicting his earlier report of July. He unamibigously stated:

“With reference to my despatch No.299 of the 10th ultimo, I have the honor to inclose copy of a despatch from the British Consul for the Somali Coast, stating that there was no foundation for the report that King Menelek of Shoa was about to march on Harrar.”*

* Foreign Department, Somali Coast—Shoa and Harrar affairs, 1883—NAI, New Delhi.

But the Acting Consul for the Somali Coast, Captain Sealy, reported to the British Agent and Consul General in Cairo saying that there were rumours reaching Aden to the effect that Menelek of Shoa "is about to march on Harrar with 60,000 men, and that intimation of this has been given by Abubakr Pasha of Zaila by one of his sons in Shoa." Sealy said that he was not sure whether there was any truth in the news and asked information on the subject and the cause of the threatened attack.

Major Hunter also reported on January 22, 1887 that "Menelek, King of Shoa, was within three days' march of Harrar, and that the Emir had gone out with all his forces to fight the Abyssinians, who were said to be accompanied by several Italians.

Jebril Marijou, Interpreter to Menelek, King of Shoa, has been in Zeyla for some days past, and has informed M. Estemios Moussaya that King Menelek, at the instigation of the French, is about to attack Harrar.

The army, which has already started, consist of 15,000, men of which 5,000 are cavalry, and the remainder infantry and artillery. They are waiting in the Galla country for the arrival of a French *kafila* from Tajourra, which is taking them a large supply of Remington rifles and ammunition. Muhammad Abu Bakr (one of the Pasha's sons) and some Frenchmen are with the *kafila*, which left Tajourra more than a month ago. My information states that the march of the army will probably be delayed by the standing crops of jowari in the Galla country."

As it turned out the Abyssinians forces were, indeed, moving towards Harrar. Next day the (British) Resident at Aden telegraphed that the Emir of Harrar had been totally defeated by the Abyssinians and had fled with his family to Ogaden territory.

After invading and occupying Harrar, Menelek sent the following letter from Harrar on January 8 (20th January 1887) to the British Consul at Aden:



OGADEN (ABYSSINIA)

“From—MENELEK, King of Shoa and of all the Galla, good and bad,

“To—The English Consul at Aden.

“How are you?

“By the Grace of God, I am well. Amir Abdillahi would suffer no Christian in his country.

“He was another “Gragne” but by the help of God I fought him, destroyed him, and he escaped alone on horseback.

“I hoisted my flag in his capital and my troops, &c., occupied his city. Gragne died: Abdillahi was in our days his successor.

“This is not a Mussalman country as every one knows.”

The British Consul at Aden replied to Melenek’s letter on February 10, 1887:

“From—Major F. M. HUNTER, Political Agent and Consul for the Somali Coast,

“To—KING MENELEK, Negus of Shoa, Efat, and the Gallas, & c.


“After compliments—We have received Your Majesty’s friendly letter informing us that you captured and occupied Harrar and hoisted your flag there.

“There can be no need to recall the terms of the treaty concluded with Her Majesty the Queen in 1841 by Your Majesty’s predecessor King Sahela Selassie, Negus of Shoa, Efat and Galla.

“Your Majesty may rest assured of the continued friendship of the British Government, and we hope that under Your Majesty’s protection may revive and the trade route be safe.

“On all the Somali Coast from Ghubbet Kharab, and especially at Zaila, Bulhar and Berbera, where our troops are now stationed, we shall always be glad to further Your Majesty’s interests.”*

* Foreign Department—Secret, E. June 1887, N.212-272—NAI, New Delhi, India.



HARAR

In view of the Abyssinian claims, it must be explained that when Harrar was evacuated, Abdullahi, a son of the last reigning Amir, was installed as a Native Chief. On March 27, 1886 an Italian commercial and scientific expedition started under Count Porro from Zaila for Harrar, and it is claimed that a party of Arabs sent from Harrar, after disarming the Italian detachment at Gildessa, fell upon the Italians at Arto and put them all to death. Britain's Lord Rosebery disclaimed all responsibility for the massacre and inquiries were being instituted with a view to ascertain how far the Amir was to blame, when, suddenly, news arrived of the capture of Harrar in January 1887 by King Menelek of Shoa.

Menelek announced his capture of Harrar in a "friendly" letter to Major Hunter. The London Foreign Office was cautious, as it considered it necessary to avoid any recognition of Menelek's independence which might offend King John of Abyssinia. Menelek withdrew in February leaving Makunan as his Governor of Harrar, and the latter opened friendly correspondence with the British. For several months after this British officers constantly expected that the people of Harrar would turn out the Abyssinians. The British authorities ruefully noted: "But they have never done so, and the Abyssinians having conquered Harrar after our protectorate treaties can hardly dispute our prior rights, although, being irritated at our recognition of the Italian protectorate, they have in recent years claimed Somali Land as part of their dominion. Since Makunan's establishment at Harrar we have repeatedly treated his overtures with coldness, and given him to understand that our external relations in respect of Abyssinia were arranged with Italy. Despite, however, our delimitation with Italy, Biyo Kabobo, on the Harrar road inside our limits, was occupied in 1891-92 by the Abyssinians, who also have recently hoisted a flag still further inside our boundary at

Alalo. We have just destroyed the flag and some huts there.”

The withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Harrar took place in the first week of November 1884. Major Hunter reported from Zaila on November 7, 1884, that “the first detachment, consisting of 1,036 persons: 1 Pasha, 12 Civilians, 11 Officers, 498 Men, 277 Women, 237 Children, 3 Guns, and 54 Horses reached the Coast about November 12, 1884.” Mr. Roof, the Assistant Director of the Khedivial steamers arranged with Major Hunter that the S.S. *Mahalla* should be at Zaila ready to embark this party. Within a month three detachments of the same strength left Harrar. The Egyptian garrison left Zaila on November 4, 1884 for Narghileh via Aden on board *Mahalla*. Following arrangements were made for the future administration of the place:

The Pasha Abubakr (was) to remain as nominal Civil Governor on his previous salary (Rs. 700) so long as the Egyptian flag continued to fly. The real authority was vested in the British Agent and Vice Consul (at that time Kingsmill, Royal Navy, on Rs. 150 per mensem deputation allowance). The rest of the staff:

Agent	Rs. 50
1 Clerk	Rs 30
1 Dragoman	Rs 40
1 Sweeper	Rs 16
1 Peon	Rs 13
House-rent	Rs 50
Contingencies	Rs 20

A Police force, consisting of 30 armed and 18 unarmed constables:

1 Superintendent	Rs. 250
1 Jamadar	Rs 35
1 Havidar	Rs 17
2 First Class Constables	Rs. 30
48 Second ditto	Rs 624

The *Kazi* was re-appointed, and allowances for religious services and political pensions continued as set forth below:

<i>Kazi</i>	Rs 50
<i>Mozzin</i>	Rs 5
Keeper of tomb	Rs 5
Servant ditto	Rs 2
Sayyid Alawi	Rs 4
Hossain Muknoon	Rs 6

Richard F. Burton has provided a brief account of the history of Harrar when its ruler had once dominated the region. He wrote in his book "*First Footsteps in East Africa*" that Harrar was a mere mass of Badawi villages during the reign (of) Mohammed Gragne, "the left-handed", (in the Somali dialect "Guray"), Attila of Adel. In A.D. 1528 he took possession of Shoa, overran Amhara, burned the churches and carried away an immense booty. The next campaign enabled him to winter at Begmeder; in the following year he hunted the Emperor David through Tigre to the border of Sana'ar, gave battle to the Christians on the banks of the Nile, and with his own hand killed the monk Gabriel, then an old man. *Guray* captured and burned Axum, destroyed the princes of the royal blood on the mountain of Amba Geshe, and slew in A.D. 1540, David, third of his name and last emperor of Ethiopia who displayed the magnificence of "King of Kings."

According to Burton, "Claudius, the successor to the tottering throne, sent as his Ambassador to Europe, one John Bermudez, a Portuguese who had been detained in Abyssinia, and promised, it is said, submission to the Pontiff of Rome, and the cession of a third of his dominions in return for reinforcements. By order of John III, Don Stephen and Don Christopher, sons of Don Vasco da Gama, cruised up the Red Sea with powerful flotilla, and the younger, slew Nur the Governor, and sent his head to

Gondar, where the Iteghe Sabel Wenghel received it as an omen of good fortune. Thence the Portuguese general imprudently marched in the monsun season, and was soon confronted upon the plain of Ballut by Mohammed Gragne at the head of 10,000 spearmen and a host of cavalry. On the other side stood rabble rout of Abyssinians, and a little band of 350 Portuguese heroes headed by the most chivalrous soldier of a chivalrous age.

“Mohammed on his part was not idle. He solicited the assistance of the Moslem princes, and obtained a reinforcement of 2000 musqueteers from the Arabs, and a train of artillery from the Turks of Al-Yaman. Encouraged by the assistance he received from the Muslim princes, Mohammed Guray attacked the Portuguese trenches.

Don Christopher had already one arm broken and a knee shattered by a musket shot. Burton says: “Valour was at length oppressed by superiority of numbers: the enemy entered the camp, and put the Christians to the spear. The Portuguese general escaped the slaughter with ten men, and retreated to a wood, where they were discovered by a detachment of the enemy. Mohammed overjoyed to see his most formidable enemy in his power, ordered Don Christopher to take care of a wounded uncle and nephew, telling him that he should answer for their lives, and upon their death, taxed him with having hastened it. The Portuguese roundly replied that he has come to destroy Moslems, not to save them. Enraged at this language, Mohammed placed a stone upon his captive’s head, and exposed him to the insults of the soldiery, who inflicted upon him various tortures which he bore with the resolution of martyr.”

Richard Burton continued: “Mohammed Gragne improved his victory by chasing the young Claudius over Abyssinia, where nothing opposed the progress of his arms. At last the few Portuguese survivors repaired to the Christian Emperor, who was persuaded to march an

army against the King of Adel. Resolved to revenge their general, the harquebusiers demanded the post opposite Mohammed, and directed all their efforts against the part where the Moslem Attila stood." Mohammed Gragne, known also as "Ahmed Guray" died in action. He was killed by the Portuguese who were on the side of the Abyssinians.

On February 26, 1887, the British Resident at Aden reported that 'Menelek had withdrawn from Harrar, leaving about 3,500 men there, and that Ali Abubakr, who was Acting Governor, was collecting ransom, of which 13,500 out 30,000 dollars remained unpaid, and that it was believed that, when all was liquidated, the Abyssinians would probably retire. Public safety was not assured, hence trade was slack.

Under the circumstances, it was not thought necessary to dispatch a (British) special messenger, and reply to the Abyssinian Commander's letter. It was forwarded by the hand of the escort proceeding with a "Kafila" to Harrar. Only natives of the Somali country or Arabs were then used as protectors of caravans.

The report went on to state that little improvement in trade was expected until the retirement of the Amhara troops. It was believed that Ali Abubekr would be able to maintain his authority as Amir. And there was no reason to suppose that he would prove unfriendly to British interests.

After invading and occupying Harrar by force, the Abyssinians continued their adventure towards the rest of the Somali territories. The cruelty of the Abyssinians went to the extent of Makunan opposing even the digging of water wells for the Somalis.* Referring to a telegram of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated November 8, Her Majesty's Consul for the Somali Coast Colonel

* Foreign Department, Letter from the British Consulate in Cairo, dated November 20, 1889, (Confidential at NAI New Delhi).

E.V. Stace reported that Makunan complained at Rome that the Zeyla authorities were digging a well in the Province of Mandaha belonging to Harrar. Col. Stace, replying to the complaint on November 10, 1889 wrote to the British Consul at Cairo:

“In reply to your telegram of yesterday’s date, informing me that Makunan had complained at Rome that the Zeyla authorities were digging a well in the Province of Mandaha, and that the Italian Government asked for suspension of the work, I had the honour to reply by a telegram, of which a copy is attached. I now ask to be permitted to make a few remarks on the subject.

“The place where a party is now engaged in boring for a well is situated about 25 miles from Zeyla in the Mandaha Plain, near Dahab (please see Protectorate Map, route from Zeyla to Harrar). The work, which has received the sanction of the Government of India, was undertaken because there is no water between Hensa and Warabod, and, in the hot season, many men and animals have succumbed to thirst crossing the plain. The people of Zeyla and all those interested in the caravan route are most anxious that the work should be completed.

“When Makunan passed through Zeyla recently on his way to Italy, he asked to be permitted to participate in the work, but I declined this as impracticable and likely to delay *ad infinitum*, whilst it is of much importance that it should be completed as soon as possible. At the same time, knowing Makunan’s ideas of gradually extending his rule, it would not have been polite to give him even this small pretext for future claims. There is no doubt whatever that had it not been for the present Abyssinian relations with the Italians, Makunan would (have) never dreamt of asserting that the territory belonged to Harrar. He thinks he now sees a good opportunity of a bold push forward, but he has not the remotest right to make the claim he now advances.

“No doubt when the Egyptians held Harrar, after the annexation of that town in 1874, the province of the same name was held to include the whole country to Zeyla, but also Jibuti, Tajourra, Obokh, Ras Bir, and eastward Berber, with even Ras Hafun. But, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, Harrar became independent, and the town was captured by King Menelek in January 1887; he never conquered more than the town itself, and no claims that I am aware of have even been advanced to the rest of the province, which was called Harrar by the Egyptians. Certain it is that the authorities of the Abyssinians has never extended further than the walls of the town. Even the Somali tribes, as the Noh and Jarsa, have deemed themselves independent, though Makunan has made several efforts to reduce them to submission. As for the Easa and Gadabursi, though nominally under Egyptian rule, they have never in the remotest degree been under Abyssinian rule, and the Easa country extends to Gildessa, which is 153 mile from Zeyla, or about 127 miles from where the well is being made, and throughout the whole of this territory Makunan has never had even nominal control. Under the Egyptians, the Province of Harrar proper was subdivided into four *Moudiriehs*, which lay “within the circumference of a circle, of which the centre is the city of Harrar, and the radius a distance of about 10 miles.”

“In the Convention of February 1888 between the English and French Governments, the respective sphere of influence of the two Governments were recognized as divided by the line from Lahada through Abassaen to Bingo-Kabobo (Biyokaboba). The last named place is 62 mile nearer to Harrar than the position of the well now being made.

“Finally it must be remembered that in 1884 we concluded a Treaty with the Easa tribe, by the 1st Article of which they are bound not to cede, sell, mortgage, or

otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory inhabited by them or under their control. This manifestly admitted their complete independence from Harrar.

“Under the above circumstances, it is evident that, whatever the relations of the Abyssinians with Italy may be now or hereafter, the Government of the latter country has no right to interfere with our present action regarding the well, or indeed in any part of the Easa country.*

Earlier, Colonel E.V. Stace, sent the following telegram dated, Aden, November 9, 1889, to the British Consul in Cairo, Sir E. Baring:

“There is no Province of Mandaha. Well being dug within one day’s march of Zeyla. Makunan never had a shadow of authority there, nominal or otherwise. The territory belongs to Easa. The people wish the well, and Makunan himself offered to contribute toward the work. The Italians have no reason to interfere, and it is of the utmost importance to resist this attempt. The Resident approves this Report.”

To substantiate his contention, Col. Stace cited the report prepared by the Assistant Resident of Zaila, Lieut. J.L. Harrington who toured Isa and Gadabursi countries in May and June of 1896. In his long report on June 10, he stated:

“... Marched Arabeh to Hadawi (Harrawa valley)—12 miles, accompanied by Ughaz Nur, Makail Dera and Forlaba elders. En route passed skeletons of three elephants, which I was told had been killed by Somalis. Today also received news that Aysa Nur, son of the Ughaz, has killed six elephants in the Takka Hills; after enquiry I ascertained that three was more like the correct number. About a mile and a half from Arabeh, came to place called Alalo where a spring issues from a white

* Foreign Department, Red Sea and Somali Coast—Confidential, Nov. 1889, NAI, New Delhi.

earthen bank. Where the water issues, it is so hot that one can do no more than dip one's hand in it, withdrawing it as rapidly as possible. The spring sends up clouds of steam at its mouth.

"Some distance from the source there is a grass shed covering a basin which has been scooped out to an extent sufficiently large for two men to recline full length in it. Shed and basin have been by the Abyssinians, who use the place somewhat as a health resort. Between the spring and bathing place on a high bank with naturally scarped sides, overlooking the stream, the Abyssinians have built about six grass huts, colonial in shape, surrounded by a thorn *Zariba*, for their accommodation when they visit Alalo."

On June 11, Harrington arrived at Hadawi and camped near a Makail Dera *Karia*, where the *Ughaz* brought a sheep and a couple of goats as a present for the British Official. But Harrington commented:

"Knowing the insuperable objection the Somali have to parting with any of their property without receiving a substantial *quid pro quo*, I tried to avoid the acceptance of these animals from the *Ughaz*. I informed the *Ughaz* that, unless the *Sarkar* required animals, in which case he will ask for them, the *Sarkar* does not want people to bring them; moreover, in this case, the animals were not his property, but extracted from *junglis* by virtue of his authority as their *Ughaz*. I pointed out to him that the same remarks would be passed about me as were passed about the Abyssinians."

The British Official added: "In the course of the discussion, the *Ughaz* dropped the remarks that, *when the English visit his country, they say they want nothing, whereas when the Abyssinians come, they always say their mouths are empty and come to him to fill them*. He represented that (I) was putting indignity on him in refusing his offer, as he and other Somalis were on a

different footing, to which I replied that, had the incident occurred in the *Ughaz's* own *Karia*, I would have raised no objections; finally, I took two of the animals from him as my camp was well supplied with sheep. Before leaving I made it my business to personally pay the owners of the animals their value."

The Assistant Resident, Zaila, wrote on June 13: "During the course of the day, I had a long interview with the *Ughaz*; he asked about his sword, and remarked that it appeared to him that we were unwilling to give him one. I reminded him that these matters took time, that his sword has been written for, and that his sword was not the only matter that the Political Agent and Consul had to concern himself with. Referring to his request to be allowed to make a permanent settlement at Halisa, he said he had sown jowari there and was anxious to have a definite answer. He remarked that our behaviour in the matter had conveyed the impression to his mind that we were (not) willing to grant his request for a *pukka* settlement and police post. He put it to me in extremely plain terms, as to whether we feared the Abyssinian, that we did not decide one way or the other. I replied to him that the delay was not to be viewed in the light of a refusal to accede to his request, that Somali land was an extremely insignificant portion of the English Raj, and quoting the case of his reinstatement as a stipendiary of the English Government, that always moves very slowly in the matter. The *Ughaz* being a man of more than ordinary intelligence, I plainly told him that Somali Coast affairs were before Government, and that until a reply was received, I saw no hope of his getting a definite answer. He said he would wait a few months more, when, if he received no answer, he would start a settlement there on his own account.

Harrington's report of his interview with *Ughaz* continued:

Ughaz recounted his visit to Harrar as follows: "He had gone to Darimi to visit his Gerrhi wife, and to see about a quarrel that had occurred between some of his Midgans and the Abbasgul, when Garashmash Banti, called him to Harrar to enquire from him whether we intended to give Zaila or Dongarita, &c., to the Italians, as the Abyssinians were in great dread of an attack from this side. He assured them that there was no truth in the report, and that he did not think we would let the Italians pass through our territory. As for giving up any place on the coast, he told the Abyssinians that, so long as we held Aden, we should hold on the coast. As regard resisting any Italian force advancing on Harrar, he remarked that neither he nor his tribesmen would have any objection in sacrificing themselves and their flocks in resisting the Italians...He says that the Abyssinians lost heavily in their engagements with the Italians and are very much cowed; they dread a continuation of the war and particularly an attack from this side, which they know would raise the whole of the Gallas and Somalis against them. He quoted a remark made to him on a former occasion by an official in charge of Darimi, which is very true and such as might be expected from the Abyssinians to the effect that white men apparently had no sense, for they supplied the Abyssinians with guns, and thus enabled them to resist the attempts of white men on their country, whereas formerly they were in possession of only a few rifles and those had ones."

Harrington went on to state :“17th June—In consequence of Garashmash Banti’s letter, I deemed it advisable not to proceed to *Lafaleh* which is close to the Abyssinian border and about 40 miles from Harrar, as previously intended, for fear of any complication with the Abyssinians, but, as I had expressed my intention of visiting Dumbal to meet the Forlaba and Hassan Ghadechi, I proceeded there by a route less near to the

frontier, as I was aware there was sufficient time for me to reach Dumbal before a reply to my letter could reach me from Harrar." The Harrington report proved that Harrar belonged to Somalia.*

MILITARY RACE

Rennell Rodd, the Special Envoy of the Queen to Abyssinia, wrote to the Marquess of Salisbury, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, about the Abyssinians and Harrar:

"The Abyssinians themselves are a military race in a perpetual state of mobilization. They inhabit circular huts of mud and wattle roofed with thatch, even the great Chiefs contenting themselves with such a modest domicile, while their followers pitch their tents round about the compound of their masters, and the suggestion of permanency is certainly absent from their habitations. Preserving their supremacy and extending their borders of recent years over the savage races by which they are surrounded, then have become a dominant military caste, for whom occupation in warlike enterprises must be found continually to compensate them for the extremely scanty pay and indifferent nourishment which they receive. A system of petty Chiefstainships, holding feudal system, out of which in recent times or other would emerge to establish a precarious overlordship, has not been united by the strength and ability of the Emperor Menelek and the menace of European invasion into what appears at present to be a fairly united and coherent whole.

"But the Abyssinian, although in many cases he develops considerable ability and enterprise as a petty trader, and can fairly be trusted to employ profitably

* Foreign Department, Report signed by J.L.Harrington, Lieut. Dated Zaila; the 15th July 1896—NAI, New Delhi, India.

small capital committed to him to speculate with as merchant, has none of the characteristics which go to make the citizen. War waged, as a rule, upon weaker races who are without adequate arms to resist his incursions successfully, raiding, in other words, is his real occupation, and the prospect of plunder his incentive."

Rodd said: "I have elsewhere alluded to a characteristic observation which was made to me to the effect that the Somalis were, since ancient days, the cattle-keepers of the Ethiopians, who could not themselves live in the plains, and as such were bound to render due tribute of cattle to their masters. When they failed to appreciate this obligation, it became necessary to coerce them.

"This is the normal attitude of the Abyssinian towards the subject races to the number of which he is perpetually adding, and it is to the continual exaction from these of the uttermost farthing in tribute and forced levies that the unprogressive character of his country, really rich in natural resources, is due." The British diplomat added: "Large districts inhabited by quiet, though semi-savage, races, who owned rich flocks and herds and prosperous plantations, have been devastated by the raids and incursions of their Christian conquerors in the ever-recurring expeditions necessitated by the institution of the military system in a race which, possessing neither arts nor crafts, looks on agriculture as rather the business of their vassals than themselves.

"Those who know the neighbourhood of Harrar in the days of the Egyptian occupation speak bitterly of the contrast which its present aspect affords. The invading Abyssinian even cut down the magnificent coffee plantations to burn with the same improvidence with which the forests of Shoa have been destroyed," Rodd reported. He dericively wrote about the Abyssinians: "To replant a tree never enters their heads."

Writing about the Abyssinian soldiers, Rodd said:

“The soldier lives for the most part sparingly, and is satisfied with the (c)rude sour bread manufactured in the country, which, seasoned with pepper and, more rarely, with meat, forms his only food. The desire of a better mode of existence appears to be entirely absent. At the same time, in order to secure the little that is necessary, as he does not work himself, it must be wrung from the subject races.”*

According to Thesiger, “the Amharas and Tigreans, as opposed to the Galla and the other tribes they had incorporated into their empire, resembled no other race in appearance or character. They regarded themselves, however fallaciously, as light-skinned; in their paintings they were invariably shown full face and almost white, whereas their enemies were always depicted in profile and black, unless they were Europeans.”**

BRITAIN IGNORE ABYSSINIAN CRUELTIES

The Abyssinians continued their invasion of Somali territories and inflicted heavy damages on the Somalis and the British “protectors” kept looking at it as passive spectators. The British even directly facilitated the Abyssinians to perpetuate their cruelty against the Somalis, for whom they were responsible by the Treaties of Protection. As far as the Abyssinian incursion into the Somali territories were concerned, the British applied what they called “a policy of complete abstention from interference.”

The Deputy Assistant Political Agent, Bulhar, David Morrison, reported to the Assistant Resident at Berbera,

* Foreign Department, Red Sea and Somali Coast-Confidential-Letter N.5 (Commercial), dated Adis Abbaba, the 14th May 1897, at the NAI, New Delhi, India.

** Wilfred THESIGER, *The Life of My Choice*, Flamingo, London 1988, pp. 43-44.

on February 1, 1891,* that he received the following information from a kafila that returned from Ogadeyn:

“About twenty-five days ago the Abyssinians came to the Ogadeyn country. The force was 7,000 (?) strong. Their intention was to proceed to Merka and take possession of it. Merka, I am informed, is inhabited by the Jaberta people (Rer Gibelad and Gibelmadow), whose Governor is named Suliman, a nephew of the late Sayyid Barghash, of Zanzibar. The country is rich and well cultivated.

“While on their way along the River Soolool and at Harah Abdullah, they found the Ogaden Malangoor, whom they looted of 600 sheep and goats and 10 bullocks, all of which they killed and ate. They also looted one camel belonging to Ali Yusuf Rer Hosh Yunis, and killed one Malingoor and wounded another.

“After this, they proceeded on their march and met the Ogaden Rer Amadin-al-Galadooray. There they attacked an Ayal Yunus kafila, killing Hassan Mahomed Rer Mah Gedid (brother of Jama Mahomed, *Havildar* of Police), Adan Abdi Miad Gedid and one Ogaden Rer Ali Esak, looting the entire kafila. They also attacked the Rer Amadin and looted two kraals containing camels (male and female), cows, bullocks, sheep and goats, and killed twenty men. After this they proceeded to Hamar and Merka. The Abyssinians said it was their intention to go to Merka and there make a settlement.

“The Ayal Yunus wish to know if any compensation will be given for the loss sustained in life and property. “Horah Abdullah is thirteen days from Bulhar and four from Harrar in a southerly direction. Galadooray is only three days from the Webi. Morrison wanted to know the reaction of the British Government to the Abyssinian invasion.

Major C.W. H. Sealy, Acting Political Agent and

* Foreign Department, Report No. 39, 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

Consul, Somali Coast replied: "With reference to the report No.39 dated February 1. 1891, from Mr. Morrison in regard to the action of the Abyssinians, the Ayal Yunus should be informed that it is not a matter in which we can interfere."*

The British policy on the Somali Coast Protectorate boundaries in the interior was, according to Brigadier General J. Jopp, Political Resident at Aden, "non-interference, and simply the protection of our ports and their immediate neighbourhood.** The Brigadier-General sent a message dated, Aden March 3, 1891, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay. He reported: "On the 27th February I forwarded a telegram to you to the following effect:

"Perfect confidence restored to the ports and all quiet. No danger of complication."

"On the 26th February I received a telegram from the Secretary of State for India, London, to the following effect:

"Foreign Office ask if you have any information apprehending Abyssinian advance on Merka."

To this I replied to the following effect:

"News as to the Abyssinian advance on Merka very conflicting. Some accounts declare they have been annihilated by Ogadeyn, while other show they are in the Rer Hamar district and still advancing towards Merka. They have almost certainly got as far as Faf."***

On February 9, 1891, the Assistant Resident at Berbera, Lieutenant H. Merewether sent three reports to the Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, about the

* Foreign Department, Secret E, October 1891, No. 234-314, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1891, No. 67-129, NAI, New Delhi.

*** Ibid.

attitude of the Abyssinians. The report stated "I have further had several conversations with Shaik Mattar, who is still here and leaves tomorrow, and he tells me that the Abyssinians have got wind in their heads and think because the French and Italians have given them guns and rifles that they are irresistible.

"As regards the French I have the honour to invite your attention to the last two lines of Mohammed Dosa's deposition, and I would with all deference submit that the present action of the Abyssinians in the Ogadeyn and elsewhere is a sure token of support afforded them from some quarter at present unknown though not difficult to be guessed.

"It must be noted that the information referred to in the last paragraph was volunteered and not elicited by any question.

"I have the honour to suggest that a slight increase in the garrisons of Berbera and Bulhar, with the addition of some guns of the camel battery, would not be out of place, and could be easily effected with the next relief expected here on the 20th instant.

"When the Bulhar news leaked out yesterday through arrivals from that part, the merchants were I am told in a great state of mind and were coming to me in a body had not Muhammad Hindi and one or two other men of influence and common sense dissuaded them. I have quieted them but the measures I have suggested would I think inspire confidence.

"Shaik Mattar, who leaves tomorrow as already stated, has engaged to send spies towards Harrar, &c., to keep me fully and punctually informed of all that is passing there. I have told him to come in here if he is in any danger."

Report No. 75-91-P

Abdalla Samanter H.G. Abdul Ismail on solemn affirmation states:

“Six days ago I came into Bulhar with a kafila from Hargeisa. There were two men with us from the Abisgool country. These men told us that seven Habshis from Harrar had arrived in their country, one “*Shoom*” non-commissioned officer and six men. These men were collecting taxes being apparently a miniature “*Mulkgiri*” army. The “*Shoom*” asked what cattle, &c., and what crops were forthcoming at Hargeisa. The Mullahs whom they were questioning told them that Hargeisa was but a small *kariya* (Village) with a few huts; and that there were no oxen or flocks (this was of course untrue). The “*Shoom*” remarked “perhaps we shall go there.” The two Mullahs came to Bulhar in the kafila. This is what I reported to the *jemadar* at Bulhar. I cannot say whether the *Shoom* meant he and his party or an Abyssinian force would go”

The second statement was that of Oday Adowa A.Y. Wujap Shirdone. This was included in the Brigadier General’s statement as Report No.2. It stated:

“Eleven day ago from yesterday I was trading in the Abisgool country at a place called Kaboo. While there some Abyssinians, five in number, one an officer as far as I can judge, one non-commissioned officer, and three *sepoys* arrived. They demanded something from us. We gave them a little rice and one to be. These they declined and took all our goods by force. These men told us that the Abyssinians were dividing up the country and that this officer’s share was the Abisgool territory. I am told the officer said “when the next moon is nearly full (i.e., the new moon of the 9th instant) I shall take a force against Hargeisa. I shall take a *buloog*, e.i., a “company.” This was told me by a H.A. Rer Abaneh, who was acting as interpreter to the *Habshis*. A *buloog* is equivalent to about hundred men as far as can be ascertained. I hear that the “*Shoom*” was told that there were many oxen in Hargeisa. There was heavy loss among the Abisgool, Berteri, &c., from cattle disease last year,

and ghee is reported to be scarce. I spoke with no Mullahs and no *Biladiya*.”

The Report No. 3 was the statement of Muhammad Dosa, Hasti Mijertain. He stated :

“The day the *Tenasserim* arrived here last she had on board a man of position in Abyssinia. I do not know his name; his servant was with him. He goes about sometimes to the French, sometimes to the English territory. He has also been to Zanzibar. He came and dined with me. Amongst other things he said: “It is pity that when the Egyptians evacuated Berbera the Somal(is) did not make us their *vakeel* (i.e., the Abyssinians). We Abyssinians consider all this country ours.” He added: “Our spies have twice been as far as Hargeisa, and it is our intention to keep them on the move. The English intend dividing the country with us, but it is our hope that it is all ours already. The English purpose making boundaries which we shall not pass, but the country is ours. The English took Harrar and gave it over to a weak ruler from whom we took it. Now the English are against us for having done so.”

I said “what do you want to do now? He said “I am going round the country to see it.” I said Somali land belongs to the English *Sirkar*: what do you mean by saying it is yours? He replied: “I admit that as much country as lies within range of ship’s guns from the coast is your *Sirkar*’s, but beyond that we have power to assert our claims.” He said much else that I cannot remember. He said: “A little friendship exists between us and the French.”*

THE ABYSSINIAN CRUELTY

Various reports received by the British officials talked

* Foreign Department-External, N. 35 of 1891, pp. 7-9, NAI, New Delhi.

about Abyssinia's cruelty and oppression that was being perpetrated in the Ogaden. On November 28, 1894, the British Acting Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, Captain H.M. Abud sent a report to the Political Resident at Aden, in which he pointed out:

“In continuation of my letter n. 841, dated the 29th August 1894, reporting that Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar, had informed me of his intention to dispatch an expedition to the Ogaden to punish the tribes for certain misdeeds, I have now the honour to report that it would seem that the expressed intention has been fulfilled as constant representations are being made to the Assistant Resident at Berbera of the cruelty and oppression that is being exercised by the Abyssinians on the Ogaden. As an instance of the cruelty exercised it has been sworn to by a man at Berbera that the Abyssinians had skinned his brother. That this is true can hardly be doubted, as the man was actually seen by Major Mainwaring, South Wales Borderers, and Mr. Christie who have lately returned from shooting in the Ogaden. These gentlemen, moreover, state that they actually say (saw) a boy whose private parts had been cut off by the Abyssinians.

“I would suggest that, now that this part of Somali land has been placed in the sphere of Italian influence, the attention of the Italian Government might be drawn to the utter ruin and the revolting cruelty that is going on in the Ogaden at the hands of the Abyssinians.”

In a similar report on December 3, 1894, to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, the British Political Resident at Aden, Brigadier-General, John Jopp stated: “This Residency is now powerless to check those atrocities in the Ogaden.”

“Before the protocol of May 1894 was published, although Abyssinian raids were more or less constant, such revolting cruelty, though habitually practiced in Abyssinia proper, was almost unknown in this part.

British influence extended so far inland and the knowledge that our officers on the coast would take measures, acted as a deterrent.

“Now all is changed. The Abyssinian Government know the range of our authority is now limited, and the Governor of Harrar who on two or three occasions being addressed in a friendly manner by the political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, bringing to his notice the extortion committed by his people, has invariably replied that “the country belongs to King Menelek,” and more or less resents our interference.

“The Ogaden, by the new Protocol, is now in Italian sphere of influence, but there is not an Italian official within hundreds of miles, not even I believe in Harrar, who could intervene to induce the Abyssinian authorities to keep proper check over their soldiers who traverse the country.

“I attach notes of an interview that Captain Abud, Assistant Resident, had with Mr. Felter, a merchant residing in Harrar, and who lately arrived in Aden, on the subject of Affairs in Abyssinia for what it is worth.

“He is actually an agent employed by the Italian Government and is paid as such, and has the title of Resident though this is not publicly avowed.

“As touching the action of the Abyssinians in Ogaden, he stated that the expedition returned on the 14th November, and that his wife saw slaves tied to the horses' tail. It is well known that prisoners of war (natives) in Abyssinia are sold although Abyssinia had signed the Brussels's Act.

“On referring to the late case of skinning a man alive he said that the Abyssinians did worse than that, and that every week Queen Taiton had two or three virgins killed and their entrails examined for omens.

“He said that the Abyssinians had got wind in their heads and openly stated that the whole of East Africa

belonged to them, and he said that the Abyssinians were the French of Africa (boasting). The Abyssinians think the French the strongest of all European nations, and that all the world is concerned with Abyssinia, and that should one power want to go to war with, the other would prevent her.

“He said that lately the Abyssinians had heard of a country called *Koufur* to the south-east of Autolo and that in it there was a city built of stone; that on the 22nd December next Menelek with 50,000 rifles was to start to conquer it, and had already named the city Adis, Harrar or new Harrar in anticipation of their victory.

“He expressed an opinion that there was no other way of dealing with these people but by force of arms as they listened to no remonstrance of any kind from anyone.”

Lieutenant-Colonel, C.W.H. Sealy, Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, said in a Memorandum (No.438, dated Aden, February 14, 1895), quoting Mr. Gillett who returned to Aden from the Ogaden:

“He informed me that the Abyssinians were still carrying out their apparent object of subjugating the country on, and south of, the Webbe Shebeyli. The procedure appears to be this: first, a some what small force goes and collects tributes from villages; if unsuccessful, they are backed up by a second and larger force behind them, and behind all is Menelek’s own force.

“As far as I could learn from native sources at Berbera, while recently on the coast, it is not now the Ogaden who are suffering from the Abyssinians, but Galla tribes further south and south-east and south-west of the Webbe Shebeyli. For, whereas **Mr. Gillett said that quite recently the Abyssinians continued their atrocities (such as cutting off women’s breasts and piling up the heads of victims in pyramids, &c.),** the Ogadens who came into Berbera with caravans reported that those atrocities had ceased, as the Ogaden were paying up the

tribute demanded by the Abyssinians. The inference is that the victims referred to by Mr. Gillett are Gallas, not Ogaden.

On his part, Captain Abud, Acting Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, at Aden, provided* the following information about the “*Koufur*” which Menelek threatened to conquer:

“*Koufur* is a country formerly Hawiya and lies between Webbe Shabeli and the Juba and to the west of the Rahanwein (Jeberties); its ports are Merka, Haman (Hamar?) and Barawa. The country was formerly Hawiya but owing to an influx of other people the language has become assimilated to that of the Jeberties.

“The country is cultivated and has villages. It is full of Mullahs, who are educated to a certain extent and are held in much veneration by all.

“There is no town in it as imagined by the Abyssinians, and Bardera is at one corner of it, and possibly this may be the town they mean.”**

When the news that the Abyssinians would attack Hargeisa reached the British Headquarters in Berbera, the Assistant Resident made the following suggestions: (1) That Shaik Mattar be granted some *Baladiya* at Hargeisa, and (2) That he be given a British flag. The Assistant Resident said:

“As regards the first, Shaik Mattar has asked me to apply for thirty men for him. The number appears to me excessive, but Shaik Mattar is one of the few stipendiaries who has consistently rendered good service to the Agency, and certainly deserves all the help we can give him. I presume that given the rifles he would find the men.

“As regards the flag it would show the Abyssinians clearly that Shaik Mattar is our servant, and would, I

* Foreign Department, Letter dated, Aden, the 1st December 1894, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department – February 1895, NAI, New Delhi.

believe, be a protection to him, for I do not believe the Abyssinians will, at any rate for some time to come, take the initiative against us.”

“The British flag was hoisted at Hargeisa by David Morrison, Deputy Assistant Political Agent at Bulhar on February 17, 1891, at 4:30 P.M. near the masjid and Shaikh Madar’s house and then gave the flag in custody of Omar Madar, son of Shaikh Madar to keep till the arrival of his father, into whose charge it is to be given.

But the Acting Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast reacted negatively about the hoisting of the British flag and wrote to the Assistant Resident at Berbera* that: “the earliest opportunity may be taken for hauling down the flag if hoisted, and it should only be hoisted when a hostile force is actually in the vicinity. The departure of Mr. Morrison would be a sufficient excuse for hauling down the flag, which may, however, be left with Shaikh Mattar with instructions to him to show it merely to any hostility disposed persons who may visit Hargeisa.”

Shaikh Madar, was appointed as the custodian of the British flag, but neither protection nor military support was extended to him by the British authorities. On the issue of granting him some security men for the protection of the interest and the prestige of the British Empire, Major C.W. H. Sealy, told the Resident at Berbera:

“There is no objection to your granting Shaikh Mattar (Madar and Matter both spelling have been used in the documents) 15 it as a temporary measure and at his own expense, but in the event of an overpowering force of Abyssinians marching on Hargeisa it would be better for Shaikh Mattar to retire to Berbera, as already suggested in the 7th paragraph of your No. 135 of 9th instant.”

Besides, the Assistant Resident at Berbera, Lieute-

* Foreign Department, Letter dated Aden, 15th February 1891 NAI, New Delhi.

nant H. Merewether, sent by a special messenger, via Bulhar, the following letter to Shaik Mattar:

“After compliments. —These are the *Sirkar’s* orders regarding you and your *kariya*:

“The flag which Mr. Morrison hoisted you will pull down and keep. Should any spies or single individual visit you to collect information for our enemies show it to them. Should any large force come near you re-hoist it. Should any large force come against you retire with all speed to Berbera.

*“Do not fear, the Sirkar knows everything and is doing what is best for everybody. Regarding the Biladias let me know if you are prepared to pay and feed so many yourself. May you be preserved.”**

By denying Shaikh Madar to have maintenance support for 15 *Baladiyas* (the local militias) to defend the country, which was at the time their own colony or protectorate, from Abyssinian attacks and to “advise” him in case of Abyssinian invasion to “retire” meaning to run, “with all speed to Berbera”, was really mean and a clear indication that the British valued more the meat they collected from the country for their Aden garrison, than the people and country.

In fact, on April 1, 1891, the British Political Resident at Aden, submitted a Memo to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, in which he said that the presentation of the British flag to Shaikh Mattar (Madar) by the Deputy Assistance Political Agent at Bulhar was an error of judgment, “but to withdraw the flag at once (would) have a bad effect”.

“I will however endeavour to persuade Shaikh Mattar to quietly return it unbeknown to his men on the plea that the purpose for which it was granted has now passed and there is no fear of the Abyssinian force, which has

* Foreign Department, No. 35, of 1891, External, Government of India, NAI, New Delhi.

moved far away from his district, molesting him.”*

And on July 29, 1891, the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department, W. Le-Warner, quoting the Political Resident at Aden, reported to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, that:

“Lieutenant Merewether, Assistant Resident at Berbera, has privately recovered the British flag which was in the possession of Shaikh Mattar at Hargeisa, and that it was necessary to act secretly in this matter, because if it became publicly known that the flag had been withdrawn, the effect upon the Somalis would have been bad.” **

Well ! nothing happened. Somalis did not know what was the meaning of the flag.

It was already known that the chief *raison d’etre* of the British control over the Somali Coast, was to provide Aden with meat supply and also to provide camel transport if necessary. And all the so-called Treaties of Protection were used just as instruments to keep the other powers away. Out of all the powers that have acquired Somali territories, for short or long period, i.e. Turkey, Oman, Britain, France, Italy, Britain was the only power that caused the worse damage to Somali nation, in the 19th century as well as in the 20th century. Not only it did not develop the country, but it has given away Somali territories to other countries. It gave Ogaden to Abyssinia in 1897, Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenya in 1963 and Socotra to Yemen in 1967.

The Commander of the Abyssinian Forces at Jig-Jiga, Mangasha, sent a letter through Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, to Shaikh Mattar of Hargeisa. The

* Foreign Department, Secret, E. July 1891, No. 353-359, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, Secret, E. August, 1891, No. 131, NAI, New Delhi.

letter, dated the 3rd *Al Kada*, 1308, read as follows:

“After compliments.—We inform you that people came to us and told us Shaikh Mattar had gone to Berbera and Aden to collect an English (*Farangi*) army and Muhammadan that they might fight you (us), and when we heard this we were on our guard, but we heard were present ... (sic) and the English Commander’s name with the army was Sabwal. When we heard we were astonished, and afterwards were intending to come to you when we heard of this state of affairs. But the precious letter arrived, and we read and understood it and believed it. But the Government does not confuse the country; the Government wishes peace, and on that account has destroyed all the road-cutters (plunderers) of the Berteri on account of the travellers. But you and I, oh, Shaikh Mattar, are allies in God, and before this affair I knew (intended) nothing bad and you similarly, but let us two meet and consult about everything in peace.”

According to a telegram from the British Secretary to the (British) Government Bombay, March 18, 1891, the Resident at Aden telegraphed on March 17 that “the Abyssinians invaded Gadabursi on the 1st March, and that Gadabursi applied for protection to Lieutenant Merewether.”

The British Government notified the powers that the Gadabursi were under the British protection. Moreover, the agreement with France of February 1888 treated the Gadabursi as under the British protection, although it did not provide for protection

A Foreign Office official having initials W.J.C. considered the British position so ambiguous that it could be interpreted either way. The official wrote on March 19, 1891:

“Our position with the Gadabursi is such that we can, if we like, assert our protection as against the Abyssinians or any one else, and we can, if we like, leave the Gadabursi

to their fate because our treaty does not provide for protection.”

“Whether we should protect or not depends on whether Her Majesty’s Government wish to claim a hinterland or mean to leave it to the Abyssinians and through them the Italians; it depends also on whether Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to make good and effectual protection from inland aggression to a tribe the extent of whose territory we do not know.” W.J.C. added: “I think we may answer”:

“Foreign. Secret. Your telegram, 18th Gadabursi. The Bombay Government have telegraphed to Aden: Begins.

“It is undesirable to notice threatening disturbances beyond the sphere of protective treaty, or, until you have clearer proof of the hostile invasion of Gadabursi country, to consider question protection treaty with the Gadabursi. Presuming Hargeisa and Harawad are beyond the sphere of protective agreements hoisting flag appears undesirable. Our policy is to interfere only where protective treaty absolutely requires. Ends. I concur, and do not advise extending protectorate to Gadabursi whose inland limits are unknown and who have no coast unless Her Majesty’s Government have determined to claim hinterland extending past Harrar on the east to British East African Company’s territory.”

In a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for India, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Foreign Office, London, Sir P.W. Currie, mentioned a telegram dated March 17, 1891, from the British Resident at Aden, respecting the movements of Abyssinian forces in the districts inhabited by the Gadabursi tribes. The British Ambassador in Rome was instructed to state to the Italian Government that King Menelek has attacked the Gadabursi who have treaty relations with Her Majesty’s Government, and to request them to call upon him to desist from such proceedings. British

Resident at Aden expressly stated that the Abyssinian force entered the Gadabursi country on March 1, 1891.*

The British Secretary of State in London sent the following telegram on March 18, 1891, to the Viceroy in Calcutta:

“Foreign . Secret. Resident at Aden telegraphed 17th March: “Abyssinians invaded Gadabursi 1st March. Gadabursi applied Protectorate. Merewether says that if not granted they will, probably, ask for help elsewhere and recommends hoisting flag Harawad. Zaila instructed to take no action pending order. Gadabursi rely upon the word maintenance of independence in the preamble Treaty, 1884, and press for a reply. Jopp give no advice. What are your views? Please telegraph reply at once.**”

The Political Secretary, Bombay sent the following telegram to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta on March 18, 1891:

“Following telegram received from Resident at Aden last night: Begins.

As follows.

Following telegram sent now to Secretary of State.

Following telegram received from Assistant Resident at Zaila to Consul, Somali Coast, just received: Telegram begins. “Abyssinian force entered Gadabursi country on first. Gadabursi fled from mountains; no fighting. Abyssinians returned Gedi. Gadabursi apply for protectorate. If not granted, probably apply for help elsewhere. Recommend hoisting flag Harawad whilst yet time and Abyssinians out of country; await instructions. Second force left same date ostensibly against the Hargeisa” Telegram ends. Harawad is between the Hargeisa and Gildessa in Gadabursi country. Zaila instructed to take no action pending orders. Gadabursi rely on words

* Foreign Department, SE 165, 169, July 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, SE 106, April 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

maintenance our independence in preamble Treaty, 1884, and press for a reply. Baring informed 16th February that our flag hoisted at Hargeisa." Aden telegram ends.

I have telegraphed to Resident at Aden: Telegram begins. "Your Secret telegram of yesterday evening. Undesirable to notice threatening disturbance beyond the sphere of protective treaty or until you have clearer proof of the hostile invasion of Gadabursi country to consider question protective treaty with the Gadabursi, presuming Hargeisa and Harawad are beyond the sphere of protective agreements. Hoisting flag appears undesirable. Our policy is to interfere only where protective treaty absolutely requires" My telegram ends. We have no communication with Secretary of State but should invasion extend protected territory we shall be glad to receive clear instructions."*

Then the Viceroy in Calcutta sent the following "Personal telegram" No.566-E, dated the 21st March 1891, to the Secretary of State in London:

"Your Lordship's telegram, dated 18th March (Foreign-Secret). Decision as to the assistance to be given to Gadabursi must depend on policy which Her Majesty's Government decide to adopt as to the Somali Hinterland-see our Secret despatch No. 123 of 7th October 1890. Until a conclusion upon this point has been arrived at we shall be guided by your Secret despatch No. 30 of 31st October. This action will accord with view of Bombay Government, who have telegraphed to Aden that it is inexpedient to notice threatening disturbance beyond the sphere of protective treaty or to consider question of protectorate treaty with Gadabursi until clearer evidence of invasion of their country is received and further that presuming Harawad and Hargeisa are beyond sphere of protectorate

* Foreign Department, SE 107, April 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

agreements it appears undesirable to hoist flag at those places. Unless where protective treaty absolutely requires it our policy is not to interfere.”*

On March 16, 1891, Colonel E. V. Stace, Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast told Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul General in Cairo, Sir E. Baring that he did not know the object of the Abyssinian raid into the Gadabursi country. However, he knew that: “There has been something going on between the Gadabursi, *Ughaz Nur* Roblay and Makunnan of Harrar for a considerable time, and the latter, as long ago as October last, tried to entrap the former into his power by inviting him to Harrar. Subsequently, as you are aware, Makunnan seized Nur’s brother and has him in custody.”

Colonel Stace went on to add: “It is difficult at present to express any opinion as to the raid now reported, but it would manifestly be dangerous if the Abyssinians got possession of the Gadabursi country for it would bring them into direct contact with the tribes who look to us for protection and who frequent the ports of the Somali Coast. Troubles would most certainly arise and be serious as the Abyssinians are very proud, arrogant, and defiant, besides being very reckless.”

It was most unfortunate that the Somalis were not defended by the British and at the same time, were not allowed to defend themselves. In his letter, Colonel Stace, the British Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast stated Captain Ashby, Assistant Resident at Zaila, “has been instructed to take no action and to advise the Gadabursi to be calm.”**

On July 1, 1891, Colonel Stace wrote a letter to Ras Makunnan, Governor of Harrar:

“After compliments.—We hear that you have arrived at Harrar and congratulate you on your safe arrival, and

* Foreign Department, SE 108, April 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, SE 127, April 1891, NAI.

trust that you are in the best of health.

“We have heard with much regret that there has been some scarcity at Harrar, and that some of the people have suffered in consequence.

“The Gadabursi have been in fear that some of the soldiery from Harrar might enter their country, and now we understand that the Jibril Abokr tribe of the Habr Awal are similarly disturbed.

“We are thoroughly convinced of the sincere friendship of King Menelek and yourself towards the British Government, and also convinced that you would not countenance any inroad into the territories of tribes which have treaty engagements with the British Government, and we therefore write to you, relying on your friendship, to ask you to be kind enough to restrain any persons who may have any design to enter such countries with any hostile intent.

“We beg you to favour us with an early reply to this by the special messenger sent, and at the same time receive the assurance of our continued friendship and esteem, and we trust to hear always good news of you.”

Makunan, calling himself Amir, replied:

“Dated the 5th Amlil 1883

“From Ras Makunan, Amir of Harrar and its Dependencies,

“To: Colonel E.V. Stace, Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast.

“After compliments.- We have received your letter, and we are obliged and highly pleased for your friendship towards His Highness King Menelek.

“Be it known to Your Excellency that friendship, love and amity will continue between you and us for ever. Be sure that nothing displeasing to you will be ever done by us except what is pleasing.


“As for the Gadabursi, they are always molesting and looting the travellers who come to Harrar. This we do not

hide from you. The doings of this tribe are much injurious and troublesome to all the people as they loot the travellers without cause. As regards what you wrote appertaining to an intended attack by some of our soldiers against them (Gadabursi), we are not aware of it because we were absent. Before taking such steps, we would consult you. As for the Gadabursi and a part of the Habr Awal being subjects, His Highness Negus Menelek wrote to the European powers in his letter that they were subjects of King Tobyaur (of Ethiopia), therefore we cannot reply on this subject without asking His Highness King Menelek, as he alone communicates with the powers and make the limits. May you remain, &c.”

In 1891, the British Ambassador in Rome, The Marquis of Duffering and Ava, and the Marquis de Rudini, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, signed in the morning of 24th March 1891, a Protocol for a delimitation between the English and Italian sphere of influence from the mouth of the River Juba to the Blue Nile. The town of Kisimayo with its adjoining territory on the right bank of the Juba was included (in) British jurisdiction. (Appendix Twenty-Three).

ABYSSINIA CLAIMS ITS SHARE OF AFRICAN TERRITORIES

In his circular letter to the European Heads of State in 1891, Menelek defined what he called the old frontiers of Abyssinia and informed his intention of restoring these ancient limits as far as Khartoum and Lake Nianza with all the Galla country, as well as the Somali territories, and appealed to the Christian powers to restore the “maritime frontiers,” or at least give him access to the coast. Besides the British Queen, Menelek sent his letter to the Czar of Russia, the Emperor of Germany, the King



MENELEK'S CLAIM TO TERRITORY IN HIS CIRCULAR LETTER TO EUROPEAN POWERS IN 1891

of Italy and the President of the French Republic.

Following is the text of the circular letter sent by Emperor Menelek to Heads of European States in 1891:

“Being desirous to make known to our friends the Powers (Sovereigns) of Europe the boundaries of Ethiopia, we have addressed also to you (Your Majesty) the present letter.

“These are the boundaries of Ethiopia:

“Starting from the Italian boundary of Arafale, which is situated on the sea, the line goes westward over the plain (Meda) of Gegra towards Mahio, Halai, Digsä, and Gura up to Adibaro. From Adibaro to the junction of the Rivers Mareb and Arated.

“From this point the line runs southward to the junction of the Atbara and Setit Rivers, where is situated the town known as Tomat.

“From Tomat the frontier embraces the Province of Gedaref up to Karkoj on the Blue Nile. From Karkoj the line passes to the junction of the Sobat River with the White Nile. From thence the frontier follows the River Sobat, including the country of the Arbore, Gallas and reaches Lake Samburu.

“Towards the east are included within the frontier the country of the Borana Gallas and the Arussi country up to the limits of the Somalis, including also the Province of Ogaden. To the northward the line of frontier includes the Habr Awaz (*sic*), the Gadabursi, and the Esa Somalis, and reaches Ambos.

“Leaving Ambos the line includes Lake Assal, the province of our ancient vassal Mohamed Anfari, skirts the coast of the sea, and rejoins Arafale.

“While tracing today the actual boundaries of my Empire, I shall endeavour, if God gives me life and strength, to re-establish the ancient frontiers (tributaries) of Ethiopia up to Khartoum, and as far as Lake Nyanza with all the Gallas.

“Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of Pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator.

“As the Almighty has protected Ethiopia up to this day, I have confidence He will continue to protect her, and increase her borders in the future. I am certain He will not suffer her to be divided among other Powers.

“Formerly the boundary of Ethiopia was the sea. Having lacked strength sufficient, and having received no help from Christian Powers, our frontier on the sea coast fell into the power of the Mussulman.

“At present we do not intend to regain our sea frontier by force, but we trust that the Christian Powers, guided by our Saviour, will restore to us our sea-coast line, at any rate, certain points on the coast.

“Written at Adis Abbaba, the 14th Mazir, 1883 (10th April 1891)

(Translated direct from the Amharic.)

Adis Abbaba, 4th May 1897.”*

But the text sent to the British Monarch, Queen Victoria, was in French, which read as follows:

“(Traduction.)

“LION vainqueur de la tribu de Juda, Menelek II, élu du Seigneur, Roi des Rois d’Ethiopie. A notre amie Sa Majeste la Reine Victoria, Reine de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande, Protectrice de la Foi, Imperatrice des Indes, salut!

“Nous demandons particulièrement la nouvelle de vostra precieuse sante.

“J’avais adresse a vostra Majeste une lette datee du 25 Maskaram, 1883; m,ais je ne sais pas si elle vous est parvenue.

“La grande Puissance Anglaise etant

* Foreign Department, October 1897, No.18-102, NAI, New Delhi.

jusqu'aujourd'hui l'amie de l'Empire Ethiopien, en connaissance de vos bonnes intentions pour elle, nous vous exprimons notre gratitude.

“Comme nous desirons faire connaitre les limites de l'Ethiopie aux Puissances amies de l'Europe en leur écrivant, nous adressons également a votre Majeste la presente lettre, et nous portons avec l'esperance que vous vfeuillez prendre bieveillamment en considertion ce qui suit:

Limites de l'Ethiopie.

Partant de la limite Italienne d'Arafali, qui est situe sur les cotes de la mer, cette limite se dirige vers l'ouestg surt la plain de Gegra-Meda (Pintades), et la limite arrive jusqu'a l'endroit ou le Mareb et le fleuve d'Aratab se reunissent. Cette limite partant ensuite du dit endroit, se dirige vers le sud, et arrive jusqu'a l'endroit ou le fleuve d'Atbara et le fleuve Setit se rencontrent et ou se trouve la ville connue sous le nom de Tomate. Partant de Tomate, la limite embrasse la Province de Ghedarif et arrive josqu'a la ville de Karkog, sur les bords du Nil. De Karkog cette limite arrrive jusqu'a l'endroit out le Nil Blanc et le fleuve de Sobat se rencontrent. Partant de cet endroit, la limite suit le dit fleuve de Sobat, y compris les pays Gallas dits Arbore, arrive jusqu'a la Mer Sambourou. Vers l'est, compris le pays Gallas connus sous le nom de Borani, tous les pays des Aroussis, jusqu'aus limites des Somalis, y compris egalment la Province de Ogadene.. Vers le nord, la limite embrassat les Habr-Awal, les Gadaboursis, les Issa-Somalis, arrive jusqu'a Hambos. Partant de Hambos, la limite embrasse le Lac Assal, la province de nostre vassal d'ancienne date Mohamed Hanfari, longe la cote et rejoint Arafali.

“En indiquant aujourd'hui les limites actuelle de mon Empire, je tacherai, si le bon Dieu veut bien m'accorder la vie et la force, de retablir les ancienes frontieres de l'Ethiopia justq'a Khartoum et le Lac Nianza, avec tous le

pays Gallas.

“Je n’ai point l’intention d’être spectateur indifférent, si des Puissances lointaines se portent avec l’idée de se partager l’Afrique, l’Ethiopia ayant été, pendant bien quatorze siècles, une île des Chrétiens au milieu de la mer des Païens.

“Comme le Tout-Puissant a protégé l’Ethiopia jusqu’aujourd’hui, je me porte avec l’espérance qu’il la gardera et l’élargira aussi pour l’avenir, mais je ne doute nullement pas qu’il partage l’Ethiopia avec d’autres Puissances.

“Auparavant la limite de l’Ethiopia était la mer. A défaut de force et à défaut de l’aide de la part des Chrétiens, notre frontière du côté de la mer est tombée entre les mains des Musulmans. Aujourd’hui nous ne prétendons pas retrouver notre frontière de la mer par la force; mais nous espérons que les Puissances Chrétiennes, conseillées par notre Sauveur Jésus-Christ, nous rendent les frontières de la mer, ou qu’elles nous donneront au moins quelques points sur la côte.

“Fait à Addis-Abeba, le 14 Mars de l’an 1883 de la miséricorde (Avril 1891)”*

All the Kings in Abyssinia used religion as means to reach their aims. Before Menelek, King John of Abyssinia also sent a message to Queen Victoria of Britain in 1885. The Abyssinian King’s message was sent through Her Majesty’s Acting Agent and Consul General in Cairo, E.H. Egerton, who made the translation and forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Salisbury, with a letter dated, Cairo, 10th November 1885.

Following are the letters of the Abyssinian King and the reply of the British Queen:

“From King John of Abyssinia, King of Kings, &c., to Victoria, by the Grace of God, Defender of the Faith,

* Foreign Department, Secret-E, October 1891, No. 233-249.

Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India.

“Since I last wrote to you how has your health been? I am, thank God, quite well, as all my people, by the everlasting mercy of God.

“When I made a treaty with you that I would save the Egyptian garrison of Bogos (Senheit), Amadib, Kassala, and Metammeh (Galabat), which I did with the loss of many men from cold, and being carried away by rivers, and killed in action—this I did from friendship to you and not to the Egyptians—I hoped to get the guns, ammunition, and stores, but I only found two or three guns. I saved the garrison and sent them to their country; I fed and clothed them, and gave them money. In the treaty nothing was said about feeding and clothing the released garrisons; this I did from (for) love of Queen Victoria.

“I wished to be faithful son of Queen Victoria for ever, but before a year the treaty I made is broken. When the Egyptian left Massowah I thought Massowah would be mine, but now the Italians have taken Massowah, and more of my country besides.

“The Kings of England before Queen Victoria, and the rest of the Christian Kings of the world, were friendly with the Abyssinians, and waged war against the Moslems to convert to Christianity; but they never interfered with the Abyssinians because they were Christians.

“I have said this openly and frankly to you because we are Christians, and have confidence in each other.

“Now, all these soldiers of your that have been killed in the battle of the Soudan, all the money you have spent, has not been caused by me, but by the Muhammadan Dervishes, and my conduct towards you has been perfectly straightforward and loyal; but now the Italians have come and occupied Massowah, which I thought would belong to me, and they wish to take some country of mine.

“I do not know whether they come on their own res-

possibility or by your command. If they come of their own accord, I am not afraid; I will remain in my country and oppose them, but if they come by your sanction I wish to remain friendly with you, and wish to know what you mean by sending them here? Recently an Envoy came from Italians and wished to make a treaty with me like the English treaty, and I told him that he, must first obtain from Queen Victoria a written document accrediting him to me; without this I did not wish him to come to my country. When I said this the Italians were angry and stopped the import of guns into my country; and more than this, the Italians have taken possession of some sea-coast which long ago belonged to the Abyssinians, and was then occupied by the Turks, but which, through your aid, you promised to me. I wish you to give me Massowah, and will hold it against any foreigners.

“On the seal: “King of Kings, King John of Mahoun, in Abyssinia. The Cross has conquered the race of Ishmael.”

And the Queen sent the following reply, December 8, 1885:

“From—HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA,

“To—KING JOHN OF ETHIOPIA.

“Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India &c. to our friend the King of Kings of Ethiopia, Johannis.

“We trust Your Majesty is in good health. We are through the mercy of God quite well.

“We have received you(r) letter, and have made inquiry on the various matters of which you write.

“As regards the relief of the garrisons, what you have done has been friendly, and has deserved our esteem and thanks. If you have not found so many guns and so much stores and ammunition as you expected, this is no doubt a misfortune and a disappointment.

“But we are assured that the Egyptian Government have supplied to you from Massowah as many guns and rifles as you required, and that they have also made to you other presents on account of what you have done for the garrisons, and are about to send you further acknowledgments.

“The sword also which we have wished to offer you on account of the rescue of the garrison of Galabat is being made, but it is not yet completed as we wished it to be made on purpose for you, and to be such as you would like to accept and wear. As soon as it is ready it shall be sent.

“As regards the Treaty, we have faithfully observed every portion of it. It does not promise that Massowah should belong to Abyssinia when the Egyptians leave it, but that there shall be free transit for all goods to and from Abyssinia through that place. But if the Italians have stopped the import of guns, we will ask them again to permit it, as we have already done, and we feel sure that they will consent.

“We understand that the Italians desire to have friendship with you, and are sending a mission to your country, and we hope that you will be able to come to a friendly arrangement with them. And if we can in any way help in the accomplishment of this we will gladly do so.

“As regards the matter of the Church at Jerusalem, about which you wrote to us in January last, we have made inquiries at Jerusalem, and we have also caused a communication to be made to the Coptic Patriarch at Cairo. The latter has promised to write to the Bishop at Jerusalem, ordering him to treat all Abyssinians in every way as Copts and brothers, and to give them access to, and free use of all the Copt buildings at Jerusalem.

“We hope this will be satisfactory to you.

“And so, with our sincere wishes for Your Majesty’s health and happiness, and for the prosperity and welfare of your dominions, we recommend you to the protection of

the Almighty.

“Given at our Court at Windsor Castle the 8th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1885, and in the forty-ninth year of our reign.”*

In any message to European Powers or in all the Treaties signed with them, the Abyssinian Kings always used their anti-Muslim sentiment as the basis for their friendship with Christian European Powers. On June 7, 1843, Sahle Selassie, Grand father of Menelek, signed a “Political and Commercial” Treaty with the King of France, Louis-Philippe. Religion and war against the Muslims were mentioned in the very first article of the Treaty. (Appendix Seventeen)

The “Amir of Harrar” wrote to the British Commandant a letter :

“Dated the 12th Sani 1883.

“From Ras Makunan, Amir of Harrar and its Dependencies,

“To The British Commandant.

“After compliments.—We hear of some building being made in direction of Harrar by the aid of some European(s) in Somali land. We do not know the reasons for the same. We feel confident in your sincere friendship, and that when such work is required by you for the benefit of both sides, you would inform us about it. Now we did not believe the news and write you this to enquire about your health, and to inform us whether the fact is true or not. If it is true what is your intention in building in that place, because you know that the people of this country are ignorant and barbarians, and probably they will molest and harm the European(s) without our knowledge, and thereby we will be annoyed with you for not informing us previously. We hope that you will please explain the

* Foreign Department-Secret—E. February 1886, No. 121-133. NAI, New Delhi.

facts to us. Whatever service you require which is good to both of us we will assist, so that no risk will occur in future and that peace may prevail in the country and on the road. May you remain protected, and we pray God to increase your respect, and that friendship may exist between us for ever.”*

And the British Consul replied on July 7, 1891:

“From Colonel E.V. Stace, Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast

“To Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar.

“After compliments.- I have received your letter of 12th Sani 1883, which was sent to me by the Assistant Resident, Berbera, in which you ask about a fort or building being erected in Somali land, and kindly express yourself in a friendly manner to the British Government. I hasten to assure you that I have no knowledge whatever of any fort or building being erected anywhere in Somali land by any one. Certainly, none such is being erected by our knowledge or consent. You know the Somalis; they are not likely to build forts. As for the British Government its position is the same as it has been; it occupies the ports and has under its protection certain Somali tribes, no change has been made whatever.

“If you hear any more of this please let me know. Certainly no measures unfriendly to you will be helped or approved by in any way.

“We feel much obliged for your friendly sentiments expressed towards the British Government. We reciprocate them, and shall always be most glad to hear of your welfare and prosperity in all things.”*

The Abyssinians, the black colonialists in the area, kept harassing the Somalis, in the presence of the British Protectors. The British did not defend either physically

* Foreign Department, Secret E, October 1891, No.179-216, NAI, New Delhi.

or morally. The Somalis were not allowed even to act in self defense. The British Government received information that the Abyssinians were advancing to Samadon, which is about eighty miles from Zeyla on the Harrar road and also to Abassaen which is on the line dividing the British from French.

According to Colonel Stace the Easa tribe had interviewed the British Assistant Resident at Zeyla on this matter and asked three questions:

(1) Had the Abyssinians occupied Biyokaboba with the knowledge and consent of the British authorities.

(2) What did the British Government contemplate doing in this matter?

(3) In case the British Government did not act, were they (Easa) at liberty to attack and expel the Abyssinians?

On the first question the Easa were, of course, assured that the British knew nothing of the intention of the Abyssinians, and that the occupation of Biyokaboba had not taken place with their consent.

“To the second question”, the Consul wrote, “that a reference had been made to Aden.”

By this it meant that the British did not approve that the Somalis defend their territory and liberate it from the Abyssinian occupation.

The Political Agent told his superiors: “I have written to the Assistant Resident at Zeyla to urge upon the Easa that they should not attack the Abyssinians but have patience.”

The British official assured that “Biyo Kaboba is well within the limits of the Easa territory,” adding, “and it is, I think, very doubtful if the Easa, a much more resolute tribe than the Habr Awal, can long be restrained from attacking the Abyssinians in spite of the latter having fire-arms.”

On his part, the British Viceroy sent the following secret telegram from Simla to the Secretary of State in

London:

“Foreign. Secret. Biyokaboba on the Zeyla road has been occupied by Abyssinian troops from Harrar. The Abyssinians are said to contemplate a further advance to Samadon on the Zeyla road and Abassaen on the boundary of the Somali Coast Protectorate. The Easa tribe claim British intervention or permission to attack the Abyssinians. Our information regarding the territory which can fairly be claimed as belonging to Harrar, is not definite, but it seems certain that the boundary limit is considerably south of Biyokaboba, and that this place is within the Easa territory. Colonel Stace has been instructed to send a remonstrance to Makunan. We propose instructing the Bombay Government to restrain the Easa tribe if possible from attacking the Abyssinians, and to take no further action beyond strengthening the garrison at Zayla, unless the Abyssinian troops advance beyond Samadon and Abassaen, so as to threaten Zayla. We suggest pressure being put on Menelek to obtain the withdrawal of his troops from the territories of the Easa tribes, whose treaty does not contain a protection clause, but over whom a British protectorate was notified to the Foreign Powers in 1887. It may possibly be desirable to re-examine the proposal to send a mission to Makunan at Harrar.”

In the meantime the Assistant Resident at Zayla, reported 70 Abyssinian soldiers with many workmen and masons arrived at Biyo Kaboba and began to build a fort there.

The Secretary to the (British) Government of Bombay, Political Department, sent a telegram on September 14, 1891, to the Foreign Secretary in Simla. He wrote that the Resident, Aden had sent today telegram confirming his earlier telegram of September 9. The Resident further stated : “Protest of the Easa disregarded; they demand our intervention or liberty to attack. Samars report that

further advance to Samadon eighty miles from Zayla and Abassaeen intended. Foreign Office informed through Cairo. Telegram ends.

If the line of demarcation of French influence is overstepped, would it not be well to strengthen Zeyla garrison?"

The following day, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay sent another telegram from Poona, India, to the Foreign Secretary in Simla, India, on September 15, 1891. Indicating the anxiety of the British government to prevent the Easas from taking any "offensive action" He informed the Foreign Secretary in Simla:

"My Secret telegram 14th September. We propose to telegraph to Aden:- "Telegram begins. Warn Easas and any protected tribes, that being taken under British protection, they must abstain from all offensive operations without permission. You should also ask Makunan to explain advance, warning him that incursion of his troops or any of his protected tribes is likely (to be) regarded as an unfriendly act on his part. Telegram ends. Does the Governor-General in Council approve proposed telegram."*

Another official whose initial was only L. wrote from India Office to the British Government:

"My impression is activity of the Italians will, or ought to, force us to declare ourselves distinctly, but the proper way to do this is not to treat the question as a local one and to send small expeditions from Aden, but to tell the Italian Government, through the London Foreign Office, that we regard the hinterland of the Somali Coast as outside the sphere of Italian or Abyssinian influence, and that we look to that Government to prevent acts of

* Foreign Department, Secret E, October 1891, No. 233-249, NAI.

aggression on the part of Abyssinians. Her Majesty's Government recognise the fact that King Menelek is under Italian protection and have, if I remember right, suggested that Italian Agents should be our intermediaries whenever we have any communications with the Abyssinians."

Although they were under Italian protection, the Abyssinians were begging for British friendship. Ras Mangasha, Chief of Tigre Province of Abyssinia, and nephew of the late King John sent letter to the British Queen and another to Sir Herbert Kitchener.

Following is the translation of the letter from Ras Mangasha to Her Majesty the British Queen, dated 12th Toot, (September 21, 1894) City of Makalli:

"A message from Ras Mangasha, son of King John, King of Kings of Zion and Ethiopia, to the Great Queen, Queen of Kings, Queen of the Great Red Sea. I bow low before Your Majesty's feet; my father lived all his life under the shadow of your friendship, and I beg to be accorded the same privilege. I beg also for your spiritual friendship. When I heard that English troops were coming, I went from Tigre to Amhara, and I remained there all the winter till the summer near the sea. But when no one came I returned to Tigre.

"I now beg for your sincere friendship. To obtain that is my greatest desire. I have not sealed this, as I do not possess a seal. I therefore beg Your Majesty's permission to make a seal".

Following is the translation of a letter from Ras Mangasha to General Kitchener Pasha, dated 13th Toot, (September 22, 1894), city of Makalli:

"Greetings to you. How are you? Are you well? Thank God, I am well, than you. May it please God to give me health. I remain in friendship to you, as were my father and mother. I remained at Amhara all this winter waiting, because I heard that you were coming, and

therefore have waited for you from day to day, but you have not come. Even as my father and mother loved you, so do I; and now you are in place of my father and mother. I now ask your friendship in return, and stand waiting for you with arms folded.

“I have sent this without seal, because you have not yet permitted me to make one, and when I hear from you, then shall I make one when you order me to do so”.

In the meantime, Italy's General Baratieri “was anxious that the transit of arms for Ethiopia should be prohibited and they wished him to urge the French Government no longer to except Menelek from the general prohibition of the importation of arms into Africa under the Brussels Act”.

According to a *Precis of Circular of April 20, 1895*, from Baron Blanc, Italian Foreign Minister to Italian Representative with signatories of the Brussels Act, “Italy, after founding the colony of Erythrea and declaring a Protectorate over Ethiopia and its dependencies, signed the Brussels Act of the 2nd July 1890. Even before signing it, she introduced into her African Treaties provisions for the suppression of slavery, and she afterwards made the local chiefs dependent on her and declare their adherence to the Act. This was done by Menelek and by all the Sultans and Chiefs having Protectorate Treaties with Italy, through the latter, both with regard to the Slave Trade and the trade in arms and spirits.

“Nevertheless, one of the Chiefs subject to her, after remaining faithful to his engagements for some time, has returned to slave-taking and slave-trading. This is Menelek, who ought to have been the last to return to those evil courses, seeing that he is a Christian, and that he personally asked to be allowed to be represented at Brussels.

The Italian Foreign Minister's circular, reproduced by the British Foreign Office, on April 27, 1895 and signed

by G. Fairholme, accused Menelek of advancing into territory belonging to the Italian sphere on the Indian Ocean.

The Circular stated:

“He (Menelek) was not content with killing and plundering, but introduced all the horrors of slavery. He took 60,000 heads of cattle and 15,000 of slaves. Apart from the slaves which he reserves for himself, he levies a tax of 1 dollar on every slave captured by his soldiers on entering Shoa, or leaving it, sold”.

“The Slave Trade has never been carried on in Africa more openly and shamelessly,” said the Italian circular.*

On April 27, 1895, the Italian Ambassador in London went to the British Foreign Office and informed them that the Italian Government received a telegram from General Baratieri, reporting that, according to advise from Shoa, confirmed from Agamet, King Menelek was sending Ras Alula against the Italian Colony of Eritrea with a force of 12,000 men, in the middle of next month.

“King Menelek was himself to follow with other forces, and would be joined by the followers of Ras Mangasha

According to Lord Kimberley, Ras Mangasha sent letters to the governments of Russia, France and Switzerland against Italy. Lord Kimberley said that General Ferrero (of Italy) doubted whether Ras Alula could collect the force mentioned, and still more, whether he could bring it up to attack the Italian positions. But the report was of importance as showing that the attitude of King Menelek was one of open hostility.

On April 1895, the British Foreign Office told the Italian Ambassador, General Ferrero, that Lord Kimberley has been in consultation with the India Office on

* Foreign Department, Red Sea and Somali Coast-Confidential-Foreign Office, London, April 27, 1895, NAI, New Delhi, India.

the desire of the Italian Government to receive an assurance that her Majesty's Government will prohibit the importation of arms and ammunition into Harrar and Abyssinia by way of Zeyla.

"Her Majesty's Government have, as your Government is well aware, been always opposed to the importation of arms on the Somali Coast, and they have only permitted the importation of a certain number of rifles into Harrar through Zeylah because it seemed certain that if this were forbidden the arms would find way to Ras Makunan by way of Jibuti. Your Government was duly informed of this at the time", said T.H. Sanderson of the British Foreign Office who signed the letter.

Sanderson told the Italians that Britain would be ready to prohibit the importation of fire-arms into Harrar and Abyssinia through the ports of the British Protectorate, and they would be glad to learn that the French Government had issued a similar prohibition as regards French ports.

Italy also complained about the French attitude towards them. In a secret report prepared in the Italian Foreign Ministry, and marked 'for private use only', it also complained against the alleged feeling of indifference by which England was actuated as regards Italian interests on the Somali Coast.

The Italian Government realised that both France and England were leaning towards the Abyssinians and it seemed to it that "it would sometimes appear as if the position of Italy in Africa were considered in London to be an obstacle in the way of arrangements between England and France on the numerous Colonial questions pending between those two Powers in different parts of the African continent."

The report said:

"This may explain the long resistance offered in London to a joint Agreement with Italy for the purpose of

defining the respective sphere of influence in Eastern Africa; and also the not less long negotiations which culminated in the two Protocols of March and April 1891, and in that of May 1894.”

Italy mentioned a long list of facts showing the action of France against Italy at Obokh-Gibuti, in Harrar, and in Shoa. It gave the following examples:

The grant of an Abyssinian decoration to M. Legarde (March 1894) and of the Cross of the Legion of Honour to Mgn. Taurin de Cahagne, head of the French Apostolic Mission at Harrar, as recompense for services rendered with Makunan.

“The journey of Ras Maconen to Gibuti by order of Menelek (April 1893), and subsequent discussions with M. Legarde on the question of the boundary of the French Gibuti Harrar-Shoa Railway, of the recognition of the French Protectorate over the missionaries at Harrar, and of the establishment of the bases of an agreement which should make of Gibuti a ‘Port of equipment’ (Porto di rifornimento) at the entire disposal of the Emperor of Ethiopia.”

The French took advantage of the attitude of England to carry on intrigues in Abyssinia, to the prejudice of the Italian interests, which had as a centre of operations Obokh, Gibuti, Harrar and Shoa.

The Italian document contains more accusations against French Agents whom it also blamed for organising anti-Italian campaign in Shoa. It mentions names like merchant Chefneux, unofficially employed by France, merchant Savoure, Head of the Franco-African Company, M. Moudon de Vidaillet, journalist, who provided information to Menelek, the engineer Ilg, not to mention other less important names, who the Italians said have spread a regular network of operation at the Court of Addis Ababa, which covered the ground from Shoa to Harrar and extends as far as Tigre.

The document said: “Chefneux and Ilg are working in France and Switzerland to bring Menelek into postal Union. They are printing postage stamps and coining money (100,000 Thalers) with his effigy (August 1894), which has already been sent to the Emperor (November 1894); they send him arms and ammunition (last consignment, October 1894); they obtain a concession for a railroad from Gibuti to Harrar; Savoure makes a contract with Menelek respecting the transport of goods by means of carts between Gibuti, Harrar and Shoa (April 1894). The President of the French Republic sends an official letter direct to Menelek (August 5, 1894).

On July 15, 1895, Major W.B. Ferris, British Consul for the Somali Coast, wrote a letter* to Her Majesty’s Plenipotentiary and Consul-General at Cairo in which he reproduced a letter, dated 25th April, from General Ferrero to the Foreign Office, in which he communicated translation of a document dated 19th idem, from Baron Blanc to General Ferrero in which appears the following passage:

“I observed that the British Government seem to wish to let slip a good opportunity for establishing on the Coast of the Gulf of Aden neighbourly relations between France, Italy and England, and for facilitating the pacification of Ethiopia, Obokh and Jibuti.”

The British Consul at Aden denied the statement as “totally incorrect” and further noted that it “contains a distinct charge of assisting the enemy of a friendly power by supplying him with arms.”

The British Consul for the Somali Coast gave a short resume of the communications that had taken place between the British Consulate at Aden and Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar, on the subject of impor-

* Foreign Department, *The Red Sea and Somali Coast Confidential Printed Papers*, No. 1607 of 1895, NAI, New Delhi.

tation of arms. He noted that “ in June 1893 Ras Makunan asked to be allowed to import some arms to Harrar through Zeila.”

After correspondence between home (England) and (British) Indian Government permission was accorded in September 1893. In a telegram dated 25th idem, the Government of Bombay asked to be informed whenever the permission was acted upon.

“Ras Makunan duly expressed his sense of obligation to the British Government but took no advantage of the permission accorded for thirteen months, that is, until the end of October 1894, when he requested his Agent, E. Moussaya, might be granted a license to import, via Zeyla, 200 rifles, of various patterns, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, from which to select the kind he proposed to purchase

“The license was issued on 1st November 1894, and on the strength of it Moussaya exported from Aden to Zeyla four cases containing thirty patter rifles and no ammunition.

“This is the only installment of the 200 rifles that has ever been imported. Makunan chose his pattern from among them and ordered 4,000; the first batch of these, 660 in number, arrived in March 1895, and under the orders of the Government have been impounded.

“On the 30th November 1894, that is one month later than the despatch by Moussaya of the thirty pattern rifles, a letter was received from the Italian Vice-Consul at Aden requesting that the arms etc. (1 sword, 12 lbs of gunpowder, 103 rifles, 13 revolvers, 1 case rockets, 500 empty cartridges, 14,000 cartridges) might be landed at Aden and trans-shipped to Zeyla, they having been sent in charge of one Mr. Filter by General Baratieri as a present to Ras Makunan. Permission was accorded on 3rd December 1894, and the Vice-Consul informs me that the arms and ammunition were dispatched to their

destination on the 5th idem.

“On the 14th of the previous November the India Office addressed a letter, No.1501, to the Foreign Office, in which, referring to the request of Makunan to import 200 rifles and ammunition, it is added that Makunan announced his intention of sending an armed force into Ogaden, that the Ogaden was under the Italian sphere of influence, and it was a question whether facilities should be accorded to Makunan for the prosecution of the enterprise by the importation of warlike material through Zeyla.

The British Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs then wrote to Sir Clare Ford, under date 17th November 1894, offering to temporarily withhold from Makunan the permission to import, granted the previous year, if the Italian Government so desired. The British Document said: “The Italian Government did so desire and the importation was first temporarily and then finally stopped.”

“The dates above quoted are worth(y) of note”, said the document, “for while on the 17th November in deference to the Italian Protectorate over the Ogaden, the British Government offered to suspend a permission already granted to Makunan to import some arms, and the Italian Government accepted the offer, on the 5th of the following month the Italian Vice-Consul actually imported a considerably larger quantity of arms, with ammunition, as a present from General Baratieri to the very man who was supposed to be going to use them against his Government’s protected subjects. “...a false impression that arms had frequently been imported, whereas thirty pattern rifles and no ammunition were sent through Zeylah at Makunan’s request, while the Italians themselves at a subsequent date sent, by the route, a considerably large quantity accompanied with ammunition.”

In Russia, the newspaper “*Novoye Vremya*” of 11th-

23rd June 1894, after discussing the Anglo-Congolese Treaty went on to say:

“Incomparably more interesting to us is the other agreement, that of May 5th, by which are delimited the mythical “sphere of influence” of Italy and the English colony of Zaila, Abyssinian Harrar falling to Italy.

“Strictly speaking this agreement is merely complementary to the Italian Declaration of 1889, relative to the establishment of a Protectorate over Abyssinia and to the Anglo-Italian Convention of 12th March 1891 by which not only all Abyssinia, but also the countries dependent on her were recognised as being within the Italian sphere of influence, and as Harrar then belonged to Abyssinia and still belongs to her, the Convention of 5th May, which completes the former agreement, creates no new situation so far as those powers are concerned which accepted the Italian Declaration of 1889 and the Agreement of 1891.

“Those powers on the other hand, which did not accept the above instruments (and Russia is one of them) must see in the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 5th May a skillfully concealed attempt to obtain an indirect recognition of international arrangements handing over Abyssinia to be devoured by Italy. France has already protested, basing her protest on her Agreement of 1888 with England, by which the two countries mutually guaranteed the integrity of Harrar.

“Still more important, is that we, who are deeply interested in Orthodox, though distant, Abyssinia, should avoid falling into the Italian trap, and by taking note of the Agreement of the 5th May, handing over our brother in faith through ignorance, to Catholic Italy. Even if we have no intentions with regard to Abyssinia at present, we ought not to tie our hands for the future.

“Speaking more generally the events which have lately occurred in Africa deserve more attention on our part than they have yet received. Every step that we take

in Asia causes a tumult, outcries, indignation, etc. and the practical Englishmen never miss an opportunity of demanding adequate "compensation" from us in such cases. And in the end in order to secure one thing, which we desire we are obliged to give up something else not less desirable. Suppose we should ever want something not on the Asiatic frontier, but in Africa or in the Pacific (the Islands I mean), what "compensation" could we give, or to speak plainly what could we cede? Shall we give up Kamtchatka, Signaling, or Crimea? Would it not be better to take part now in international colonial life, so that no important event could take place in those regions without an expression of opinion on our part without our consent or refusal to consent? A simple stroke of the pen on our part, would suffice, and in return for it we could claim proper "compensation".

"It is more profitable to obtain something for your consent than to pay for it, better for Russia to have a provision in store and the power to cede something distant and of little value to us, but previous to other so that we may receive in exchange for it something near and vital to us."

"Current event on the Gulf of Aden, on the Congo, and in Morocco afford us an excellent opportunity for such a policy."*

The "*Moscow Gazette*" commenting on the Anglo-Italian Agreement, wrote:

"We are deeply interested in this. The country of Abyssinia is not strange to us; it is almost Orthodox, and consequently a country which professes the same faith as Russia. Beyond the confines of Russia all her friends regard her as the some and powerful bulwark of the true faith. Can we therefore abandon our fellow believers of Abyssinia to be devoured by Jesuits and Catholics? This

* Political and Secret Department, Nov. 1894, N. 63, NAI, New Delhi.

consideration is all the more important, in view of the circumstance that Western European free thinkers indulge in such free thinking only at home, while in the colonies and foreign countries the Jesuits are their best friends. While struggling with the Pope, Italy will contribute all the necessary means for facilitating the propaganda of Catholicism in Abyssinia if the Anglo-Italian Convention be realized. Can and ought we to allow this?*"

On December 5, 1897, the British Consul in Mombasa, Basil F. Cave, reported that French mail-steamer which arrived at Zanzibar on November 28 brought several members of the Russian Mission to Abyssinia as far as Jibuti and landed there on November 24. Amongst the members were General Vlassow, late Governor of Khorassan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to King Menelek; Colonel Ahrtomanoff, late Governor of Mero; Prince Orloff, and ten other officers, some of them belonging to the personal staff of His Imperial Majesty the Czar. The Mission which had an escort of about twenty Cossacks, took with it a very large quantity of baggage, consisting chiefly of presents, and of a considerable amount—estimated at 200,000 rounds—of ammunition. Russia sent five doctors to found a medical school in Abyssinia.**

In 1898, the British Consul General at Odessa reported that the Russian Mission to Abyssinia under the leadership of M. Leontieff, accompanied by M. Ato Joseph, Secretary to the Negus, with a body-guard of Cossacks and negro servants, en route for the Equatorial Province, where M. Leontieff will enter on his duties as Governor-General of that province.

* Political and Secret Department, Nov. 1894, N. 64, NAI, New Delhi.

** Red Sea and Somali Coast, December 27, 1897-NAI, New Delhi.

“The object M. Leontieff has chiefly in view is the establishment of commercial relations with Abyssinia. He is, accordingly, taking with him a large quantity of Russian manufactures, purchased at Moscow, Lodz, Warsaw, &c., of the value of £30,000, out of funds assigned by the Ministry of Finance for the purpose, together with numerous presents for the Negus, among which may be mentioned a Russian image of St. George, a gift from the Russian officers of the Guard to the church in course of erection on the battlefield of Adua, and a gold sword for the Negus.”

In a letter dated Bombay Castle, September 5, 1895, the Honourable G.W. Vidal, I.C.S., Acting Chief Secretary to Government, Bombay, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, a Memorandum from the Political Resident, Aden, No. 281, dated the 14th ultimo, and of its accompaniments, relative to a complaint by Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar, regarding the alleged action of certain Englishman in building a house in Errar in the territory of the Negus of Ethiopia.

The translated letter from Ras Makunan to the British Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, Aden, dated 21st Amlil, 1887 (Received 10th August 1895) reads as follows:

After compliments.—“We inform you that some Englishmen are encamped in the part of Errar and are building a house for residence there according to what we hear. As the spot on which the building is commenced is in the territory of John Howi, the Negus of Ethiopia, the said building cannot be allowed under orders of his Majesty. It is improper for neighbour to exceed the boundary, therefore the building on the said spot must be stopped and removed from it. Please send intimation to stop the building which is going on until we receive orders

from John Howi regarding the same. It is not right for neighbours to make such buildings, and the Somalis should remain in their places as they were before. Your Excellency must see that such circumstances are disturbing our minds, and we pray the Creator to protect and prolong your life. May you be preserved.”

And the British Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast, replied to Ras Makunan in letter No.18, dated August 12, 1895:

“After compliments.—We have received Your Excellency’s letter dated 21st Amlil, 1887, and regret that you been misinformed. Error is in the Dankali country with which we have no concern. The only building of which we are aware outside our Coast ports is at Hargeisa, but that cannot be the one Your Excellency refers to, as Hargeisa is and has been long within the British Protectorate. We do not disturb the minds of our friends, but your informants have misled you.

“Under the agreement between Great Britain and Italy defining their respective sphere of influence in Eastern Africa, dated 5th May 1894, the boundaries of the British Somali Coast Protectorate were defined as lying as far south as the 8th degree of North latitude and west to 42°20' East longitude. It will therefore be seen that Hargeisa, which is situated on the 44th degree east longitude and 9°50' north latitude, is well within the British Protectorate”.

THE WAY THE BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA ARE MADE BY THE POWERS

In 1889, the Director of the British Military Intelligence prepared a map of Somaliland which showed the protectorates and sphere of influence of the different European powers which have the right in this part of the world in colour.

On December 18, 1889, Sir E. Hertslet, Under Secre-

tary of State for India in a memorandum observed: "I would omit the words "spheres of influence" inserted on this map in explanation of the colouring. Colonel Stace, it is true, uses the term in his despatch to Sir E. Baring of the 10th November last, but it is incorrect and misleading, as those words have a very different meaning to the word "Protectorate." The arrangement entered into between this country and France in February 1888, with regard to the "respective rights" of either country in the Gulf of Tajoura and on the Somali Coast, defined how these "Protectorates" should be separated. The term "sphere of influence" was not used at all in the arrangement (Confidential, 5659-Nos.58,66,76). Mr. Clarke states in his despatch No. 386 of 20th November 1889, that Her Majesty's Consul for the Somali Coast (Colonel Stace) has reported that a complaint has been made by Makunan at Rome that the Zeyla authorities were digging a well in the province of Mandaha belonging to Harrar, but it appears that Colonel Stace said, in a telegram to Sir E. Baring of the 9th November 1889, that there was no province of Mandaha. The Intelligence Department are right, therefore, in omitting the name of any such province from their map, and in only inserting a place of that name, but which they spell Mandoa.

"The position of the wells of "Haddon" or "Lehadu" as it is spelt in the despatch of Lord Lytton, No. 46 of 27th January 1888, or "Hadon" as it is spelt in the note to Mr. Weddington of the 9th February 1888, is spelt "Lanadu" on the map and placed within the line of the British Protectorate, although Lord Salisbury proposed to the French Ambassador, on the 27th January 1888, to agree to the inclusion of the wells of "Haddon" or "Lehadu" within the French boundary, provided that the French Government would not maintain a Consular or other Representative at Zayla, without the consent of the British Government, so long as it was in British

occupation.

“In the arrangement which was subsequently agreed upon (on the 9th February 1888), it was expressly agreed that the use of the wells of “Hadon” should be common to both parties. The position of this place therefore should, I think, either be placed on the boundary line, or on the French side of it, but not on the English side.

“By the arrangement of February 1888, the two Governments agreed not to endeavour to annex Harrar, nor to place it under their Protectorate, but the pink colouring goes so close to the place that it looks as if it touched it. I think it should be very clearly shown that it is not intended to do so.

“The Habr Awal, the Habr Taljaala, Habr Gerhajis and the Warsangali tribes have placed their respective territories, and not their coasts only, under British protection. The words “sphere of influence,” as applied to Italy, would also appear to be equally misleading, as they have established a “Protectorate” over the Danakils.”

The Under-Secretary of State for India J.A. Godley wrote back to the Sir Hertslet* who had sent the memorandum the following day :

“I am desired by Viscount Cross to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 19th December, on the subject of the coloured map of the Somali Coast Protectorates which has been prepared for the use of Department of Her Majesty’s Government, and I am to offer the following observations in reference thereto:

“His Lordship concurs generally in the remarks made in Sir E. Hertslet’s Memorandum on the subject of this map, but with respect to the wells of Hadon or Lehadu, it will be observed on reference to the Anglo-French Protectorate Agreement of 9th February 1888, that the line of separation of these Protectorates is described in

* Foreign Department, Letter dated, India Office, London, the 6th January 1890, NAI, New Delhi.

clause I of the Agreement as passing “through the said wells,” Lehadu is therefore correctly shown in the map as on the line of division. In accordance with clauses 1 and 4 of the Agreement the coloured line of demarcation might stop short of Harrar in order to indicate that Harrar is outside the limits of the Anglo-French Protectorates, and Gildessa might be considered as the terminus of the line as in the accompanying map of 5th October 1885 (I.B. No.497), that place is marked as the last station in the Easa country on the Zaila-Harrar caravan route.

“In conclusion, I am desired to draw attention to Article II of the French Treaty of 11th March 1862, with the Chiefs of the Dankali and other tribes occupying territory to the north of the Gulf of Tadjoura. By that Article Obokh was ceded to the French “with the plain which stretches from Ras Ali in the south to Ras Dumairah in the north.” The blue (French) colour on the map should therefore be carried up to Ras Dumairah”

The controversy about the exact line of demarcation of boundaries continued. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Foreign Office in London, Sir P.W. Currie, wrote on the 5th December 1890, to the Under-Secretary of State for India:

“The Marquis of Salisbury has had before him your letter of the 10th ultimo, respecting a reported intention on the part of the French to establish a post at Lehadu on the Somali Coast.

“As the Secretary of State for India is aware, the Agreement with France of February 1888 laid down the boundary between the British and French Protectorates as passing through the wells of Lehadu.

“Lord Salisbury therefore considers that this should distinctly appear on the map prepared for official use by the Intelligence Division of the War Department.

“In the letter from you(r) Department of the 6th of

January last, it was suggested that the coloured line should stop short of Harrar, so as to indicate that that place is outside the limit of the Anglo-French Protectorates, and that Gildessa might be considered the terminus of the line.

“Lord Salisbury concurs in the view that the line should stop short of Harrar, but in his opinion it would be advisable that the map should accurately illustrate the agreement between France and this country, and that the coloured-dividing line should therefore not terminate at Gildessa but be prolonged to a point just short of Harrar.

“Your letter of 6th January 1890 also suggested that the map should be so coloured as to give the whole coast line of the Dankali and other tribes occupying territory to the north of the Gulf of Tajoura to France from Ras Ali to Ras Dumairah, in virtue of Article II of the Treaty between France and the Danakils of the 11th of March 1862. On this point I am to observe that the Treaty referred to has never been officially communicated to Her Majesty’s Government. Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General at Cairo procured a copy of this Treaty from the Egyptian Government in February 1884, but he was warned at the time by Tigrane Pasha that the translation from the Arabic was not certified document, and that the Egyptian Government had never seen the original convention, the only document in their possession being the copy handed by the French Consul at Aden to the Governor of Harrar.

“In the absence of precise and authentic information it would, in Lord Salisbury’s opinion, be better to abstain from defining by colours or otherwise the supposed boundaries between the French and Italian Protectorates.

“It will, His Lordship considers, be sufficient to denote by a red and blue line the boundary between the French and British Protectorates from the coast to a point just

short of Harrar as stated above, and to colour red the coast which we have declared our protection.

“I am to request that, in submitting the above observations to the Secretary of State for India, you will inform His Lordship that a copy of this letter will be forwarded to the Intelligence Division.”*

All the Agreements signed by the Somalis with Great Britain for the protection of their territories, properties and lives from attacks or occupation by other powers and particularly by Abyssinia, remained just on paper. While Abyssinia enjoyed all the support of the European colonial powers against the Somalis. It availed itself of the preferential treatment accorded her under the Brussels Act of 1890. Britain denied arms to the Somalis because of its adherence to the Act, but it allowed the Abyssinians to import arms through the Somali port of Zaila.

The British Viceroy in India informed the Foreign Office in a secret telegram on November 12, 1894, that “Ras Makunan requests two hundred rifles and ammunition ... may be now imported through Zaila.”

When Makunan received the message of approval for the arms to be imported through Zaila, he sent the following letter to the British Political Agent and Consul at Aden, dated the 4th Tasas 1887:

“We have received yours, dated 16th October, and in reply we inform you that the permission accorded by you for our arms brought through Mr. Moussaya is highly considered by us as a token of your friendship, and have observed the exact facts of your love and friendship. We are obliged and thankful to you for this permission. Many thanks to you. We have now sent to the Assistant Resident, Zaila, for the purpose of sending to you a small and insignificant present of our part, viz., three lions for

* Foreign Department, Secret E, March 1891, No. 71-74, NAI, New Delhi.

the illustrious British Government.

“Please kindly accept the same as a token of our friendship, amity, and sincerity towards your illustrious great Government.

“Please send the said present to Her Majesty the Queen.”

The ammunition was 20,000 rounds. But when it was reported that the French Government decided to send a shipment of 2,500 Remington rifles from Marseilles to Obokh by way of Aden, for eventual delivery to King Menelek, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Julian Pauncefote, told the Under-Secretary of State for India that*: “I am to inquire whether measures can be taken to prevent these arms on their arrival at Aden from being forwarded to the Somali Coast.”

For the British the main *raison d’etre* of their control over the Somali Coast was to provide Aden with its meat supply, and also to provide camel transport if necessary and for that they would not jeopardise their relations with Abyssinia.

According to Ray Beachey** “Somalis had no central Government or authority to act on their behalf, no overall spokesman.” The Sultans or the Ugases or the Chiefs had control only over their tribes and had no authority to negotiate for the rest of the population who were beyond their tribal boundaries.

Abyssinia took advantage of the passive attitude of the colonial powers. The British, the Italians and the French who occupied the Somali territories put the Somalis at the mercy of the cruel Abyssinians.

After it was defeated by the Abyssinians at the Battle

* Foreign Department, See letter, Foreign Office, London, 11th February 1889, NAI, New Delhi.

** The Warrior Mullah, Bellew Publishing Company Ltd. London, 1990 page no. 28.

of Adua in 1896, the Italian Under-Secretary of State for War, General Afau di Rivera, informed the British Embassy's Military Attaché in Rome, Colonel Charles Needham, on August 28, 1896, that Italy decided to send General Valles to Shoa in order to treat for peace with Menelek, King of Abyssinia, and to arrange for the release of the Italian prisoners of war. The General was given authority to arrange a Treaty of Peace on the basis of the following terms: Abrogation of the Treaty of Nocialle, declaration of the absolute independence of Abyssinia, restriction of the Italian Protectorate to the confines of the original Colony of Erythrea, i.e., the line of the Belesa Muna Rivers, the release of the Italian prisoners.

The British Military Attaché, reported to London that a caravan, bearing clothing, medicine, and provisions for the prisoners is on the way from Harrar to Shoa, in charge of a Chief, appointed by Menelek, no Italian being allowed to accompany it.

Major Nazzarini is on his way from Zaila to Shoa, in order to arrange preliminaries of the Treaty of Peace, to be confirmed by General Valles. The caravan organized by the Roman ladies for assisting the prisoners is also on its way to Shoa, in charge of a Roman Catholic priest, but its whereabouts is uncertain.

General Afau di Rivera, being asked whether he considered Italy could now make better terms, had she retained Adigrat, and taken possession of Adua, as persistently advocated by the press, replied that, even if such were the case, it would have been impossible to remain in the country after the relief of Adigrat, from financial and commissariat difficulties.

Following the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians, Italy, the so-called colonial power, was denied permission to accompany even the goods they

wanted to deliver to their prisoners of war. With the approval of the British Government, the Italian Red Cross were allowed, on September 9, 1896, to proceed to Gildessa and to fly the Red Cross flag.

Encouraged by the victory over the Italians and the support, both material and moral, of the European Colonial powers in the area, the Abyssinians, instead of helping other Africans, like the Somalis and the Sudanese, attacked the neighbouring Somali territories. It became more aggressive than the European colonialists who occupied the Somali territories. The problem was that the British signed agreements to protect the Somali territories, but in fact, it just closed its eyes in the face of the Abyssinian aggression against the Somali people who were, by agreements, their subjects, i.e. British subjects.

When Abyssinia threatened to attack Hargeisa in 1891, British action was limited to mere protest to the Italian Consulate General at Aden and sending of "Kingfisher" to Berbera for, as the British (Bombay) Government claimed, to "give confidence". And when Mr. Morrison was deputed to Hargeisa to hoist the British flag it was considered a mistake and the order was countermanded. But the British Political Agent at Aden has allowed a stipendiary, named Shaikh Madar, to take 15 policeman to Hargeisa and to keep the British flag and to be hoisted "when circumstances so require".

Mr. Ney Elias wrote to the Deputy Secretary on March 3, 1891 that:

"It is satisfactory that instructions were issued to the Deputy Assistant Political Agent to avoid hoisting the flag, but it seems very doubtful whether a flag should be left in the hand of a native Agent with order that "it should only be hoisted when hostile force is actually in the vicinity" and that "he should show it merely to any hostilely disposed persons who may visit Hargeisa. It

might be better to leave all responsibility for using the flag with British officers. As all is now quiet the opportunity would be a good one to withdraw the native Agent, the fifteen policemen, and the flag.”

Although they had taken the tribes in the interior under their protection, the British Government wished to confine their policy to “one of non-intervention”.*

The British policy of non-intervention enormously encouraged the Abyssinians to be more and more cruel. On September 1, 1896, the Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast at Aden, informed her Majesty’s Acting Consul General in Cairo, in a cipher telegraphic dispatch, that “Ras Makunan, the Abyssinian Governor of Harrar, has hoisted the Abyssinian flag at a place called Alalo (Alalo) in the Gadabursi country within the British Protectorate.

The Political Agent at Aden also sent a letter in which he gave more detailed information on the sequence of events. He said that in the month of May last, Lieutenant Harrigton, Assistant Resident and Vice -Consul at Zaila, made a tour into the Aysa and Gadabursi country in order to arrange a peace between some of the tribes under the British Protectorate. At a place called Alalo he came across some hot springs, at which huts had been built by the Abyssinians who had apparently come there to use the water medicinally. “He describes this place as undoubtedly well within our sphere of influence”.

The Political Agent stated in his letter: “On Ras Makunan’s return from the war in Tigre, he addressed to me a friendly letter announcing the fact, and in replying him I took the opportunity of bringing to his notice the fact of the huts having been constructed at Alato (Alalo) in our territory without our sanction, and while telling him that there was no objection to Abyssinians coming

* Foreign External, Secret E, April 1891, No.67-129, at NAI, New Delhi.

and using the springs, that erections could not be permitted unless previous sanction were taken.

“I took this course in preference to summarily ordering the huts to be removed by our people. To this I received reply, in which I failed to understand the allusion to the flag, but noticed that mention of the huts was avoided. Today I received a letter from Lieutenant Harrington of which is an extract, and this read with Makunan’s letter leave no doubt that the Abyssinian flag has been hoisted at Alato (Alalo) with the intention of establishing a claim to the suzerainty of that part of the country.”

The British Political Agent at Aden told his Government that the flag must not be allowed to remain or “our prestige will suffer considerably.” He added: “Ras Makunan ignores the delimitation of 1894 between Italy and Britain, and lays claim not only to the Gadabursi country, but to a considerable portion of the British Protectorate beside. This tentative encroachment will, if unnoticed, be only a forerunner to others, and I have no means whatever with which to stem it, and I have the honour to request that early instructions may be taken and issued to me of the action Her Majesty’s Government would desire me to take and the policy to be pursued, as in the helpless condition of Italy, with whom the delimitation was effected, it is difficult to know how to proceed to avoid our frontier being violated.”

The British Agent concluded his letter by saying: “Pending orders I am writing to Ras Makunan requesting him to have the flag removed, as it is not proper that it should be hoisted without permission in the country belonging to her Majesty the Queen.”

Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Ferris, Consul for the Somali Coast, sent the following letter to Makunan:

After compliments.

“Further it has come to our knowledge that some (of)

Your Excellency's subjects have built huts near the medicinal springs at Alato (Alalo) in the territory of our tribe of the Gadabursi.

"From the friendship we bear Your Excellency, we shall always be glad to offer facilities for your subjects to enjoy the benefit of these springs, but buildings should not be erected within the territory of Her Majesty the Queen of England without permission, and we trust that you will warn your subjects that such buildings cannot be allowed unless our sanction be first taken." dated 13th Mahasi 1888 (received 27th August 1896)

Makunan replied to the British Consul on 13 the Mahasi 1888 (received on August 27, 1896)

Following is the translation of the Makunan's letter to Colonel Ferris:

"After compliments. Your kind letter, dated 11th August, has reached us. May God keep you in good health for the trouble you had taken to write to us. It is true we received a shot in the arm, but we were not much injured; we recovered soon and we are not ill now. May God keep you for your remembering us.

"Our people who are in the Gadabursi country who put the flag, it was not for bad purpose, but for travelers who pass peaceably and to arrest our soldiers who run away from us. It was not for any other object. You should not think otherwise. Our King Johnowi had previously written your Government about the limits of our country and communicated the same to the other Governments. We did not make a new statement except what our King has ordered us. If there is no fear on the road, it is good for the caravans going to Zaila. We have no ill views and what we wish is that we may remain friendly neighbour with you. We have no bad intentions. May our Lord preserve you from all evil."

* Foreign Department, letter dated 31st August 1896, NAI.

The Assistant Resident at Zaila told his immediate superior at Aden*:

“Alato (Alalo) is undoubtedly within our limits; every one knows we claim authority to the Gerrhi and Barteri borders, and the Abyssinians have up to the present tacitly acknowledged the fact; it is, however, quite possible that Makunan is perfectly aware that we merely confine ourselves to protests which mean nothing. The value of Alato (Alalo) to us of course is nil; its occupation by the Abyssinians would be fatal blow to our prestige and influence in our Somali Coast Protectorate.”

Then the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in London, sent a telegram to Consul at Aden on September 5, 1896:

“Secret. Abyssinian encroachments. Where is Alato; with what object has it been occupied, and what difficulty do you anticipate if flag is not removed?”

The Consul replied:

“Your Secret Telegram of 5th. Alato (Alalo) is in Gadabursi country. Probable object of occupation assertion of sovereignty. If flag allowed to remain, our prestige and influence will weaken; further encroachments may occur and certain protected tribes with portion of caravan route come under Abyssinian influence.”

However, notwithstanding the feared loss of prestige and the weakening of influence, in the end the British gave in to the wish of the Abyssinians. On September 18, 1896, the British Consul at Aden received a telegraphic dispatch to the effect that “Lord Salisbury is of the opinion that the flag at Alato (Alalo) should not be removed in the presence of superior force, but that, if the removal could be accomplished without any collusion, it should be done

* Foreign Department, No. 746, dated Aden, the 21st September 1896 (Confidential), NAI, New Delhi.

as a protest and claim of title; if on the other hand, the flag could not be removed owing to the presence of superior force, or if it should be set up again after removal, Her Majesty's Government would consider the course to be adopted."

In his report,* to the British Consul General in Cairo, Ferris, said that "the incident is the corollary of the events of September 1891, when Ras Maknan built a fort within the British occupied territory at Biyo-Kapoba and garrisoned it.

"There were protests at first which the Ras replied to in evasive terms," the Aden Resident said, adding: "but finally in a letter dated 24th November 1891, he (the Ras) stated that the Ays and Gadaursi countries belonged to Abyssinia and not to England, and we (British) had no right to protest against his (the Ras) action."

"Since 1891, the Abyssinians have occupied, first raiding and subduing the Ogaden, afterwards opposing the advance of the Italians on Northern Abyssinia; now that peace, with considerably more honour than was anticipated, is only a question of few months, they are again pushing forward the old claims that were in no way affected by the Anglo-Italian Boundary Protocol of May 5th 1894," the Consul wrote.

"Ras Maknan, on behalf of King Menelik, has claimed the Ays and Gadaursi country as Abyssinia territory.... He has now done the same to the latter by hoisting his flag at Alato (Alalo). Ferris continued: "... no doubt he (Ras) is proceeding cautiously and waiting to see whether his tentative move will meet with any more serious opposition than his venture of 1891." He added: "...the great aim and object of the Abyssinians is to secure a report."

Ferris reported: "Some further light is thrown on Abyssinian ambitions by the fact that in August of last year, Ras Maknan wrote to the Habr Awal tribes around Hargeisa claiming them as Abyssinian subjects, and calling upon them to destroy a small zariba built there by Lord Delamere which he said was in Abyssinian territory. The matter reported at the time to the Bombay Government, and the letter is in my possession. Ras Maknan was asked why he wrote to British subjects,

and tried to seduce them from their allegiance, but failed to reply.”

All trade routes from Southern Abyssinia and the Galla country to Berbera and Bulhar converge upon Hargeisa.

The Sell Out

The British Queen appointed Rennell Rodd as Her Special Envoy to King Menelek of Abyssinia on February 24, 1897* and the following officers were attached to his mission:

Lieutenant-Colonel Wingate, C.B.; Captain H.G.C. Swayne, R.E.; Captain Count Gleichen, Grenadier Guards; Captain the Hon'ble Cecil Bingham, 1st Life Guards; Lieutenant Lord Edward Cecil, Grenadier Guards; Dr. Pinchin, and Captain T.C.S. Speedy, Interpreter.

The Marquess of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told Rodd:

“I have to instruct you to proceed at once upon your mission, accompanied by the officers who have been attached to you.

“It will be your duty to assure King Menelek of the friendly feelings entertained towards him by Her Majesty's Government, and of their desire to maintain with him the most cordial relations. You will explain to him further, that the operations which the Egyptian Government have undertaken against the Khalifa are

* Foreign Department, Letter No.2, dated Foreign Office, London, the 24th February 1897 (Confidential), NAI, New Delhi.

solely for the purpose of regaining provinces which were formally under Egyptian rule, and that there is no intention whatever of taking any steps which could be considered hostile to Abyssinia, or which would involve any encroachment on Abyssinian territory.

“It should not be difficult to make it clear to the King that the establishment of a civilized Government, desirous of developing peaceful intercourse and commerce in the countries immediately adjacent to his dominions, will be far more advantageous than the continuance of the state of disorder and depredation which characterized the rule of the Khalifa.

“In case, as may be expected, King Menelek should ask for some recognition of a definite frontier of his dominions towards the valley of the Nile, you are authorized to enter into a discussion on the subject, in which you will be assisted by the advice of Major Wingate.

“Broadly speaking, Her Majesty’s Government see no objection to recognize an Abyssinian frontier between the 10th and 15th parallels of north latitude which would not exceed the sphere of influence assigned to Italy by the Protocol of the 15th April 1891.

“They would, indeed, be ready to agree to a further extension of the frontier as far as that portion of the Blue Nile which lies between Karkoj and Famaka, if it should be necessary for the purpose of securing King Menelek’s alliance and co-operation against the Dervishes. But the matter is one which largely concerns Egyptian interests, and you should be guided in your negotiations on this point by the information and advice you will receive from Lord Cromer before leaving Cairo.

“It must also carefully be borne in mind that Her Majesty’s Government cannot pronounce upon any claims which the Italian Government may wish to advance to districts lying within the sphere of influence assigned to Italy by the Protocol of the 24th March and the 15th April


1891, and of the 5th May 1894. Her Majesty's Government have no exact information as to the intentions of the Italian Government in this respect, and in view of the fact the negotiations for the delimitation of frontier between Abyssinia and Italy, provided for in the treaty of the 25th October 1896, are still pending, it will be necessary that any arrangement which you may make in regard to the recognition of Abyssinian territorial claims should contain an explicit statement that recognition is made only so far as British-Egyptian rights are concerned. While the language of any instrument, you may sign, must contain nothing inconsistent with the rights of Italy as defined in stipulations to which Great Britain is a party, it is not desirable that in negotiation you should urge or mention the claims of Italy to King Menelek or his Ministers. To do so would probably be to open an unnecessary controversy.

"The question of the frontiers of Abyssinia to the south-west and south is one which may be more properly left for discussion between King Menelek and the Government of Italy, within whose sphere of influence, as recognized by Great Britain in the Protocol of the 24th March 1891, those frontiers would seem to lie.

"You are not, however, precluded from listening to any statements which may be made to you of Abyssinian claims in this direction, though it would be desirable to avoid placing them on record in any written agreement.

"With regard to the frontier on the south-east, you are aware that Ras Makunan, who holds the Government of Harrar under King Menelek, has advanced claim to the country occupied and governed by the Gadabursi tribe, which lies within the present limits of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast.

"The views of the Government of India as regards the conditions which may be agreed to in the settlement of the frontier between Abyssinia and the British Protec-



PARTITION OF SOMALI TERRITORY BETWEEN 1888-1897

torate are stated in the letter from the India Office of the 25th January last, of which a copy is inclosed herewith for your information and guidance.

“You will also be assisted in the negotiations on this subject by Captain Swayne, who has been attached to your mission at the request of the Secretary of State for India for this purpose.

“You will remember that one of the principal objects of your mission is to come to arrangements with King Menelek for a definite understanding as to the frontier between Abyssinia and the Protectorate, and for friendly intercourse and relations between the British and Abyssinian authorities and the inhabitants on either side.

“You are authorized, if absolutely necessary, to make concessions in regard to the frontiers of the Protectorate, as defined in the Protocol signed with Italy on the 5th May 1894, provided such concession are not of a nature to interfere with the main object for which the Protectorate was assumed, viz., the securing of adequate supplies for the support of Aden, and the administration of the Protectorate itself on a basis which shall as far as possible be at least self-supporting, and should afford some prospect of further development of the resources of the country.

“You will state that Her Majesty’s Government are ready to offer every facility for trade and commerce from Abyssinia through the Protectorate to the sea coast, and that Her Majesty’s Government are ready to agree that all goods coming to Abyssinia for the use of the King himself or his family, or for the public service, shall, under proper guarantee that they are so intended, pass through Zaila free of duty. They are also ready to afford the King, as being a party to the Joint Act of the Brussels Conference, those facilities of importation of arms and ammunition which are admissible under that Act. They are perfectly willing, if the King should wish it, to give permission for the residence of an Abyssinian Agent in Zaila.



THE CONQUESTS OF MENELEK II

“If you should find it necessary for the success of your negotiations, you are authorized to promise a favourable consideration of any proposals for reducing the rates of export and import duties upon goods going from or coming to Abyssinia through the British Protectorate.

“In the event of your finding it necessary, for the purpose of your negotiation, to agree to the transfer to Abyssinia of any of the tribes now under British protection, you will be careful to obtain pledges that they will be treated with justice and consideration.


“It will be essential that in your discussions and in any eventual agreement upon this point, you should bear in mind the terms of the Protocol signed with Italy on the 5th May 1894, and that any recognition of the territorial claims of Abyssinia outside the British sphere of influence, as defined in that Protocol, should be made on behalf of Great Britain alone, without assuming to deal with claims or rights of other Powers.

“You will equally bear in mind that the Protocol in question precludes Her Majesty’s Government from attempting to include under British administration any country lying outside the British sphere of influence, as defined in it. Finally, it will be necessary to take account of the notes exchanged between the British and French Governments in February 1888, with regard to their respective Protectorates on the Somali Coast. The provisions laid down in those notes are still in force, and must be carefully observed.

“Copies of these notes, of the three Protocols with Italy, and of the treaties signed between Italy and Abyssinia in 1889 and 1896 are inclosed herewith for convenience of reference.

“I also inclose copy of the General Act of the Brussels Conference to which King Menelek’s accession was notified through the Italian Government in September 1890.

“You may assure King Menelek that wherever the



THE VARIATIONS OF FRONTIER IN EAST AFRICA

possessions of the two countries are close to one another, we shall prefer that our frontiers should be conterminous, and if you can procure an assurance that districts recognized by us as Abyssinian shall not be ceded to other Powers, it would be desirable that you should do so.”*

In a separate letter, the Marquess of Salisbury, told Rennell Rodd :

“I should wish you to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by your approaching visit to Abyssinia to endeavour to conclude a most-favoured-nation Convention with King Menelek.

“It will be well to limit your efforts to the conclusion of such an instrument in its simplest form, and for this purpose it will be sufficient to frame an agreement to the effect that Great Britain and her Colonies shall always receive, unconditionally, in Abyssinia, the treatment accorded to the most-favoured-nation in regard to all matters relating to commerce, including customs duties and local taxation.”

Rodd reported to the Marquess of Salisbury,** that at the outset of his negotiations with the Menelek, he was surprised to know about a circular letter which Ras Makunan had addressed on April 10 1891, to the Sovereigns and Chiefs of the various States of Europe in which Makunan laid down what he considered the actual boundaries of the Ethiopian empire.

Rodd said that the document was produced, together with a French translation which had appeared on March 12, 1896, in a Paris journal called *La France Militaire*.

He claimed that his Government had no knowledge of the existence of the “Proclamation” or “Declaration” that Menelek sent to the various States of Europe in which “he

* Foreign Department—Secret, E. May 1897, No. 47/88, Part A—NAI, New Delhi.

** Letter No.15, dated Adis Abbaba, the 4th May 1897.

laid down what he considered the actual boundaries of the present Ethiopian Empire to be" etc.

"I glanced over this translation, which I have since found to be inaccurate in some details, and then told His Majesty that so far as I was aware, no such document was known to Her Majesty's Government, indeed, had the British authorities been aware of it, they could not have been so much exercised to know what the Declaration referred to by Ras Makunan might be," said Rodd. He added: "I asked His Majesty how it had been sent, and he gave me to understand that it had been entrusted to the Italian Government for communication, but from what I had now told him, it appeared to him probable that they had suppressed it, at any rate, so far as we were concerned. That its existence must have at some time or other become known to the French, who have for long had their agents here, is of course clear from the fact that it subsequently appeared in a French newspaper."

Rodd wrote to the Marquess of Salisbury:

"I have had a proper translation made of this remarkable document, which I have the honour to enclose herewith. Your Lordship will perceive that the line actually laid down by King Menelek cuts off the greater portion of the British Protectorate of Somaliland, leaving a narrow strip along the sea, while on the western side of Ethiopia as far larger area than my instructions had contemplated the possible cession of, extending actually to the White Nile itself, while a theoretic claim is advanced even to the Victoria, Nyanza and Khartoum."

British researches and investigations have shown that Menelek has been for years actively engaged in making his occupation effective. With standing army of 80,000 men, and at least 200,000 modern rifles imported through Massawah and Jibuti he had engendered a formidable fact to reckon with.

Of course, religion played an important role in the

colonisation policy particularly in this part of Africa. Claiming to be “a Christian Island in a sea of pagans” Abyssinia won all the sympathies and support of the European colonialists.

Rennell Rodd, reported: “It will be enough here to state that it has become sufficiently effective to make it an extremely difficult task to negotiate with a King, who, fully confident that his pretensions had been made publicly known and had remained undisputed; confident, moreover, that, as a Christian African Power, his claims to a sphere of influence were better founded than those of Powers whose seat of Government is in another continent; flattered and encouraged by a small number of irresponsible journalists and foreign agents, who have assured him of the support of those Powers whose own interests are not menaced, has already tightened his grasp over districts to which we have indeed established claims, but in which no visible trace of our occupation can be found, and where no obstacle to his advance has ever been raised.”*

RODD RECEIVED BY MENELEK

The British Envoy, Rennell Rodd, was received in ceremonial audience by Menelek, on May 1, 1897, for the purpose of handing over to him, the presents of the Queen. Menelek made no pretense of concealing the satisfaction and surprise, which he repeatedly expressed. He was especially struck with the silver plate, saying that nothing of the kind had been seen in the country before, and he admired particularly the tiger and polar bear skins with their heads set up to represent life. The gifts that Rodd brought from the Queen to Menelek also included

* For the text of the letter that Menelek addressed to Queen Victoria and other European Heads of State in 1891 see pp. 141 and 142.

gold-mounted express rifles, a silk Persian carpet from Cairo, and a copy of the "Abyssinian History of Alexander the Great."

At Menelek's Court there were a number of high-ranking Europeans and Abyssinian *Rases* (Governors) as well as high-ranking military officers. But he did not trust his own people when he was dealing with representatives of foreign countries. His closest adviser was a Swiss, M. Ilg, who acted as the Emperor's confidential adviser. He was almost like a minister in matters relating to foreign affairs.

The *Neuer Züricher Zeitung*,* a very influential Swiss newspaper, published a series of letters by C. Keller, Professor of Natural History and Ethnography and a traveller in Somaliland and Madagascar, on the great position and influence attained at the Court of the Emperor of Abyssinia by M. Ilg, a native of Zurich, whom he described as virtually His Majesty's Prime Minister.

But, of course he was not there to render services in charity. In fact, Menelek granted M. Ilg permission to form a Company entitled "*La Compagnie Imperiale des Chemins de Fer Ethiopiens*," to construct and work a railway in three sections from Jibuti to Harrar, from Harrar to Entotto, and from Entotto to the White Nile.

The agreement by which Menelek granted the permission to Ilg stated in Article 3 that the concession extended beyond ninety-nine (1899), during which time no other Railway company was to be allowed to construct competing lines either from the shores of the Indian Ocean or of the Red Sea into Ethiopia, or from Ethiopia into the White Nile. Further articles were as follows:

Article 4—stipulated that the concession would be annulled if the works did not commence within two years.

Article 6—provided that the company should construct a telegraphic line wherever the railway reached.

* Foreign Department, Secret E, October 1897, NAI.

Article 9— authorized the company to levy customs duty of 10 per cent. on all goods entering or leaving the country. It was, however, to be reduced to 5 per cent. when the net profit of the company would amount to 2,500,000 fr., and would be removed altogether when the profit reach 3,000,000 fr.

Article 10—It stated that all goods transported from Harrar or Jibuti should henceforward only be carried by rail.

Article 15—It provided that King Menelek was to receive a sum of 100,000 thalers for the granting of the Concession to the Company, but the amount was to be paid in shares of the Company.

The share capital amounted to 8,000,000 fr., half in vendors' shares, of which a large proportion were allotted to King Menelek as the price of the concession.

The length of the line from Jibuti to Harrar was stated to be 300 kilometers (185 miles), and from Harrar to the capital about 400 kilometers (250 miles).*

During his first interview on May 3, 1897 with Menelek, Rennel Rodd asked directly for the concession of the most-favoured-nation clause to Great Britain and its colonies.

Next morning, Rodd went to Palace again and resumed the discussions on the Somali Coast frontier. "I explained I did not feel able to define in an Article, until we had somewhat cleared the ground by thoroughly understanding the basis of our respective claims" Rodd told Menelek. "I drew attention to the fact that the Declaration he had furnished me with (Inclosure in my No.15) lays claim to districts which cover more than half of our Protectorate as defined in an Agreement, which we had every reason to believe, under the Ucciali Treaty, as we at the time understood it, have been brought to his

* Red Sea and Somali Coast—Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Salisbury, Paris July 22, 1897 at the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

notice. That we had concluded Treaties dating from 1884 and 1886, with the tribes included in that line and considered our rights there fully established.”

Speaking about Menelek, Rodd reported that Menelek said to him during the meeting: “Looking at the way on which the frontier was traced, he exclaimed: “But you are advancing right up to the gates of Harrar.”

Rodd added: “I pointed out that it was Abyssinia which had advanced up to us; that we were the rever-sionaries of Egypt in those districts, and had established ourselves there by Treaties with the native tribes before the Abyssinians had come to Harrar.”

The British Envoy wrote:” The Emperor then again referred to the ancient limits of Ethiopia. I asked him how the Somalis, who had been established in those regions for so many centuries, could possibly be looked upon as included within the ancient limits of Ethiopia.”

“His Majesty then propounded the extraordinary doctrine that the Somalis had been from time immemorial, until the Moslem invasion, the cattle-keepers of the Ethiopians, who could not themselves live in the low countries; they had to pay their tribute of cattle to their masters, and had been coerced when they failed to do so,” Rodd reported.

He went on to say that the Emperor himself confessed as much that he was disappointed that he (Rodd) did not immediately agree to accept his views. “I then told him that I was ready to meet him in a spirit of concession. He complained of our proximity to Harrar; I would suggest, therefore, cutting off the triangle included between Bia Kaboba, Gildessa, and Makanis, which would transfer white Esa tribe to Ethiopia, and remove the line of demarcation a good many marches further from Harrar. I was also prepared to offer concessions on the eastern side, but I considered the Gadabursi and certain other tribes indispensable to us, in view of the main object for which our

Protectorate is maintained. I should mention that these concessions were proposed after due discussion with Captain Swayne." The tribes in the eastern part of the Protectorate, he reported, were "at present practically out of our control, while the white Esa, since the erection of the Abyssinian fort, which has been suffered to remain six or seven year at Bia Kaboba, had practically been living under the shadow of Abyssinia influence."

Finally, they re-opened the question of the definition of the frontier of the Somali Coast Protectorate. "I recapitulated the whole situation, the misunderstandings which had arisen owing to our not realizing each other's point of departure, and once more urged on him a line based on tribal divisions, on which, indeed, the line we had drawn in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of May 1894 was based."

Rodd's report ran on: "His Majesty's attitude was distinctly oriental. England was a great Power; could we not cede these small parcels of territory, which meant so little to us and so much to him? He had gained Harrar by conquest, and looked on all these regions as part and parcel of the Harrar province. I assured him that this was not so; we were established in these countries long before the expedition which resulted in his annexation of Harrar, and though he had conquered Harrar, he had not conquered us."

Rodd showed Menelek on the map the pastures frequented by the tribe under the British Protectorate. But Menelek said he could not understand maps to judge. "Should we not rather agree to maintain the *status quo*?" Rodd replied that the *status quo* must be defined in an agreement, for it was impossible to know what the actual conditions of occupations were since Ras Makunan had hoisted a flag and raised a claim to jurisdiction at Alalo to which the British did not admit his right to do."

"His Majesty had never heard of the Alalo incident,"

wrote Rodd. Menelek said, according to Rodd, "he had not realized I (Rodd) was coming to discuss these questions or he would have summoned Ras Makunan to the capital."

Despite the long discussions that took place between Menelek and Rodd during which it seemed that British Envoy defended the Somalis under their protection, although he was given full authority by the Foreign Office to make "concessions in regard to the frontier of the Protectorate," he gave in to the demands of the Abyssinians for the subjugation of the Somali territories. And the British were given a promise that the Emperor would not give any assistance to the Dervishes of the Sudan, and would prevent the passage to them through his dominions, of arms and ammunition.*

In his report No. 35 dated Harrar June 4, 1897, Envoy Rodd said that the line proposed by Ras Makunan had started at Ellan, on the Zeyla-Harrar road. But the British team Captain Swayne and Captain Harrington recommended in preference the hill or mountain of Somadou somewhere near Bia Caboba. The line was then drawn to about half-way between the 9th and 10th parallel, and "the Ras had hoped when it came to defining it, I afterwards discovered, to be able to deflect it towards Hargeisa."

According to Rodd, "the Ras had not the most elementary knowledge of geography or geographical expressions, nor did he know the country in question sufficiently well to be able to identify the places on the line. He had collected a few merchants and Somalis who frequent those parts to advise him, but owing to the difference of pronunciation many of the names on the maps, which are only locally known, could not be identified, and again the same names, or names very similar, repeatedly occur in different parts of the country.

* Foreign Department, October 1897, No 18-102- British Mission to Abyssinia— NAI, New Delhi.

“Again,” Rodd said, “owing to recurrence of a somewhat similar names, he gained the impression that I had consented to give him Hargeisa, the chief object of his ambitions, and things proceeded smoothly until he was disabused of this idea. He fought desperately for Hargeisa, and once more said that if I would not give it up, he must refer the whole matter to the Emperor and close the negotiations.”

“Now, Hargeisa or Sheikh Mutta (sic) is in a way the sacred city of the Somalis who come to Berbera; and to hand it over to the Abyssinians would mean to lose all influence and prestige with many of the tribes of great importance to us in view of the Aden food supply, which my instructions specially directed me to safeguard, whatever else might be abandoned. I therefore met him with a simple *non possumus*, and over this point ventured to use language somewhat stronger than I should have been warranted in doing had I not felt that he would give way before a firm attitude,” reported Rodd to his superiors at the Foreign Office in London.*

Any how, at the end of all these so-called negotiations or discussions between the British Mission, led by the Queen’s Special Envoy, and the Menelek the conclusion was that Britain handed over the Somali territories to the cruel Abyssinians.

“In any case, Rodd wrote to the Marquess of Salisbury,** “I trust that Your Lordship will agree that the advantage of a definite settlement, which after all reserved to us the greater part of the sphere we had claimed, and only abandons a sparsely populated and barren region, will well outweigh any local difficulties which may

* Foreign Department, October 1897, Nos. 18-102, NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, No. 35 dated Harrar, the 4th June 1897, NAI, New Delhi.

arise, but for which a solution can easily be found locally. It is scarcely possible to provide for all contingencies in a document which in order to be understood by *savage or semi-savage people*, must be couched in the simplest possible terms," (emphasis added)

Rennell Rodd's mission, indeed, was just to hand over Somali territories to the Abyssinians so that they could be friends with Britain. It took less than a week to produce an agreement that placed the Somali territories under a Black colonialist, without even consulting the Somalis.

As the mission came to Abyssinia with a readymade cake only to be delivered in a little more than two weeks of the so-called negotiations, an agreement was concluded between the two sides: the out-going British colony and the in-coming Abyssinian colony. Difficulty arose over the language in which the Agreement should be written. The Emperor told the British delegation that he had no English interpreter and his Swiss Adviser had little knowledge of English. So they agreed to use Amharic, French and English.

Of course, having said 'yes' to whatever the Abyssinians wanted from them, the British said yes also to the Abyssinian proposal that the Articles of the Treaty be translated in French and used in case of misunderstanding in the interpretation of the its articles.

The British Envoy said: "I agree, on behalf of my Government, to the proposal of Your Majesty, that, in case a divergence of opinion should arise hereafter as to the correct interpretation to be given either to the English or Amharic text, the French translation, which has been agreed to on both sides as adequate, should be accepted as furnishing a solution of the matter under dispute." (Appendix Twenty-Four)

After the treaty with Abssynia was approved and ratified, Rennel Rodd wrote to Menelek II from Cairo on

August 30, 1987 informing him that the Treaty had been approved and ratified. He wrote:

Peace be unto Your Majesty,

“I have the honour to announce that the Queen, my gracious Sovereign, has been pleased to approve and ratify the Treaty which I had the honour to sign with Your Majesty on the 14th May last.

“Her Majesty has also been pleased to approve of the arrangement which, in accordance with the terms of Article II of the Treaty, was agreed upon between Ras Makunan, as Representative of Your Majesty, and myself by exchange of notes relative to the frontier of the British Protectorate in the Somali Coast; and it is presumed by Her Majesty’s Government that your Majesty has also approved of it, as they have received no notification to the contrary.

“The notes exchanged have accordingly been annexed to the Treaty which has received ratification, signifying Her Majesty’s approval of all these documents.

“I have now the honour to return herewith the copy of the Treaty intrusted to me by Your Majesty, with its ratification in due form.

“When I shall have received from Your Majesty a letter signifying that this Treaty, thus ratified and approved, has come safely to Your Majesty’s hands, it will be made public by the Government of the Queen, that all her subjects may observe it and abide by it, and that it may strengthen the ties of friendship between our countries, and increase the feelings of esteem and goodwill towards Your Majesty which the reception of the British Mission in Ethiopia has awakened in my country.

“I pray that Your Majesty’s life and health may long be preserved, and that your people may have peace and prosperity.”

(Translation)

Menelek II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to

Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and Empress of India, Upholder and Keeper of the Christian Religion.

“May peace be unto you,

“Your Majesty’s letter of the 28th Hamle (3rd August) and 22nd (23rd) Mascarem (1st (2nd) October) 1897, and the Treaty with the Great Seal, dated the 28th Hamle (3rd August)1897, have reached me, and We received it with joy. The Treaty of Peace which is now between you(r) Government and our Government, We hope it will ever increase in firmness and last for ever.

“We (prey to) God to give Your Majesty health, and to your kingdom quietness and peace.

Written at Adis Abbaba, the 8th December 1897, A.D.
(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)*

Rodd telegraphed from Aden on 12th June 1897 to the Foreign Office: “Somali frontier delimitation completed to-day. Have started for coast.” The notification issued by Political agent Sadler summed up the content of the treaty very well.

NOTIFICATION

Be it known to you that by the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia signed at Addis Ababa on the 14th May 1897, by the Emperor Menelek II and Her Majesty’s Envoy, and which was ratified in December last, the frontiers of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast have been recognized as follows:

Starting from the seashore opposite the well of Hadou, the boundary-line follows the caravan road by Abbasouen till Mount Somadou; from Mount Somadou to Mount Egu; from Mount Egu to Moga Medir; starting from Moga Medir it goes in a direct line to Eylinta Kaddo and Arran Arrhe on 44° east of Greenwich and 9° north, and again in

* Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1898, No.28/38 NAI, New Delhi.

a direct line until 47° east and 8° north, thence along 8° north to 48° east, thence in a straight line to the intersection of 9° north with 48° east, and thence along 49° east to the sea.

In the event of the occupation by Ethiopia of territories inhabited by tribes who accepted and enjoyed British protection in the districts excluded by the present boundary-line from the limits of the British Protectorate, the Emperor Menelek II has engaged that such tribes shall be well treated and have orderly government.

The subjects of both Governments are at liberty to cross the frontier and graze their cattle, but these people, in every place where they go, will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Government in whose limits they may for the time be.

The wells which are in the neighbourhood of the boundary-line will remain open to both sides.

The subjects of, or persons protected by, each Government shall have full liberty to come and go and engage in commerce in the territories of the other, enjoying the protection of the Government within whose jurisdiction they are; but it is forbidden for armed bands of either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever without previous authorization from the competent authorities.

The caravan route between Zeyla and Harrar by way of Gildessa shall remain open throughout its whole extent to the commerce of both nations.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER,

Political Agent and Consul, Somali Coast.

Somali Coast Political Agency and Consulate,

Aden, March 12, 1898.*

As for the Somalis, who were not even consulted, received the news of their territory's transfer to Abys-

* Foreign Department-External-B. November 1898, No. 31/69—NAI, New Delhi.

sinia, through verbal communication by Sadler, the British Consul, at Aden, during a short tour he made in the area in March 1898.

“At Zeyla the Akils listened in silence till I had completed my communication, in which I dwelt particularly on the fact that the wells and grazing-grounds in the vicinity of the boundary will remain open to both sides, that the subjects and protected persons of each Government have full liberty to come and go across the border and engage in trade, under the protection of the Government within whose limits they may for the time be, but that under no circumstances would raids or counter-raids be allowed on the border line,” Sadler said in his report to his Government.

At Berbera he repeated the same announcement he made at Zeyla. The Consul informed the Akils of the so-called assurance given by the Emperor Menelek II, that in the event of his occupying the territories inhabited by tribes who enjoyed British protection in the districts excluded by the present boundary from the limits of the British Protectorate, such tribes would be well treated and be given orderly government.

The British Consul reported:

“Here, again, there was an absence of any excitement, and my announcement was received with less interest than I had anticipated, when we consider that several sections of the Habr Awal, with whom we effected a Protectorate Treaty in 1886, pass either wholly or in part from our protection, and that their relations with the Ogaden tribes beyond the new boundary are more those of war than peace.”

According to Sadler the Akils listened attentively, and he said “and when I had concluded they agreed to accept the boundary and abide by the conditions they had heard, saying that all would be well if the Abyssinians treated those who went over properly.”*

Prof. Ray Beachey**, has observed that “there was no attempt to consult Somali tribal elders in the matter. “Even the Doughty Swayne, despite his grave doubts as to the morality of it all, did not speak up on behalf of the Somalis”. He went on to say: “This boundary line gave Ethiopia not only 13,500 square miles of British protected territory but also territory (including Gildessa, Jigjiga and Mimid) assigned to Italy by the Anglo-Italian protocol of 5 May 1894.” The Director of the British Military Intelligence, J.C. Ardagh, said in a memorandum to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the “claims of Menelek, however, comprised a far larger slice of British Somaliland, in fact not far from half of it.... The area claimed by Menelek was about 20,000 square miles in excess of what he has obtained under the Rodd Treaty, and included the domiciles of several important Somali tribes.”***

Menelek succeeded in gaining all his aims, i.e. to get territories for colonisation as the Europeans were doing. His action and behaviour indicated that all, but his colour, was similar to that of the Europeans and that included his mentality, too. He used religion as means to reach his end. In his Circular letter, to the Heads of European States in 1891, Menelek said: “Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator”. Like European colonisers, he also wanted to have his own share of the African territories. He claimed as his country’s frontiers up to Kharoum, and as far as Lake

* Foreign Department—External-B—November 1898, No.31-69—NAI, New Delhi.

** The author of *The Warrior Mullah*, London, 1990, p. 28.

*** Foreign Department, *Red Sea and Somali Coast*, 1898, NAI, New Delhi, India.

Nyanza with all the Gallas. He collaborated with the Europeans against the other African countries.

As regards the north-eastern boundaries, the Proclamation states that the Abyssinian frontier line includes the Habr Awal, the Gadabursi, and the Esa Somalis and reaches Ambos, whence, including Lake Assal and skirting the coastline, it rejoins the northern limits at Arafle. Menelek completely ignores the existence of British protective Treaties over the Mijjertain Somalis, dated the 1st may 1884, Habr Awal Somalis, dated the 14th July 1884; Gadabursi Somalis, dated 11th December 1884; Habr Tol-jaala Somalis, dated the 26th December 1884; Esa Somalis, dated the 31st December 1884; Habr Gerjahis Somalis, dated the 13th January 1885; Warsangali Somalis, dated the 27th January 1886; Habr Tol-jaala Somalis, dated the 1st February 1886; Habr Gerhajis Somalis, dated the 1st February 1886; Habr Awal Somalis, dated the 15th march 1886; such treaties having been concluded during and subsequent to the Egyptian occupation of Harrar and prior to the seizure of that province by the Abyssinians.*

The Italian Charge d’Affairs in London called at the Foreign Office on September 2, 1889, and communicated (to the British officials) the substance of “a very private and confidential” telegram from Signor Crispi.

This was to the effect that King Menelek had proposed an arrangement for joint action to be taken by England, Italy, and Abyssinia against the followers of the Mahdi in the Soudan, and Signor Crispi was anxious to learn the view of Her Majesty’s Government before entertaining such a proposal.

The British Government rejected the idea stating that their policy in Egypt “is for the present a defensive one,

* Foreign Department—Secret-E, October 1897, N.18-102, NAI, New Delhi.

and that therefore Her Majesty's Government would not be prepared to join the proposed combination.*

Wilfred Thesiger, whose father was British Minister in charge of the Legation in Adis Ababa, wrote about Menelek in his book *The Life of My Choice*:

“Before he was incapacitated, Menelik had won recognition for his conquests and acceptance of his new frontiers. He had incorporated into his empire the Ogaden, the town of Harar, the lands of the Galla tribes, the Gurage country, the ancient kingdom of Kaffa, and the Anuak and other tribes on the borders of the Sudan.”**

In the same year the British Ambassador to Italy, referring to his earlier despatch No. 117 of the 10th of August 1897, relative to the frontier proposed by King Menelek for the boundary between Abyssinia and the Italian Colony of Erythrea, transmitted to the Marquess of Salisbury, a “rough sketch map, published in the *Tribuna*,” purporting to show the boundary proposed in the abortive Treaty of 1891—that was now proposed by the Negus after conferences with Major Nazzarini—and the line of frontier known as that of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna, which at present constitute the *de facto* boundary between the two countries.

“It should be stated that the map is unofficial, and, further, that the Emperor Menelek's proposal has yet to be considered by military experts, and that although, as the Marquis Visconti Venosta was careful to inform me, it appeared to him to be on the whole acceptable, it is still liable to certain modifications,” he said.

The following are the criticism to which the proposed line was subjected to the following criticism in the unofficial press:

“It is pointed out that with the Mareb-Belesa-Muna

* Foreign Department, No. 202 Very Confidential—Foreign Office, September 9, 1889, NAI, New Delhi, India.)

** “The life of my choice”, London, Flamingo, 1992, p. 44.

boundary the Colony is protected on the side of Abyssinia by a line of positions sufficiently strong to resist an invasion until reinforcements could be sent from Italy.

These defensive positions are:

(a) The Tucul Mountains against an attack from the westernmost part of Abyssinia.

(b) The ridge of Gundet with the fortifications of Adi-Ugri across the great road of Adua.

(c) Gura, where many roads from Entiscio and Adua itself converge.

(d) Adi-Cajah and Senafe, commanding to a certain extent the high road to Adigrat, and protecting the Valleys of Comailo and Haddas leading to Massowa.

By the new frontier three of these positions are lost, that is, the Tucul Mountains, the ridge of Gundet, and Adi-Cajah, only leaving to Italy the position of Gura.

The British Diplomat stated:

“By the loss of the Tucul Mountains and the cession to the Negus of the Province of Seræ, the defence of the Colony on that side has to be transferred to Asmara, which is equivalent to saying that, in case of a campaign on the western frontier, the Italians would be confined to the edge of the high plateau with no means of manoeuvring, because the surrounding of Asmara is not impossible by means of the road used by King John when he advanced against Satti.

“Gura, without the Provinces of Seræ and Ocule-Cusai, loses much of its importance, and could be scarcely sufficient to protect Asmara, as the enemy would hold all the best roads leading from the south and west to the basin of Gura.

Towards the east matters would be in a still worse condition, as the Valleys of Comailo and Haddas would be completely open to the enemy.

The value of Lageneiti would be completely neutralized, if, by a *coup de main*, the enemy were to

obtain possession of Halai. If, on the other hand, Halai were turned into an intrenched camp, its strategic action would not extend beyond the Balley of the Haddas, and the Valley of Camailo would always be open invasion.

These appear to be some of the more important military considerations raised by the proposed frontier of Erythrea, based on a knowledge of the locality and a study of recent campaigns. In view, however, of the statement recently made by Signor Visconti Venosta, that the policy of the Government is to reduce to the utmost extent the military occupation in Erythrea, if possible, to the mere possession of Massowah, it may be doubted if they will have much weight in the decision ultimately arrived at."

(Signed) G.F. Bonham.*

* Foreign Department-External, B. November 1897, No. 123-133, NAI, New Delhi.

12

The French Occupation

France like Britain and Italy was determined to bring as large African territory under its colonial rule as it could. On March 11, 1862 France signed a treaty with the chiefs of Danakil tribes on the coast of Adal. The treaty ostensibly for the peace and friendship was intended to carve out a large piece of territory exclusively for France. In particular, the sultan of Adal ceded to France the harbour, the roadstead and the anchorage of Obokh. For this concession, the French agreed to pay a sum equivalent to 55,000 francs. The Treaty guaranteed several rights for construction and grazing to the Frenchmen settled in Obokh. The most important clause of the Treaty was, however, the commitment on the part of the Chiefs "to communicate to the French authorities at Obokh any proposal for a cession of territory which may be made to them on the part of any foreign government. They engage themselves singly or collectively to decline any overtures which may not have met with the approval of the Government of His Majesty, the Emperor of France." (Appendix Six)

Twenty two years after France signed the Treaty with the Tribes of the Adal coast, the French Commandant of Obokh signed two treaties in 1884; the first with the Sultan of Gobad (Appendix Eighteen) in April and the

second with the Sultan of Tadjoura in October. (Appendix Nineteen) The Treaty with the Sultan of Gobad conferred on the French several rights for carrying on commercial activities and the rights of construction in the Gobad territory. It again provided for an undertaking by the Sultan that he would “conclude no convention and sign no treaty without the assent of the chief of the colony of Obokh...” The Treaty signed with the Sultan of Tadjoura was even more astounding. The Article 2 of the Treaty stated that Sultan Hamed “gives his country to France in order that the latter may protect him against every foreign power.” Article 5 promised not to sign any treaty with any foreign nations without the assent of the Commandant of Obokh. For the surrender of this sovereign right the Sultan was paid a monthly subsidy of hundred dollars and his Vizir monthly subsidy of eighty dollars.

On 1st August 1885, a Bill was laid before the French Chamber of Deputies to open a credit of 624,720 fr. (24,980/1.) for the Minister of Marine and Colonies, “on account of the organization of the Colony of Obokh, and of the French Protectorate over Tadjourra and the neighbouring territories up to Gubbet-Kharab.” The Bill was passed by the Chamber by a majority of 223 against 54. And the Senate also similarly voted by a huge majority of 226 to 4 on August 5 .

Following is an extract from the “*Journal Officiel*” of August 14, 1885 which was sent by Sir J. Walshan of the British Embassy in Paris to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on August 17, 1885:

Loi portant Ouverture au Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, sur l'exercice 1885, d'un Credit de 624,720 fr. Pour l'Organisation de la Colonie d'Obock et du Protectorat de la France sur Tadjourah et les Territoires voisins jusqu'à Gubett-Karab.

Le Senat et la Chambre des Deputes ont adopte',

Le President de la Republique promulgue la Loi don't

la teneur suit:

Article 1—Il est ouvert au Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, sur l'Exercice 1885, des credits extraordinaires montant a' 624,720 fr., pour faire face aux depenses necessitees par l'organisation de la Colonie d'Obock, ainsi que pour l'etablissement du Protectorat Francais sur Tadjourah.

Ces credits sont rattaches comme suit aux differents chapitres du Budget du Ministree de la Marine et des Colonies:

Ch. 2	Personnel des services civiles aux Colonies	Fr. 50,700
5	Personnel des services militaires aux Colonies	Fr .37,485
7	Frais de voyage par terre et par mer	Fr. 11,900
9	Vivres	Fr. 30,387
10	Hopitaux	Fr. 40,430
11	Materiel des services civiles	Fr.162,330
12	Materiel des services militaires	Fr.120,000
13	Depenses diverses et d'interet general	<u>Fr.151,488</u>
	Total	<u>Fr.624,720</u>

Art. 2—Il sera pourvu aux depenses ci-dessus au moyen des ressources generales du Budget ordinaire de l'Exercice 1885.

La presente Loi, deliberee et adopte par le Senat et par la Chambre des Deputes, sera executee comme Loi de l'Etat.

Fait a Mont-sous-Vaudrey, le 12 Aout, 1885.

(Signe) Jules Grevy.

Par le President de la Republique:

Le Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies,

(Signe) Galiber.

Le Ministre des Finances,

(Signe) Sadi Carnot.

The English version of the Law:

ARTICLE I.

The Minister of Marine and the Colonies is hereby granted an extraordinary vote of credit for the year 1885, amounting to 624,720 francs, to cover the expenses necessitated by the organization of the colony of Obokh, as well as by the establishment of a French Protectorate over Tajourra.

This vote is distributed as follows, under the different heads of the Budget of the Ministry of Marine and the Colonies:

Francs.		
Ch. 2	Salaries of civil employees in the Colonies	50,700
” 5.	Pay of troops in the colonies	37,485
” 7.	Travelling expenses by sea and land	11,900
” 9.	Provisions	50,387
” 10.	Medical services	40,430
” 11.	Stores (civil)	162,330
” 12.	Stores (Military)	120,000
” 13.	Miscellaneous	151,488
	Total	<u>624,720</u>

ARTICLE 2.

The above expenses shall be provided for from the general revenues according to the Ordinary Budget for 1885.

Sir J. Walsham wrote to the Secretary of State on August 4, 1885, about the debate on the Bill in the French Parliament. He stated that the Deputy, Mr. Perrin, who had in recent debates spoken against the policy of any fresh colonial extension, opposed the bill. He reminded the House that Obokh, which was opposite to Aden, was purchased by France in 1862 for a trifling sum; that during some twenty years its very existence seemed to be forgotten, and that it was not till 1883 that the late

Government recollected the circumstance of France having certain rights there.*

On March 31, 1887, the Deputy Assistant Political Agent at Bulhar, D. Morrison, received information from a Somali named Ali Noor (Ba Gadabursi Sherdon) that French man-of-war had arrived at Dongarita. Ali Noor told the British Agent:

“I was living at a place known by name Doho near Samarwanak, and about 7 o'clock this morning I heard what I thought to be the report of a cannon two or three times. I thought nothing more of the matter till a man named Mohamood? (Rer Ali Baghoba) came to my *Kraal* from Dongarita I asked him if he had heard the guns; he replied, he had, I asked what was the cause; he said a French man-of-war has arrived at Dongarita and hoisted the French flag there. I then mounted my horse for the purpose of giving information at Bulhar. I have just arrived. I started from Doho at about 3 o'clock this afternoon”.

Upon receiving the information, Mr. Morrison at once proceeded on board H.M.I.M.S. *Amberwitch* which was to sail next morning at 1 o'clock for Berbera, and consulted with Captain Aves as to the necessity of going at once to Dongarita, firstly, to verify the information, and secondly, to take some action if true. Captain Aves agreed; it was highly advisable to proceed at once to Dongarita and promised to sail at 1 A.M. on the 1st instant, which he did arriving at Dongarita 7.25 AM. On the same date, where they found the French gun boat *Meteore* under the command of Captain Latour.

Morrison officially protested against the French flag being flown at Dongarita and asked the French to pull it down. The French Captain turned down the request.

* Red Sea and Somali Coast printed papers, Nos. 17-25, Foreign Department, 1885, NAI, New Delhi.

Morrison threatened to hoist the English flag. At this the French Captain became very excited and said: "I ask of you in the most sincere and friendly manner not to carry out your intention, as I could but consider it an insult to the French flag to do so in the presence of a French man-of-war." The Englishman said: "If I hoist the British flag, what will you do? Will you pull it down? Or will you prevent me from hoisting it by force? The French replied: "No"; but upon the British putting the same question, the French replied: "I beg of you most sincerely not to do so, as it would entail very grave consequences, in fact, I cannot say if I might not have to use force."

The French shot the cannon, it seems just as a notice of their arrival. There was no physical fighting between the two European powers that were scrambling for the Somali territories. There was only war of words.

The British Agent at Bulhar and the Captain returned to their ship the "*Amberwitch*" and wrote a letter of protest and delivered it to the French Captain, Latour. Shortly afterwards, Captain Latour delivered a letter in reply. But while the two sides were exchanging letters, the British was informed that the English flag had been hoisted by the person (Raga Booda) who was entrusted with the English flag.

The English man, proud of what had happened, told the French:

"You now see our flag hoisted on shore, and I call you witness the fact that no communication has been held between this ship and the shore since our arrival."

The French replied:

"Mr. Morrison, I ask you officially to send on shore and order the English flag to be hauled down."

Morrison replied:

"I certainly shall not do so".

The French Captain said:

"I will go on board my ship and write you a protest

against the English flag being hoisted at Dongarita.”

Next day, February 2, 1887, Morrison went back to Zaila to consult with his boss, Major Hunter, but Hunter had already left for Aden. Morrison therefore reported to the Acting Consul, Lieutenant Mellis at Zaila, about the incident that had taken place, who then sent the following telegram to Major Hunter:

“French have hoisted flag at Dongarita. Morrison protested. Have sent small party of Soudanese to protect British flag.”

The French ship also left the area, but both sides left their flags hoisted at shore.”

The British decided to send to Dongarita ten Soudanese with their *Effendi*, and a *Soubhedar* of the 9th Bombay Native Infantry, an orderly, and Deriah Magan as interpreter, with 15 days' provisions from the ship “*Amberwitch*” for the purpose of protecting the British flag.

Although they considered advisable to send this detachment, the British were “uncertain as to whether the Soudanese troops (owing to their being Egyptian) could be taken to represent the British interest.” The British thought it necessary to send a *Soubhedar* of the 9th Bombay Native Infantry for that purpose, giving him a letter to that effect with the following instructions:

1st.—In the event of a European armed force landing at Dongarita, he was to approach them in full uniform and present the letter referred to above for the purpose of their reading it for information only.

2nd.—That this letter was not to be given up.

3rd.—He was to protest against the landing of any armed European force other than British.

4th.—He was to offer no resistance to any such force.

5th.—If such force ignored his protest and proceeded towards our flag (The British flag) for the purpose of pulling it down, he was to again protest against any such pro-

ceeding, not to use force to prevent him, but immediately to communicate by messenger with either Bulhar, Zeyla or both.

Further that the Soudanese troops were placed there simply for his protection against the natives. Instructions were also given to the *Effendi* to this effect

Following is the letter given to the Officer who was ordered to protect the British interest:

“Dated Zeyla, 2nd February 1887.

To—All whom it may concern.

We hereby declare that *Subhedar* Mihseer, 9th Regiment, Native Infantry, an officer of Her Britannic Majesty’s Army, has been specially sent to represent and uphold the British Protectorate proclaimed at Dongarita on the 26th December 1886.

(Sd.) C.J. MELLIS, Lieutenant,
Commanding at Zeyla.

(Sd.) DAVID MORRISON,
Depy. Asstt. Polt. Agent,
Berbera & Bulhar.

The British also claimed that their flag was hoisted at Dongarita in 1885. Major Hunter, the British Consul, sent Walsh to hoist British flag at Dongarita in March 1885. He did hoist the flag at a place some miles from the position where the French also hoisted their flag. British also claimed that “it exercised actual jurisdiction over the coast between Zeyla and Berbera since 1854.” That is the time when Richard Burton set foot on Somali territories for the first time.

But a letter dated Foreign Office, London, the 14th February 1887, from Sir Julian Paucefote, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, to the Under-Secretary of State, India Office, indicated that there were discussion going on over the French and British claims to Dongarita on the Somali Coast. The French authorities re-hoisted their flag at Dongarita while the discussion with regard

to the respective sphere of influence of Great Britain and France on that part of the Somali Coast was still pending. Dongarita is situated on the coast nearly halfway between Zeyla and Berbera.

On January 1, 1886, the British Foreign Office forwarded for the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India Lord Randolph Churchill, the draft of a circular dispatch to Her Majesty's Representative in the countries which took part in the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885, excepting France. The draft directed that a notification should be made to the Governments of those countries, as required by Article 34 of the General Act of that Conference, to the effect that a British Protectorate had been established over Somali Coast from eastern shore of Ghubbet Kharab to Ras Galweni, both inclusive.

In generally approving of these proposals, Lord Randolph Churchill remarked on January 18, 1886 that, although the British Protectorate eastwards on the Somali Coast then stopped at Ras Galweni, it was improbable that at some future time it might be considered expedient to extend that protectorate to the old Egyptian limit near Ras Hafun.

The British Protectorate had, however, been extended to the 49th parallel of longitude by the treaty which Major Hunter had concluded with the Warsangali tribe, specially providing protection. In communicating the fact to the British Secretary of State, the Resident at Aden informed that a supplementary agreement with the Habr Gerhajis was completed, that with the Habr Toljaala was almost ready, that a supplementary agreement with the Habr Awal was not urgent as Berbera was British occupation. He wanted to know if the treaties with the Easa and the Gadabursi tribes should be supplemented.

A supplementary Protectorate agreement was concluded with the Habr Awal tribe by Major Hunter, to come in to force from March 5, 1886. For the British the pri-

mary object of the Easa, if not of the Gadabursi Treaty was to facilitate the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from Harrar. Almost simultaneously those engagements became as valuable as preventing the acquisition of rights by the French in the Somali country.

On their part, the French informed the British Government that they had established a French Protectorate over the Somali territory. The British Charge' d'Affairs in Paris, John Walsham, reporting his conversation with M. de Freycinet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 1, 1885, stated that he was officially informed that: "The French Vice-Consul on the Somali Coast, M. Henri, and the Commander of the French ship of war *Garonne*, had been taking steps to assert a French Protectorate over parts of the coast between Gubbet Kharrab and Zeyla.

"That French troops had been landed at Khor Ambadu, though there was reason to believe that they were subsequently withdrawn.

"On the 12th February last the French Ambassador in London had announced to Her Majesty's Government the establishment of a French Protectorate from Ras Ali to Gubbet Kharrab, and had asked (that) the British authorities at Aden might be instructed to desist from levying the customs dues which had latterly been collected there on behalf of the Egyptian Government goods coming from or dispatched to Tajourra

In reply to this demand, the British Government had stated that, without prejudice to the territorial rights of the Sultan, they would be prepared to issue the necessary directions in the above issue.

However, Sir J. Walsham sent a note to M. de Freycinet in which he stated: "I have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to inform Your Excellency, without delay, that reports of a disquieting character have just reached Zeyla, and they would therefore venture to express

the earnest hope that, in view of the urgency of the case, distinct and immediate orders may be sent to the French Naval Commander in those waters to abstain from any act which might be calculated to produce a collision.”

The French based their claim on the following documents:

1. A Treaty concluded on the 11th March 1862 between the French Government and Ding Ahmed Abubekr, delegated by certain Chiefs of the Danakil, Adel, and Debeneh tribes, ceding the littoral from Ras Dumeirah to Ras Ali on the north shore of the Gulf of Tajourra, including Obokh, besides granting certain grazing rights at Ambadu, Kassassazele and at Elo, near Cape Jibuti; (Appendix Six)

2. A deed of gift, dated 14th December 1884, by Sultan Loita, Chief of the Debeneh section of the Danakil tribe, giving to the French Government the country stretching from Adaeli (Ras Ali) to Ambadu;

3. An arrangement dated 25th March 1885, between M. Henri, French Vice-Council at Zeyla, and some members of the tribe of the Jibril Abukar, placing themselves under French protection;

4. A letter dated 25th March 1885, purporting to be written by Nur Roble and certain others said to represent the Gadabursi tribe, to M. Henri, offering to place under French protection the country from places named Aravra to Helo (Ailo) and Sabah-le to Kulangarit; and

5. A Treaty, dated 26 March 1885, between M. Legarde, Commandant at Obokh and certain Chiefs of the Easa Somali tribe, who state that they own the territory from Ghubbet Kharab to Ambadu and who accept French protection. (Appendix Fourteen)

The British Under-Secretary of State for India, J.A. Godley, challenged the French claims and said:

“In considering these documents, it should be borne in mind that, according to trustworthy information in the possession of Her Majesty’s Government, the Danakil

tribe inhabit the littoral from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to the western extremity of the Gulf of Tajourra; that the Easa Somali, who are known to be inveterate enemies of the Danakil, possess the coast extending from Ghubbet Kharab along the southern shore of the Tajourra Gulf and onwards to a point called Dakunkal, a coast line which included both Ambadu, Jiubuti, and Dongarita; and that the Habr Awal tribe, of which "Jibril Abukir are known to be a sub-section, occupy the littoral from Dakunkal east-wards, having for their chief towns Bulhar and Berbera. These facts render the examination of the French case more simple than it might otherwise be.

"It is evident, in the first instance, that the French Government, in endeavouring to establish their claim to Ambadu and Ras Jibuti, place considerable reliance on the Treaty of the 11th March 1862 with the Danakil Chiefs. By Article 7 of that instrument the French subjects settled at Obokh were at liberty to pasture their flocks at Ambadu near Tajourra, at Kassassazele and at Elo, near Cape Jaboutil or Jibuti, without this right giving rise to any claim for compensation; but, on the other hand, the actual cession of land provided by Article 2 of the Treaty was strictly confined to the tract extending from Ras Dumeirah on the north of Obokh to Ras Ali on the south of it. This latter point, being outside the limits of Tajourra, neither included that port and district nor the Bay of Ghubbet Kharab, nor Ambadu, nor Ras Jabuti.

"With regard to the deed of gift of the 14th December 1884, by which Sultan Loita of the Danakil tribe affected to cede to the French the coast line from Ras Ali to Ambadu, which last-mentioned place, as just said, is situated in the territory of the Easa Somalis, it is only necessary to state that whilst the French said that they had previously acquired the rights claimed under the Treaty of 1862, the gift was at the same time illegal, the said Loita having no right whatever to cede territory

beyond Ghubbet Kharab belonging to the Easa Somalis, who are not only completely independent of him but the bitter enemies of his tribe. For this reason, so far as this coast is concerned, Lord Cross attaches no more importance to this document than to the previous Treaty of 1862.”

Challenging the French claim Walsham argued further:

“ With respect to the third document under review, viz., the arrangement said to have been entered into on the 25th March 1885 between M. Henri and some members of the tribe of Jibril Abukir, who state that they inhabit Dongarita and the adjoining littoral and desire to put themselves under French protection, it may be observed that the signatories of that document do not profess to represent, or to be empowered to act for, the entire tribe; nor do they demand that the whole tribe should be taken under French protection; nor do they specify any territory as intended to be made subject to that protection. M. Henri, in reciting the purport of their petition in his reply to the signatories, goes far beyond the statement which the text of the petition itself warrants. It may also be remarked that Major Hunter, in his letter of the 8th March 1886 to the Resident at Aden (Somali Coast, No. 169), proves by a genealogical table that the Jibril Abukir are merely a section of the Habr Awal, which as an independent tribe came into political relations with the British Government in July 1884. Consequently the entire tribe of Jibril Abukir, so called, had no right to make any separate engagement at all, more especially one affecting a place such as Dongarita, which, as already shown, belongs to the Easa Somalis, although it is believed that the Habr Awal tribes occasionally wander in its vicinity, which may account for the statement made by those who signed the petition that they were inhabiting Dongarita and the neighbouring coast. It appears, moreover, that after full inquiry at Zeyla Major

Hunter could not ascertain that any intercourse took place between the tribe and M. Henri at that place except by means of a few troublesome members of the clan who reside near it, and who together with some Gadabursi, are said to have taken a French flag to Dongarita at some period in April 1885 and attempted to plant it on that spot.

“With reference to the fourth document under review, viz., a letter dated 25th March 1885, addressed to M. Henri by Nur Roble and certain other persons who purport to represent the Gadabursi tribe, expressing a desire for French protection over a tract of country stretching from places designated as Aravra, Helo, and Sebah-le to Kulangarit inclusive, I am to remark that this paper on which the French Government found a claim to sovereignty over the Gadabursi tribe was disavowed by Nur Roble himself some months afterwards, on the ground of his never having heard of it before, of his never having “signed, sealed, or authorized any one to seal for him.” In short, from inquiries made by the British Vice-Consul at Zeyla in September 1885, it was ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the letter was written by one Ali Saleman in the house of Burhan Abubekr (a son of the late Abubekr Pasha), who dictated it and got it signed and sealed in M. Henri’s presence. Moreover, according to the latest information received at the India Office, the Gadabursi have for many years past possessed no coast at all and had no right therefore to cede any place on that littoral to the French. Apart from all this, the fact remains that on the 11th December 1884, or three months prior to the date of the alleged letter from Nur Roble, a treaty was entered into between Hunter and the Chiefs of the Gadabursi tribe, the validity of which cannot be affected by any agreement said to have been subsequently entered into by the French Consul at Zeyla.

“With regard to the last document of the series, viz., the Treaty of the 26th of March 1885, between M. Legarde

and certain Chiefs of the Easa Somalis, declaring that they possess the territory from Ghubbet Kharab beyond Ambadu near Zeyla, and accepting the protectorate of France, Lord Cross has only to observe that whilst, as stated in paragraph 3 of this letter, the Easa Somalis do undoubtedly possess this coast line, the Elders of this very tribe, in whose territory it may again be remarked are situated Ambadu and Dongarita, signed a treaty with Major Hunter on the 31st December 1884, or three months before M. Henri's alleged engagements of the 25th March 1885 and the one under review, on the strength of which the French claim possession of those two places. Moreover, as reported in Mr. Egerton's letter of the 16th and 28th September last year, the French Commandant at Obokh acknowledged to Captain King that it had not been signed by the Chief of the Easa, in addition to which the principal men of the tribe denied the right of the signatories to cede their land, and protested from the beginning against the proceeding."

GIFT MADE BY THE SULTAN LEITA

Haured, Sultan de Tadjourah, ayan donne son pays au Gouvernement Francais jusqu'a l'endroit appele Adaili.

Moi, Houred-Leita, j'en fais de meme et je donne au dit Gouvernement de Adaili a Ambaddo.

Signatures et cachets de Houred, Sultan de Tadjourah et de Brahime, Vizir du mem endroit, lesquels temoignent de l'authenticite de la dite declaration.

Signature de Houred Leita, lequel certifie l'authenticite de son dire.

Obock, le 14 Decembre 1884.

Pour traductoin conforme:

L'Interprete Militaire de la Colonie,

(Signe) OHLENSCHLAGER.

Vu pour la legalisation de la signature de
M. Ohlenschlager, Interprete Militaire:
Le Commanbdant de la Colonie,
(Signe) LAGARDE.

As it is mentioned above, the Sultan Leita has given a Somali territory to France as a gift.

On November 21, 1886, the French Vice-Consul at Zeila, M. Henri, reported that the Captain of the boat "*Pingouin*" and seven of his crew had been massacred by, according to the French Consul, people belonging to the Arona tribe and informed the British Vice-Consul at Aden that the assassins are in Zaila. The massacre took place at Khor Ambado. The date was not known but the boat left Zeyla on the morning of November 18, 1886.

The French landed at Ras Tibirsi for the purpose of surveying the place for the establishment of a French settlement there. But the latest account says that the French had landed, unarmed, at a place called Gan-man (Ga'an ma'an) between Tibirsi and Ambado. They brought with them a bag of biscuits, which they gave to some Somalis near the watering place. They did not appreciate the gift and a young boy in the group said: "Is this what you give in exchange for our animals which you carried off?" and then drove his spear into one of the sailors. His example was immediately followed by the rest of the group and other who ran up. M. Legarde, M. Henri's son, and two Ayal Yunis Somalis employed in the ship escaped by running away and swimming. One of the Ayal Yunis men received a wound from a stone on the back of the head.

An armed party then landed and drove away the Easa, and took the dead bodies on board of the ship.

The British Vice-Consul reported that "some six or seven month ago some of the Ker Hurone sub-tribe of the Easa who occupy the country in the neighbourhood of Ras Tibirsi came to Zeyla and complained to me that the French had carried off nine of their camels and a large

number of sheep in retaliation for the carrying off of the camels belonging to the Bremond-Barelli-Kafila. I sent the men away with a small present, and told them I could do nothing for them.”

The British wrote: “This I believe to be the real motive of the massacre. The natives, proverbially treacherous, seeing before them unarmed the very men who had carried off their animals on a former occasion, could not resist the temptation to retaliate.”

The two foreign European Powers, Britain and France, who were scrambling for Somali territories solved their disputes over who takes what and where, by correspondence in their mutual interests, without consulting the people of the country.

On March 30, 1887, the British Viceroy from his Camp at Dehra Dun, India, sent the following telegram to the Secretary of State in London:

“Your telegram of 24th. After consulting Bombay, I am of the opinion that there is no objection to limiting recognition of our protectorate from Ras Jibute to 49th parallel. We should obtain, in addition to prohibition of trade in arms and slaves, withdrawal of French claim to protect Gadabursi, of French interference and Consul at Zeyla. Agreement of French with Easa should be subject to our approval. No protective duty should be introduced and no penal settlement formed.”

On 15th April 1887, the Secretary of State replied to the Viceroy:

“We agree to recognize French protectorate west of line drawn from Jibute to Harrar. French agree to recognize our protectorate from Jibute to 49th parallel, to withdraw claims to Gadabursi and Jibril Abukrs, and will not establish penal settlements. The two Governments to take necessary measures for suppressing slave trade and importation of arms.”

“Have you any further views to express”, asked the

Secretary of State. And on April 16, 1887 the Viceroy replied that he had “nothing more to say.”*

Of courser, the British, the French and the Italians agreed to suppress arms importation in the area. But this applied only to the Somalis and allowed all kinds of arms to the Abyssinians.

In 1898 Edmund Monson sent a letter from Paris to the Marquess of Salisbury in London. He quoted a telegram from the British Consul Arthur, in Dakar on January 5, in which he reported that Prince Henry of Orleans enlisted 100 men for service in Abyssinia. Monson further quoted a telegram from Charles Hardinge respecting the arms and military stores shipped on board the “*Baluchistan*” from Marseilles on the 27th ultimo and according to Hardinge these were destined for Jibuti, on the Somali Coast, and had been supplied by the Russian Government to the Emperor Menelik.

The British Official refered to an article in the French paper “*Patrie*” giving an interesting account of an interview with Prince Henry of Orleans on the subject of his Mission to Abyssinia. Prince Henry stated that the 100 Senegalese enlisted at Dakar would sail for Jibuti under the command of Viscount d’Origny, formerly of the Spahis, and of MM. Lacombe, Sibillon, and Leymarie, who at one time in command of the local troops “*milice*” in the Congo Colony.

Prince Henry stated that 30,000 rifles and 5,000,000 cartridges have been presented to Menelik by the Emperor Nicholas, while for the use of his own expedition he has forwarded 12,000 guns, 2,000,000 cartridges, 2 mitrailleuses, tents, and agricultural implements, &c.

The mission, which was not, apparently, for purely military purposes, comprised engineers, doctors, archi-

* Foreign Department, French proceedings at Dongarita, May 1887—S 197-200, NAI, New Delhi.

tects, and a commercial agent—in all, twenty Europeans, who were to instruct and educate the Gallas tribes, an agricultural and pastoral people.*

* Foreign Department, Red Sea and Somali Coast, Confidential, Section 1, January 15, No.21, NAI, New Delhi.

13

The British and the German Activities

On August 2, 1870, the Master of the British Ship, *Morning Star*, Evan Evans, reported that on July 22, 1870, at 11 P.M., the ship ran on shore close to Ras Aloola. On February 22, 1871, the Commander of the British Ship *Lynx*, J.K. Keats, arrived on the Somali coast and anchored on a place called Mowuyeh. He wanted to meet either the Sultan or the Chiefs but was told that they were some 100 miles inland in the direction of Ras-Hafun. In his report to his superiors at Aden, Commander Keats stated: "I instructed the interpreters that in case they were absent, a messenger should be at once despatched to them. This was done, but through some misunderstanding, a couple of days were lost before the messenger started; however after seven days' waiting, the Chief returned."

The visit of the Commander was connected with the murder of the Steward of the *Morning Star*, another British ship, allegedly committed by a Somali named Mohamet Gombi and to find out whether or not the Chiefs were taking steps to apprehend the alleged murderer. The Chief told him that "they had used all means in their power, but that the man had escaped, and that they had

searched every where inland, and also sent vessels round the coast, even to Zanzibar.”

But Keats reported: “This I did not believe, as if buggalows had been sent anywhere south of Ras Asir, they could not have returned against the north-east monsoon. They evidently thought from the absence of any English vessel that the matter had been forgotten.”

Then the British Commander left a letter from the Resident at Aden and told them that British authorities should not be satisfied unless and until they surrender the alleged murderer. And in the meantime, he posted “a proclamation” effecting the blockade of about 30 to 35 miles of the coast. He told his superiors at Aden, that to “effectually blockade this extent of the coast certainly two vessels are required, if not three; one at Aoolo, one at Haa-pow, and one off Murrya.”

The Chiefs, accompanied by one person from Aoolo, went on board of the vessel and reported what they had told him before, that the man had escaped, and that he had gone towards the coast of Zanzibar, but that they were willing to deliver up any number of men he liked to be executed with the father and brother of the alleged culprit. The English informed in his report to the Resident at Aden: “*These proposals I of course declined, and told them that it was quite inconsistent with our notion of justice to execute one man for another, and I again pressed upon them the absolute necessity of apprehending the murderer.*” But in the meantime, they were executing the whole nation, by blockading their ports, by denying them to receive any vessel, including those carrying food and other vital cargo.

On the morning of February 28, 1871 the British Commander Keats reported that two dhows were observed attempting to run the blockade. He sent all the boats manned and armed in charge of the 1st Lieutenant with order to seize the buggalows and before the ship boats

could overtake them, they managed to get close to the shore, and began to land some of the packages. A great number of natives, congregating on the beach showed evident signs of hostility. He said "in attempting to take one of the buggalows in tow, the natives entered the water, and began throwing spears (at) the crew ... It then became necessary to endeavour to terrify them by using blank cartridges and several rounds were fired; in the meantime, using every effort to tow the boat which had grounded off shore."

The Captain alleged that "the Somalis returned to the attack more numerous, and more determined than before, and the lives of our men were greatly endangered. A few rounds of ball cartridge were then fired, and I regret to say one native was killed; after this the natives retreated, and the baggalow was allowed to depart."

The Political Resident at Aden reported to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay* : "It will be observed that the natives of Aloola, when attempting to resist the detention of two small buggalows which were found to be running the blockade, committed such acts of hostility that the officers in command of the ship's boats were obliged to fire upon them, thereby killing one of the party. This act appears to have been done in mere self-defence."

This is the logic of power. On two similar circumstances when the Somalis resisted the presence of the British vessels on the their coast two persons were killed. On the first occasion a Steward of the British vessels the *Morning Star* was allegedly killed by a Somali and following that the British blockaded about 30 to 35 miles of the coast. And when they decided to suspend the operations against the Somalis, the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, told the Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay that ..."it will be sufficient for a vessel to visit

* Foreign Department, See letter No.74-722, dated Aden, 8th April 1871, NAI, New Delhi.

these ports during the next season, and make enquiries as to the result of the further proceedings of the Somalee Chiefs; and, should the murderer not be then produced, the tribes might be warned that, if they are ever found to have sheltered him, they will be severely dealt with." As for the killing of the Somali by their officers, the Resident at Aden, said : "This act appears to have been done in mere self-defence."

After investigating the matter, the Resident in Aden, Major-General C. W. Tremenheere said that "there was no reason to detain the buggalows, which was towed to Aden by the Commander of the *Dalhousie*, after J.I. Keats requested him to do so. He told the Secretary to the Government of Bombay that "Commander Keats' statement contained nothing which could be accepted as a proof either that there was any intention of running the blockade, or of her being in any way concerned in the transaction, which unfortunately ended in blood-shed and loss of life upon the sea-shore."

The Political Resident sent copies of depositions of the people who were interviewed on the matter and translations of letters received from the Sultan of the Mijjerteyn and the Gerad of the Warsangali, complaining of the conduct of the Commander of the *Lynx*, Keats.

Tremenheere had an interview with Noor Oosman, the relative and representative of the Sultan of the Mijjerteyn, who stated that before they had any official dealings with the British Government, when a vessel was wrecked upon their coast, they had harboured and fed the crew and protected the property; that their exertions had been recognized and liberally rewarded by Government. According to the British Official, Noor Oosman added that it was their earnest desire to merit the approval of Government by their conduct in similar cases, but that there were bad characters in every nation whose conduct could not be controlled.

Following is the translations of the letter from Sooltan Mahomed Oosman Yusuf, of the Mijjerteyn, to Tremenheere:

“AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—I have received your letter which you despatched by the steamer, and understand its contents. You wrote to me to give up the murderer, or my ports will be blockaded. This man fled before the steamer of Captain Miles arrived. I have made inquiries in all parts of the Mijjerteyn country, both on the hills and in the *jungle* country, but without success. Between the departure of Captain Miles and the arrival of the other steamer, I made all the inquiries in my power. I have heard that he went by land to the Sowahilee country. When I heard this, I took period of three months from the *Sahib* Captain Keats and sent some Mijjerteyn people with Ismael Oosman, the grandfather of Oosman Mahomed. I afterwards went inland, and this steamer continued to frequent the ports of Murya and Aloola, and I asked the *Sahib* but he told me that he had no orders on this subject. When the Aloola Chief heard this, he burn(t) Aloola, and they buried their provisions and property, and left the port. When the steamers returned, the Captain ordered all the people to return to Aloola; cameliers brought things on camels, and boatmen brought things in boats. The Captain saw two fishing boats. In these boats were some provisions and things, which were being landed on the shore according to his order. All at once five boats left the ship fully armed; the sailors landed and plundered some of the things, and fired some muskets at the people. Two men were killed, and one was wounded. When this had happened, I determined to complain to you, and I have sent my grand-father, Noor Oosman, to you. Whatever you see likely to lead to a peaceful settlement, do. There are many Arabs witnesses in this, Abdulla bin Ali bin Omed, Souree, Ahmed bin Ali Junebee-Da-ar Omar bin Kalida, Abdallah bin Ahmed

bin, Omar Omeene bin, Abdullah Mahree Salim bin Abdallah bin Essah, Salah.”

Translation of a letter from Sooltan Mahamed Bin Ali Gerad, the Warsangali, to General Tremenheere, C.B., dated 12th “Mohurrum”, 1888, (corresponding with 2nd April 1871).

“AFTER COMPLILMENTS,—I am sending to you on my part my children Easa Mahamood and Ahmed Mahamood Ali Gerad and Mahamood Abdallah Gerad. I have heard that you blockaded Makhar; (The East Somali country, or called Makhor, the North Coast Dabir), you did not inform me of this, and I knew not of it before, and none of my subjects in Makhar told me. Now, to-day there has been plundering and murder done upon my people. There is a covenant of old between you and me. Now I have sent my children to you to meet you. One of our men is slain, and our property is gone, which was in our bugalow, and our bugalow also; the Nakhuda Moorah Gooled, and the helmsman Saeed Gooled. Do give orders in the business as you deem best. I have had no difference with you since the time you took Aden.”

(True translation) (Signed) W.F. Frideaux, Assistant Resident.

THE GERMANS

On March 17, 1886 in London the German Ambassador Count Hatzfeldt verbally informed the British Foreign Office that on September 6, 1885 the German East African Company had made a Treaty with the principal Chief of the Mijjerteyn Somalis, the Grand Sultan Osman Mahamoud Youssouf, at Alula. Under this Treaty the whole Somali territory from the east of the town of Berbera to Cape (Ras) Asurad had been ceded to the German Company. The representative of the Company had also made a Treaty with the Ruler of the Somali town

Obbia (Obbiah), the Sultan Yussuf Ali Yussuf, whereby the Company had acquired, with all sovereign rights, the entire territory between Obbia and the town of Warscheich, belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar, on the one side, and between the Indian Ocean and the Galla frontier, about twenty-five days' journey inland, on the other. Count Hatzfeldt informed that on the strength of these Treaties, the German East African Company had asked the German Government to undertake the Protectorate over the Somali Coast, and had made all due reservations with regard to any encroachment on their rights on the part of England. (Appendix Twenty and Twenty one)

The Ambassador was quoted by Sir J. Pauncefote of the British Foreign Office as saying: "The German Company had received intelligence that an English gun-boat had appeared at Lasgori, within the limits of the Warsangali territory belonging to the Grand Sultan Osman, and that Major Hunter (The British Consul at Aden) had hoisted the English flag."

Count Hatzfeldt went on to remark that by the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of September 7, 1877, the British Government had recognised the jurisdiction of the Khedive over the Somali Coast as far as Ras Hafoun under the suzerainty of the Porte, but the Khedive had bound himself not to cede any part of the district so incorporated into Egyptian territory to any foreign Power whatsoever.

"Exception being made of that part of the Somali Coast, *viz.*, between Berbera and Ras Hafoun. No foreign Power had", the German Ambassador said, "so far the German Government were aware, raised claims to sovereignty over the rest of the Somali Coast, namely, from Ras Hafoun, southwards to Warscheich."

The German Ambassador inquired whether his Government were correct in their view so far as the

knowledge of Her Majesty's Government went. He also told the British officials that English agents were actively engaged in endeavouring to persuade the Somali Chieftains to give up their engagements with the (German) Company, and he asked whether Her Majesty's Government had any information with regard to the proceedings of the British local agents and the action of Major Hunter at Lasgori

The Earl of Kimberly sent a telegram to the Viceroy of India on March 26, 1886 in which he conveyed:

"Germany has notified Protectorate over Somali Coast from east of town of Berbera to Ras Asurad. We propose to assert our right as far as 49th degree of longitude, but to admit rest of their Protectorate. Do you object? Reply early."

Next day, the Viceroy replied to the Earl of Kimberly:

"Your secret telegram, 26th. German Protectorate. No objection."

Then the British Foreign Office drew up a memorandum on April 5, 1886 for the German Ambassador in London which contained the following points:

(a) "that the territory and coast line between Ghubbet Kharab and the 49th degree of longitude east are already under British protectorate

(b) "that Her Majesty's Government do not claim to exercise a protectorate over the Mijjerteyn Somalis or any of the tribes eastward of the 49th degree;

(c) "that the establishment of a German protectorate on the Somali Coast eastward of the 49th degree to Cape Guardafui and from thence to Warscheich would be welcome by Her Majesty's Government."

Four months later, Sultan Yusuf Ali visited Aden and met with the British Consul, Major F.M. Hunter. The latter discussed with the Sultan about the Agreement German claimed to have concluded with the Mijjerteyn Chiefs. During the meeting the two sides discussed bi-

lateral agreement. Afterward the British official reported to his Government:

“With respect to the desire of Yusuf Ali to enter into a separate engagement, I elicited that he claimed jurisdiction over Alula and Habo (between Muranjah and Alula) only, and that he expected at least 360 dollars annual subsidy to enter into a protectorate engagement. It has to be remembered that we already pay the Mijjerteyn 360 dollars per annum to protect life and property, and this agreement has been signed by Yusuf Ali as one of the Chiefs of the tribe. If we enter into a separate agreement with the latter, there will be a risk of Sultan Othman taking offence.”

The Consul concluded:

“I informed Yusuf Ali that the British Government are quite prepared to pay a reasonable amount to the Mijjerteyn tribe, or even himself personally, in case they or he accepted British protection. Further that if he used his influence to obtain the required concession for the erection of a lighthouse at Guardafui, he would be well and suitably rewarded.

The British Consul claimed that Sultan Yusuf Ali made the following statement:

“I was not present when the agreement was made between the Sultan Othman and the German, but I have seen the Arabic copy.

“I do not recollect what the preamble said as to the actual parties making the agreement, whether it was on behalf of themselves or of their Governments.”

“The substance was that the Germans were to be allowed to trade and were entitled to protection; the consideration was 1,000 dollars payable to the Sultan, and 1,000 dollars to myself, annually. There was no mention of sovereignty or territorial rights, or flag. When the second time the Germans came I was present; they asked for the Sultan’s flag to fly on their boat for protec-

tion. They also said they wanted to build a house and fly their own flag over it. Both these requests were refused. We have not received any portion of the annual stipend, but we have accepted presents of cloth.

“Since I arrived at Aden, I visited the German Agent Max Winter here and showed him the paragraph from the *Standard* about his Company having annexed the Somali country from near Berbera to Warsheikh; he declared he knew nothing of any such intimation having been published.”

This statement was taken by Major Hunter on March 26, 1886. Three years later, in 1889, the German Government asked the British Government permission to recruit, within the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast, a small force of blacks that were intended to serve as police in the territories of the German Company at Zanzibar. But the British considered “extremely undesirable to accustom the Somalis to the use of firearms” and at the beginning it raised objections to the German request.

Earlier, the Political Resident at Aden, Brig.General A.G.F. Hogg, reported in a letter on April 24, 1889, that in accordance with instructions received from the Secretary of State for India in September last, the Italians were permitted to enlist Somalis for service at Massowah. The men, about 150, were regularly trained in the use of firearms during the last six months, and have now been sent back to Aden.

The Political Resident argued:

“It is evident that if foreign nations are thus permitted to train the Somalis to the use of firearms, and then send them back to their own country, most undesirable results will ensue; and I trust that in future permission may be refused to any foreign nation for the enlistment, as soldiers, of Somalis within our Protectorate.

“Possession by the Arabs of rifles, is becoming very common indeed, and if Somalis receive a military train-

ing, they are certain to use every endeavour to obtain possession of firearms which are now almost unknown in their country," he said.*

However, on May 31, 1889, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Salisbury went on to state that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of doing all in their power to meet the wishes of the German Government in this matter, and the objection raised by the Government of India to the recruitment were accordingly overruled.

The British policy has always been to keep fire-arms out of the hands of the Somalis as much as possible, and, for the British "the recruitment for foreign service would introduce into the Protectorate a considerable number of men trained to the use of fire-arms and consequently more than ever anxious to obtain possession of such weapons."

THE BRITISH

As for the British themselves, they had already established contact with the Chiefs of the Mijerteyn. They had signed agreement with the Chief of Alula in March 1879.

In October 1880, Acting Political Resident, Aden, Major G.R. Goodfellow, was sent to Alula to deliver the ratified copy of the agreement to Sultan Yusuf Ali. But the Sultan was out of town.

In a letter to C. Gonne, Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay, dated Aden Residency, October 15, 1880, Major Goodfellow said:

"I regret to say that in consequence of the Sultan's absence from Marayeh, in the interior, his representative there would not receive the Treaty, or amount of subsidy due, from Commander Byle, R.N. A local copy of the

* Foreign Department-Secret-E. July 1889, Nos. 119-121, NAI, New Delhi.

Convention was delivered to Yousuf Ali, who accepted it. A sum of dollars \$180 was expended in presents, for which the sanction of Government is solicited.”

On January 16, 1883, Brigadier-General J. Blair, V.C., British Political Resident at Aden wrote the following letter to the Sultan, Othman Mahmoud:

“It is not hid from you, oh, friend, that in March 1879 you and the other Chiefs of the Mijjerteyn entered into an agreement with Major Goodfellow, and that this agreement has been ratified by the Governor-General of India. We now send you our Acting First Assistant Resident, Captain Sealy, who will deliver to you the copy of the ratified agreement.

“It is also known to you that the arrears of the stipend mentioned in the said agreement are due to you and Captain Sealy is authorised to pay you the same, amounting to 720 dollars, to March 1882.

“You will also recollect that the Great Government was pleased with your kind treatment of the crew of the wrecked steamer *Fleur Castle*, last year, and we have much pleasure to informing you that Captain Sealy is commissioned to deliver to you 500 dollars, which the Great Government desires to give you as a mark of appreciation of the services rendered by you on that occasion. This is quite separate from the payment mentioned in the agreement.

“We rely on your friendship to meet the wishes of the Great Government in the above matters.

“May you be preserved.”

Then the Political Resident instructed Captain Sealy to proceed, in the course of the day, in the *Amberwitch* to Bunder-Mureye.

Brigadier-General Blair told Captain Sealy to do the following:

“At Bunder-Mureya you will endeavour to communicate with Sultan Othman Mahmoud of the

Mijjerteyn, and deliver to him the copy of the agreement ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General on the 23rd August 1880, together with the accompanying letter from the Political Resident.

“Should the said Sultan Othman Mahmoud accept the treaty, you will proceed to pay him the arrears of stipend, amounting to 1,080 dollars due to the 31st March 1882, less the sum of 300 dollars paid to Sultan Yussuf Ali. If, however, the Sultan Othman Mahmoud objects to receive only 720 dollars, you are authorised to pay the full amount of 1080 dollars.

“You will also pay to Sultan Othman Mahmoud the sum of 500 dollars, which the Government has sanctioned as a mark of appreciation of the services rendered by him to the *Fleurs Castle*. You will let Sultan Othman Mahmoud distinctly understand that these 500 dollars is entirely apart from the agreement above noted.

“Should Sultan Othman Mahmoud refuse to accept the copy of the agreement, you will withhold payment of the arrears of stipend, and receive from him any communication he may wish to make as to the reasons for his refusal.”

Following the instructions given to him, Captain Sealy sailed on February 16, 1883 on the *Amberwitch* and anchored off Bunder-Mureyah at about 8 a.m. on February 19.

Captain Sealy reported that when he arrived at Bunder-Mureyah, Sultan Othman Mahmoud was away at a village a little distance away, and was unable to have an interview with the Sultan until 2:30 p.m. At his meeting with the Sultan, Captain Sealy wrote in his letter to the British Resident at Aden, following people were also present:

The Sultan's uncles Ali Othman, Ismail Othman, and Sherwaah Othman as well as Mahmoud, a son of Sherwaah Othman, Sheikh Idress, the *Kazee* and some

thirty others. "I was received with every appearance of friendliness and respect", Sealy said and added "the Sultan had been appraised of my object in visiting him by the letter from the Political Resident, which I had caused to be previously delivered to him by Mahomed Saleh of the Arabic Department, and Dariah Magun, Somali interpreter.

"The sum of 500 dollars on account of the wreck *Fleur Castle* having been handed over to the Sultan, the terms of the agreement were read over in detail and translated into Somali, and the Sultan then expressed his views thereon. The Sultan commenced by saying that, when that agreement was originally drawn up, he was young and inexperienced, and that now having had time to consider its provisions, and gained some experience, he desired to withdraw from it, as it appeared to him and his subjects to cede territory to the British Government, should the latter require any for the proposed lighthouse or beacon, such cession being impossible. The Sultan expressed his readiness, and that of his subjects, to protect wrecks as heretofore, and to be on friendly terms with the British Government, but declined to accept the ratified copy of the agreement so long as it contained the obnoxious provision (Article 5) regarding the lighthouse or beacon. The Sultan and all present expressed their readiness to execute a fresh agreement, containing all the other articles except the said Article 5.

As the Sultan refused to accept the copy of the ratified agreement, the British Envoy took leave without paying the arrears of the stipend provided in the agreement. The Sultan requested Captain Sealy to deliver a letter to the Resident in which the former said:

"Dated 19th February 1883.

"From—SULTAN OTHMAN MAHMOUD,

"To—The Political Resident, Aden.

"We received your kind letter, and the same day we

visited Captain Sealy, on which occasion he delivered to us 500 dollars, which the Government had ordered to be given to us as recompense for the (good) treatment shown by us to the steamer wrecked at Ras Asir.

“As regards the agreement, we are willing to agree to all terms in it except the lighthouse. God willing, we will send some men to you on our behalf. On meeting together we will converse and salutation (*sic*).

When he went back to his base in Aden, Captain Sealy wrote the following memorandum listing the value of the presents he gave:

MEMORANDUM

Presents paid to the relatives, friends and followers of Sultan Othman Mahmoud of Mijjerteyn at Bunder-Mureyah:

Ali Othman, Sultan's uncle	Dollars	17
Ismail Othman		15
Sherwaah Othman		10
Mahmoud, son of Sherwaah		5
Mahmoud Shermarker (Ako)		3
Shaikh Idrees (Cazee)		5
Haj Ali		2
Khamees		2
Mahmoud Moosa		2
8 Followers at \$ 1/2 each		4
Total		<hr/> 65

(Sd.) C.W.H. SEALY, Captain,
Acting First Assistant Resident.

The British did exactly what the Sultan Othman Mahmoud demanded. They came up with a new agreement excluding the clause, which provided the erection of a lighthouse on Cape Guardafui. The British Government authorised the Resident at Aden to revise the agreement

in this sense, but no formal agreement was necessary on that point. The British made the payment of annual sum of 360 dollars agreed upon conditional on the faithful observance by the Somalis of the terms of the agreement.

In 1866, an engagement was concluded between Lieutenant-Colonel W.L. Merewether, C.B., British Political Resident at Aden and Sultan Mahamud Yusuf, Sultan of Mijerteyn, regarding the prohibition of exportation of slaves from Africa. (Appendix Seven)

Italian Enterprise

Around 1885, when Italy started its colonial enterprise, Somalia had Britain and France on the North and on the coast of Benadir, the port of Kisimayo, Brava, Merca and Mogadiscio and Warsheikh were the dependencies of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The rest of the territories were divided among the various tribes. The sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over these ports were recognised by Germany, France and Great Britain in June 1886.

The Italian intervention started with the Commercial Treaty of May 28, 1885, precisely few weeks after the Italian occupation of Massawa on February 5, 1885, when the Ship *Barbarigo* was sent to Zanzibar for the purpose of visiting the coastal territories which were under the Sultan and to explore the outlet of Giuba river.

It is evident that the colonial powers consulted each other before taking over a territory for colonisation. No consideration was ever given to the agreement of the population concerned for the occupation of a territory. Only these colonial powers decided among themselves which power takes what. In the case of the Somali territories, the Italian Government asked the British Government if they had any objection to the Italian occupation of Somali territories. When the Secretary of

State informed the Viceroy of India on January 3, 1889 that Italy “proposes to occupy or protect territories from eastern limit of British protectorate Somali Coast as far the border of Zanzibar and whether “India has anything to say against the proposal.” The Viceroy promptly replied on January 5 that “They had no objection.”*

As the scramble in the Horn of Africa and particularly for the Somali territories by the European Powers continued, Italy too started moving towards it. Unlike the British and the French, who occupied the territories through treaties signed with the Somali chiefs, the Italian Empire, came through the Sultanate of Zanzibar, with whom it signed a Convention on August 12, 1892 for concession of the Coastal region of Benadir. The Italo-Zanzibar Convention was presented to the Italian Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Caetani, on June 1, 1896 and approved with Law No. 373 of August 11, 1896. (Appendix Twenty-Two)

Italy took over the administration of the Benadir (Mogadishu, Merka, Brava and Warsheik) following the concession agreement signed at Zanzibar on August 12, 1892, between the Italian government and the Sultan of Zanzibar (Muskat-Oman). For the Sultan of Muskat, the agreement was signed by the British Consul General, Sir Gerald H. Portal and for Italy, Mr. Pierre Cottoni, Manager of the Italian Consulate and on their part, the Italian government officially passed over the territory to Filonardi Company, which promised to pay to the Sultan an annual fee of Rupees 160,000 and the Italian government allowed the Company to take the customs duty.

Although the intention of the Italian government was to obtain territorial concessions from the Sultan of Zanzibar, which, at that time could not be achieved they

* Foreign Department—Secret—January 1889, NAI, New Delhi.

managed, however, to conclude a treaty which assured Italy important commercial advantages.*

According to the Italian Colonial Office document** these activities brought positive results, since by the end of 1888 the Sultan of Obbia requested the protection of Italy. The Acceptance Act was signed in Obbia by the Italian Consul Filonardi and Sultan Yusuf Ali on February 8, 1889. With this Treaty all the possessions of the Sultan from El Marek to Ras Auad passed under the protection of the Government of Italy.

The document of the Italian Colonial Office stated: "later on, the territory of the Uaesle was separated from the Sultanate of Obbia and passed under direct control of Italy, following the Treaty signed at Mogadishu on 4th November 1896, by the Chief of the tribe and Comm. Dulio."

In 1889 the Sultan of the Mijerteyn reached an agreement with Italy on April 7, at Bender Alula. The Agreement placed under the Italian protection his possession on the Indian Ocean from Ras Auad to Ras el Kyle, including Nogal Valley, promising that he would not enter into further treaties with other Powers for the remaining territories in his possession.*** (Appendix Twenty-Five)

To legalize the Agreements with the tribes of the Habab and Beni-Amer on the frontier of the Italian colony of Eritrea and with the Sultan of Obbia and with the Sultan of the Mijertins, along the coast of Africa bordering on the Indian Ocean, Signor Rudini, the Italian Foreign Minister submitted at the Italian Chamber of Deputies for the consideration of the House, four Projects of Law.****

* SOMALIA—Memoria sui Possedimenti e Protettorati Italiani, Roma, 1908, p. 7.

** Ibid, p. 8.

*** Ibid p. 8.

**** Foreign Department, Letter of the British Embassy in Rome, No. 60, dated April 3, 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

Regarding the Somali territories, Rudini said in his statement:

“The Sultanate of Obbia extends on the coast of the Indian Ocean from the northern frontier of the Zambezi (*sic*) territory of Uarsceik (2° 30' north latitude) to 5° 53' north latitude. The Treaty of Protection with the Sultan Jusuf Ali Jusuf was signed on the 8th February, 1889, in the name of the King's Government, by Cavaliere V. Filonardi, then Royal Consul at Zanzibar. The Sultan places himself and his possessions under the protection of the Italian Government, undertaking not to make, without the consent of the latter, Treaties or Contracts with any other Government or person whatever. In compensation, an annuity of 1,200 dollars is granted to Sultan Yusuf Ali Yusuf.

“Being a region bordering the sea, the Protectorate over the Sultanate of Obbia was notified to the Powers in the telegram of the 3rd March and the Circular of the 11th May, 1889, according to Article XXXIV of the General Act of the Berlin Conference.

“The country of the Mijertins extends from 5° 53' north latitude to the extreme limit of the Sultanate of Obbia, along the coast as far as Cape Guardafui, and beyond into the Gulf of Aden as far as Bender Ziadeh (49° east Greenwich).

“The Sultan Osman Mahmud has accepted the Italian Protectorate for the part of his dominions which, from the frontier of Obbia reach 8° 3' north latitude; with regard to the remaining part, he is also bound not to make Treaties with other Governments.

“The Acts relative to this Protectorate were ratified on April 7, 1889. They bear on the part of the Italian Government the signature of Cavaliere Folonardi, at that time, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, and of the Commanders of the Royal ships “*Rapido*” and “*Staffetta*,” and for the other Contracting Party the signature of an

emissary of Sultan Osman Mahmud. The compensation agreed upon is 1,800 dollars for Sultan Osman Mahmud and 600 dollars for the Sultan of Obbia, Yusuf Ali Yusuf.”

In the case of this Protectorate also, regions bordering on the coast of Africa being in question, notice was given to the Powers on the 11th May, 1889, in accordance with the General Act of the Conference of Berlin.

“Besides the above protectorates other analogous Agreements have been made by order of my honourable predecessor, both with Chiefs on the African Coast, north of Kismayu, or that portion of the coast between the Zanzibar stations of Brava, Merka, Mogadisciu, and Uarsceik, and with several tribes in the neighbourhood of Eritrea on the western side: the Hadendoa, the Ad Omar, Sabderat, Hamram Baze, Baria, Az-sciraf, Maria Neri, Maria Rossi, mensa-bet-Abrahe, Mensa-bet-scic, Begine, Bet Mala, Ad Ecched, and the Hallenga.

“However, these Agreements are not yet complete, and I will in due time present them to you either for your information or your approval, according as they may or may not affect the finance.

Projects of Law

1. The Act annexed to this with regard to the Protectorate of the Royal Government over the Habab tribe is approved.

2. The Acts annexed with regard to the Protectorate of the Royal Government over the Beni-amer tribe are approved.

3. The annexed Acts with regard to the Protectorate of the Royal Government over the Sultanate of Obbia are approved.

4. The annexed Acts with regard to the Protectorate of the Royal Government over the Migertins are approved.*

* Foreign Department, Secret, June 1891, N. 234-314, NAI, New Delhi.

On October 10, 1892, the Sultan of Obbia, Yusuf Ali Yusuf wrote a letter from Obbia to the Italian Consul Vincenzo Filonardi :

“Our dear friend, Sig. Vincenzo Filonardi,

“May God preserve you.

“We hope that all of you are in good health.

“We inform you that this year we have been abandoned and there was no steamboat that has come to us, as it was the habit.

“Nobody has brought to us the woods and we have neither food nor cartridges.

“There was a serious war this year. The inhabitants of the desert have rebelled against us and there was a fighting in which some of ours have been killed.

“After the departure of the steamboat *Esfita* we hoped some one would come from your side, but until now nobody came.

“On the date of this (letter) Abu Bakr bin Auad has arrived bringing to us the payment of the year 1891.

“We hope that you will help us with food and the supply of war material, because we are under your protection and your flag.

“We would not think that you have abandoned us.

“Now we wish your arrival together with what we have requested. Abu Bakr bin Auad will give full information.

“We hope that you come soon; this year to negotiate together.

“Now we have two countries: Obbia and Fil Hur (sic) and we have many soldiers different than before.

“Those of our friends killed are 11.

“ Our *saia* (boat) has broken down this year at Obbia with some of our properties on board. We need money and we are without boat. You are our friend and we do not know other Christians besides you, and we defend your flag.

From your friend

Sultan Jusuf Ali Jusuf (Sultan of Obbia)

On October 19, 1892 (27 Rabi El Aual, 1310), the Sultan of the Majerten, Sultan Osman Mohamud Jusuf, wrote the following letter from Alula, to Signor Vincenzo Filonardi, Consul of Italy, in which he said:

(Translation from Italian)

“To our most respected friend Signor Vincenzo Filonardi, the Consul of Italy. May God preserve you.

“How are you; we hope that you, your brothers and your friends are all in good health. We with all our friends and our tribes are well.

“Since long we have not seen you and we have a great desire to see you.

“You are our friend and we do not know why you have abandoned us.

“The steam boat *Esfita* has arrived this year, but without you. Now we hope to have the pleasure of seeing you, because friendship and affection exist between us.

“Kindly bring to us the rifles and the cartridges of which we have spoken about with you last year, because the rebellion has increased around us. We expect assistance from you because you are our friend and you will do it.

“On the date of this (letter) Abu Bakr has arrived here bringing to us the salary of the year; we have recommended him to give you detailed information.

“When you come we will understand each other.

“We want *barut* for the ofiat, the seats and the other furniture.

“We wish to construct a stone house in your name. For you we wish to work and we shall agree at which site the house will be built.

From Sultan Osman Mohamed Jusuf

(The Sultan of Migertini)*

* From the Archives of Filonardi 1892, ISIAO, Rome.

The British Ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, informed his government that he and the Marquis de Rudini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, have signed on the morning of March 24, 1891, a protocol for delimitation between the English and Italian sphere of influence from the mouth of the River Juba to the Blue Nile and the town of Kisimayu with its adjoining territory on the right bank of the Juba included within British jurisdiction. (See Appendix Twenty-Three)

Then the Italian protectorate has been extended to all the Mijerteyn territory with a Convention dated 18th August 1901. (See Appendix Twenty-Five)

On August 6, 1892, Mr. B. Brin of the Italian Foreign Ministry wrote a letter to Signor Filonardi informing him about the agreement reached for the Somali coast of Benadir and that Italy would pay Rupees forty-thousand at the occupation and then, forty-thousand Rupees each quarter of a year. At the expiry of twenty-five years the agreement was to be renewed. The Minister offered Filonardi, who already had the experience in dealing with the Somali territories, as the first choice to take over the Administration of the Ports of Benadir.*

The Filonardi Company, whose Motto was "*Italia*", took over its new duties on November 10, 1893.

Usually, Filonardi wrote about his activities in Somalia in the form of private letters to his brother Angelo. In one of them, on 26 August 1894, (Doc.No.33,) Filonardi complained to his brother about the Italian government's lack of interest in colonising a province of Africa. In disgust he wrote : " I will leave so that the great governing men could take exact cognition of what it means to govern a province in Africa", adding : "I cut my

* Documento No.17- letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Div./1 Sez.2 No.29663 dated Roma, 6 August 1892- Filonardi Archives—ISIAO, Rome.

head if they are good to keep Benadir with the expenditure of two million each year." In his words:

"Lascerò così che i grandi uomini Governativi possano prendere più esatta cognizione di ciò che significa governare una provincia in Africa.—Mi faccio tagliare la testa se sono buoni a tenere il Benadir con la spesa di due milioni all'anno."

He continued:

"Besides minor robberies on the caravans routes, the country, for the time being is quiet. I am happy of these poor people, the only satisfaction I had, comes from them.

Filonardi further informed his brother how happy he was to be in Somalia as the colonial administrator. Describing the feast annually held in Mogadishu by the inhabitants, Filonardi wrote: "The 16th of August is the beginning of the Somali year; in this day, it is the custom of the male folks to come out in different tribal groups, well armed, and make feint against each other. Prior to the feast, the elders come to me to ask for permission to hold this extraordinary feast and permit to carry arms; they assure me that at the end of the feast, all arms to be brought back in custody.

"It means to have all the citizens (about two thousand persons) armed during one day. It was a test and I tried.

"I gave the permission and I made sure that the Arab soldiers would not mix with the citizens, and notified that two shots of gun would indicate the beginning of the permission for the arms and two other shots would indicate the end of the permission. The first shots will be at 09,00 in the morning and the second will be at 7,00 in the evening."

Filonardi took seat at the terrace to enjoy the event. He wrote in his letter:

"The four tribes of Scingani quarter, strong, of about two hundred young people, dressed like warriors; the elders walking in the front of their respective tribes,

inspired the youngsters to sing and dance.”

Overwhelmed by the feeling of his power, the founder of the first Italian colonial administration in Somalia wrote : “ to my astonishment and my emotion were great when the groups paused in front of me, raising their arms towards me, chanting “*Ao-Filo*” (*Ao* meaning father and *Filo*, short form of Filonardi) and there was a chorus of good wish for power for me,” and boasting as a real master, Filonardi recorded : “My satisfaction was immense, I would never had hoped so much and was unable to stop some tears.”

Filonardi went on: “I did not, therefore, worked for nothing, and if in Italy it is not recognised, luckily, the Somalis recognise. Later on, the four tribes of the Hamarweyn, followed the same ceremonial. Being the most populated and richer quarter, the various groups were more, greater in number and were better equipped, it was a splendid show.”*

On October 24, 1893 Filonardi issued a notification announcing that his company has taken over the administration of the Somali territories of Benadir.

Following is the original version of the notification issued by Filonardi:

“NOTIFICAZIONE 24 ottobre 1893 del regio console Filonardi e del comandante Incoronato della regia nave *Staffetta* per la presa di possesso del Benadir da parte della compagnia “V. Filonardi e C.”**

“In nome di S.M. Umberto I Re d’Italia, Noi V. Filonardi, console della prefata Maesta’ Sua in Zanzibar, e Noi Edoardo Incoronato, capitano di fregata, comandante la regia nave italiana *Staffetta*:

“Notifichiamo the il territorio, sottoposto al protettorato italiano sulla costa Somali, dalle foci del Giuba al territorio

* From pos.255, 1894. Filonardi Archives, ISIAO, Rome.

** Libro verde “Somalia, 1895”, pag. 124.

di Meregh (confinante col sultanato di Obbia) fu dal Regio Governo Italiano concesso in amministrazione alla compagnia italiana per la Somalia, V. Filonardi e C.

Magadiscio, 24 ottobre 1893.

Il R. console: V. Filonardi.

Il capitano di fregata: E. Incoronato.”

In a letter dated London, March 2, 1889, the Italian Government notified the British Government through their Minister at the Italian Embassy in London, Mons. T. Catalani, that the Sultan of Oppia (Obbia) on the East Coast of Africa has, through a special mission, formally requested the protectorate of the of His Majesty of King of Italy.

According to the provisions of Article 34 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference for the Congo, the Colonial Powers had to inform each other whenever one of them occupied a territory.

The Italian Minister's letter also indicated the limits of the Sultanate of Oppia (Obbia in the British map) as follows:

“On the North Ras Awad 5° 3' north latitude; on the south, the village el Marek 3° 40' north latitude. Oppia, the chief city, although placed in many maps more towards the north, is really in latitude 5° 22'.”*

The Italian diplomat told the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis of Salisbury, that having ascertained on the spot that neither a foreign Power, nor any private Company depending on a foreign Power, had taken possession or established any Protectorate, or any foreign influence on the above-mentioned territory, an Italian man-of-war, by order of His Majesty's Government hoisted on February 8, last the national flag and declared the Protectorate, by means of regular treaty with the Sultan, who had stipulated in his own name and

* Foreign Department—June 1889—SE 56-59—NAI, New Delhi.

on behalf of his successors and of the Chiefs under his sway.

When the matter was raised at the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the British Ambassador in Rome, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, reported to his Government that, in reply to interpellation by Messrs. De Valle and di Rudini as to the establishment by the Italian Government of a Protectorate over the country of the Sultan of Obbia near Zanzibar, "Signor Crispi, in reply, recapitulated the circumstances under which the Protectorate had been established, viz., that on 12th July 1888 the Chiefs of that country applied to the Italian Consul on behalf of their Sultan to be placed under the Protectorate of Italy".*

According to the Italian documents,** in the year 1888, the Sultan of Obbia requested the protection of Italy and in 1889 a Treaty was signed between Sultan Yusuf Ali and the Head of the Italian Company, Filonardi at Obbia on February 8, 1889. Like the British did, sending only one person, during their occupation of the Somali territories, Italy too, appointed V. Filonardi as Consul to deal with the Somalis on behalf of Italy. In the same year, 1889, the Sultan of Mijertein signed a Treaty on April 7 at Bender Alula, placing his territories under the Italian protection and promising not to sign further treaties in respect of the remaining territories in his possession with other powers.

In November 1889, Italy notified the powers that it had assumed the protection of the above territories.

The Anglo-Italian protocols of March 24, and April 15, 1891 express the desire of the two sides for the demarcation of their sphere of influence. The need for the demarcation was emphasized when in August 1892 Italy

* Foreign Department, See Ambassador's letter No.69, dated Rome, the 20th March 1889, NAI, New Delhi.

** Source: Italian "Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore, 1908.

extended its claims southward to the Juba and the Sultan of Zanzibar gave on lease to Italy for the period of 25 years and, after its expiry, renewable for the same period and conditions, for the annual payment of Rupees 160.000 (Lire 268.800) the ports of Brava, Merca, Mogadishu and Warsheikh.

According to Art. VIII, the Italians pledged to pay to the Sultan of Zanzibar the sum of 40.000 Rupees as initial payment when the Italian administration would take over the ports, the cities and territories in the agreement and subsequently 40.000 Rupees at the expiry of each quarter of the European year.


As Zanzibar itself was under the British protectorate, the Agreement was signed at Zanzibar by Sir Gerald H. Portal, Diplomatic Agent and General Consul of Her Britannic Majesty and M. Pierre Cottoni, Consul of H.M. the King of Italy on August 12, 1892.

Mogadishu became the capital of the Italian Colony although the founder of the colony, Captain Filonardi, landed at the village of Atel (Adale, Itala) on February 1891 and on March 14 took possession on behalf of his Government.

In 1893, the Italian Filonardi Company issued a bank Note for the denomination of Five Rupees. It was printed in Rome but the place of issue is *Itala* (Somalia).

The Model of Filonardi Company's Bank Note, dated July 1893 is given on the next page.

The amazing thing is that Filonardi called the currency *Rupia* (which was brought to the Northern part of Somalia by the British from India) and not *Somali* or *Lira*. As the place of issue was *Itala* or *Adale*, he could have called it *Itala Lira*, Italian *Lira* or even *Somali Lira*, as the *Rupiee* was a currency introduced by another colonial power, the British (in British Somaliland) and belonged to another country, in this case India. He used the Italian language on the front side of the Note and



BANK NOTE OF FILONORDI COMPANY

Arabic on the back. That was correct, as Italian was his own country's language and Arabic spoken and written in Somalis.

But Filonardi told his family in a letter dated, Mogadiscio 3.5.1894, that he was going to put into circulation

during that month the bank note which he thought would be welcomed by the people.

After coming back from abroad, the colonial administrator, told his family in the same letter:

“Here I am again in my possession (colony); upon my arrival I found the completion (of the construction) of the wall of the city and now they are finishing the two new fortresses overlooking the big square, which later, I have the intention of it be the market.”*

Meanwhile, in the country, where Italy played the role of the protector, the Somalis were harassed by the Abyssinians, who crossed the borders into Somali territories for looting and plundering

In a letter dated Mogadiscio December 1, 1894, to Comm. Pisani Dossi of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Vincenzo Filonardi, the Administrator of the territory, reported that:

(From the Italian text): “The Abyssinians, meanwhile, after having devastated and plundered the Ogaden, in search of a profitable loot, moved towards Borana-Galle and, passing through nearby Lugh, have sent a messenger to collect the “tribute”. The Sultan of Lugh, fearful, sent the “tribute” and at the same time sent a mission to me asking for protection.”

On June 2, 1895, the Sultan of Lugh Sultan Alio bin Sultan Hassan Aba Malle wrote to Filonardi that: “I am afraid that the Amharas might return to my country and we cannot defend ourselves.”

According to documents in Filonardi Archives, the Sultan pleaded with the Italian: “Please send us urgently your flag and the Protection Act. Do not forget my request; you can send the flag and the Protection Act with Sceik Mohamed bin Harun.” (The Sultan’s letter was originally written in Arabic)

* Pos. n.232, year 1894, Filonardi Archives, at ISIAO, Rome.

Some time in 1895, the Somalis at Lugh Ganane complained about an invasion of their territory by Abyssinians. The people of the town reported that the Amharas after looting the properties of the local inhabitants were proceeding to the city of Brava, via Bardera.

Hussein bin Sceik Hagi Dere who was in Ganane during one of the attacks by the Abyssinians, sent the following letter to the people of Brava giving them detailed information and advance warning regarding the intentions of the Amharas:

Following is a translation of the letter from Italian:
Ganane, without date.

(Aprox. The 20th Sept. 1895)

“To Most distinguished,

Agi Otoman bin Mohamed

Sceik Mohamed Harun—Brava

“Greetings,

“I bring to your notice that on the 2nd September (Rabi-al-Aual) 2000 Amharas have entered the city of Ganane. Gesar Ghede and Gaohaamin ran away abandoning their homes and properties; we of Mogadishu remained and forced to give more than one thousand *Taller* (*Maria Theresa* Dollars) in kind not to be killed or ill treated.


“The Amharas stayed in the city for 12 days and now they left via the river; we fear a lot and we want you to help us with yours prayers.

“We maintain good health.

“Inform our children not to start their journey to come here until I come back.

“I wish to go to Hacaba with all my goods, because the city of Ganane has been visited by infidels who said they will be returning each year to collect the tribute of 10

* Filonardi Archives ISIAO, ROME.



THE AMHARA ATTACK ON LUGH

elephant teeth, 10 slaves, 500 cotton dresses, 20 lion skins and 20 leopard skins.

“I do not wish absolutely to remain at Ganane.

“The Amharas are dark of skin, they are dressed with lion or leopard skins; their arms are rifles, swords and have shields bigger than those of the Somalis; they said they would go to Brava via Bardera and they repeat saying that all the territory belong to them.*

The Abyssinians were invading not only Lugh but they were also attacking Baidoa for the purpose of looting the population of the area.


The Filonardi Company penetrated the interior of the territory with commerce. The activities of the Company were many. It assumed new responsibilities with military clauses. In fact, it was understood that the “*Societa*” would maintain a number of soldiers in the territory and exercise control over the natives, the nationals (the Italians) and the foreigners who resided in the territory.

In 1896 the “*Societa*” had radical transformation. The Government of Italy established a new company which was named “*Societa Commerciale Italiana del Benadir*” and reached a new and favourable understanding with the Sultan of Zanzibar, Obbia and Migiurtini.

After some time the new “*Societa*” started functioning. The Consul Cecchi was nominated Commissioner by the Government and the *Societa*’ sent *Commendatore* Dullio as its representative to be next on authority to Cecchi.

On November 25, 1896 the Somalis rebelled and massacred at Lafole (20 Km from Mogadishu) the Commissioner Cecchi, ten Officers, five civilians and seventy askaris (local soldiers). Commander Dullio took over the responsibility on behalf of the Government and from that moment the Italians started military operation in Benadir.

On May 25, 1898, the Italian Government decided to hand over the administration of the territories of Benadir



THE INCURSION OF THE AMHARA ON LUGH AND IN BAIDOA IN 1896

and their hinterland to a new company, called the “*Societa' Anonima Commerciale Italiana del Benadir (Somalia Italiana)*”.

Article 2 of the Convention signed between the Government and the Company on January 24, 1898 stated that the Government would pay to the Company, from May 1, 1898 to April 30 1910, an annual amount of fr. 400.000, and from May 1, 1910 to July 16, 1946, fr. 350.000 annually, for the maintenance of the existing stations as well as for any other that the Company might think to establish in the future.


Article 3 said that the Government would provide fund necessary for the annual payment due to the Sultans of Obbia and of Alula, amounting to *Maria Theresa Tallers* 3.600 in all, and this as long as the Italian government was obliged to do so towards these Sultans.

The establishment of the Company, which replaced the Filonardi Company was approved by the Milan Court on July 24, 1896, and had its Headquarters in Milan. It's Administrative Council was composed of the following persons: Signor Anfonso Sanseverino Vimercati, President; Cav. Giorgio Mylius, Vice-President; Cav. Angelo Carminati, Managing Director; and Comm. Doctor S. B. Crespi, Councillor.

The Agreement signed between the Italian Government represented by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Treasury and the Minister of the Navy and the Members of the Administrative Council of the Company came into force starting from May 1, 1898.

It was approved by the Law on December 24, 1899, n. 466, and the King of Italy, Umberto I issued the following:
 UMBERTO I^o , ecc., RE D'ITALIA.

Il Senato e la Camera dei deputati hanno approvato:
 Noi abbiamo sanzionato e promulghiamo quanto segue:



THE MAIN ITALIAN EXPLORATIONS IN SOMALIA FROM 1883 TO 1897

Articolo unico.—E' approvato, con effetto dal I° maggio 1898, la Convenzione firmata a Roma il 25 maggio 1898, relativa alla concession da parte del Re del Regno d'Italia al "Societa' Anonima Commerciale Italiana del Benadir (Somalia Italiana)" delle citta' e dei territori del Benadir e del rispettivo hinterland (2)

Ordiniamo che la presente, munita del sigillo dello Stato, sia inserita nella Raccolta ufficiale della legge e dei decreti del Regno d'Italia, mandando a chiunque spetti di osservarla e di farla osservare come legge dello Stato.

Dato a Roma, addi 24 dicembre 1899.

UMBERTO Visconti Venosta—Pelloux —
Boselli—Carmine—Bettolo.

V. il Guardasigilli: A. Bonasi.

In 1898 the Government administration came to an end and the colony was temporarily handed over to the Benadir Company (Societa' Benadir) which effectively took the management in January 1900 with the appointment of Commendatore Dullio as the Governor. He held the office until May 1901.

ITALY CLARIFIES POSITION

There were popular uprisings in the interior of Benadir which culminated in the revolt of the Bimal. There were many clashes between the tribes and the Askaris of the Company and the most serious battles were those of Merca, Banzale, Addadei, Gelib and of Mellet. The most important for the Italians was that of Danane which temporarily cut off the aggressiveness of those whom they called, the rebels.

Due to the continued-armed struggle of the Somalis, the Italian Government directly assumed the Government of the colony by a decree of March 19, 1905. In January of the same year, Italy acquired outright possession of the Benadir port for which it agreed to pay 144,000 pounds to the Sultan of Zanzibar. To facilitate

communication with the Benadir country Britain leased to Italy land near Kismayo in 1905. In 1908, by a royal decree, the country between the Juba and the southern Mijjertein was placed under an Italian civil governor. In the same year Italy and Abyssinia signed a convention on their colonial frontiers. (Appendix Thirty-Two)

The British Ambassador in Rome, Rennell Rodd, reported a long conversation he had with Senator de Martino, the Governor of Benadir, and Italian Somaliland. In the course of the conversation de Martino explained to him his various schemes and ideas, and referred to the new arrangements made for Italian Somaliland. Rodd informed that the Italian told him: "I should explain in the first place that it is not strictly correct to speak of the Benadir coast of Somaliland. The Benadir coast and its hinterland is here regarded as a colony, whereas Italian Somaliland which lies to the north, is only a protectorate."

Martino further explained that: "Both the colony and the protectorate were under his supreme direction, but the Somali Protectorate had a Commissioner acting under his orders". The Italian Consul at Aden acted as Commissioner. But this disposition has been modified and a separate Commissioner had been appointed in the person of Signor Ferrando (sic) who had much African experience. He was to reside at Obbia in Somaliland.

Ambassador Rodd said in his report:

"Under the Commissioner there would be two Assistant Commissioners. One of these would also reside at Obbia; the other was to be posted in the Mijurtein country somewhere near Cape Guardafui. As both the Sultan of Obbia and the Mijurteins were enemies of the Mullah, Senator de Martino said it was important to keep them under observation and well disposed, and he apprehended that this policy on the part of Italy would be in conformity with our interests also."

In 1898, the influence of the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle

Hassan, was felt as far away as the Province of British East Africa. To counter the Somali movement, the British had in the Province of Jubaland, the following force:

“The Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, A.C.W. Jenner, left Turki Hill on the 18th April 1898, accompanied by Major Quentin, three officers of the Bombay Rifles, Captain Madocks, and 150 men, not including followers and drivers, but they were delayed at Yonte owing, as he described, to “false reports which I got from more than one quarter, that the lake was dry, and that water was only to be found in pools at Kurkurmez and Malhadatcha, and at one or two other place of which we had no certain knowledge.”

He reported: “Whether these reports, which deceived experienced travellers of the Afmadu road like Adam Musa and Dualla, were purposely and maliciously set afoot I do not know, but I am inclined to think that they arose, in the first place, from the fact that the bays and indentations of the lake which are both nearest to the road, are the usual drinking places of the cattle, were indeed dry, and that in consequence water was actually being drawn out of small water holes dug in the dried bed of Malkahna Bay for instance, and that perhaps this was repeated and exaggerated by some of the Hertis, who from fear of the Ogadens raiding their cattle, or from other motives, are disposed to put obstacles in our way.”

The British expedition was further delayed by the discovery that many of their leather water-carries brought for the use of the Indian troops leaked so badly as to be useless and this necessitated sending back to Turki Hill for more.

On arrival at a place of Heleshid Bay (which is quite dry) and situated on the bank of the lake they found the latter containing plenty of water. “We then marched to Kurkurmez and from the latter place reached Handarof, following the dry beach of the lake which has receded from

its bank in some place to the distance of 100 yards. We thus got in sight of Malkadatcha, which is nearly the extreme north-western end of the lake."

He said: "We found the report that the Ogadens were waiting for us in force at Kurkurmez, and that they had had a large quantity of cattle there recently to be false; in fact we saw nobody but a few Herti women and one small herd of cattle in the distance, which was probably the property of the Herti."

"We then, our provisions being finished, returned. The Indian troops marched well and worked extremely hard and cheerfully, making bomas, but seem to require a good deal of water," the Sub-Commissioner, at Kismayu said.

He added: "The mere fact of our marching out seems to have cleared the district, for the present, of the marauding bands of Ogadens, and this effect may be enhanced by the fact that the Herti police had a successful skirmish with a small party of Ogaden raiders at Jirole, near Koyama, during our absence."

The Sub-Commissioner then suggested what kind of action was necessary to counter the Somalis. "As for the steps to be taken to punish the Ogadens," he said, "I propose that after the establishment of a station on the lake, which ought to be effective in keeping off Ogaden roving bands we should make a march on Afmadu, carrying explosives for the purpose of destroying a few of their wells as a lesson." He added: "I do not think one such expedition will be enough, but if we go there soon when there is water on the road and then on our return to the lake visit Dirib, a place about the same distance as Afmadu from the lake but more to the west and then again to Afmadu later, when perhaps the rain will have ceased, and they will be forced to draw nearer to the permanent water supplies, I hope the Ogadens will begin to realize that we are masters of their country, and that they must either make terms with us or evacuate it."

The British Sub-Commissioner wrote to Sir A.H. Hardinge about the young Ogadens who troubled the British:

“If we harass them sufficiently it is, I consider, certain that they will either submit or what is, I think, more likely, leave the country and settle down on the outskirts of Boran, a course which must be humiliating to them since they cannot do it without asking leave of the Boran Chiefs, and which will probably eventually lead to the break-up of their tribe.”

Sir A.H. Hardinge, British Consul at Zanzibar arrived at Kismayu on May 8, 1898 on Her Majesty's ship *Barrosa*. On the following day, Hardinge had a meeting with Mr. Jenner, Major Hatch, Major Quentin, and Captain Rogers whose provinces were always indirectly affected by the state of the British relations with the Jubaland Somalis. The discussions centered round “as to the best means of restoring order at Afmadu, in such a manner as should be most effective and most economical in the long run.”

“The conclusion at which we arrived was that a strong post should be established with the least delay possible at some point on the shores of the Lake Deshek-Wama, either Loya, Hardarap, or Kurkurmez, all three of which are between fifty and sixty miles from Affmadu, that the present Indian garrison of the province, 440 strong, should be moved there, except fifty men to be kept at Yonte and fifty at Turki Hill, and that during the present rainy season, i.e., in about three weeks or a month's time, expedition, consisting of 150 Indian and fifty Soudanese, with a Maxim, should march from this advanced post on Afmadu, and occupy that place for about a fortnight, clearing the Ogadens out of the neighbourhood, capturing any cattle on which we could lay hands, and perhaps destroying as a lesson and indication of what we might do in future one or two of the numerous wells which render

Afmadu their favorite residence", it was noted.

Hardinge held a "*baraza*" in the morning of May 10, 1898 at which he informed the Elders of Kismayu and the Chiefs of the Herti Somalis of the (British) determination to occupy Affmadu, and warned the Herti Chiefs that if they withheld from the British for fear of the Ogadens any information as to the movements of the latter, they would be held responsible for any results prejudicial to the interests of the (British) Government which might ensure(sic) from their inaction, and, further any Herti cattle found among those of the Ogadens, which could not be shown to have been looted by the enemy (meaning the Ogadens), would be treated by the British as prize of war.

According to Hardinge the Hertis promised to support the (British) Government, and to give any information which reached them. "But", he said, "it is only natural that they should think more of their own cattle than of the interests of the Administration, and be reluctant to draw upon themselves the hostility of the Ogadens." Hardinge admitted: "The latter have hitherto, very wisely, only attacked those of the Hertis, who like the police killed at Yonte, were actually in the service of Government."

"Still it is necessary that the Hertis should take one side or another, and they have, under existing circumstances, if pressed, no alternative except to espouse ours", he added.

To suppress the Somali Movement that resisted the foreign occupation, the British authority had in the Province of Jubaland the following force:

440 Indians (of whom 310, 4th Bombay Rifles and 130, 27th Baluchistan Regiment), distributed between Turki Hill and Yonte; 240 African troops, of whom half at Kismayu, and the other half in Gosha.

Sir A.H. Hardinge said: "We have thus 680 men of all arms for dealing with Afmadu, and pacifying the Ogaden



FASCIST COLONIAL ARCH IN MOGADISHU

district.”*

Hardinge sent a telegram from Mombasa to Foreign Office, London, in which he informed:

“Regret to report that 26 men and one native officer of the party of 40, 4th Bombay Rifles, were killed in an ambush laid by Somalis near lake Wama on June 22nd largely owing to carelessness of native officer (groups evidently omitted) to march without swords fixed. Remainder retreated in good order inflicting some loss on enemy. Officer Commanding, 4th Bombay Rifles, asks for 400 more men to enable him to dislodge Somalis from Lake, which in view of present drought, it is hoped will insure their submission without occupation of Affmadu. Hatch and Crawford think so large increase of force

* Foreign Department, Letter N.141, dated Kismayu, the 10th May 1898-East Africa Confidential, NAI, New Delhi.

unnecessary, but in view of difficulty of protecting communication and transport, I am sending as authorised by Your Lordship four Indian Companies Uganda Rifles to occupy base in Jubaland and thus relieve whole force now in province for offensive operations. Uganda Rifles cannot proceed beyond Kikuyu for considerable time for lack of transport and will be more usefully employed guarding our base in Jubaland than in merely being encamped in Ukamba. Hope Somali affair will be over by time their transport is ready.”*

On July 15, 1924 a final Treaty was signed according to which Britain ceded to Italy the territory of Jubaland which took the name of “Oltre Giuba” (Beyond Juba) in accordance with the decree June 11, 1925.

At the end of the World War II, British took over the Somali territory, which was under Italian domination. In 1950, when former Italian Somaliland was placed under the United Nations Trusteeship for ten years, Italy was nominated as the Administering Authority.

THE KING’S VISIT TO SOMALIA


An important event in the history of the Italian Somaliland was the visit of the King of Italy from 3rd to 16th November 1934. The King, accompanied by his Minister of Colonies Signor De Bono arrived at Mogadishu on November 3, 1934 on board of the Royal Yacht “*Savoia*” escorted by two destroyers “*Gorizia*” and “*Niobe*”.

During the two weeks of his stay in Somalia, the King extensively toured the country. In Mogadishu, he drove by car to the Governor’s Palace where a triumphal arch had been built for the occasion of the visit, and attended a

* Foreign Department Proceedings- Secret E. October 1898, NAI, New Delhi.



MOSQUE OF GIAMA (FRONT VIEW) HAMARWEYNE, MOGADISHU



MOSQUE OF GIAMA (INSIDE) HAMARWEYNE, MOGADISHU

service at the Cathedral.

In the morning of November 4, the King reviewed the troops of the colony and took salute as the assembled troops marched past. There were said to have been 25,000 troops on parade including a large number of native tribes under their own chiefs. Afterwards the King visited the Mosque of Giama. He also inaugurated a new gymnasium, started a new electrical installation and visited the plant which supplies Mogadishu with water.

On November 5, the King visited the Village "Duca degli Abbruzzi" and there laid a wreath on the tomb of the Prince and inspected the work of the Italo-Somaliland Agricultural Company (SAIS). He went on to Afgoi where typical Somali dances were performed in his honour, and returned to Mogadishu the same evening. On November 6, the King left with a caravan of fifty cars for Belet Wein stopping over at Bulu Burti where he had lunch. The King and his party concluded the day with a Somali dance, performed by the Ascaris by torchlight.

Next day, the King motored on to Mustahil on the bank of the Webi Shebeli and only a short distance from the frontier with Abyssinia; he went to Morogovi where he spent the night. On November 9, the King was presented with 1,000 head of livestock and a large quantity of *dura* by the Oddur tribe. He caused these to be distributed to poorer tribes. Before leaving Morogovi he witnessed a native dance by this tribe. He went next to Lugh, stopping at Wegit on the way and reviewing the troops there including a camel battery.

From Lugh, the King went to Baidoa, which he left on November 12 for Merca, passing through Bur Hacaba and Audegle on the way. From Merca the King's caravan proceeded to Brava on November 13, and on the way made a stop over at Vittorio d'Africa (Shalambot), where the King reviewed some Fascist militia, ex-service men and colonialists. The king also visited on the way the colo-

nialisation scheme at Genale. He arrived at Brava in the evening.

Next day, November 14, the caravan continued southwards to Gelib where the King inspected the Government agricultural experimental station. The party then crossed the Juba; they motored down through Margherita (Giamama), which lies exactly on the equator, to Kismayu, where the King opened a hospital. He spent the night at Kismayu returning next day to Brava. On November 15, the King took part in an elephant hunt and is reported to have shot a fine tusker at a range of ten metres. On November 16, the King returned to Mogadishu and embarked the same day, sailing for the salt works of "Dante" (Hafun) in the evening.

After concluding his visit to the Italian Somaliland, the King of Italy, on his journey back home, called at Berbera, British Somaliland on November 21, 1934.

Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador in Rome, reporting to his Government on the King's visit to Somaliland said:

"... His tour gave the Italian press occasion to refer gracefully to the most recently acquired territory of the Colonial Empire and to the fact that it had been ceded by Great Britain. *The "Corriere della Sera"*, in particular, paid warm tribute to the friendly relations existing between British and Italian Somaliland.

"The authorities wished to advertise to the Italian people the existence and value of their most distant colony, which since it has figured less prominently in recent military history than the North African colonies, and is a less fertile territory than Eritrea, is not as well known as it deserves to be to the mass of the Italian people." The Ambassador, continued:

"It seems likely that Italy as a whole will now be able to take a more intelligent interest in the present dispute with Abyssinia over the frontier between that country and

Italian Somaliland. A lesser, but important, aim of the visit was no doubt to stimulate and reward the 1,700 Italians more or less permanently settled in Somaliland and who are doing good work in the face of very great difficulties.”

“When I was discussing this visit, a colleague who has special sources of information told me that a gold mine of considerable potential value had been discovered in Italian African territory, I believe in Somaliland. The greatest secrecy is, however, being preserved with regards to this discovery, and I can see no means at present of verifying the report.”

“In conclusion I may perhaps add that the following story is going around in Rome. The King is said to have wish to remain in Italian Somaliland since to see black people in white shirts was in such pleasant contrast to his daily practice in Rome,” added the British Ambassador with the proverbial touch of British humour.*

* Foreign Department, Nov. 1934, NAI, New Delhi.

Socotra and Dependencies

Description of the Island of Socotra:

The Island of Socotra lies about 150 miles off Cape Guardafui on the African Coast and five hundred miles from Aden. Its area is about 1,000 square miles; its population, mostly Bedouin, is about 5,000; its sovereignty is vested in the Chiefs or Elders of the Mehra, a tribe of Arabs residing at Kisseen on the Arab mainland. The island is mountainous but fertile and in some parts affords a healthy climate.

Phil Robinson in his book *Cyprus and Socotra*, published in London in 1878, suggests that the name Socotra may have been derived either from the Sanskrit words signifying "the Abode of Bliss," or from the Arabic, meaning, "Dragon's-blood." As to the chief products of the island, he wrote "the people themselves are spoken of as being subjects to the kings of the Incense Country.*

Describing the physical location and people of Socotra, he wrote, "The Island upon which the British flag has recently been hoisted, lies 148 miles east of Cape Guardafui (the most easterly point of the mainland of Africa) and directly therefore, in the route of ships from the Red Sea to India. From its position it should be able to

* Phil. Robinson, *Cyprus and Sokotra*, London, 1878.

command a large trade; and that, in turn, France, Portugal, and Turkey have contemplated its annexation proves that this fact has been recognised. It measures 82 miles in length and 20 miles in width, so that its area amounts to about 1600 square miles.”

Robinson made a sketch of the island which shows the closeness of the place to the mainland of Africa.

A Handbook prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office*, describes the geographical position of the Island as follows:

SOKOTRA is the most easterly, and by far the largest of a group of four islands under British protection which lie in the Indian Ocean to the east-north-east of Cape Guardafui. These islands command the ocean trade-route from the Suez Canal to the East and to Australasia.

Of the other three islands off Cape Guardafui Abd el-Kuri, the most westerly, is about 20 miles long and 3 1/2 miles wide at its widest part, while the other two, known as The Brothers (Darzi and Samneh), are respectively 3 miles and 6 1/2 miles in length and 1 mile and 3 miles in width.

Writing about the inhabitants, Robinson says: Beni, to the east of Tamarida, is the headquarters of a large population of Arabs and Bedouins and former are the mixed offspring of Arabs, *Hindustanis*, Somali Africans, and Portuguese half-castes, but preserve a certain common resemblance by speaking the same language, wearing the same dress, and professing the same debased form of Mohammedanism. The Bedouins, on the other hand, possess all the characteristics of a well-defined and separate community, and may be considered the aborigines of the island. They are divided into families, each occupying a defined area, and presided over by an elder,

* Foreign Office, BRITISH SOMALILAND and SOKOTRA, London, March 1919, page 12.

with whom nominally judicial authority rests. As a race, they may be described as comely, for the men are tall and well made, with curling, though not negroidal hair, and abundant beard, whiskers and moustaches, while the eyes, mouth and nose are all so well formed as to have given rise to the conjecture that they are of Jewish or European descent. The women are described as prepossessing, and often remarkably pretty, the complexion being generally maize-coloured, and the skin clear and soft. They adopted none of the habits of the Arabs,—the women, for instance, going unveiled—but they profess the Mohammedan religion, though observing none of its ritual nor any of its regulations, except that of circumcision.”*

Not only the British government but other European powers were interested in the acquisition of Socotra. The British diplomats watched with hawk eye any move by a rival power towards the island. The British Political Resident at Aden reported to his government that in October 1857 the Austrian Consul at Khartoum, accompanied by a Naval Officer, had left Massowah for Socotra. They were to wait there the arrival of the Austrian frigate which was to take possession of the Island. And in October 1859 Brigadier Coghlan reported the intention of the French to occupy “Socotra”. In September 1871, the Government of India requested information regarding Socotra, which the Italians proposed to occupy as a penal settlement. In his letter of January 27, referred earlier, Wedderburn said: “Last year the committee on the East African Slave trade suggested with reference to depots for freed slaves. As Aden is in our opinion unsuitable besides being too far removed from the cruising ground, we think that the chief of Socotra might be asked to allow us to establish a depot as well as a

* Phil Robinson, *Cyprus and Sokotra*, London: 1878, p. 44.

coaling station either there or at Ab-el-Kurray (Ab-el – kurray is mid way between Socotra and Cape Guardafui).

The British refused to allow any other power to take over Socotra as the Island was considered important entrance of the Gulf of Aden, almost on the direct route to and from India. The official answer of the Government of India to the Italian Government regarding the latter's desire to acquire possession of the Island of Socotra for establishing a penal colony therein, was: "It would, we conceive, be decidedly adverse to British interests were any European Power to establish itself in an island which lies so immediately on the direct line of communication to the East via the Suez Canal. Although among the Powers of Europe is none which we would more gladly welcome than Italy as a neighbour in the East, we cannot shut our eyes to the possibility that an island which, once occupied, would be converted by Italian enterprise into a valuable Marine Station, might eventually fall into the hands of another nation less surely bound to England by ties of long friendship and common interest."

The British claimed that they themselves had no intention of establishing a station on the island which their force had occupied in 1835. But they were not prepared to assent to its being occupied by another power. The First British officer to occupy Socotra was Captain R.A. Bayley, of the 5th Native Infantry, Command(ant) at Socotra, who arrived there on May 1, 1835. He brought in with him a quantity of rafters for the erection of the temporary barracks proposed to be erected for the men and quarters for the officers. He informed his Government that "in consequence of the great sickness and mortality which has, and still exists amongst the detachment, there being at the present instant only 1 *Havildar* (Sergeant), 1 *Naique* (Corporal), and 7 *Sepoys* (Soldiers) for duty, and that small number even not efficient men, from having been more or less affected by fever."

In the year 1833, when the project for overland communication between India and the Continent of Europe was in its infancy, the (British) Government in India considered that the opening up of steam communication between Calcutta and the Red Sea hinged on the possession by it of a secure coal depot on the Island of Socotra. Accordingly the Bombay (British) Government was asked to report what arrangements should be made to procure the desired object, and whether it would be necessary for the British Government to take over the entire island, and, if so, what pecuniary compensation should be given to its owners in the event of such a demand being made.

The British Government deputed Captain Ross of the Indian Navy on a mission to Socotra. He concluded an agreement dated Kisseen the 28th March 1834 with Sultan Ahmed Ben Sultan of Fartash and his cousin, Sultan Ben Amar of Kisseen, the "two persons having authority over Socotra." The agreement ran as follows:

"First.- The said Sultans do promise and agree to the British Government landing and storing on any part of the sea-coast of the Island of Socotra any quantity of coals or other articles which may be sent now or hereafter from the British Government of India to be deposited on the Island.

"Secondly.- Captain Daniel Ross on the part of His Excellency the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General do promise that there shall be no interference with the laws and customs of the Island of Socotra, or with the interior of the island, or shall the inhabitants of such parts where the coals are deposited be ill-treated by the English vessels visiting the island with the coals." (Appendix Twenty-Six)

After concluding the agreement Captain Ross left Kisseen for Socotra landing at the latter place some five tons of coal and an Agent of the Bengal Steam Company. Captain Ross requested the Bombay Government that,

“unless there were insuperable objections, an early opportunity might be taken to depute a qualified officer to negotiate the purchase of the island, if it could be obtained from the Chief of Kisseen on reasonable terms.” It appeared from Captain Ross’s report that the island was admirably adapted for promoting the object of steam navigation in the Red Sea as well as possessed natural advantage which rendered its easy occupation.

“There are reasons,” Ross wrote “which from the position of Socotra render the acquisition of this island very desirable altogether independent of the facilities it would afford for steam navigation.”

It would appear from the reply of the Bombay Government that had the business been effected at the time of Captain Ross’s visit, the island could have been bought for two thousand crowns. But as a result of the visit, the Kisseen family attached additional importance to their Socotrian possessions. It was estimated, therefore, that the Chiefs would not abandon their rights in the island for a sum less than from fifteen to twenty thousand rupees.

One Sultan Abdoolla had visited the depot at Tamareed and had threatened to take the life of the Agent and to burn the place unless he received some money. He was quieted with a gift of fifteen dollars. Referring to this incident, Ross remarked:

“The inhabitants are apparently well disposed, and I have reason to believe would rejoice in being placed under our Government, but insecurity must attend all property lodged on Socotra so long as a discontented member of the family may offer a like interruption.”

The family or tribe of El Afreer, to which the present Sultan of Kisseen and Socotra belongs, has enjoyed the supremacy over, and in respect of the Mehras for a long period. Its representative is still acknowledged by the whole people, subsequently explained Lieut. Col. S.B. Miles, British Political Agent and Consul in Muskat on

October 2, 1875. He wrote: "The Afreer tribe is a very small one, only numbering about twenty members. Sultan Saad's mother is a native of Socotra, but Salim and Isa are by Mehra mothers."

On January 19, 1839 Aden fell into hands of the British Government and consequently all anxiety for a coal depot on Socotra vanished.

In July 1871 the Italian Minister at the Court of St. James quite confidently and without making a formal application asked Lord Granville whether there would be any objection on the part of the British Government to the acquisition by the Italian Government of the Island of Socotra. The Italian, he said, wanted to establish a penal colony on the island. The British Resident at Aden and the Bombay Government were both averse to the occupation of Socotra by the Italians. Therefore, the British government's answer to the Italian request was : "The Bombay Government was "not prepared to assent to its being occupied by another power."

As there were activities of Turkey and Egypt on the African Coast, the British Consul at Aden proposed that Britain should open negotiations with the Sultan of Kisheen, with a view to bind him not to sell, transfer, or allow a foreign Power to settle on the island without the consent of the British Government.

The British Political Agent and Governor of Aden John William Schneider believed that it should not be presumed that the Egyptian would stop short at Cape Guardafui, if the Khedive's claim to the African Coast from Suez to the Cape was admitted. He thought it might be expedient to be prepared for such an event as far as Socotra was concerned. He was of the opinion that it would be necessary to offer a larger sum than 2,000 dollars to the Sultan of Kisheen and Socotra.*

* Foreign Department, From Bombay Government, No. 7891 dated 28th December 1874, NAI, New Delhi.

On January 23, 1876, the British Government concluded an Agreement with the Sultan of Socotra . Under the Agreement the Sultan pledged himself and his heirs never to secede or sell or mortgage or otherwise give the Island, or any of its dependencies or neighboring islands for occupation to any other nation save to the British Government. In return, the Sultan received from the British official an immediate payment of 3000 dollars. He and his heirs were to further receive a yearly subsidy of 360 dollars. The subsidy imposed on the Sultan and his heirs an obligation to render assistance to any vessel, whether belonging to the British or any other nation that may be wrecked on the shores of Socotra or its dependencies or neighboring islands. For such assistance the Sultan and his heirs were to be given suitable rewards. (Appendix Twenty-Seven)

The Agreement did not completely satisfy the British government. It wanted a more firmer commitment from the Sultan. The Earl of Kimberley sent the following secret telegram on March 26, 1886 to the Viceroy of India:

“Foreign Office suggests steps for securing firmer hold over Socotra.

“Looking to recent German proceedings, it would be unsafe to trust existing engagements with Sultan.

“I think Aden Resident should be instructed to propose to Sultan additional protectorate Article. Do you concur? Reply at once.”

The Earl of Kimberley did not wait for the reply from the Viceroy and sent a Secret and Very Confidential telegram to the Aden Resident, Brigadier-General Hogg:

“SOCOTRA. Treaty with Sultan does not appear to afford sufficient security against apprehended designs of other Powers on island. We therefore think it important that Sultan should agree to additional Article, placing himself and successors under British protection as in case of Somali tribes, and I desire that you will lose no time in

taking steps for this purpose. You should explain to Sultan that this does not imply any intention on our part to interfere with him more than hitherto. Keep proceedings as secret as possible.”

In 1886, Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener drew up a note on the subject of the lines of British Communication in the Indian Ocean. On Socotra, he said: “One of the most important points on our communications with our Australian colonies is Socotra and the adjacent island of Abd-el-Kuri.

“Every ship to or from those colonies must pass close to these islands, which will, in all probability, from their position, form the coaling station and depot on that route, when the Australian trade becomes more extended.” He added: “Our present hold on Socotra is very fragile. A treaty exists with the supposed Sultan, who lives on the main land, and never visits the island, specifying that he will not part with his rights to any foreign power other than England. Our flag was at one time flying on the island, but was hauled down, thereby showing that we gave up any pretensions to the possession of the island. From all that is known there appear to be no laws, nor any recognized authority, and no form of existing government in Socotra.” ... “It would not, therefore, be very difficult for any foreign power to deny the authority of the chief recognized by us, and to acquire rights under other treaties with unknown chiefs in the island.” He contended “Owing to the recent development of colonial enterprise by Germany on the East Coast of Africa, the possession of Socotra becomes to them a matter of considerable importance. Attempts have lately been made by Germany to acquire some position on the Somali coast, and as these attempts fail, as they apparently have done up to the present, Germany will see the necessity of taking a commanding position on the trade route to their new colonial possessions thus invitingly left open.”

“Should such a case arise, it is most unlikely that we should fight for or even risk war for the possession of Socotra, and yet, in foreign hands, the island becomes a source of considerable danger to our colonial development, and England would be rightly accused by the colonies if she allows such a position to fall through negligence into other hands.” He concluded by pleading that “the British flag be again hoisted on Socotra and the adjacent islands.*

Kitchener’s statement irritated Governor Schneider. Strongly disagreeing with Kitchener, he wrote in his memo: “Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener’s remarks, in respect of Socotra and its dependencies, (and) the adjacent islands, have apparently been written under some misapprehension. It is true that the Sultan of Socotra resides chiefly on the mainland opposite the island, that is to say, at Kisheen on the Arabian coast; but he is represented at Socotra by one or more of his sons, who rule there in his name.

“When I concluded the existing treaty or arrangement at Kisheen with the Sultan early in the year 1876, (Appendix Twenty-Seven) he had then three sons living on the island, the eldest being considered as Regent. The yearly subsidy of \$300 is payable at Socotra, and reference to my report will, I think, show that I laid great stress on the necessity of the island being visited annually by an officer from the Aden Residency, in order that our interest and connection with the place should not be lessened. The very nature of the treaty or arrangement will prove that the British flag was never hoisted at Socotra, and consequently it could not have been hauled down. The erroneous idea on the subject entertained by Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener may have been derived from a historical sketch published by “Phil. Robinson” in the year 1878, where it is mentioned, “the island of Socotra upon

* Foreign Department, H.H. Kitchener, Lieut.-Col. Zanzibar, 22nd December 1885, NAI, New Delhi.

which the British flag has recently been hoisted lies 148 miles east of Cape Guardafui (the most easterly point of the mainland of Africa).”*

According to Phil. Robinson, the Island of Sokotra became interesting only from the date at which it first attracted the attention of the British. In 1834, it seemed desirable to possess a coaling station en route between Suez and India, and while one party carefully surveyed the Arabian coast for a suitable situation, another made a thorough exploration of Sokotra. The result was the commencement of negotiations for the sale of the island, but the Sheikh of Keshin refused to part with his domains. “As sure as there is but one God, and he is in heaven, I will not sell so much,” said, he, making a span with his fingers; “this island was a gift of the Almighty to the Mehras, and has descended from our forefathers to their children, over whom I am Sultan.”

In an account of the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean and their inhabitants, by Duarte Barbosa and completed about the year 1518 A.D., it is said that there are three islands, one large and two small between the Cape Fartaque and the Cape Guardafui. “The two smaller islands seem to be ‘Abdal-Kuri, or ‘Abdal-Karim, as Bent calls it, which are not far from Cape Guardafui, and the group of “The Brothers”, nearer to Socotra.”

Henri Yule and Henri Cordier in their work *Ser Marco Polo* have stated that “...The Island (Socotra) was under the King of the Incense Country.” Despite the clear evidence to the contrary, Britain always insisted the island to be under the rule of the Sultan of Kiseen, of the Coast of Hadramut in Arabia and ignored its connection with the mainland Africa, i.e. Somaliland. The Sultan’s

* Foreign Department, Memo dated 8, Queensborough Terrace, 23rd February 1886. S.E. 348-349-350, September 1886. NAI, New Delhi, India.

supremacy was merely nominal. With the capture of Aden in 1839, Britain secured a far more valuable coaling station and Socotra lost its value in this respect.

At that time, one of the British officers at the India Office, who signed with initials C.U.A., in a K.W. Secret proceedings, September 1871, Nos.27-29, said:

“As we have no rights or interests in the island, and as we have no power to prevent the Italian Government from making a settlement on it, it is just as well to admit gracefully what we cannot prevent. We have far less to fear from its occupation by Italy than by many other powers that might occupy it if so disposed. I think therefore the Secretary of State might be told that the Indian Government have no objections to offer to the formation of a penal settlement on Socotra by the Italian Government.”

But in the end the Officer, signing with the initial H.LeP W. issued the following order:

Council Order

DESPATCH to go to Secretary of State, expressing a strong opinion that British interests would be prejudiced if the Island of Socotra were to fall into the hands of any European power.

(Sd.) H.LeP W.

In 1886, the Resident at Aden was instructed to make arrangements for the conclusion of an Article with the Sultan additional to the Treaty of 1876, placing the Sultan and his successors under British protection as in the case of the Easa and other Somali tribes.

The British Government appointed Brigadier General A. G. F. Hoggs, the Political Agent at Aden, to conclude the treaty. Under the treaty British extended protection to the Island of Socotra and its dependencies and the Sultan in turn promised to refrain from entering into any correspondence or agreement or treaty with any foreign power except with the knowledge and sanction of the

British Government. Socotra was required to bring to the notice of the Political Resident at Aden or any British officer attempt by any foreign power to interfere with the Island and its dependencies. The treaty was to come into effect from the date on which it was signed. i. e., April 23, 1886. (Appendix Twenty-Eight)

Northern Frontier Districts and Djibouti

Prof. S. Samatar wrote in his book, *“Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism”*.*

“It need be observed that by 1898, the year of the inception of the Somali resistance struggle, the main spheres of the three European powers and Ethiopia were tentatively demarcated, though their boundaries were ill-defined, especially those between Britain and Ethiopia on the one hand and Italy and Ethiopia on the other. The Somali peninsula, one of Africa’s few homogeneous regions, was divided into mini lands—into a British Somaliland, a French Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland, an Ethiopian Somaliland, and what came to be known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. The unrealistic and opportunistic character of the partition of the Somalis was to prompt Lord Rennell Rodd, who served as the Britain’s Ambassador to Rome, to observe ruefully decades later, ‘If we had been interested enough... (and if the world had been sensible enough), all the Somalis ... might have remained under our administration ... But the

* S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism*, p. 92, Professor of History at Rutgers University.

world was not sensible enough, and we were not interested enough, and so the only part of Africa which is radically homogeneous has ... been split into such ... parts as made Caesar's Gaul the problem and cockpit of Europe for the last two thousand years. And Somaliland will probably become a cockpit of East Africa.'

In fact, Rodd was the same person who as the Representative of Her Majesty the Queen had signed with Emperor Menelek II the Treaty of May 14, 1897, according to which the British Government handed over a large part of the Somali territory to Abyssinia

To decide the future status of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) which was under the British rule together with Kenya, an independent Commission "to investigate public opinion" was appointed by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, The Right Honourable Duncan Sandys, MP, on October 5, 1962. The Commission was composed of two members: A Nigerian Judge, G.C.M. Onyuke and a Canadian Major General, M.P. Bogert..

The Fact-finding Commission which toured the territory had extensive talks with the population of the region from October 22 to November 26, 1962 and presented to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a 34-page report entitled "Kenya-Report of the Northern Frontier District". The Secretary of State for the Colonies presented it to the British Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty in December 1962.

According to the Report, the Commission also met a delegation of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) headed by the late Jomo Kenyatta. The principal speakers were Kenyatta and T.J. Mboya. Kenyatta strongly supported the retention of the NFD as part of Kenya and said that he favoured it becoming a region under the Kenya regional system. He stated that as there were many supporters of KANU in the NFD he had a right to speak on their behalf.

The Report said: "Mr. Mboya contended that Somali opinion was divided as to the best future government" But the Commission Members said in their Report: "We did not in fact find any evidence of this in the NFD".

Summary:

"75. In an effort to establish public opinion as to the future government of the Northern Frontier District, it has been considered area by area. As has already been stated, we found that opinion is often unanimous over a wide area, particularly where this is the grazing area of a single tribe. It was apparent that opinions were influenced by religion, ethnic affiliation and way of life. Consolidating the findings already set out by districts, we can define three kinds of area: areas supporting the Somali Opinion, area supporting the Kenya Opinion and area of mixed opinion.

76. The areas in which we found the people supporting the Somali Opinion are the biggest in total population and size and are in fact one. They extend from the Somali frontier to the Somali-Galla Line and beyond, to include the grazing lands of the Adjuran. We found that the people there almost unanimously favour the secession from Kenya of the NFD, when Kenya attains independence, with the object of ultimately joining the Somali Republic, but they want the NFD to have a period under British authority in which to build up its machinery of government so that it can join the Somali Republic as a self-governing unit.

77. This is the Somali Opinion as expressed to us verbally and is based on the premise that there can be no question of secession before Kenya gets independence. The Somali Opinion as expressed in the written memorandum submitted by almost all supporters of the Somali view is somewhat different. This memorandum requests that union of the NFD with the Somali Republic should take place contemporaneously with the granting of

Kenya's independence, that the establishment of a legislative assembly for the NFD should take place before and not after Kenya's independence, and that the secession of the NFD from Kenya should take place immediately. The written memorandum was obviously prepared by some central authority and we consider that it is less personal than the opinions expressed verbally.

78. The areas supporting the Kenya Opinion we found to be grazing lands of the Gabbra in Marsabit District, of the non-Moslem Boran in Moyale District and the Reverine Tribes on the banks of the Tana in Garissa District. Here the people wish to remain part of Kenya and to participate in its constitutional development.

79. Although the Gabbra and Boran have close affiliations with Ethiopian tribes, no suggestion was made in verbal statements that Ethiopia has any concern with the problems under consideration and in fact, such a suggestion only appeared very briefly in one of the written memoranda.

80. The areas of mixed opinion we found to be Moyale Township and the grazing area of the Sakyue to the east as far as the Boran-Adjuran Line, Marsabit Township, Isiolo District, Garissa Township, and the grazing area of the Orma south and west of the Tana River.

81. We noted that the division of opinion almost exactly corresponds to the division between Moslem and Non-Moslem.

82. It is apparent that in this division of opinion mention has been made of neither the Gelubba nor the Rendille. The Gelubba are not mentioned because we do not consider that these people have a coherent opinion as to the future government of the NFD. The opinions we received from the leaders of the Rendille we are not prepared to accept as an accurate reflection of the opinion of the people.

83. We understand that 90 per cent of the Rendille are

pagan, and that, although their language bears some resemblance to Somali, their dress and customs are different and have in fact, more in common with those of the Samburu and the Masai. In view of these differences it seemed strange that they should want to join the Somali Republic but when taxed with this, the Rendille Chief insisted that their customs are like those of the Somali and not those of the Samburu and Masai, he did not mention religion, perhaps the most significant point. We understand that traditionally the Rendille have lived in harmony with the Gabbra, although recently they have quarrelled seriously over grazing rights. But, whether or not this quarrel has caused a serious break, we cannot believe that Rendille people, who have no direct contact with the Somali, genuinely want to join the Somali Republic. The difference in religion between the Rendille and the Somali reinforced this belief. We do not wish to imply that the Rendille necessarily support the opposite view, but simply that we do not accept their opinion as given.

84. Apart from the case of the Rendille, we believe that we have obtained a true picture of public opinion as to the future government of the Northern Frontier District.

Dated this 7th day of December 1962.

G.C.M. Onyiuke (Sigd), Member

M.P. Bogert (Sigd), Member.

P.A.G. Field (Sgd), Secretary*

Prof. I.M. Lewis, an Anthropologist and expert on the Somali Affairs wrote:**

“The Commission found that the Somali who they estimated made up 62 per cent of the NFD’s population ‘almost unanimously’ favoured secession from Kenya with the object of ultimately joining the Somali Republic”. He

* Ref. Kenya—Report of the Northern Frontier District, London, 1962.

** I.M. Lewis, “The Modern History of Somaliland”, 1965.

added, "At last, in March 1963, it fell to Mr. Duncan Sandys, the new British Colonial Secretary, to announce his Government's decision. To the satisfaction of the Nairobi and Addis Ababa governments, but to the chagrin of the Somalis, this was that the NFD was to be brought into Kenya's regional constitution. A new, predominantly Somali Northern-Eastern Region was to be created in which Somalis would enjoy the same degree of local autonomy as had already been accorded elsewhere in Kenya's other six Regions".

In the year 1897, Britain placed the Western Somali territory under the Abyssinian colonialism and in 1963 it placed the NFD under the Kenyan colonialism and still in 1967 it passed the Socotra Island and its dependencies to the then South Yemen administration.

The British decision to give the NFD to Kenya was contrary not only to the wishes of the Somali population in the territory but also against the result of the referendum conducted by the so-called "independent Commission" which Britain itself had appointed.

The people in the Somali Republic demonstrated against the decision and demanded that the Government sever diplomatic ties with Britain and the Prime Minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, had no alternative but to table a motion in the Parliament to that effect. Diplomatic relations between the Somali Republic and Britain were broken off on 12 March 1963. Although the reason for which they were broken off remained, the relations between the two countries were restored in 1967.

BRITISH AND ABYSSINIA MISS DJIBOUTI

The Colonial Powers divided the Continent of Africa between themselves as a piece of cake during the Scramble for Africa. The main players in those years were Britain, France, Portugal, Italy and Germany. But soon,

in 1891, a Black Power emerged on the scene that also wanted to have a slice of the cake. The Abyssinia's so-called "The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Menelek II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia" wrote a Circular letter to the Heads of European States in which he stated among other things:

"Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian island in a sea of pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator".

Besides giving to each other territories in their own interests, the colonialists could also exchange other peoples' territories between themselves. According to the British, Djibouti was the key to the political situation not only in Abyssinia but also in Somaliland, Jubaland and on the Sudan frontiers. An official of the British Legation in Addis Ababa Wilfred G. Thesiger, reported in 1914 that so long as it (Djibouti) was held by the French, it would be used mainly as an arms depot from which to flood the interior with rifles and ammunition, whereas in British hands it would have a direct political influence on the future of Abyssinia and would insure the peace and safety of the frontier districts. He argued: "It is thus evident that the mischievous effects of the arms traffic, which depends solely on Jibuti for its center, touches every portion of British territory adjoining Abyssinia and, as I reported in January 1914, I can see no prospect of any amelioration in the situation unless we can persuade France to exchange French Somaliland for territory elsewhere."

Speaking about the British Somaliland, Thesiger said that the authorities appear to have the situation well in hand, adding: "a continuation of this satisfactory state of affairs must depend on our capacity to keep the Mullah from renewing on any large scale his supplies of rifles and cartridges, but our power in this respect is terribly

limited and, in reality the whole problem turns on the quantities available in this country and on the attitude of the Abyssinians.”

“As regards the relations between the Abyssinians and the Mullah”, the British Official wrote, “the situation, owing to the very pronounced Moslem sympathies of Lij Yasu, has become decidedly worse of late and threatens, if one can judge by recent exchanges of presents and professions of friendship.”

Thesiger said in his Confidential letter dated January 1, 1914: “As all efforts, whether made through the French Legation, the Jibuti authorities, or in Paris have hitherto proved unsuccessful, and the question has now assumed such important proportions, I would venture to ask whether it would not be possible either by purchase or by exchange of territory to buy out French interests in this country.

“I would therefore put forward the question whether by exchange—say, for Gambia, or other territory in another part of Africa— it would not be possible for us to take over French Somaliland with the French reversionary interests in Abyssinia. By so doing we would destroy the arms traffic at its source; find a certain solution for the Somaliland question within three years by cutting off the supply from which the Mullah obtains rifles and cartridges .”*

Had this proposal been approved, Djibouti would have been another British Somaliland. But there is no way of knowing whether Britain would have annexed Djibouti to British Somaliland or it would have given the territory to Abyssinia as it did in the case of Ogaden. Considering that the suggestion originated from the British Legation Official, Wilfred Thesiger, who was very sympathetic to the Abyssinians, Djibouti might have been given to the

* Thesiger's Memorandum was attached to his despatch n. 34 of March 16, 1916, Foreign Department, NAI, New Delhi.

Abyssinians, as they needed a seaport rather badly.

In 1891 the British Embassy in Rome forwarded to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, a telegram that the Italian Government had received from their Consul in Aden. The telegram stated that “A large caravan with important Abyssinian personages has arrived at Ras Jibuti. There is continued talk of the cession of the port of Jibuti to Menelek. Lagarde is expected at Obokh on the 24th instant, it is said, with instructions to treat, respecting the cession of Jibuti, with the Abyssinian Chieftains.”

In his letter forwarding the telegram, the British Ambassador in Rome,* wrote that the Marquis di Rudini, the Italian Foreign Minister, “mentioned that the Italian Agent at Aden was a very reliable officer, and unlikely to be led away by a mere rumour.”**

The idea put forward by Wilfred Thesiger in his despatch No.3 of January 1, 1914, was not approved by the British Government. As reported by the British official, the talk on the same scheme—arrangement between Great Britain and France to exchange French Somaliland for territory on the West Coast of Africa—was also heard directly from the Governor of Djibuti.

Africa was treated like spoils to be distributed among European Powers who shared common colonial interest. In this scramble for Africa and Africans, it was the Somalis who suffered most. First they suffered as the result of European occupation and then again when they were handed over to Black colonialists (Ogaden was given to Abyssinia or present-day Ethiopia, the NFD to Kenya and Socotra Island to Yemen). This phase of suffering still continues for the Somalis.

* Foreign Department, No. 145-A, dated Rome, September 21, 1891 (Confidential), NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, Secret, No. 44, December 1891, NAI, New Delhi.

In the 1960s while most African countries celebrated their independence from European domination there were many others which continued to remain under the tutelage of African colonial rule. A year after the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the leaders of those African countries which were given territories beyond their own by the colonial powers, thought it fit to legalise their possessions. This they did by introducing at the Summit of the Heads of State of the Organisation held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1964, the following resolution: "The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its First Ordinary Session in Cairo, UAR, from 17 to 21 July 1964:

CONSIDERING that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension,

CONSCIOUS of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African States,

CONSIDERING FURTHER that the borders of African States on the day of their independence constitute a tangible reality.

RECALLING the establishment in the course of the Second Ordinary Session of the Council of the Committee of Eleven charged with studying further measures for strengthening African Unity,

RECOGNIZING the imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework, all disputes between African States,

RECALLING FURTHER that all member States have pledged, under Article VI of the Charter of African Unity, to respect scrupulously all principles laid down in paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity,

1. SOLEMNLY reaffirms the strict respect by all Member States of the Organization for the principles laid down in paragraph 3 Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity;

2. SOLEMNLY declares that all Member States existing on their achievement of national independence.”

The First Preamble of this Resolution states that “border problems constitutes a grave and permanent factor of dissension” and as such those Heads of State who attended the Cairo Summit should have considered immediate steps to correct the wrongs done to the countries who became victims of arbitrary creation of the artificial boundaries by the Colonial Powers.

The Second Preamble states “Conscious of the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African States”.

In fact the so-called Founding Fathers of the Organisation of African Unity should have realised that what they were persuaded to legalise was what the colonialists left behind with the purpose of letting the Africans fight each other over borders after independence. Of course, the African Heads of State referred to in the second sub-section of the Preamble to “...the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African States”. But instead of mending and rejecting the “dividing manoeuvres”, the Founding Fathers of the OAU referring to the infamous artificial borders created by the colonial powers, said “the borders of African States on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality”.

It was the most dangerous resolution that an organisation aspiring for the unity of its continent and the welfare of its people could ever adopt. In fact, it is the most divisive and war mongering document.

At the time of independence, some African countries had portions of their territories and peoples under their neighbours and for those population which were cut off from their own lands continue to suffer, only this time it is under black domination. No matter how long it might take, the justice will definitely prevail.

In 1950, the United Nations, which was supposed to

be the supporter of the independence of people under colonial rule and the advocate of the human rights, did not allow Eritreans to exercise their right to self-determination, instead the UN decided that Eritrea was to be a part of the Ethiopian Empire. For the Eritreans their struggle for independence only came to an end in 1993.

It took the Eritreans forty-one years, a lot of sacrifice and bloodshed to achieve their goal. Eritrea succeeded in breaking the chain of colonialism by sheer force and determination, and neither Art. 3 (Para 3) of the OAU Charter (Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence) nor the Cairo Declaration of 1964 (All Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence) could prevent them to secede from Ethiopia.

The Eritrean experience should be lesson for all those who practice injustice against fellow human beings. Sooner or later the people who suffer under colonial rule—either African or other colonialists—like the people in the Ogaden, Socotra and NFD, are bound to liberate themselves from the evil and abhorrent domination of colonialism.

The Eritrean case is a practical example of the failure of the unrealistic documents of the OAU. As such these documents were meant only to suffocate the victims of the colonial injustice. The Eritrean people succeeded in demonstrating the invalidity of what the OAU Charter calls “sovereignty and territorial integrity” by declaring its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. On May 12, 1998, a border war again erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia claimed that “Eritrea carried an aggression on Ethiopia and occupied its territory”. On its part the Eritrean government claimed that the territory it occupied was, in fact, within its border as that existed

during the European colonial rule. Eritrea refused to recognise the border which the OAU's Cairo Declaration calls "...borders existing on their achievement of national independence."

It is a pity that we Africans do not realise that these boundaries were drawn by the colonial powers who had the power of manipulating the continent in a way that served their interest. The reasons for creating these artificial boundaries between African countries, the awarding of territories in an arbitrary fashion, could be described as economical, religious and political. However the central purpose of this kind of exercise was to create areas of continued and permanent conflict. It is like a time-bomb.

We are doing exactly what the colonialists wanted us to do—fight each other. African leaders avoid discussing matters relating to their borders. Most of them say that "Africa will explode, if we touch this problem." They are afraid of facing reality. Like an ostrich, they bury their heads in the sand and when a border war takes place, they support the stronger party which not necessarily has the legitimate claim. According to these leaders might is right. They evoke the OAU Charter and Cairo Resolution to suppress the rights of legitimate claimants.

The Resistance

On November 26, 1896, Somalis under Italy rebelled against the administration and massacred Commissioner Cecchi, ten Officers, five civilians and seventy Askaris (local soldiers) at Lafole, twenty km from Mogadishu. The struggle of the Somalis continued and spread. All the tribe of Bimal (Suleiman, Daud, Jasmin) openly rebelled against the colonial administration and vehemently opposed any accord with the Italian authority. Thousands of the Bimal cut the communications with Mogadishu and blocked the transit of caravans, killing any one who came out of the settlement.

The other Italian officers and civilians killed in the Lafole battle included Officers Santifelice, Baraldi and the maestro of the *Volturno* house as well as Gasparini, Barone, De Cristofaro, and Commander Mongiardini, Signor Quirighetti, Eng. Olivieri, Guzolini, Medical officer Smuraglia, Commander Maffei and Assistant Stoker Rolfo and many Somali Askaris (local police).


On February 12, 1897, at 14:00 hours, the Colonial Resident in Merca, Trevis was stabbed to death by a Somali, who posed himself as a begger. This was not an accident but rather a well planned attack on the colonial

officers in the country. Infact, an Italian eye-witness, Difatti l'Aghida testified:

“I was at the Custom; when I saw Mr. Trevis coming down. I went to him and reached him when he just jumped down from the seat on which he was carried by porters. I shook his hand and accompanied him, placing me on his left hand side. I could not see the assassin before he hit; as soon as I realised, I pulled out my sword and hit him, first on the head and then on the neck, forcing him immediately (to) fall down. Signor Trevis was escorted by six Suwahili askaris, two in front and four in the back. The Suwahili (guards) thought that the man, who was crouching on the beach, was a begger (meskin) who wanted to kiss the Resident's hand, and let him move closer, having the attitude of asking alms!...”*

In December 1903, in Mogadishu, while Sapelli was the Governor, a European was stabbed to death. In Merca, the hostility increased as more and more, particularly religious people, preached oppositin against the colonial government's action. Governor Sapelli dismissed the Somalis whom he thought were not responding to the need of the service and started employing new *askaris* for the Guard Corp of Benadir, which was established in April 1904.

* Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di S.M./Ufficio Storico: SOMALIA Vol.I, Dalle Origini al 1914, p. 274.



THE BATTLE OF DANANE ON 10 FEBRUARY 1907

THE MOVEMENT OF SAYID MOHAMED

In the British Somaliland, in the middle of 1899, when the Consul-General Hayes Sadler returned from Zaila, he found conflicting reports in Berbera regarding the activities of a *mullah* by the name of Haji Muhamed Abdullah, in the Dolbahanta country. These reports stated that Abdullah was collecting arms and men with the goal of establishing his authority over the south-eastern portion of the protectorate. Referring to the rumours, the Consul-General told his government, "that it was his... ultimate object, should he find himself strong enough, to head a religious expedition against the Abyssinians."

In a long report addressed to the Marquis of Salisbury from Berbera dated April 12, 1899, Sadler wrote: "This Haji Muhammad Abdullah belongs to the Habr Suleiman Ogaden tribe; he married into the Dolbahanta Aligherry, amongst whom he now lives. His place of residence is Kob Fardod, a village inhabited by Mullahs, a day's march east of Kerit, and distant about 170 miles from Berbera. He is a man in the prime of life, and in person is described as dark-coloured, tall, and thin, with a small goat's beard. He has made several pilgrimages to Mecca during the last three years. At Mecca he attached himself to the sect of Mohammad Salih, whose deputy he claims to be in Somaliland."

Sadler told London that "this sect was established in Berbera about twelve years ago. It preaches more regularly in the hour of prayer, stricter attention to the forms of religion, and the interdiction of Kat—a leaf the Arabs and coast Somalis are much addicted to chewing on account of its strengthening and intoxicating properties. This teaching has not found much favour with the people of the town. It has been known for some time that the Haji had acquired considerable influence over the

Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the remoter parts of the Protectorate, but hitherto it had always been thought that this influence had been exerted for good; he settled disputes amongst the tribes in his vicinity, kept them from raiding each other, and was generally thought to be on the side of law and order. Several communications had passed between him and the Vice-Consul (Berbera), all written in proper terms, and three months ago he sent a prisoner into Berbera, against whom a complaint had been laid of robbery and violence in the interior."

Sadler said: "Inquiries were at once set on foot to ascertain what the rumours and reports concerning this individual meant, on what they were founded, and what his possible intentions might be. The result, and his own communications made within the last few days to the Vice-Consul, leave no room to doubt but that he is now organizing a religious movement antagonistic to the Administration."

Informing Lord Salisbury of the facts that brought this Mullah prominently to his notice, Sadler wrote: "In the middle of February last, Ahmed Muhammad, who had just been made a Stipendiary Akil in the place of his father, Muhammad Shermarki, deceased, signalized his accession to office by heading a raid by his tribe, the Habr Yunis Mussa Arrah, on some camels belonging to the Mullah and his people. As soon as news of this raid reached me a party of the Camel Corps was sent out to intercept the raiders. This was successfully done, Ahmed Muhammad being brought into Berbera from 60 miles off with over sixty raided camels. These were returned to the Mullah, who wrote a civil letter of thanks, adding that there were more camels to be returned, and hoping they would be sent. In the meanwhile, the Mullah collected a force from the Dolbahanta and moved against the Habr Yunis. He was written to and told that as his camels had

been recovered for him there was no necessity to proceed against the Habr Yunis, and that he should return to his country. There was then no reason to suppose that he was actuated by any desire (other) than that of recovering his raided animals. In the Habr Yunis country, however, he was joined by Madar Hirsi, the rival of Sultan Nur for the Sultanship of the Habr Yunis, and his party.

“The story of Madar Hirsi is a long one. Suffice it to say that he and his cousin, Nur, were both claimants for the Sultanship of the Habr Yunis. Eventually the matter was decided by the tribe by casting lots—Nur won, and was acknowledged as Sultan by the Coast Authorities in 1895—Madar Hirsi, who had received 100 sheep from Nur as compensation, acquiescing in Nur’s election. Since then Madar Hirsi has refused to acknowledge Nur, has made fresh claims to the Sultanate, and drawn off a portion of the tribe to his side. The matter by (sic) itself is unimportant, as neither Nur nor Madar Hirsi have any real authority over the Habr Yunis, who look to us as their Sultan; but it has a bearing on the present question, as it has afforded Haji Muhammad Abdullah an opportunity of extending his influence and of interfering in the affairs of a tribe with which he had no previous concern.

“Taking Madar Hirsi and his followers with him, the Mullah returned to Burao, still in the Habr Yunis country, and close to the Habr Toljaala border, and having halted there some days, he finally left for Kob Fardod about the 19th March.” Continuing his account, Sadler further wrote, “It was whilst he was at Burao that the first reports of the new attitude he has assumed reached us. Information came that he had proclaimed Madar Hirsi Sultan of the Habr Yunis in place of Sultan Nur. Further accounts said he had lately received some sixty rifles from the Mijjertein of Obbia on the east coast, and was expecting more, and that he intended to rule the interior, leaving the coast to the Europeans.”

“Whilst inquiries were proceeding news was received that a man in the employ of Captain Cox, who was collecting natural history specimens in the interior, had ran away with a rifle supplied him for escort purpose. There was reason to believe that this man had taken the rifle to Haji Muhammad Abdullah, and from information since received there can be little doubt but that this was so. This seemed a convenient opportunity of ascertaining the Mullah’s attitude, and by my direction, Lieutenant Cordeaux wrote to him directing him to return the rifle to Berbera if it was with him. This letter was dispatched on the 29th ultimo, and the reply was received on the evening of the 8th instant.”

Sayyid’s reply to the letter angered Sadler. He felt insulted. He found the reply: “evasive, and couched in terms of great disrespect. The expression, “Oh, man,” is in Arabic one of contempt; it is never employed amongst equals in addressing each other, and the whole tone of the letter can only be looked upon as a defiance. It was, however, written on the back of our letter, in small letters on the top, and repeated in large letters in white over the rest of the sheet, which was painted in red.”

Sadler continued:

“I have no knowledge of the communication to which his longer letter purports to be a reply. Only one was sent from here. It is equally insolent and defiant. A large portion of it is taken upon a quotation from the 4th chapter of the celebrated Arabic classic, “The Mukamat of Harriri.” To rightly understand this extract it must be explained that it is a portion of a discourse in which is noted the manner in which it behoves a person to act towards his neighbour. The allusion is unmistakable.”

Sadler explained: “With these two letters came a third, which evidently refer to a previous communication made to him to return the Habr Yunis country. This is written as it should be. The statement of the Sowar who took our

letter has been taken, and a copy is attached. It throws some light on the doings of this Mullah and his following, and of their present attitude towards us. I cannot help thinking, though, that this man knows more than he has said, and that he has probably been sworn and threatened not to give information—he had a scared look on him when he returned.”

“It is difficult to get accurate information regarding this Mullah’s doings and future intentions, both on account of the distance he is off, and because all those who willingly or under compulsion join his sect are sworn to say nothing about him, and an oath, though not usually binding on a Somali, is so when administered by a man of such reputed sanctity and power as this Mullah. The position, though, as I gather it after sifting the various reports I have heard, is as follows: ‘The Mullah has abandoned his former practice of merely redressing grievances, and has commenced to proclaim himself a power in the land. He forces all within his reach to join his sect, and threatens expeditions against the Dolbahanta tribes who hold aloof. He levies blackmail for the support of his followers when supplies, which are freely given by the tribes whom he has brought under his influence, fail.

“He has amongst his followers several bad and suspicious characters, who probably use his name for their own purpose. He lays claim to the possession of supernatural powers, such as being able to hear with his own ears in the Dolbahanta what is being said of him in Berbera, with the usual story of being able to turn bullets into water.

“This is believed in by more ignorant people of that far-off district. It is to this belief in his supernatural powers, coupled with the fact that he has undoubtedly done much to preserve the peace in the Dolbahanta, and the power he now has of enforcing his orders through a

large following, and the possession of fire-arms, that his hold over the Dolbahanta country has become so strong. He has some sixty modern rifles, which he has obtained from the Mijjertein of either Ras Hafoon or Obbia, and it is said that he is expecting more from the same quarter. It is very doubtful if he has ammunition in any quantity. On this subject I have telegraphed, and ventured to suggest whether a representation might not be made to the Italian Government.

“The tribe over whom this Mullah has more immediately consolidated his influence are in the Dolbahanta, the Bahr-as-Somah, the Arar Samah, and the Ali Gheri; other sections of the Girad Farah are under his sway, and the powerful Mahmood Girad, against whom he threatened to send an expedition, are now said (to) have sent him a deputation of 300 horsemen. In the Habr Toljaala country the Aden Madoba and the Yesaf have joined themselves to him, possibly other tribes in that vicinity.

“In the Habr Gerhajis country, beyond espousing the cause of Madar Hirsi he failed to effect anything—they would have none of him. I do not think there is any chance of his extending his influence over the two large Ishak tribes—the Habr Gerhajis and the Habr Awal—these might be depended on to operate against him. With the tribes under his sway we have no quarrel.

“Owing to its distance from the coast, we have hitherto exercised no effective control over the Dolbahanta country, and have interfered but little in its affairs. Dolbahanta caravans come with regularity into Berbera, but beyond this we have but little information available as to the country and the character of its inhabitants. Since 1891, when, for various reasons, it was decided not to enter (into) engagements with the Dolbahanta tribe, their country has been visited but twice—once by Captain Welby in 1895, and once (by) Captain Merewether in

1896-97. On each occasion these parties were received well, but their object was a friendly (visit) alone. What the attitude of these tribes would be in a move against this Mullah is as yet doubtful. According to some reports which have reached me, the adhesion of some of these tribes is due more to fear than to any particular interest in the Mullah's cause, and some might be glad to be rid of him."

Mr. Sadler continued:

"The Dolbahanta is now an integral portion of our Protectorate, and though we have not hitherto exerted our influence there, we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs as would follow the establishment of this Mullah's rule, under the conditions which are now apparent. Nor can we permit this man to import arms against our orders, and use them to terrorize our unarmed tribes. At the same time it would be a difficult business at present to seize this Mullah or to disarm him.

"The best means of meeting this situation in the Dolbahanta would, I think, be to organize a military promenade. It seems necessary in Somaliland to make a display of force in the interior every four or five years, and such a display has never been made in the eastern portion of our Protectorate. All the people there know of us is what they have seen of the few small parties that have visited their country and what they have heard from their caravans frequenting our ports. It is now four years since the Rer Harad expedition was undertaken, and the good effect it produced is wearing off. I have no doubt, too, that this Mullah has been encouraged in the attitude he has assumed by the progress of events in the French Protectorate.

"I would propose, for your Lordship's consideration, that I should take a force of 100 native infantry, 25 sabres of the Aden troop, and 5 sappers to manage the *zariba*, under a British officer; if this force can be spared from the

Aden garrison. I would supplement it with 15 sowars from the Camel Corps and a few foot police. I would further ask for two Maxim guns, which, I think should be permanently retained in the Protectorate.

“Should the circumstances of the next few weeks still necessitate such a move, I would propose to march with this force through the Habr Toljaala country, which borders on the Dolbahanta, moving into the latter if found expedient, ascertaining the exact position of affairs, and acting as circumstances may require.

“The routes through these countries are shown in pp. 13 and 32 of “Swayne’s Reconnaissance of Northern Somaliland, 1891.” The strength of the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes are given at p. 13 of “Swayne’s Preliminary Notes on Somaliland, 1898,” at 7,000 and 20,000 fighting men respectively. There is, however, no reason to anticipate that we should have to deal with anything like that number. The northern Habr Toljaala tribes are, as yet, unaffected by this movement; the Dolbahanta tribes are scattered over a large expanse of country, and the Mullah’s adherents are not all with him.

“So far as is known he has some 3,000 men. After the rains fall in this month and May the tribes now round the Mullah will be moving to the Haud, and he will be left with a comparatively small following. This is the time I should choose for the expedition. No opposition would be met with unless operations were directly taken against this man, and as regards that I should have to be guided by the circumstances as I find them.

“It has been known for a long time that I purpose going out on tour this hot season, and it could easily be given out that I am touring in the eastern portion of the Protectorate to meet the people and inspect the country, and that I am taking a larger escort than usual as the country is little known to us. I would acquire information as to the location, strength, and attitude of the tribes as I went

along, and if I found I could deal with this Mullah I would do so.

“If, on the other hand, I found him surrounded by a large force of horse and foot with which I could not cope, I should have to leave him alone for the time. Should matters so turn out we should not have struck at the root of the difficulty, but we would, at any rate, have shown our presence in that part of the country, demonstrated to the tribes that we are not indifferent to its affairs, and acquired reliable information as to the attitude of the tribe, which it is most difficult to do here at this distance off. I am, however, hopeful that my presence in the neighbourhood, accompanied by such an escort, will change the aspect of affairs in this remote portion of the Protectorate, unless the movement has wider scope than I am yet aware of .

“The great difficulty of a move direct on Kob Fardod, besides the present large following of the Mullah, would be the badness of the water supply after leaving Ber. Both at Kerrit and at Wadamago the water is foul, and would be dangerous for troops. A large transport would be necessary to carry water.

“It may not be unlikely that the tribes will themselves tire of this Mullah’s exactions and the demands on them for supplies for his people, and leave him; but we cannot depend on this, and as long as he has arms he will always be able to enforce his will over the people within his more immediate vicinity.

“If your Lordship approves of the suggestion to employ Indian troops, I would ask that the General Commanding at Aden may be asked to hold the men in readiness, so that they may at once be available should circumstances require their employment some time in May. I shall, in the meanwhile, try other measures to detach the tribes from this Mullah’s influence, but I am not sanguine that any measures will be effectual which are not backed up by a show of force.

“Should the suggestion to employ Indian troops not find favour, I should have to wait before moving in the direction indicated till the new levies which have just been recruited have received their arms and accoutrements, and have been drilled and put through a course of musketry which might mean a delay of two or three months. The precise object of this movement has as yet not been ascertained; it is a religious movement, and this is always a matter for concern in a Mahommedan country. I am, therefore, not sure what steps may eventually have to be taken to meet it; it may be only the attempt of a fanatic to impose his sect on the Dolbahanta tribes in order to establish his authority locally, or it may have a wider meaning. I will keep your Lordship informed of any change in the situation by telegraph.

“I think it would be well if two Maxim guns were supplied to the Protectorate at once from home; they may not be procurable at Aden, and I would wish to retain them permanently.”

A copy of this despatch was also sent to Britain’s Agent and Consul-General, Cairo, and to Mr. Harrington with the following inclosure.*

Inclosure 1 in No.1

Vice-Consul Cordeaux to Haji Muhammad Abdullah.
(After compliments)

Berbera, March 29, 1899.

“It has been reported to us that a man, by name Duwaleh Hirsi, in the employ of Captain Cox, has run away with a rifle which he has stolen from that gentleman, and that he has taken the rifle to you.

“We therefore write this letter to inform you that if the rifle is with you it must be sent into Berbera immediately.

(Signed) H.E.S. CORDEAUX.

* Foreign Department-External-B, August 1899, N. 33-234, NAI, New Delhi.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Haji Muhammad Abdullah to Vice-Consul Cordeaux.

“THERE is no God but God, Muhammad is the prophet of God.

“Oh, man! I have not stolen anything from thee nor from any one else. Seek thy object from him who has stolen of thee, and serve whom thou pleaseth.

(The above is written in Arabic on the back of Lieutenant Cordeaux’s letter, on the top. The same is repeated in large characters in white sprawled over the rest of the sheet, the groundwork being over in red.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 1

Haji Muhammad Abdullah to the Officers of Government.

“THIS letter is from him who says, “There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the prophet of God.” I reply in this letter to the officers of Government. First, two letters have been received from you, we have read them and understood their contents. The one brought by the Ascar was only a request for assistance. The second contained expressions which are the reverse of good. Both came from you, and we see they are signed by you. We were surprised, and say, “What is this with such a one;” but “I do not assist any but my friends, and do not render justice to one who denies me justice, and I do not make brotherhood with one who makes my ties of brotherhood void, and I do not incline towards one who destroyed my hopes, and I do not care for one who undoes me, and I do not have regard for one who ignores my position, and I do not give my friendship to my opponent; who has decreed that I should be profuse, and that he should hoard; that I should be lenient when he is harsh; and that I should melt when he freezes? No, by God! But we will be alike in speech to the weight of a grain, and alike in deeds as one shoe is like its fellow. How can justice be attracted by oppression; when does the sun shine through a mist; and

what free man would agree to this?"

"Further, we inform you, oh, man, do not ride two horses at the same time; you are like one possessed of two feet, one of which is sound and the other has been struck by the times and halts.

"We also inform you that our history commences from 131 years after the Hijira of our prophet Muhammad, upon whom be peace, &c., and when our religion became weak, after it had been powerful and great, we restored it by redressing grievances, by promoting peace, and by stopping back-biting and enmity.

"And when our rule is such, then who is in the wrong? What Mahommedan will deny the restitution of the faith, and to what heretic is it allowable to object to this? This, and salaam.

(Undated and unsigned.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 1

Haji Muhammad Abdullah to the Officers of Government.

"I HAVE informed you before this of the camels I lost. Some of them have not been returned, and I am in want of them. I do not think you have returned them. This, and salaam.

"Also, oh Sirkar, we have returned whence we came to our country according to your order. God is God. We wish from you that you send us the remaining camels."

(Unsigned and undated)

Inclosure 5 in No. 1.

Statement by Ahmed Adan, Camel Sowar.

ABOUT ten days ago, on Thursday night, I left Berbera with a letter for Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Travelling by Burao and Bur, I reached Wadamago on the fourth day after leaving Berbera. The first thing I saw was a number of people sitting outside the Tarika compound. As I approached, two men, who afterwards proved to be the Sheikh and one Abdi Awaleh, got up and came

towards me. I went on and handed the letter to the Sheikh in person. A number of the people, mostly Mullahs, then crowded round us, and the Sheikh drove them off with a whip. He and Abdi Awaleh then took me aside, and the Sheikh read the letter. He said to me, "What is this about the rifle?" I replied that I knew nothing about the contents of the letter. He said, "How should I know anything about the rifle? Why has the Sirkar written to me about it? There is no mention of the man's name or tribe in the letter, so what can I do? He then told a bystander, a Mullah, to take me to his (the Sheikh's) house. One of his wives and his mother lived there. I was given food, and slept in that house all the time I was at Wadamago. There was no restraint put upon me. I was out most of the day looking after my camel. On the third day the Mullah sent for me. I had seen him before; he often used to come into the house. I went to him, and he said he would give me his reply to the letter I had brought; that he had just received another letter which had been brought by a Somali. He asked me about it, but I told him I knew nothing about it, and asked him who had brought it. He said, "A Somali." A man named Salan had come in that day. I thought that he must have brought the letter. He then gave me a letter. It was written on the back of the letter I had brought him. I saw the Government stamp on it. He (the Sheikh) said, "This is the reply to your letter. I will give you the answer to the other letter to-morrow." He said that the second letter contained "bad words." Next morning he gave me two letters, and I then went away, and got into Berbera on Saturday night.

"I knew many of the people there—some of them were relations of mine. My brother-in-law, Dualeh Aoreb, was there. I asked them if they had any rifles, they said they at first had only six, but had just received fifty-five from Hafoon. I saw two or three of the new lot, they are Martins (new). They told me they had one or two "14-shot rifles." I

saw some Mullahs walking about with Sniders. The Sheikh himself and some of his Mullahs used to practice daily shooting at a target; they put up a shield against a tree. I used to talk with people every day. We talked about many things, some of the words they said were good and others were bad. They called me a *Kafir*, and laughed at my uniform, saying that I smelt, and asking me why I wore the *Sircars* clothes. There were hundreds of people there, some from every tribe, Dolbahanta, Habr Toljaala, and Habr Yunnis. I saw one or two pistols, I did not ask about ammunition, and did not see any. I saw an old man named Firin Goleh there. He is a Musa Ismail Jungly Akil; he came down to complain about a horse which the Mullah had taken from him; he did not get it back, and when the Mullah said he was going away to attack the Mahmood Gerad Berkal, he said to some people, "I hope God will not bring him (meaning the Sheikh) back to this place." The Sheikh heard of this, and sent for Firmin, and the men who had heard him say this. When the Mullahs heard what the old man had said, they set upon the old man and beat him with shoes and whips, so that he became unconscious. They then threw some water over him, and lifted him up and put him under a tree. This was on the day I left, and he was lying under the tree when I came away.

"I have no more information of any kind to give, and have not concealed anything.

(Signed) H.E.S. CORDEAUX, Vice-Consul.

Berbera, April 10, 1899.*

On April 18, 1899, the British Ambassador in Rome informed his Government that, following a representation he made, the Italian Government agreed to give orders to their Consul-General in Zanzibar to stop the arms

* Foreign Department—External—B. August, 1899, No. 33/234, NAI, New Delhi.

destined to Sayyid Mahamed. The British Ambassador, sent the following telegram:

“Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury (Received April 18)

No.65.

(Telegraphic) P.

Rome, April 18, 1899

Following is in reference to Foreign Office telegram No.90 of the 15th instant:

“In reply to representation which I have made, I am informed by the Italian Government that their Consul-General in Zanzibar had already drawn their attention to the importation of arms by the Mullah Abdulla.

“The Italian authorities in Zanzibar and the Benadir and the Commanders of Italian war-vessels in those part have been given strict orders by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to use their utmost endeavours to prevent arms from being imported along the Somali Coast.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy had sent the following letter to the British Ambassador in Rome:

“M. Canevaro to Lord Currie.

(Translation)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome,

April 17, 1899.

My dear Ambassador,

On receipt of your letter of the 15th, I telegraphed to His Majesty’s Consul-General at Zanzibar, who now replies to me that he had already called the attention of the Governor of Benadir to the existence of arms in Obbia, acquired from the Arab agent Mohamed Abdullah, and he adds that he lately made further representations to the said Governor, laying stress upon the anxiety felt by our Government and by that of Great Britain with regards to this illicit traffic.

“I can assure you that His Majesty’s Consul-General at Zanzibar, the authorities of Benadir, and the Commanders of ships stationed in that Colony, have

instructions from the Royal Government, and do their utmost to hinder as far as possible the traffic in arms along the Somali Coast.

Accept, &c.

(Signed)

N. CANEVARO.*

On April 19, 1899, Sadler again wrote a confidential letter to Salisbury,** stating that "the latest reports from the Dolbahanta are that the gathering of tribes round the Mullah Haji Muhammad Abdullah has dispersed, and that he himself has gone a day and a-half journey further into the interior to settle a dispute between the Ali Gheri and the Bahr As Samah. His more immediate following now consists of between 200 and 300 men, composed of the Mullah faction at Kob Fardod and adventurers who have joined themselves to him, from the Ogaden and elsewhere.

"Whatever may be his ultimate object it seems certain that he will not attempt any move at present. The general opinion about the man is that (he) has gone religious mad, and that the defiant attitude he has assumed has been prompted by the bad advisers he has around him. Accounts differ as to the number of rifles in his possession. They probably do not number more than fifty, including muzzle-loaders, that he received some breech-loaders from Ras Hafoon is certain; I was so informed by one of his following now in Berbera. He may be able to obtain more arms from the Mijjertein and the Ogaden in small quantities. Yusuf Ali, the Chief of the Obbia Mijjertein, to whom the Mullah lately sent a present, has declared against him.

"There may be some truth in the reports which have

* Foreign Department, External-B. August 1899, N.33-234- NAI, New Delhi.

** Foreign Department, April 1899, Letter No. 30, NAI, New Delhi.

been current that this movement is ultimately directed against the Abyssinians; the Mullah is himself an Ogaden man, others from the Ogaden are with him, and the treatment the Ogaden tribes have for years received at the hands of the Abyssinians would nourish a feeling of hatred against them. From native reports, too, I hear that some intimation of this kind has reached Harrar. If this is the Mullah's object it is not likely to be attempted for some considerable time to come, and before that I trust his influence will have been broken. What he is now doing is to try and unite the Dolbahanta tribes so as to establish his influence over that part of the Protectorate. He will attempt nothing more yet awhile.

"I have to-day telegraphed to your Lordship with regard to the rumours which would appear to have reached Harrar in connection with this Mullah's possible intentions against the Abyssinians.

"A copy of this despatch has been sent to Cairo, and to Mr. Harrington, I have written to Mr. Gerolimato in Harrar.*

The British Consul-General, Sadler, sent another confidential letter** to Salisbury in which he said, "since my despatch No.30 of the 19th instant was written, information has been received that the old man, Ferin Godeh, who was maltreated by the Mullah's people, has succumbed to the injuries he received." The Consul added: "The effect has been, a measure, to turn public opinion against the Mullah. Allusion to Ferin Godeh is made in Inclosure 5 to my despatch No.26, Confidential, of the 12th instant.

"My senior Dragoman, who is himself a Dolbahanta man, has been deputed to ascertain how matters stand in

* Ref. Foreign Department – External-B, August, 1899, No. 33-234, NAI, New Delhi.

** No.34, confidential dated Berbera, April 26, 1899, NAI, New Delhi.

that direction. He was directed to avoid the Mullah, but to get information as to the strength of his following, the numbers of the surrounding tribes whom he could collect, and the attitude of the tribesmen. I expect him back in a week, in time to telegraph by the next mail.

“My proposal to employ 100 native infantry will probably prove too cumbersome, especially in view of the difficulty of water. On further consideration, I am inclined to think, if your Lordship approves of my proposal with regard to the military promenade, that it would be better to take forty *Sowars* of the Aden troop and twenty infantry, who would be mounted behind the Sowars, with fifteen of the Camel Corps and ten police similarly mounted.

“It would do more harm than good were I to take a tour in the direction of this part of the Protectorate with the few men I have at my disposal here, and it seems to me that a display of force on the eastern side of the Protectorate will most probably be advisable.

“The Chief of the Dolbahanta, Ali Mahmood of the Gerad Farah, is on bad terms with the Mullah, the latter having usurped his position with the tribes. This Chief wrote to me some time ago asking to be given a stipend. I replied saying I would consider the matter, and asking him to come in and see me. This he may be unable to do, as he would have to pass through tribes who might be hostile to him. I think it would be polite to accede to his request, and grant him a stipend of 30 rupees a-month, thus showing that he is directly recognized by us as the Chief of the Dolbahanta. It may be desirable to allot an Akilship of 20 rupees per mensem to the Ali Gheris should their attitude be found satisfactory.

“I would solicit sanction to these allotments should I find desirable to make them. The cost would be partly, if not fully, met from the Budget allotment for Berbera Akils, in the list of which there are vacancies.”

As the British authorities were not able to collect information regarding the activities of the Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, they employed Somali nationals as interpreters or guides, but in fact used them as informers, who would go deep in to the area where the Sayyid and his people stayed and mixed with them without difficulty and then report to the Consul-General.

Following is a letter Sadler wrote to Salisbury dated, Berbera, May 4, 1899 and received on May 22:

“In continuation of the correspondence ending with my despatch No. 34, Confidential, of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to submit translation of a report made to me by the Dragoman whom I deputed to ascertain the position of affairs in the Dolbahanta, together with translation of a further letter received yesterday by Lieutenant Cordeaux from Haji Muhammad Abdullah.

“In the main, the report of the Dragoman coincides with other reports which have reached me during the past week, that the strength of this movement is subsiding. There is, however, no doubt but that this Mullah has still a strong position in the Dolbahanta country, and that he could command a large gathering from the wild eastern tribes who have never been brought under our control.

“The raiding which has recommenced in the Dolbahanta shows that the Mullah is losing the hold he had over the tribes by which he was able to keep the peace amongst them. These raids are not directed against us; they have been the normal feature of the country for years past, and so far, caravans passing to and fro from the Ogaden have not been molested.

“In his last letter the Mullah pretends to speak in the name of the Dervishes, their Amir (himself), and the Dolbahanta tribes. This letter shows his object is to establish himself as the Ruler of the Dolbahanta, and it has a Mahdist look. Reports had reached me that he might declare himself a Mahdi should he find himself

strong enough to do so, but the general opinion is that he will lose his influence before matters get to that stage. In the Berbera mosque the Mullahs of the powerful Kadiriyah sect, which is followed by the Habr Awal and Habr Gerhajis tribes, have begun to preach against the Mullah as an impostor.

“The movement so far appears to be local. I have not been able to ascertain that any outside influence are at work, but the connection of this man with Mecca is a factor which must not be lost sight of. His designs against Abyssinia may be set down to the disordered fancies of a half crazy fanatic. He could not get there, and the tribes would not follow him.

“The position is not so acute as it threatened to be when I wrote my despatch No.26 of the 12th April last, but it is still serious. I do not hold with the Dragoman’s opinion that this movement is not directed against us. On the face of it, it is antagonistic to the Administration, and might become directly hostile. It is impossible to say what a fanatic of this kind might not attempt if he succeeds in firmly establishing his power.

“I do not, under present conditions, now think that any useful purpose would be served by the military promenade previously suggested, and I understand the Aden troop could not be spared at present. If troops were got from Aden, the news would at once reach the Dolbahanta, and possibly result in a large gathering of the eastern tribes to defend the Mullah, and the question of the employment of a small force so far from supports would be a difficult one.

“The best course seems to be to leave the Mullah alone for the present and watch events, letting the movement subside of itself if it will. I cannot, of course, say that it may not assume wider dimensions; the indications now point to the contrary.

“If this movement does not subside, it will probably be

necessary eventually to organize a regular military expedition against the Mullah and his following, which will have to be considered from a military point of view if we are to bring the Dolbahanta country under our control.

“I attach copy of a letter I am sending the Mullah. The principal object of addressing him at all is to remove an impression that has been created that his proceedings in the Dolbahanta have our approval.

“There is one further view of the matter to be considered, and that is the possibility of the Mullah raiding in the nearer portions of the Protectorate. This possibility is remote, but it will be well to take precautions against its happening. I should therefore be glad if it could be arranged so that I may have the services of twenty-five sowars of the Aden troop and fifty men of the native infantry should any emergency arise. They would only be asked for in case of an emergency, and the necessity for their employment will, I trust, not occur.

“The allusions in the Mullah’s letter to creating disturbance in the country and harassing the subjects are supposed to refer to the levy of export duty at our ports, to which he is said to object.

“I am leaving shortly for a tour in the interior, and shall, visit the Habr Yunis country, where, it will be observed, the Mullah has been trying to extend his influence.

Inclosure 1 in No.1

Report by Dragoman Deria Magan

“I left Berbera on the 20th April, and went via the Huguf Pass to Ber, and thence on about two days’ journey to Ballihardli, about a day and a-half distance this side of Kerrit.

“Two days’ journey from Berbera I heard that the Mullah had collected 3,500 foot and horsemen on hearing that an expedition was being sent against him. This was true; I heard it confirmed as I went along. They were all

Dolbahanta men. They remained with the Mullah for two days, consuming a quantity of provisions; then as the report of an expedition against the Mullah turned out to be false, they were dismissed. Some of the Rer Yusuf Habr Toljaala were going to and from Kob Fardod, but the tribe generally are seceding from him.

“From all the information I could gather, it is certain that the Mullah has about 52 rifles with him, of which 30 Martini-Henrys, with about 200 rounds per rifle, reached him about a month ago from the Mijjertein of Bunder Kasim, on the north coast near the boundary between the Mijjertein and the Warsangli. He sent his people there to get the rifles. He also wrote letters to the Mijjertein and the Warsangli saying they had a quantity of arms, and asking them to send men to him. They replied that they had their own affairs to attend to, and could not go to him.

“The looting in the Dolbahanta is now worse than it was. For a time the Mullah preached against looting, and managed to stop it(to) a great extent, because he redressed grievances and acted according to the Sheriah and with justice; but he has caused a lot of dissatisfaction by opening up old disputes, and by insisting on property being restored in cases of loot five and six years old. And now that the people see that his followers loot, and that he makes demands on the tribes for the support of his people, they are beginning to turn from him, and recommence their old habits of looting. No caravans are looted; the tribes respect those, and know they would be punished if caravans are interfered with. The Mahmood Girad lately took a strong force and looted the Ali Gheri, amongst whom the Mullah is. I hear that he is thinking of leading an expedition against them. The Abdi Girad have moved far off the east for fear of being attacked by the Bahr-as-Samah.

“I found no feeling hostile to the *Sirkar* as I went

along. The people obey the Mullah because they fear him. The people openly told me what they thought without my questioning them. The general opinion is that the Mullah is collecting the tribes together for two purposes: one so that he may get them all to obey in the Dolbahanta country, the other to repel a fancied attack by the Abyssinians on the Dolbahanta. He has given out it is written in his books that some day the Abyssinians will invade the Dolbahanta, and he is calling on the tribes to rally to their own defence. There are some reports that he wishes to lead an expedition against Abyssinia if he can get the strength and men; but this is absurd. He has no supplies or arrangements for water, and the tribes would not follow him. He is an Ogaden man himself, and is therefore imbued with a hatred for the Abyssinians. He has no quarrel with the British *Sirkar*, and from all I gather wishes to be friendly with them. He would have gone to Mecca this year, but could not collect enough presents for his spiritual Head, the Sheikh Salih. He is going to Mecca, I hear, for the next pilgrimage. The common report is that he becomes crazy at times. The Mullah has lost a good deal of his influence; it is not what it was a month ago, and it is decreasing day by day. A report has already been spread in the country that it was written in the ancient books that a man of this kind would arise in the East, and that for awhile he would act with justice, but that afterwards he would leave the right way, lead the people astray, and eventually perish. The Habr Toljaala tribes are not nearly so much with him as they were. The Noh Ahmed Farih have left him, as they would not stand his exactions. The people are beginning to see that he is not what he represents himself to be. He will be able to do nothing against the Mahmood Girad; they are a powerful tribe, and if he does not recover the property they looted from the Ali Gheri the tribes will leave him, for they will say that he is powerless.

“There is no doubt that he can still command a large gathering from the wild Eastern tribes who have never been brought under control, and were an expedition sent against him, the Ali Gheri, the Girad Farih, and other Dolbahanta tribes would rally round him. He has thrown over Madar Hirsi, who, he says, cannot feed the Mullahs and has now espoused the cause of Sultan Nur. Sultan Nur has gone to him, and has taken a few presents. He has gone to him because he has attracted a good deal of attention and to prevent his taking the side of Madar Hirsi. Neither the Habr Yunis nor any of the Ishak tribes, the Habr Gerhajis, and Habr Awal are likely to join him, whether their Sultans wish it or not.

“Ali Mahmood, the Sultan of the Dolbahanta, is now with this Mullah. He went to him because he fears him, and found the Mullah was setting the Girad Farih against him.

“All the disaffected in the Protectorate and persons expelled from Aden have joined themselves to the Mullah, and spread false reports about him and the *Sirkar*. Their only object is to get food and loot.

“This movement will not last long. The Mullah’s influence is declining, and he cannot go on feeding people for ever.

“The tribes are getting tired of his exactions, the novelty of the movement is wearing off, and when they see that he cannot keep the peace and stop looting they will soon leave him to himself.

May 3, 1899

Inclosure 2 in No. 1

Haji Muhammad Abdullah to the Vice-Consul, Berbera.

(No date. Received May 3, 1899)

“PRAISE be to God in all matters, and the blessing of God on our Prophet and his descendants, who are the best

of men. This letter is sent by all the Dervishes, the Amir, and all the Dolbahanta to the Ruler of Berbera. We say that we complain against you and against your subjects. Our camels are oppressed by you. We assist your *Biladiyahs*, and turn away those who backbite you; but you do not guard our reputation, and do not turn away those who backbite us. We inform you that there is peace in all the country; there is no fear.

“Secondly, I ask you, by God, by your Prophet, by your religion, and by your Church, do not create a disturbance in the country, do not ruin the country, for there is no harm on us if we leave your country, and drink our own milk, and eat our own meat. I ask you, by God, by your Prophet, by your religion, and by your Church do not create disturbance in the country; for if you oppress us, beat our people, take our money, and imprison our people, we will leave coming to your country, and the country will be ruined. We are a Government, we have a Sultan, an Amir, and Chiefs, and subjects. And how much of wisdom and forethought have we?

“This is what we have written, and salaam.”

Inclosure 3 in No. 1

Consul-General Sadler to Haji Muhammad Abdulla.

Berbera, May 4, 1899.

“YOU have written several improper letters to the Vice-Consul, Berbera, which(have) thrown doubt on your good intentions.

“Further, reports have reached me that you are collecting men and fire-arms, and interfering in the affairs of the tribes.

“Know that no one but servants of the Government are permitted to possess fire-arms in the Protectorate, and that it is the business of a Mullah to engage himself in religious matter, and not to interfere with the affairs of the country.

“If, therefore, as you say, you wish for peace in the country, cease from these matters, and salaam.*

The Consul-General Sadler wrote to the Marquess of Salisbury (Received May 22) dated, Berbera, May 4, 1899. He said :

“In continuation of the correspondence ending with my despatch No. 34, Confidential, of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to submit translation of a report on May 16, 1899, A. Godley of the India Office wrote to Foreign Office the following letter:

“Sir,

“I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of Consul-General Sadler’s reports inclosed in your letter of the 4th May.

“Lord George Hamilton is aware that later information has dispelled some of the anxiety when these reports were written as to the spread of the Mullah’s organization, and the necessity for drawing from Aden a force of 100 native infantry, 25 sabres of the Aden troop, and 5 sappers. But in view of such a contingency recurring, I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Marquess of Salisbury, that it might be well to warn the local authorities on the coast that, apart from other questions, no military assistance could be supplied from Aden without the concurrence of the Government of India. That Government would require information as to the theatre of operations, the supplies and transport available, the duration of operations, and other details. In view of the facts reported by the Consul-General Sadler, and the strength of the force which he was inclined to ask for, I am to invite attention to the Mamasan Esa expedition referred to in the Administrative Report of the Somali Coast for 1889-90 (Sent to Foreign Office in India Office letter of November 18, 1890). The total strength

* Foreign Department, External, B, August, 1899, No. 33-234, NAI, New Delhi.

of the Esa tribes then involved was 12,000 men, the operations were conducted not far from the coast, and beside 2 Gardner guns worked by a party from the Royal Navy, 60 troopers, 220 native infantry, and 30 sappers were employed. In the attack by twenty-five Esas on the Zereba at Hussein, on the 30th January, the British force lost twenty-one killed and wounded; they were unable at any time to compel the enemy to risk a battle; and they were withdrawn without having entirely effected the object for which they were originally sent. The tribe, it is true, suffered from the loss of their cattle and pastures, and their behaviour was afterwards more satisfactory; but the experience gained by the Government of Bombay was sufficient to show that any military operations in the waterless tracts of Somaliland were likely to be attended with heavy expense and inadequate results. Under these circumstances the employment of troops from Aden for operations on the Somali Coast is certain to require serious consideration, and, in the opinion of Lord George Hamilton, it may save disappointment and miscalculation if the local officers are warned of the difficulties to which any demands for assistance on their part may give rise."

Again the Consul-General, Sadler, wrote to his Government, from his Camp Sheikh, on June 5, 1899, informing the Marquess of Salisbury that the position of affairs in the Dolbahanta showed no improvement and reports that reached point to a further extension of Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan's influence.

Sadler wrote in his Confidential letter*: "He (meaning the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan) is now on his way back from an expedition against the Mahmood Girad, who lately raided the Ali Gheri. He is said to have been well received by this tribe, who returned the looted property and gave him a present of fifty horses. How far they have

* Foreign Department, Received at the Foreign Office on June 27, 1899, NAI, New Delhi.

otherwise come under his influence is not reported.

“Mullah Abdullah has emissaries in the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis countries endeavouring to win over the more influential persons of the tribe; our Akils have been tampered with, and in one or two instances overtures have been made to our officials to join the Mullah’s cause. There are further direct signs in the direction of the Dolbahanta of enmity to all those in the services of the Protectorate. It is not yet known how far this is to be attributed directly to the Mullah, or to those of his immediate following who have been expelled from Aden, or who, for other reasons, are not in the favour of the Administration.

“My present object is to confine this movement, if possible, to the eastern districts and prevent its spreading to the Ishak tribes, and with this view I am now on my way to visit the nearer sections of the Habr Yunis and Habr Gerhajis tribes, who have not yet migrated to the Haud.

“The behaviour of Sultan Nur, the Sultan of the Habr Yunis, has been anything but satisfactory. He was acknowledged by us as Sultan of his tribe, he draws a stipend from the Protectorate, and to uphold such influence as he has we have kept his rival Madar Hirsi at a distance. Yet he goes out of his way to pay this Mullah a visit at his village, takes him a present of several camel-loads of food, and further accompanies him with a body of his horsemen on his expedition against Mahmood Girad. His object, I believe, is principally to re-establish his authority over his own tribe through the Mullah’s influence; but he could not have been all this time with the Mullah without having been sworn to espouse his cause, and his open siding with the Mullah has naturally had a bad effect with his tribe and shown a bad example to others. I have stopped his stipend pending an explanation of his conduct.

"I will report further when I have observed the attitude of the tribes I am about to visit," Sadler said in his letter to the Foreign Office in London.

He continued: "I have ascertained that Sheikh Salih in Mecca, whose deputy in Somaliland Mullah Abdullah claims to be, is a native of the Soudan, of what part is not known. It is said that Sheikh Salih by no means approves of the Mullah's proceedings, and has written to him accordingly.

"I cannot say how far this may be true, but several reports to this effect have reached me. On the other hand it may be that this movement has been fomented from Mecca; there are, however, one or two reasons against such a supposition. Sheikh Salih's sect has been established in various localities in Somaliland for a number of years without any disturbances having arisen; and had he been in touch with the Dervishes in the Soudan, which he left five-and-twenty years ago, and wished to create a diversion in this direction, it is probable that this movement would have declared itself earlier.*

(P.S.—A copy of this despatch is being sent to Cairo and to Mr. Harrington)

Following letter was sent by the Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Salisbury, from the Consul-General's Camp, Oodweina, on June 16, 1899 which was received on July 3, 1899:

"LEAVING Sheikh on the 6th instant, I proceeded to Wissil on the tug "Der" about half-way between Warren and Burao, where I halted three days. I then struck to the west to reach Syk via Oodweina.

"The larger sections of the Habr Yunis are now grazing their flocks on the south of the waterless Arori Plain and the Haud, this portion of their country being occupied by the Mahomed Aysa aned Adan Aysa sections

* Foreign Department External-B., 1899, N. 8/32.

of the Habr Awal, who move on to the lands vacated by the Habr Yunis in their annual migration to the Haud. Intermixed with the Habr Awal now here are some of the smaller sections of the Habr Yunis who inhabit the hilly tracts of the Golis.

“The attitude of the Habr Yunis is unsatisfactory. One half of the tribe have come under the influence of the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, principally the Musa Ismailo, Musa Arrah, Rer Ainasha, Rer Weid, and Abdi Hirsi, with Madar Hirsi and his following of the Rer Segullah and the Ba Deria. Some of these were so from the first.

“These sections all occupy the eastern portion of the Habr Yunis country towards its borders, with the Habr Toljaala and the Dolbahanta. The rest of the tribe have not yet been affected by this movement. But few of the smaller sections of the Habr Yunis through whom I passed came to my camp, fearing to do so till the larger sections had declared themselves. I noticed the same hesitation on the part of the Habr Awal tribes now in the Habr Yunis country; these though quite loyal to us openly said that they were afraid of the Habr Yunis. Only one section, the Rer Weis, sent in a full deputation of twenty-five Elders.

“The Mullah’s influence may now be said to extend to a line drawn north and south through Hahya, a Mullah village about 10 miles to the south-west of this camp. South of the Golis and east of this line the country is with the Mullah. West of this line the tribes are either against him or as yet unaffected by the movement.

“Mullah Muhammad Abdullah has made no further move, and I have no further information as to his possible intentions. He is now at Bohotele, where he was for a time laid up with fever, brought on during his expedition against the Mahmood Girad. This expedition was not the success previous report had made it out to be. He obtained no restitution of looted property, and his party was

attacked, losing one man killed and several wounded. The horses he brought back were given him by some of the nearer sections of the tribe who had looted them from their neighbour. Sultan Nur is still with him, but is said to be soon returning to his country, when I shall take as early an opportunity as possible of coming to an understanding with him. Outwardly the country is quiet, despite reports of intended movements by one tribe against another, which are always rife in Somaliland.

Sadler reported: "All those who have been attracted to the Mullah call themselves Dervishes, and give out that they "do not want the Government." They further designate those who do not join them as *Kaffirs*, which has naturally aroused the indignation of the rival religious sects." He continued: "I believe that in all this, especially as regards most of the Habr Yunis, there is a good deal of mere talk. The question of religion, so far as the tribe are concerned, has little to do with the present movement. The Somali, though a devout follower of his religion, is not a good subject for a fanatical rising, and those who have declared themselves as the Mullah's adherents, or have otherwise gone to him, have done so mostly either to serve their own ends or through fear of coercion. "For instance, Sultan Nur repaired to the Mullah because the latter had originally declared Madar Hirsi as Sultan of his tribe. Nur has further a claim for blood-money against the Ogaden, which he hopes to recover through the Mullah's influence."

Sadler informed Salisbury: "The Musa Ismail have been prohibited by us from making reprisals on the Rer Benin section of the Habr Toljaalan (sic) account of certain loots, the compensation for which has been fixed at Berbera, but which the Rer Benin have been backward in paying up.

"Similarly, other tribes, such as the Rer Ainasha, against whom there are old outstandings, find this a

convenient opportunity for temporarily releasing themselves from their obligations.

“At the bottom of all is the pernicious influence of this Mullah, who seeks to undermine our authority with the tribes, and impose his own, for what I cannot but consider political rather than religious motives.”

The field is certainly open for such a movement as this. We have hitherto only occupied the coast towns, and depended for the exercise of our authority in the interior in such matters as we have found it necessary to interfere either on pressure brought to bear on the tribes in their dealings with the coast towns during the trading seasons, or by occasional punitive expeditions, which in each case have produced an excellent effect for two or three years.

“Two great results have been achieved by our Administration under this system. Order and quiet have been established in the Guban, the tract between the Golis and the sea, and the tribes inland have learnt to respect the sanctity of the caravan routes.” “But”, he admitted, “we have no effective administration beyond a radius of a few miles from our coast towns.” He suggested that “What we require to do is to gradually extend the influence and authority we have acquired over the Habr Awal to the tribes in the interior in the order of their accessibility to our reach, and this is now rendered more difficult by the agitation which has lately sprung up from the Dolbahanta.”

“Our action will have to depend in a great measure on how event declare themselves. If an openly hostile move is made by the Mullah, which I do not at present anticipate, this will have to be met by force. Should no such move be made, and it be decided that operations in the Dolbahanta are not worth the risk and cost, we shall have to deal with the tribes nearest us who may continue to defy authority by closing our ports against them, and, where necessary, by punitive expeditions.”

“It is noticeable that this movement commenced at the

close of the trading seasons, and has been in progress at a time when the tribes are mostly independent of us and the ports, and when they are at a distance in the interior and out of our reach. In another two or three months the condition of affairs will be altered, the grazing to the south will be exchanged, the tribes will move back, and will at once become dependent on our coast towns for their supplies and the sale of their produce, and I quite expect that many of the sections who are undoubtedly now with the Mullah, and are said to be disaffected with our rule, will send their caravans as usual to Berbera, and want to know what they have done against the Administration.

“Next to the Habr Awal on this side naturally come the Habr Yunis. I have already noted what their present attitude is, and for which the bad example of Sultan Nur is in some measure responsible; what it will be in the near future will much depend on Sultan Nur’s behaviour on his return to this tribe. I should say he is not likely to declare himself against us; if he does, he will have to be brought to reason. He is far more likely to steer a middle course, and try and keep in with us and the Mullah, if he does not throw the latter over.

“The question of interior posts on this side is one which I have not yet taken up, wishing to personally see the country before making any proposals.

“Burao offers a position of considerable strategical importance. It is close to the borders of the Habr Toljaala, the Dolbahanta and the Habr Yunis; it commands the principal water supply of the latter tribe in the dry season, as well as that of the adjacent Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes. Later on it will be an excellent place to locate a British officer, with an escort, to control the surrounding tribes, but under present circumstances it is too far removed from the coast to be safely used as an outpost. Occupied now in force it would have a controlling effect on the present situation.

“When our police are trained and armed, a commencement might be made by occupying the principal passes leading through the Golis to Berbera by foot and mounted police, and thus accustoming the tribes to the visible signs of our presence outside the coast towns. I will offer further suggestions when the intentions of the Mullah and the attitude of Sultan Nur and Habr Yunis are more definitely known.

Sadler reported to London: “Yesterday, Haji Musa, the Head of the Mullah community of Hahya, which I had visited him in the morning, came into my camp on his way from the Haj. He is the principal Mullah of the Habr Yunis; his sect is opposed to that of the Dolbahanta Mullah, and I had previously received a letter from him strongly protesting against the trouble the latter is causing in the country. I had a long private conversation with this Mullah who talks Arabic fluently, and who struck me as being a man of more than ordinary intelligence and education. He told me he wished to do all in his power to help the Administration in counteracting the influence of Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, especially with the Habr Yunis, and to this end he had already sent several of the Mullahs who had returned with him from Mecca direct to the tribes on his way to Hahya. With regard to Mecca he assured me that no assistance was being given from that quarter to the movement in the Dolbahanta, which he said was solely instigated by Muhammad Abdullah, whom he described as a religious madman. His object, he said, was to unite the tribe so as to exercise his authority over them and, in fact, rule over the Highlands. Designs against the Abyssinians were, he thought, a mere pretense, though these might enter into his scheme if he found himself strong enough.

“Haji Musa told me he would immediately go round the tribes himself, and assured me of his best endeavours to bring them round,” wrote Sadler.

“As I knew, he had some requests of his own to make, and with these I decided to comply, knowing him to be possessed of influence which I think can be usefully employed. I granted him a personal allowance of 30 rupees *per mensem*, the continuance of which will depend on his exerting himself in the direction indicated. I further promised him 150 rupees towards the construction of a masonry well he is anxious to dig in his village, the site of which I had previously inspected. I was willing to encourage the construction of this well, as there is a considerable tract of land in irregular patches round the village under Jowari cultivation, which is entirely dependent on the rainfall. A well will be useful for irrigation purpose, as well as for supplying the community which number some 300 souls, with drinking water, which has not to be brought for the best part of the year from the river bed at Oodweina. The first sum will be met from the unallotted balance of the Budget allotment for Berbera Akils, the second from my Budget allotment for Durbar presents.”*

It is interesting to note here what a British author J. D. Jardine had to say on Sayyid’s movement. He wrote “... He started a movement advocating the expulsion of the British infidel from his Mohammedan country.” Then early in 1899 he perpetrated his first overt set of hostility to the British Government.” The British called him the Mad Mullah and tried to discredit his political vision towards the country. But Sayyid Mahamed made his goals clear in the following letter to the British people: “I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion. If you will, send me a letter saying whether there is to be peace or war. I intend to go from Burao to Berbera I warn you of this—I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do

* Foreign Department, External-B. September, 1899, No. 8-32, NAI, New Delhi.

not. God willing, I will take many rifles from you, but you will get no rifles or ammunition from me. I have no forts, no houses, no country. I have no cultivated fields, no silver, no gold for you to take. I have nothing. If the country were cultivated or contained houses or property, it would be worth your while to fight. The country is all jungle, and that is of no use to you. If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant-heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war—nothing else. I have met your men in battle, and have killed them. We are greatly pleased at this. Our men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We kill, and you kill. We fight by God's order. That is the truth. We ask for God's blessing. God is with me when I write this. If you wish for war, I am happy; and, if you wish for peace, I am content also. But if you wish for peace, go Solvay from my country back to your own. If you wish for war, stay where you are. Hearken to my words. I wish to exchange a machine gun for ammunition. If you do not want it, I will sell it to some one else. Bend (sic)/ Send a letter saying whether you desire war or peace.”*

The problem Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan had to face was that his followers had to fight not only against colonial powers but also against fellow Somalis recruited in the army by the colonial authorities. His aim of anti-foreign occupation was clear, but the British portrayed it as if Sayyid was fighting against the Somalis and they were there to protect the tribes and not their own colonial interests. Every time the Dervishes attacked the British positions it was reported as attacks made on Somali tribes.

The British informed their colonial ally, the Abyssinians, what actions they were planning to take against

* D.J. Jardine, “The Mad Mullah of Somaliland,” *African Society Journal*, vol. 208, pp. 109-121, July 1920.

the Somali freedom fighters. On January 12, 1901, the British Representative in Addis Abbaba, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, told the Marquess of Lansdowne that he informed King Menelek of Abyssinia about the British preparations "for an early expedition against the Mullah." He reported that "His Majesty replied that orders have been given to the Harrar authorities to co-operate with the Somali Coast authorities as soon as the latter are ready."

"Ras Makunan is at present en route for the capital, but he has nominated Garasmach Gabri as chief of the expedition against the Mullah," Harrington wrote.

As Sayyid's movement showed no sign of fading away and instead appeared to be moving from strength to strength, the British authorities began to realize the seriousness of the challenge to their rule. In a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, the Political Resident in Aden, H.S. Barnes said:


"From what I have learnt since I have been here, I do not think the Mullah can be disposed of by regular troops alone. But whatever plan is adopted, the business is likely to be long and expensive. Personally I should be inclined to begin by building a line of posts to protect our own tribes, keeping a small number of regulars and a much larger number of regulars at each post. Then when we had secured our own country, the hunting of the Mullah might be resumed."

British Devise Strategy

The sudden outburst of Somali people against their colonial rulers should have served as a warning to the British authorities in Somaliland. But apparently they did not take any notice of the event. When they started receiving reports of the movement led by Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan they failed to comprehend its grave implication. Political Agent in Berbera Sadler believed that a display of the British would send the disgruntled “natives” scurrying for cover. In recommending a military promenade to his superiors he was grossly underestimating the strength of the movement which was being fueled by the outrage against the alien rule. Even this idea was given up as sufficient force could not be gathered for the military promenade. As the reports from their spy network piled up, the feeling among the authorities began to grow that Sayyid wanted to “undermine our authority” and they slowly moved to the conclusion that if the movement led by him did not subside soon military option would have to be considered. It was the battle at Eregno on October 6, 1902 between the forces of Sayyid and the British forces and the defeat that the British suffered led to the realization of the gravity of the challenge.

The Commissioner and Consul-General, Somali

Coast, Lieut.-Col. E.J.E. Swayne, wrote from Berbera to the Political Resident in Aden on October 30, 1902 giving an account of the disaster that had overtaken the British forces at Eregno. "Although our scouts had reported the enemy advancing to meet us, we were in such dense bush (that) it was impossible to get a very compact formation. We were in this formation:



When we halted the enemy got into trees and signalled their people to halt too. Immediately we advanced again, very slowly, they attacked us on all sides, the riflemen running in to 5 and 10 yards of our men and firing as they came. The transport stampeded and the 1,000 or so water camels clashing their tanks together broke through the left-hand rear corner of our formation. The Somali levies in the rear stood firm, as did also two companies on the left of Yaos and a half company in the front face, but a panic seized the men on the left and they came back on the centre; when this happened the half company of Somalis left in the front face made a charge and drove the enemy off and then wheeling to the left charged again. The other companies then gradually came up one by one and recovered their ground. Two companies of Somalis and two Yaos then went out and recovered the ammunition boxes thrown off by the stampeding camels, and in the evening one company of Yaos and two of

Somalis went out driving the enemy for 1 1/2 miles through the bush and recovering the bulk of our transport camels. I thought at first that we would be able to go on, but the transport was too much crippled and we could not go on without our water. Next day the impression of the fight had sunk in and it was no longer wise to think of it. It was a great disappointment to me, as five minutes' steadiness at the beginning would have probably ended this Mulla business.


"The din in the dense bush where seldom more than a dozen of our men could see each other was deafening. Your seven pounders fired away and after poor Angus was shot a detachment worked a gun, and I actually saw them set alight the clothes of a man bowled over by case shot at about 10 yards' distance. We made similar saddles for our seven pounders out of grown forks of trees bound by clamps of iron raw hide. It was impossible to avoid this bush. There appears to be nothing but dense bush for 60 miles with only one small glade about a mile broad. This advanced portion of the enemy were divided into six parties of 100 riflemen each with about 2,000 or 3,000 spearmen divided between the parties. All six leaders were killed and within a belt of 20 to 30 yards of the front face alone I counted 62 dead bodies, some 40 of whom were recognized as Hajis and Mullas. Now that I think, owing to this superstitious terror the Mulla's name seems to have on Somalis, it is no longer possible to bring him to book with levies, a most difficult and expensive problem has to be worked out, for regulars want twice the quantity of water carried for them, require rations, etc., carried and cannot live on the bad water found in a large part of the country. The transport train, owing to the impossibility of staging for the last 110 miles, there being no water for this distance, becomes enormous and entail a large number of driver, and the force moves so slowly that the enemy can always place his flock and herds, the only

thing to strike at, in safety. We might manage it with a mounted force on Somali ponies. No others would stand the country. But say, we have gone to the expense of 100,000 Pounds or a good deal more. As long as the Italian country is open to these dervishes and arms continue to flow in, I don't see how we are to prevent the whole thing coming on again the following year. When I came out the levy was the only possible thing; it drove the Mulla out of the British Protectorate and kept him out of it for six months, and we recovered everything we had lost, but now that the levy can no longer deal with the situation, I'm afraid we are involved in a long harassing transport and supply business and slow marches with hospitals, etc.etc. If the Mulla chooses to avoid us he can do so for years, and in the meantime he can raid every animal in the country, gradually reducing the population to starvation. I am so sorry so much extra work must have been thrown on you and your staff owing to us. Manning will be with you and will have answered any questions you may have wished to put to him. I am going up-country again immediately I have been able to send up rations. Up to now everything is quiet. Very many thanks for your invitation to come over, but I am afraid I cannot just now. Hoping you are quite well."

Swayne reported that fighting at Eregno on the October 6 (1902) was very severe. He said in a telegram: "Somali levies considerably shaken. Mulla bringing up reinforcements from all sides is said to be in communication with Karlinger from the Webbe.

The report said that he (Swayne) retired to Bohotle much hampered with transport of water and wounded. He asked for immediate despatch of six hundred reliable troops to Berbera and also remainder of the reserve battalion.

The immediate response of the British authorities to the disastrous encounter was to augment their armed



THE THIRD BRITISH EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MULLAH


forces. The Foreign Office responded to the military disaster suffered in the battlefield by sending a secret message in which it said: "Reinforcements urgently required in Somaliland. Hold in readiness to start at once, Native infantry battalion fully equipped and rationed. Consult General Manning, who is due at Aden on the 19th October 1902, and ask him to telegraph his views after seeing Mr. Bordeaux, who is proceeding from Berbera to Aden to meet him."

Then the Viceroy ordered 2nd Bombay Grenadiers to start for Aden and told the Secretary of State in London that his military advisers did not feel confident as to the competence of 1st Bombay Grenadiers, presumably already ordered from Aden to Somaliland to retrieve serious disaster.

The Foreign Office in London were much obliged for prompt compliance with the request but their military advisers suggested that, "looking to possible development of troubles in Somaliland, it would be advisable that regiment warned, in addition to those sent in Hardinge, should be composed of Sikhs or Punjabis.

In 1902, Swayne sent a long report on the situation in the Protectorate and his activities against Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan to the Marquess of Lansdowne. The report dated Berbera, May 5, 1902, reached London on May 26. He wrote:

"On the 12th April spies confirmed our information as to the intention of certain of the Naleyah Ahmad section of the Dolbahanta, living behind Heis and Hashow, to join the Mullah immediately. The grazing in the Nogal district permitted them to take their flocks and herds with them. Rain had recently fallen abundantly to the southward, and the movement of the tribes was therefore imminent. The Musa Ismail tribe, which owing to the pressure brought on it by the Naleyah Ahmad, had accepted the emissaries of the Mullah and had intimated the



THE FOURTH BRITISH EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MULLAH

custodians of our flag-ports into allowing the importation of fire-arms, was now preparing to follow the example of the Naleyah Ahmad and join the Mullah in the Nogal."

For the British it was important to prevent Sayyid Mohamed from gaining more strength. The Consul-General Swayne told Lansdowne that "it was essential that the disaffection of the Musa Ismail, and Ishak tribe, should not be allowed to spread to the other eastern Ishak tribes, and so add to our difficulties by opening a field for fanaticism in a part of the Protectorate which had, so far, been unaffected by the Mullah's doings."

"I therefore decided to lose no time in interposing a detachment of the levies between the disaffected tribes and the Mullah, after which I hoped to drive the former back to the coast out of touch with him", Swayne said. He went on: "In order to occupy the Mullah so as to prevent him from interfering with this plan, Major Phillips, R.E., was directed to make a demonstration with 750 men and two Maxims from Burao towards Burdab, thus threatening the Mullah's front, whilst, at the same time, the enemy's flank towards Bohotle was threatened by the friendly Ishak tribes, and on the east his supporters were threatened by an attack of the loyal sections of the Dulbahanta towards Bur Anod."

In his letter to the Foreign Office, Swayne informed that he proposed to select the Jibril Naleyah and Ali Naleyah for severe punishment, "because these sections of the Naleyah Ahmad tribe were the prime movers in the fresh disturbances in the east of the Protectorate, and were, moreover, actively concerned in the raid of December and January last, when so many women and children of the Ishak tribes were killed, and in consequence of which some 4,000 persons are now destitute."

"It was hoped that the example furnished by the punishment of these two sections of the Dulbahanta would deter the Musa Ismail from proceeding further

with their design of joining the Mullah, and so render it unnecessary to take military action against this Ishak tribe.*

With the British authorities deciding to take firm military action against Sayyid, they seriously began preparation for the contingency. They called on their vast resources in India. The Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, Mount Abu, sent a telegram on August 10, 1903, to the Foreign Secretary in Simla, saying: "Political Agent, Bikaner, wires His Highness asks that it may be ascertained whether Government wish him to send any reinforcements in men or camels to detachment, Bikaner Camel Corps, now in Somaliland; latter appear to require camels badly from reports received. *Darbar* will only be too glad to send whatever is required."**

Initially, the Foreign Secretary thanked and appreciated Maharaja of Bikaner for "his loyal offer". But a week later he sent a telegram to the British Agent in Rajputana saying that the Commanding General Egerton "now asks that detachment of Bikaner Camel Corps may be brought up to full strength and Government of India will therefore gladly avail themselves of Maharaja's offer to send reinforcements. The Viceroy said in a telegram dated 1 Sept. 1903 to Egerton: "Secretary of State for India has asked for 50 camels, Bikaner Camel Corps, to replace casualties. We understand that casualties are in excess of this and we can send one hundred and fifty if required."

On September 15, 1903, Major-General Sir E.G. Barrow, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, sent the following telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Somaliland Field Force, Sheikh, via

* Foreign Department, Political Department, N. 30 dated the 27 of June 1902, NAI, New Delhi.

** Proceedings of Foreign Department, October 1903, NAI, New Delhi.

Aden: "Your telegram of 8th September, No. 590-S.A. Orders have been issued for despatch 50 sowars, 150 camels for Bikaner Camel Corps. Please instruct Captain Walker to take favourable opportunity to send back following men: Commandant Thakur Bakhwas Singh, Subadar Yopal Singh, Havildar-Major Jowahir Singh, and one private. Best plan would be to send them back with invalids on arrival reinforcements. Secretary of State for India on 20th August stated they are required for remount duty at depot."

When he was relinquishing the Command of the Somaliland Field Force, Lieutenant-General Sir C. Egerton sent a letter to the Government of India, saying: "I have the honour to place on record my very high appreciation of the loyal and distinguished services performed by the Bikaner Camel Corps. They have served continuously in Somaliland for 18 months and since I assumed command in July 1903, they have taken a prominent part in all the operations of the Field Force, very considerably enhancing the high reputation they had already acquired."

The Bikaner Camel Corps returned to Bikaner on the evening of July 14, 1904. In his welcoming speech, the Maharaja said that "it was very sad to think that a certain number of brave men were left behind in Somaliland never to return again, but that such a death was a glorious end for a soldier and to be envied by all." He made special mention of the late Jemadar Mahtab Singh.

On August 20, 1904, Maharaj Bhairon Singh, Secretary for the Political and Foreign Department, Mahkma Khas, Bikaner, wrote to Captain W.E. Scott-Moncrieff, I.M.S., in charge, Political Agency, Bikaner:

"With reference to your letter No.1489 of the 3rd instant, I am directed to inform you that His Highness the Maharaja and the Darbar greatly appreciated the terms in which the services of their Camel Corps in

Somaliland have been spoken of and acknowledged by the authorities concerned, and His Highness desires his thanks to be conveyed to the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General and the Government of India for their kind appreciation of the Darbar's efforts to do what they can to show the State's staunch loyalty to the British Crown. His Highness's only regret is that his own personal services could not be accepted.

"I am to add that should another such occasion arise, the Camel Corps will always be at the disposal of the Government, and His Highness will be specially grateful if his own services will be also utilized on such occasions."

The Bikaner Camel Corps' casualties amounted to about 40 per cent due to various causes including those killed in action.*

The British failed to bring down to their knees Sayyid Mahamed and his followers, and as the situation on the ground was not favourable to them, the British tried to find ways of stopping arms coming to the movement from abroad. They wanted the right to search the vessels on the High Seas.

Colonel Swayne sent a letter to the Secretary of State for War, No.169, dated Bohotle, March 21, 1903 in which he informed that "Safe-guard against importation of arms at any place in British Protectorate are provided by occasional cruisers, H.M. ship(s), and by armed dhows. Consul General has also agents at all flag-ports, and is confident no arms are landed at any place in British Protectorate; he cannot exercise control over native craft trading with Bosasa and other ports in the Italian sphere. Bosasa has been, and appears to be, still centre from which Mullah draws supplies, and is principal residence of Sultan Othman Mahmud. Latter's assurances in reply to frequent remonstrances on the part of the Italian

* Proceedings of Foreign Department, October 1901, NAI, New Delhi.

Consul, Aden, appear worthless and active measures necessary to remedy existing state of affairs. May I suggest that for this purpose Italian man-of-war should be stationed at Bosasa to search for all native craft, and if necessary, blockade that portion of Italian coast?"

The British Ambassador in Rome, Francis Bertie, on April 5, 1903, called on Admiral Morin, at the Italian Foreign Office and handed over the following Memorandum:

"His Majesty's Government have received reports to the effect that the Mullah continues to receive supplies of arms and stores through the port of Bosasa on the north coast of Somaliland.

"Effectual safeguards against the importation of arms at places in the British Protectorate are provided by occasional cruises of His Majesty's ships and by armed dhows, one of which is at present patrolling the north coast.

"The Sub-Commissioner at Berbera has agents at all flag ports, and he is confident that no arms are landed in British Protectorate. Bosasa has been in the past and is stated to be still the centre from which the Mullah draws his supplies. It is the principal residence of Sultan Othman Mahmud, and his assurances in reply to frequent remonstrances on the part of the Italian Consul at Aden would not appear to be of much value. Drastic measures would seem to be necessary to remedy the existing evil. For this purpose a most effectual step might be taken if an Italian man-of-war were to be stationed at Bosasa to search all native craft, and, if necessary, blockade that portion of the Italian coast.

"His Majesty's Government would be greatly obliged if the Italian Government would inform them what measures they would propose to take for the suppression of this traffic.

"The stopping of the supply of arms and stores to the

Mullah is a matter of vital importance to the success of the present British military operations.”*

In a letter dated Foreign Office, November 27, 1903, the Marquess of Lansdowne informed Sir F. Bertie about an interview he had with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Signor Tittoni at Windsor. The Marquess wrote: “During the interview which I had with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Windsor, we had some conversation as regards affairs in Somaliland and the neighbouring country. I explained to Signor Tittoni that, although we had never undertaken, and could not undertake, to prevent the Mullah from escaping into the Benadir country, we had taken every precaution in order to contain him in a region as remote as possible from the Italian possessions. With this object we had induced the Abyssinians to advance to Wardair, and thence make a demonstration to Galadi, and we were, in the meanwhile, occupying Galadi with a British force. These measures, coupled with the demonstration at Illig and Obbia would, I hoped, have the desired effect. We were as anxious as the Italian Government could be that the Mullah should not escape to the south-west.”**

The British tried not only to prevent Sayyid from obtaining arms for the struggle against the colonial power but also foodstuffs. On March 18, 1904, the Commander-in-Chief, East India Station, Rear-Admiral George Atkinson Willes, reported to the British Political Resident at Aden that he “found the dhow *‘Fath-al-Khair’* unloaded a supply of rice and dates for the Mullah.” He said that the master’s name was Abdi Hassan and the dhow was flying Arab colours. Atkinson wrote: “I am bringing these facts to your notice with a view to such steps being taken as you considered necessary to prevent

* Foreign Department, July 1903, NAI, New Delhi, India.

** Political Depart. Secret. 11 Dec. 1903, NAI, New Delhi.

the Mullah being supplied in this way.”*

On his part, the British Political Resident at Aden Major General P.J. Maitland forwarded the message to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay telling them that the Commander-in-Chief brought the fact to his notice with a view to steps being taken to prevent the Mullah being supplied in this way. But, the Resident said that there was no Law or regulation under which the authorities at Aden could prevent export of foodstuff to the Somali Coast, British or Italian. However, they had already a regulation under which all vessels leaving Aden for the African Coast of the Gulf (were) obliged to touch Berbera and Hais ports before going to any other port and they were not allowed to leave unless permission was issued by the concerned authorities.

The primary object of this regulation was to check the arms going to Sayyid Mahamed which the British called “the illicit traffic in arms.” The British authorities in Somaliland had, of course, “the power of stopping a vessel carrying goods of any description for the Mullah.” The Political Resident concluded by saying: “*As far as I can see, the only action which could be taken at Aden to prevent supplies of food being sent for the Mullah, would be to prohibit the export of any food grains, or of dates, to any port of Somaliland, so long as the war continued. This does not, however, appear to me to be practicable.*”**

BRITAIN ASKS OMAN TO HELP

Although Britain together with its Italian ally, failed to stop arms supply to Sayid Mohamed, it tried to devise

* Proceedings of the Foreign Department, September 1904, NAI, New Delhi.

** Letter No. 108 dated Aden Residency, the 9th April 1904- Proceedings of the Foreign Department, September 1904-NAI, New Delhi).

ways and means to search what they called, "suspected" vessels on high seas. It contemplated an arrangement with the Sultan of Maskat by which "it was hoped to establish a right to search dhows flying the Maskat flag on the high seas"

No matter how much force they brought in from other territories colonised by them, the British still found it difficult to deal with Sayyid Mahamed and his forces who were determined to free the country from the colonial domination. The British felt that they should work out a way of cutting the arms supply line of the Somali Nationalist by seeking the cooperation of the Italian Government, who were also colonising part of the Somali territory. As they thought that Sayid's Movement was purchasing its arms through the Sultanate of Oman, the British approached the Italian Government to cooperate in the search of any ship sailing towards the Somali Coast, under the Italian Protectorate.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador, sent a telegram from Rome on August 22, 1903 to the British Foreign Office in London, saying that the "(Italian) Foreign Minister is quite willing to accede to proposed extension of right of search if His Majesty's Government agree to reciprocity, which will be practically only a question of form. He (the Minister) thinks it would be desirable that Sultan of Maskat should extend proposed notice of illegality of export of arms and ammunition to African coast under Italian Protectorate also, and agrees that, if agreeable to Your Lordship, British representative should approach Sultan in this sense."

On October 5, 1903, the British Foreign Office instructed its Ambassador in Rome to inform the Italian Government that the British Government were ready to grant reciprocal rights to Italian ships of war to search dhows within the territorial waters of the British Somaliland Protectorate as well as dhows met on the high

seas flying the British flag which might be suspected of carrying arms or ammunition to ports on the Somali Coast under British or Italian protection.

The British Government persuaded the Sultan of Maskat to issue notifications declaring illegal the exportation of arms and ammunition to the portions of the African coast and islands, including Socotra, lying to the north of Cape Guardafui which were under the British Protectorate, and authorising the seizure of such arms and ammunition in Maskat territorial waters and in Maskat dhows on the high seas.

Although the British could do what it pleased in the land and on the sea, they still wanted to involve other countries in their unholy battle against the Derwishes. Sultan of Maskat was asked by the British administration to cooperate in stopping and searching all vessels sailing to the Somali coast, as well as to prevent the Somali traders, who had excellent relations with the people of Oman, to take goods to their homeland. As he had no other choice, or for fear of negative consequence, if he refused the request of the mighty Britain, the Sultan issued the following notification:

NOTIFICATION

To all whom it may concern.

Be it known that, in pursuance of an understanding come to by the Governments of Great Britain and Italy, the importation of arms and warlike stores to those portions of the African Coast and islands (including Socotra) lying to the north of Ras Aseer (i.e., Cape Guardafui), which are under the British Protectorate, and also to those parts of the African Coast, which are under the Italian Protectorate, has been prohibited.

Accordingly, at the request of the British Government pursuant to her understanding with the Government of Italy, I hereby notify the said prohibition.

Be it, therefore, known that any native craft transporting arms or warlike stores to the localities in question will incur the risk of confiscation, and that I have granted the authority to British men-of-war to search, on my behalf, vessels which there is reason to suspect in this connection in Maskat and Oman waters, and similarly to search Maskat craft on the high seas if reason exists for suspecting them.

Furthermore, I hereby grant authority to Italian ships of war also to search suspected Maskat vessels either in territorial waters or on the high seas.

MASKAT,

The 24th Rajab 1321 (17th October 1903)

FEYSAL-BIN-TURKI,

Sultan of Maskat

With all their diplomatic effort, the British colonial administration was finding hard to control arms supply to the forces of Sayid Mohamed. They were looking for all the possibilities to stop the arms reaching to the freedom fighters. So they tried to find out whether they could possibly use the General Act of the Brussels Convention, 1889-1890 to stop and search all ships going to the Somali Coast suspected to be carrying arms to the forces of the Sayid Mohamed. The Secretary of the Admiralty Sir Ivan MacGregor sent the following memorandum seeking legal opinion:

(Confidential)

Admiralty,

13th October 1903.

SOLICITOR,

Will you be so good as to lay the following before the Law Officer(s) of the Crown at the earliest date possible, for their opinion:-

The measures adopted at present to check the traffic in arms and ammunition to Somaliland being insufficient for the purpose, it is desired that Officers Commanding

His Majesty's ships in the Indian Ocean may receive instruction(to) search vessels or dhows flying British or foreign colours on the high seas which are suspected of carrying on this traffic.

Can Articles VIII and X, or other Articles of the General Act of the Brussels Convention, 1889-1890, be made applicable to the case?

If not, is there any other authority under which His Majesty's ships can so act?

If not, what steps are required to give them that authority?

IVAN Mac-GREGOR

A copy of the General Act of the Brussels Convention is forwarded herewith.

Articles VIII, IX, and X generally deal with the importation of arms. Articles XXII, XXIII, and XLII deal with the stopping of vessels of less than 500 tons, but appear to apply only in the case of vessels taking part in the slave trade.

It is not stated whether or how far the importation of arms in Somaliland can be actually connected with the slave trade, but it may (be) noted that Article VIII assigns the part played by fire-arms in slave trade operations as one of the grounds for restricting their importation.

Prints of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, of Somaliland Order in Council, 1899, and of the Regulations No.2 of 1900, No. 2 of 1903, and No.* of 1903 (just allowed), which have been made under the Order in Council with respect to territorial waters, have also been obtained, and are forwarded herewith for reference if necessary.

The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General are requested to be good enough to advise the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty upon the questions raised in the memorandum of Sir Evan Mac-Gregor.

After deliberating on the issue raised, the British Law Department in London gave its opinion.

* No Number was given.

OPINION

We are of opinion that there are no Articles under the General Act of the Brussels Convention which can be made applicable to the case so as to authorise the search upon the high seas of vessels or dhows flying British or foreign colours, on the ground that they are suspected of being engaged in the traffic in arms and ammunition to Somaliland.

The Articles relating to arms and ammunition in no way relate to the high seas.

We are not aware of any other authority under which His Majesty's ships can search such vessels apart, of course, from rights as to contraband in time of war, as to which we do not understand that at present any question arises.

To confer the authority desired, treaties with the Powers concerned would be necessary, and also an Act of the Imperial Parliament to legalise the search of British vessels.

R.B. FINLAY.

EDWARD CARSON.

LAW OFFICERS DEPARTMENT;

The 2nd November 1903.*

The British did all they could to suppress the Sayid's movement and harassed those who they thought were helping the movement to obtain the arms. But what ever they did, it could not discourage the freedom fighters who became more determined.

On August 17, 1908, Captain F. Mc-Conaghey, Political Agent and His Majesty's Consul at Maskat, reported that Somalis visited different ports of the Sultanate of Maskat for the purchase of arms. The

* Proceedings of the FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, APRIL 1904, Prot. No.69-NAI-New Delhi.

Political Agent asked the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, "what steps, if any, should be taken to prevent, if possible, this trade during the present year."

He said in 1907, the number of rifles exported by the Somalis from Maskat was 450 together with about 50,000 rounds of ammunition. The British Consul reported the number of Somali buggalows, which were reported to have come (to) Maskat that year was eleven. The distribution of the same was as follows:

Four at Khadhrah.

Three at Suadi.

Two at Majis.

One at Mutrah.

One at Debai.

The Consul was informed by the Sultan that the number of Somalis who had come to Maskat and Oman in 1908 was in excess of that of 1907.

He reported:

In addition to the above:

(1) Fifty rifles have already been sold to Somalis.

(2) An Agent to M. Goguyer is lately reported to have sent rifles and ammunition to Saham in order to facilitate the sale of them to the Somalis.

The Consul added:

"At present, no doubt, the export trade from Maskat and Oman to Somaliland is in its infancy but the large profits to be made in this trade and the ease with which it can be carried on will soon induce others to join in this enterprise. In addition, the Italian Government are becoming concerned by reason of the facility with which the Mad Mullah may be able to provide himself afresh with arms from the Sultanate of Maskat and have already proposed the establishment of a Consulate at Maskat, which would, in every probability, only add to our troubles in this place."

The British Political Agent in Maskat asked the

Sultan of Oman to forbid the Omani nationals who were engaged in the arms trade from selling any rifles or war store to Somalis and accordingly the Sultan sent the following letter to the Wali of Suwerkh, Sheikh bin Salim bin Hassan, on September 24, 1907:

After Compliments.

“There comes to you our friend the Captain of the Government man-of-war.

He told us that he went to Khaderah and landed on shore, but the people would not allow him to go to the town.

Now you will accompany him to Khaderah where he will land.

He wishes to make an enquiry into what he has heard of arms having been taken to Khaderah for the Somalis.

He desires to have them seized. If you find them; seize them for I forbade them for the Somalis.

Ask the Sheikhs why they did not allow the Captain to move about freely.

If that was the work of immature youths it is necessary they should be punished and imprisoned.

Tell the Sheikhs that such a thing should not occur again.

It is necessary that when they (the man-of-war people) land they should be received with due respect and Salaam.

Dated 15th Shahban 1325.

FEYSAL.”

The British Consul in Maskat, Major W.G. Grey, said in a report on November 5, 1907 that on September 30, “His Highest the Sultan showed me a letter which he had received from the Shaikh of the Mijjertaiyin, Sultan Uthman bin Mahmud, requesting him to prevent the Mullah’s agent from acquiring arms, and asking him to keep an eye upon his subjects Ali bin Sharu’ and Muhammad bin Farah.” Following is the letter mentioned by the

British Consul:

(Translation of a letter from Sultan Uthman bin Mahmud, Sheikh of the Mijjertaiyin, to His Highest Sir Saiyid Faysal, Sultan of Oman).

After compliments.

“You are aware of the acquaintance that exists between us, and that we are in the habit mutually of assisting one another. Also you know that there is enmity between me and the false friend, and that the people of Sur have been helping the friend with arms and ammunition. Now I learn that he has bought a buggalow from the people of Sur and has sent it to you (your capital). Now it is incumbent upon me to be at enmity with your enemies and not to assist them against you, like those who are helping the false friend. So I ask you now to prevent them (the Mullah’s agents) from taking arms from you (your Capital) as they (the arms) produce disturbances in my country, and to assist me by preventing the false friend from acquiring arms. Also to forbid the Suris to convey arms to the friend; and to allow me to deal with them (as they deserve) if they disobey your orders, as I will be able to do. Hitherto I have treated them kindly, and now they are helping the friend. Secondly, Ali bin Sharu and Muhammad bin Farah who are my sons and yours, to whom you stand in my place and that of a father, are going to your country. Please punish them if they misbehave, punish anyone who ill treats them, so long as they remain with you, and Salaam.

Dated 7th Rabi-ul-Akhir 1325.”

But for Sultan Uthman Mahmud himself arms and ammunition were purchased by Mahrīs and his agents. The British Political Agent and Consul, Major W.G. Grey, reported* that the former, who were from Gishn, carried away 150 rifles with ammunition.

* Foreign Department, See letter dated Maskat, the 12th November 1907, NAI, New Delhi.

The British Political Agent at Maskat wrote to the Political Resident, Aden on October 4, 1907 that arms and ammunition were being brought into Maskat by some Mahris from Shehr and Mokalla. Some Agents of Sultan Osman bin Mohomed (Mahmud) had also come for the same purpose. The British official said: "Osman proposes to the Sultan of Maskat that he is the Mullah's enemy." What is the truth ?" he asked.

The Resident at Aden replied: "In reply to your telegram of today's date, no arms and ammunition should be supplied to Mokalla Mahris or to any other belonging to the Aden protectorate. The Agent of Sultan Osman should not be supplied with ammunition under the Brussels Convention of 1890, notwithstanding the fact that he is an enemy of the Mullah."

Despite the strict control of the seas by the British and Italian naval forces, the Somalis continued their commercial activities with the countries in the Gulf. But the British followed them to make sure that they did not purchase arms. The Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, S. Litchfield, reported from H.M.S. *Sphinx* at Maskat, that he visited Debai and Shargah. He said Five Somali dhows were found at Debai and one at Shargah. In his report dated 14th October 1908, the Commander said: On the 10th I searched the coast towards Musandani and then cruised the Bastina Coast in the hope of intercepting three more Somali dhows reported to be proceeding to Debai. We succeeded in finding all three on the 11th instant. No more Somali dhows were found, although several vessels were closed and examined.

"I anchored for the night at Sahn on 11th and at Barka on the 12th, and returned to Maskat on the 13th having called at Sib and Muttra on the way. One Somali dhow was found in Muttra and another has come in today," he said.

According to the Commander's report, it was estimated that 17, or possibly 21, Somali dhows were in the Gulf waters. "Eleven of these have been found and steps have been taken which, it is hoped, will effectually prevent them taking arms to Somaliland. It is intended to continue search for the remainder, but, for the present, further information with regard to their whereabouts and movements is being awaited. The Somalis will be commencing their return voyage about the end of October."

The British Naval Officer considered that these Somalis are, primarily, legitimate traders, "but there is no doubt that they intended and hoped to take back a very profitable addition to their legitimate cargo in the shape of rifles and ammunition. The closing of Jibuti may also have a bearing on the case."

The principal cargo brought by the Somalis was wood for building. Having disposed of this they engaged in some ordinary trade in the Gulf and then bought a cargo of dates to take back to their country.

"None of the dhows had arms on board, but it was not expected that they would run the risk of putting them on board until just before sailing on their return voyage to Somaliland. We have endeavoured to prevent this."

The Commander wrote: "The Walis and Sheikhs of the various places visited have been instructed by Captain Mc-Conaghey, who took with him a letter from His Highness the Sultan, to send information of the movements of Somalis to the Sultan and to prevent the sale of arms to them."

Although the British Law Officers clearly stated, when they were consulted by the Secretary of the Admiralty in London, that "there are no Articles under the General Act of Brussels Convention, etc.," the British Government still went ahead to look for some other pretext to prevent the Somali leader, Sayyid Mahamed from importing arms from other countries. As there was

no one else to challenge their decisions, the British authorities issued the following Order in Council:

King's Regulations under Article 32 of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899" No. of 1903

Fire-arms:

Whereas it has been agreed between the Government of his Britannic Majesty and the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy to co-operate and assist, and to direct the captains and officers of their respective navies to co-operate and assist, each other for the purpose of preventing, in accordance with the provisions of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, the illicit importation of fire-arms into the coast regions of Somaliland placed under British and Italian protection respectively.

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. These Regulations may be cited as "The Somaliland Fire-arms Amendment (No.2) Regulations, 1903," and shall be read as one with "The Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, 1899 and 1903."

2. Any ship of the Royal Italian navy and its captain or officer shall have all the powers conferred under Clause 8 of "The Somaliland Fire-arms Amendment Regulations, 1903 (No 2 of 1903)" on the ships of His Britannic Majesty's navy and its captain or officer.

(L.S.)

Commissioner and Consul-General.

BERBERA;

The October 1903.

SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE

NOTICE

The following Regulations made by His Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General, and allowed by the Secretary of State, are published for general information.

Commissioner and Consul-General
H.E.S. CORDEAUX,
BERBERA;
The 1903.

King's Regulations under Article 32 of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899."

No. 2 of 1903.

Fire-arms.

Whereas by the General Act of the Brussels Conference the importation of fire-arms was prohibited except in certain cases and under certain conditions therein laid down, and whereas it is necessary to make further and better provision for enforcing within the Protectorate the provisions of the said General Act;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. These Regulations may be cited as "The Somaliland Fire-arms Amendment Regulations, 1903," and shall be read as one with "The Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, 1899" (hereinafter called the principal Regulations), and both Regulations may be cited together as "Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, 1899 and 1903."

2. The captain or officer of any vessel in the public service of the Protectorate may board any ship, vessel or dhow in the territorial waters of the Protectorate, and may demand her papers and may search her.

3. Any ship, vessel, or dhow which is hailed by a vessel in the public service of the Protectorate shall immediately heave to.

4. The captain or other officer of any vessel in the public service of the Protectorate desirous of making any vessel, ship, or dhow heave to, may hail her, or any signal, or fire blank charge, or may fire a shot across her bows, or take such other measures as he may think necessary for compelling her to heave to.

5. Any ship, vessel, or dhow disregarding the signals

or other proceedings referred to in Regulation 4 of the captain or other officer of any vessel in the public service of the Protectorate, or attempting to escape, or in way resisting being boarded and searched, or in any way obstructing him while acting in the execution of his duty may be seized and taken to Berbera, and on proof of the facts to the satisfaction of a Magistrate shall be forfeited, and all or any of the members of the crew shall be liable to imprisonment of either kind not exceeding six months.

6. (1) Any ship, vessel, Or dhow refusing to produce her papers, or without papers, or whose papers are irregular, or which there is good reason to believe has been illegally carrying arms, or has thrown overboard arms that she was illegally carrying, may be seized and taken to Berbera and a complaint laid before a Magistrate.

(4) If the Magistrate finds that the facts alleged in the complaint are proved, he may make an order detaining the ship, vessel, or dhow until a fine not exceeding R2,000 is paid, or may sentence all or any of the members of the crew to imprisonment of either kind not exceeding three months.

(5) If the Magistrate finds that the facts alleged in the complaint are not proved, and that there was no reasonable cause for seizing and bringing in the ship, vessel, or dhow, he may award compensation to her owners and crew.

7. (1) Any ship, Vessel, or dhow found with arms on her board which are being illegally carried, may be seized and carried to Berbera and dealt with as the Commissioner may direct, and her crew shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment of either kind not exceeding six months.

(7) Any cargo not being illegally carried shall be landed and may be claimed by its owners at any time within six months, or within such shorter time as the Commissioner may by rule prescribe, if not claimed

within such period it shall be dealt with as the Commissioner may direct.

(8) Any arms or other cargo being illegally carried shall be forfeited and dealt with as the Commissioner may direct.

8. Any ship of His Majesty's navy and its captain or officers shall have all the powers conferred by these Regulations on the captain or officers of a vessel in the public service of the Protectorate.

9. In these Regulations arms include fire-arms, arms of precision, and ammunition as defined in the principal Regulations.

H.E.S. CORDEAUX

Commissioner and Consul-General.

BERBERA;

The 6th May 1903.

Allowed:

LANSDOWNE

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs.*

For the British Protectorate, the Foreign Office issued the following:

No.1502-E.A.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Simla, the 19th July, 1900

The following Order of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is published for general information:

SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE

In pursuance of the powers conferred upon me by

* Foreign Department, July 1903, NAI, New Delhi.

Article vii of "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899," I hereby order that "The Indian Registration Act, 1877" (Act III of 1877), and "The Indian Limitation Act, 1877" (Act XV of 1877), and every Act amending those Acts shall apply to the Somaliland Protectorate subject to the following modifications, that is to say:

1. In the said Acts the Protectorate shall be substituted for British India.

2. The provisions of the said Acts exclusively applying to particular parts of or places in India shall not apply to the Protectorate.

3. Notifications required by "The Indian Registration Act, 1877," to be made in the Official Gazette shall, until a Gazette for the Protectorate is

4. established, be published in such manner as the Consul-General shall direct.

5. The Protectorate Court shall be substituted for the High Court.

6. The powers of the Governor General in Council, and of the Local Government under the said Acts, respectively, shall be exerciseable by the Secretary of State, or with his previous or subsequent assent, by the Consul-General.

7. This order shall have effect from and after such date as the Consul-General shall appoint, but not earlier than fourteen days after a copy of this Order shall have been publicly exhibited in the office of the Consulate at Berbera.

FOREIGN OFFICE

(Sd) SALISBURY.

The 12th May, 1900.

W.J.CUNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.

In 1903, the following was issued:

No. 1191-E., dated Simla, the 5th June 1903.

NOTIFICATION

By the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With the reference to the notification of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1501-E.A., dated the 19th July 1900, the following Order of His Majesty in Council, published in the London Gazette, dated the 13th March 1903, is published for general information, namely:-

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 12th day of March 1903.

PRESENT:

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS by Treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, His Majesty the King has power and jurisdiction within the Somaliland Protectorate:

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers on this behalf by "The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890," or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

1. This Order may be cited as "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1903," and shall be construed as one with "The Somaliland Order in Council, 1899."

2. Where, under "The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894," or any amending Act, anything is authorized to be done by, to, or before a British Consular officer, such thing may be done in any place in the Protectorate at which there is no Consular officer by, to, or before such officer of the Protectorate as the Consul-General may appoint.

3. The Consul-General may make King's Regulation providing for the registration of births and deaths in the Protectorate.

And the Most Honourable the Marquess of Lansdowne, K.G., one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions herein.

A.W. FitzRoy.

The British authorities continued their policy of denial to Sayyid Mahamed not only the right to import arms but also foodstuffs from abroad. At the instance of the Somaliland (British) authorities regulation was made which prescribed that all vessels sailing for the African coast were required to first touch either Berbera or Hais port. The primary object of the regulation was to check what they called "the illicit traffic in arms" which in fact were the arms that Sayyid Mahamed's movement was bringing in to fight against the British occupation. There was no law or regulation under which the British authorities at Aden could prevent the export of foodstuffs to the Somali Coast, British or Italian.

In London, the Italian Ambassador Marquis di San Giuliano told the British Foreign Office that his Government had given telegraphic instructions to the officer in charge of the Italian Consulate at Aden to come to an agreement with the British authorities as regards the cruises of ships for the purpose of intercepting "the contraband trade in arms between the Arabian coast and Somaliland."

"But," Major-General P.J. Maitland, wrote in his letter to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, "whether the '*Fath-al-Khair*' went into Hais or not, it would appear that, if the Admiral had sufficient evidence to show that the dhow had actually landed rice and dates for the Mullah at Galweni, he could have seized the dhow and have taken it to Berbera, where she might have been condemned and burnt by the Somaliland authorities."

"As far as I can see, the only action which could be taken at Aden to prevent supplies of food being sent over for the Mullah, would be to prohibit the export of any food

* Italian Ambassador's letter dated, London 9th December 1907, Foreign Department, NAI, New Delhi.

grains, or of dates, to any port of Somaliland, so long as the war continues. This does not, however, appear to me to be practicable," he argued..

On March 28, 1905, the Italian Ambassador in London went to the British Foreign Office and informed them that an Agreement had been concluded at Illig on the 5th instant between *Cavaliere* Pestalozza and the Seikh Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, with the object of establishing the latter on a tract of territory in the Italian Protectorate and of assuring his peaceful relations with the British authorities and the neighbouring tribes.

As for the Italians they were playing a double game, working for themselves and at the sametime siding with the British against the Somalis. On the other hand Sayid Mohamed was considering Pestalozza as some one with whom he could talk. In 1904, the Somali leader allowed the Italian Consul to visit him at his place at Illig. Pestalozza describing his meeting with Sayid wrote: "After a complete silence"*, the Mullah addressed us:

- You are the first Europeans who have come amidst the Derwishes, what object brought you here?
- As I have already written to you, I answer, we are coming here for the purpose of peace.
- You are Pestalozza?
- Yes I am, as you are a person of law and observe the Holy Book, I believe you will listen to me, in the interest of all the Somalis.
- But you are coming on behalf of Englishmen?
- No, absolutely, I am coming from the Italian Government.
- Are you with full power and authorised to decide?
- No, I am a person who has full trust of the Government of Italy but can neither decide nor

* Translated from Italian by the Author.

determine; I will convey what you will think and decide, if that will be also approved by the Government and bring back the answer and the conclusions.

- Why do you want peace and for whom do you want peace?
- For all the Somalis who since many years suffer and particularly for the Mijerteys who depend on us – but the peace cannot be sincere and long-lasting if it is not inclusive—it is not possible to close the windows and let the door open.
- Then you want I have peace also with the British?
- I want the good, and for this I have simply come to consult with you in the interest of all the Somalis, whom you love indistinctly as a sensible and inspired man. Of these we can talk more when we sit in your home, as this is long matter.
- You are right, you have seen what splendid reception I have organised, no one else have never been accorded so far. You are sure of full immunity, there will not be any wrong done, and we will discuss again soonest. *

The Consul had a long meeting during which they also discussed the strong feeling against the British, whom the Sayid blamed for every wrong, thanking the Almighty for having always defeated (them). The Italian diplomat must have been highly persuasive as he did convince Sayed Mohamed to make peace.

Later in the day Pestalozza submitted a proposal for peace which contained the following clauses:

- a) Comprehensive peace including the English and the Abyssinians and their dependent tribes.
- b) Freedom for the Mullah to settle in the fixed place from Ras Garad to Gabee (Black Bay) under the

* Somalia: Vol. I, Dalle Origini al 1914, Ministero della Guerra, Roma, 1938-xvi, p. 308.

protection of the Italian flag, keeping for himself the Government of the interior tribes.

- c) Prohibition of sale of arms and slaves.
- d) Guarantee in money or with hostage of persons.
- e) Suspension of hostility to have time for obtaining consensus and observations of the Government to those clauses.

On October 17, 1904, the Italian diplomat had another meeting with Sayid Mohamed. "But this time", Pestalozza wrote, "he received us standing and not like previous day with all the ceremony." When all the aides of the Sayid left the room, discussions started. At the start, Sayid Mohamed renewed his verbal attack against the British. He was not yet convinced that Pestalozza was not speaking on behalf of the British. Pestalozza then asked: "Do you want that my companions declare that I am not coming on behalf of the British?" His two companions, Sylos and Paladini, immediately rushed to confirm. But the Italian insisted the necessity of peace with all, including the English.

Sayid asked that the draft be read to him again. He raised question about the point relating to the "prohibition of arms" and could not be convinced that his people could be without arms. The Italian cleverly tried to persuade the Sayid, as the latter was alone, by assuring him that if necessity arose, the Italian government would herself provide him with arms and so on.

Sayid Mohamed became friendly towards Pestalozza and wrote letters to him. In one of the letters he wrote ".....I have been treated by the English with arrogance and they have sent a military expedition against (me); my rights have been lost; they refused me the legitimate cause, and I became a victim—our religion has been scorned and they (English) were the main cause for every ill. It has forced the Somalis to subjugation and has destroyed them because they refused me to wage war."

"Now, O Pestalozza, you and Abdallah Sheri, are

delegated by me and to you I bestow the power for our cause. If you ask me pacification, I accept the peace and mutual trust – and I promise to stop the discord and the war in the interior. I, the Derwishes and all my people will molest no one, neither Mijerteys, nor the people of Yusuf Ali, neither the English nor their dependents”

“I and my people are the people and dependents of the Government of Italy if it favours us and cools our heart (the text says our stomach or our desire); we will be under its flag. We only request that the Government of Italy allow(s) us to build a country at a point which it will consider suitable, from Gabbee to Garad.”


In the end a peace accord was signed by Sayid Mohamed on his behalf and on behalf of his followers and Cav. Pestalozza, on behalf of his Government, on March 5, 1905. The accord laid down that there would be “peace and lasting accord.” And in view of this there shall be peace and accord between the Dervishes and the Her Britannic Majesty and the Somali people. There would also be peace between the Dervishes and the government of Abyssinia. By this Accord the Italian government “guarantee” and “pledge” themselves on behalf of their dependents and “*also on behalf of the British government*”(emphasis added). The Accord defined the area over which the Sayid was to exercise control. It laid down that “the government of the tribes subject to him in the interior shall remain in the hands of Sayid Muhammed and shall be exercised with “justice and equity”. Any disagreement or dispute was to be settled by the delegates of the two sides presided over by the delegate of the Italian government. Wherever British interest were involved the British envoy’s presence would have been necessary. (Appendix Thirty)

Following is one of the letters that Sayyid Mohamed sent to the Italian Consul which was received by the Governor of Benadir in Mogadishu on 25th July 1903:

من محمد بن عبد الله الخي القنصل التلياني
 ونعرفك بان الإنكليز خرب نفسه وبلادهم ورجالهم
 فأولاه ما وجدنا نحن لان الجنة وجدنا من
 عنده والغنيمة وجدنا من السلاح النار
 ية وجدنا من عيونه والقوة وجدنا من عنده
 فكانت عداوته إخواننا وانصافا كانت
 محاربتهم معاونة علينا فالموت راحة
 لنا فان ضنا فلنا الجنة وان عشنا ما
 عشنا إلا ملة بسيرة ما نأصوت طريق
 إلى الجنة والجنة غاية مرادنا فإله
 الحمد على جميع الأحوال وايضا
 نطلب منك بيان حالنا وحالكم
 فكيف العهد وكيف المداخلة
 والرسالة والمعاونة واننا ممتحن
 حبيب الجواب التي عندك ام في الله
 نيا ام في الآخره
 من محمد
 من ابن عبد الله

(unofficial translation by the Author)

From Mohammed bin Abdullahi, to the Italian Consul,
 “We inform you that the English has ruined himself,
 his countires and his men; if it was not him, we would not
 have found luck, because we found the Heaven from him,
 and found the booty from him, we found the fire-arms
 from him, and found the strength from him. His enmity
 was good for us and also his war was a help for us.



THE TERRITORIES OF NOGAL ASSIGNED TO MULLAH ACCORDING TO THE TREATY OF ILLIG.

“The death for us is a joy, if we die the Heaven is for us: if we remain, it will be only a short period of time.— The death is a way to Heaven and the Heaven is our aim. We thank God for all conditions. Further we request from you explanation about our reciprocal position: How would be the treatment and how the relations and communications as well as the assistance and all, you will send me the answer which is at your end? In this world or the final day?”

“Signature of Mohammed son of Abdullahi”*

After the accord was signed on March 5, 1905, a delegation of the representatives of Sayid Muhammed accompanied by Cav. Pestalozza visited Berebera to sign accord with the representative of the British officials of Somaliland. The accord confirmed that the agreement signed between the Italian Government and Sayid Muhammed “was in confirmity with the Britannic Majesty’s Government”. An accord was signed on March 24, 1905 by the Commissioner of Somaliland and the representatives of the Mullah that affirmed that peace had been established between the Britannic Majesty and the Somali people. The accord also stated that any dispute that might arise over the boundaries would be settled through mediation ‘in accordance with Somali customs.’ (Appendix Thirty-One)

Pestalozza stated in one of his letters to his government that negotiation to summon Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan to Berbera by the British did not materialise. According to him, the first condition Sayid posed was prohibiting the christian missions from giving shelter to the Somali children who were converted from Islamic faith. The denial of which had caused the uprising of the entire Somali population against the British. Sayid therefore sent only his representatives.

* Gustavo chiesi—La Colonizzazione Europea nell 'Est Africa. Italia—Inghilterra—Germania—Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese. napoli—Roma—Milano—1909.

*(Tentative iniziate per richiamarlo in Berbera non ebbero esito; il Mullah metteva per prima condizione la proibizione alle missioni cristiane di dar ricovero a ragazzini somali cui si cambiava la fede mussulmana; il diniego lo irritò e da lì ebbe principio la susseguente generale sollevazione delle popolazioni somale contro gli Inglesi)**

In a letter to the Secretary to the British Government of Bombay, Political Department, Colonel R. I. Scallon, Officiating Political Resident at Aden, forwarded correspondence between his office and the Commissioner for Somaliland on the subject of a visit to Aden of a deputation from the Mullah headed by Abdullah Shahri, his agent.

The Commissioner granted permission to three members of deputation from Mullah named Abdullah Shahri, Malin Mahomed, and Mahomed Adan to proceed to Aden. He told the Aden Residency "I should be obliged if you could keep a watch on them—especially with reference to possible purchase of arms, but in view of peace negotiation with Mullah, it is important that their suspicions should not be aroused."

A.H.E. Mosse, First Assistant Resident in charge Police, wrote a long report about the visit of the Mullah's delegation:

"Of the three emissaries of the Mullah from Berbera, only one Abdullah Shahri has as yet arrived; he has been quietly watched, but his movements have not as yet been suspicious or of any particular interest. I have today however had an interview with an individual who says he came from Berbera along with Abdullah. This is a Frenchman converted to Mahomedanism under the name of Ali, his original name he says was Xavier Aliothy. He says he arrived at Berbera recently from Bombay. He spins a

* SOMALIA—Vol.I,Dalle Origini al 1914, Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di S.M./Ufficio Storico, Roma/1938-XVI.

long yarn to the effect that the Mullah's agents in Berbera sounded him as to his willingness to join in a scheme for importing arms. They wanted him, he says, to find out whether the French Government would permit arms to be landed in Jibouti, otherwise the arms were to be landed at some obscure spot on either the Arabian or Somali Coast; the arms were in the first instance to be obtained from France. The Mullah wanted 400,000 rifles as a preliminary to a grand scheme for sweeping the English into the sea.

"The man who takes the principal part in all negotiations is a Somali who was employed under the Italian Consulate by name Ismail who speaks Italian very well. He acts as Interpreter to the Mullah's Ambassador Abdullah. I am making enquiries about this Ismail who may prove to be a man who got into some trouble with the Italian Consulate a year or more ago by, as I am told, trying to make bad blood between the then Consul General for Italy and the Residency. Mullah Aliothy, or Ali, said further that he had half agreed to the proposals of the Mullah's people, but only with the intention of informing the authorities here. He does so, because though a Mussulman he is still a European and could not think of assisting black men against white, a praiseworthy sentiment on which I congratulated him."

Extract paragraph 6 of Government of Bombay Special Department weekly letter, dated August 26, 1906.

6. SOMALILAND.

The Political Resident, Aden, writes under date August 18th: -

"The latest rumour from Somaliland is that the Mullah has now definitely commenced preaching a '*Jehad*' against the British and means mischief."

Extract from Aden Residency weekly letter dated the 13th October 1906.

Prot.No.304.

Intelligence Report No. 2.
(Confidential)

Political Office,

Burao,

14th September 1906.

Movements of Dervishes.- The Nogal is reported clear of the Mullah's scouts and our tribes are still grazing well east of Eildab-Wadamage line.

The Mullah's herds have moved from Adadero (115 miles east of Eildab) in the direction of Illig.

The Dervish horsemen are estimated at 500. They successfully looted the Ogaden to the south of Bahawadleh and also carried off 200 camels of the Ibrahim Ogaden.

A report from a reliable source came in yesterday, that another force had been despatched by the Mullah from Galkapy (sic) against the Bahawadleh Ogaden (Abyssinian subjects).

In the last raid the Bahawadleh did not lose heavily, but retired with their camels to Milmil (200 miles south of Hargeisa); although they concentrated, they failed to follow the Dervish raiders.

The main body of the Dervish horse is at Galadi.

The Mullah is still in the vicinity of Illig. He proposed to move to Mudug as soon as the rains fall.

Sultan Yusuf Ali, Mijjertain, is reported to have concluded a peace (agreement?) with the Mullah and is at present in his camp.

Arms Traffic.—Nil.

Political.- The Ogaden Ibrahim have returned 200 camels to the Bahawadleh.

The stock looted by the Alligheri from the Bahawadleh is still at La Surah (30 miles south-east of Bohotleh).

Five mounted riflemen of the Alligheri Post reported themselves at Burao, and say that the footmen with their rifles will arrive shortly for inspection.

K.I. reports that in the Bagheri-Dervish raid on the Ogaden, the Ogaden were caught on the run and they made little or no resistance. The raiders did not use rifles until they were pursued; he was present at a meeting of the Ogaden held at Bulaleh near Milmil (200 miles south of Hargeisa) on 1st September, and it was resolved to attack the Bagheri (Mullah's Ogaden following)

A man of the Ayak tribe living at Bohotleh was captured by the Dervishes near Galadi and released after being detained some ten days. He reports, at Elgalo near Galadi—"I was captured by seven Dervishes and 'Dabato' (refugee hunters) who killed two of the party, one a Dolbahante Osman Barri and the other Ogaden Habr Eli Rer Saleban; I was bound and taken to Galadi and there awaited return of raiding party despatched against the Ogaden. On arrival of party I was released; the leaders enquired into my case and made the patrol of seven Dervishes that captured me prisoners, killing the man that killed the Dolbahante Osman Barri and sending the other prisoners to the Mullah. They released me, gave me two camels, and said I was to give the following message to the 'Sirkar:—"We are without a clerk and cannot write; our men have made a mistake and looted the Ibrahim camels; these camels are in a separate 'zeriba', send a man to fetch them, to show that we intend to keep the peace our horsemen passed your camels in the Nogal. Beware of 'fitnawallas' (mischief-makers). The Dervish leaders also sent a message to the Alligheri, at Bohotleh Post, telling them they heard they were in trouble, but as they were their kinsmen and their friends (including the 'Sirkar') if they would send a man they would give camels to assist them."

I gather from this man that the Mullah sent a body of men specially selected to see that his orders with regard to keeping the peace with our tribes were carried out. Very few men were killed on this raid.

The political situation with regard to the Mullah is unchanged, but he has taken a good stride forward in his probable line of action, the manner in which he has handled the Mijjertain tribes speak volumes for his tact and personality. He made peace with them and to be quite certain that they would not attack him during the absence of his horsemen, persuades the Mijjertain Sultan Yusuf Ali to visit him at Illig during this dangerous period.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,

First Assistant Political Officer.

Countersigned

H.E.S. CORDEAUX,

His Majesty's Commissioner.

Extract from the Aden Residency weekly letter dated the 20th October 1906.

Prot. No. 305.

Intelligence Report No. 2.

(Confidential).

Political Office,

Burao,

1st October 1906.

Movements of Dervishes.- The Nogal is reported clear of the Mullah's scouts and our tribes are still grazing well east of Eildab-Wadamago line.

The Mullah's herds have moved from Adadero and gone in the direction of Illig.

The report that the Mullah despatched a party of horsemen against the Ogaden is untrue. He probably gave orders, which he countermanded as the Mijjertain showed signs of restlessness.

The Haroun is still in the vicinity of Illig.

Arms traffic.—Nil.

Political.—An "*Ergo*" (deputation) despatched by Sultan Omar of the Ibrahim Ogaden to the Mullah left on 26th September. It was given a safe conduct through our territory and all possible arrangements made for its

safety within our borders.

The terms of peace now under discussion between the Mijjertain (Sultan Yusuf Ali) and the Mullah are that, Sultan Yusuf Ali should return 200 camels to the Bagheri (looted a year ago), destroy the forts at Galkayu and Galadi, and give his daughter in marriage to the Mullah. Sultan Yusuf Ali agrees to the first two conditions, but will on no consideration give his daughter.

An unconfirmed rumour from Eildab says that the Mijjertain attacked the Mullah during the absence of his horsemen on the Ogaden raid. This, I think, a case of the wish being farther to the thought.

Some headmen of the Ogaden left their *Karias* at Milmil (200 miles south of Hargeisa) with the intention of asking the Abyssinians to assist them against the Mullah.

The Alligheri riflemen of the Observation post at Bohotleh were inspected at Burao and have been through a musketry course; their rifles were in good order and they produced an average of 22 rounds per man on an issue of 30. Their rifles were numbered, and 30 riflemen have returned to duty at Bohotleh, the remainder will follow as soon as their musketry course is completed. They admit having eaten the stock looted from the Bahawadleh and took the punishment inflicted in good spirit, in fact with a feeling of relief.

The loss of one Martini-Henry carbine is reported from Eildab Post.

The political situation from the Mullah's point of view has not improved, as he was undoubtedly forced by complications with the Mijjertain to withdraw his horsemen from Galadi and Mudug; this throws his allies the Bagheri (Ogaden) open to attack from the combined forces of the Ogaden. It remains, however, to be seen if they have the courage and determination to take advantage of this opening.

The inspection of rifles is proceeding in the Habr

Toljaala and Habr Yunis tribes. Some 300 men have been through a seven days' musketry course; their rifles numbered and the tribal rifles formed into *Karia* Militia sections. The ammunition returns of the Habr Yunis show a heavy wastage of 75 per cent; this is probably due to the fact that the majority inspected up to the present were tribal rifles without bandoliers, and not *Karia* Militia sections.

The ammunition returns of the four sections of Dolbahanta and Habr Toljaala *Karia* Militia inspected up to the present show a wastage of only 5 per cent; probably their tribal rifles will also show a heavy wastage.

The tone of the riflemen has improved a great deal since last inspection, and they are beginning to realise that the defence of their flocks and herds rests with them.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,
First Assistance Political Officer.

Countersigned.
H.E.S. CORDEAUX.

To
The Political Resident, Aden.

Extract from the Aden Residency weekly letter, dated
the 3rd November 1906

Prot. No. 306.
Intelligence Report No. 4.
(Confidential)
Political Office,
Sheikh,
25th October 1906.

Movements of Dervishes.—The Mullah's scouts are now in the Nogal, parties being reported at various watering places, the nearest being 70 miles north-east of Bohotleh, these scouts are covering the stock and also collecting information as to our attitude with regard to the Ogaden raid.

There is an unconfirmed report that Galadi has been

reoccupied by the Dervish horse.

K. 5 reports that the *Curgis* (shelters) left standing in the vicinity of Wal Wal (100 miles south-west of Bohotleh) in consequence of the Bhagari Dervish Raid were removed by the Ogaden Rer Haroun and Rer Abdilla; he also saw a force of 300 men armed with rifles and spears at Wardair (110 miles south-west of Bohotleh) and at night approached their camp, found they were composed chiefly of Baghari (Mullah's Ogaden following) and gathered from their conversation that they had sent scouts to the west and north-west to locate the herds of the Ogaden, Rer Haroun and Rer Abdilla (Abyssinian subjects).

K. 4 reports that the Mullah intends moving with the Haroun to Bulaleh (100 miles due south of Hargeisa).

Arms Traffic.—Nil.

Political.—Sultan Omar Ibrahim Ogaden (Abyssinian subject) reports that his Ergo left our borders safely.

Further fighting is reported between the Mullah and the Mijjertain. An unofficial letter from the Sultan of the Northern Mijjertain states that he has been attacked by the Mullah.

The musketry course of the Alligheri Observation Post riflemen being completed, they returned to the post on the 7th. The inspection of the Habr Yunis and Habr Toljaala *Kuria* Militia continue and should be completed by the 10th of November.

The political situation has cleared again, from the Mullah's point of view, and he is consistently following out his line; the negotiations with the Mijjertain have apparently fallen through and there has been severe fighting, unfortunately the Mijjertain awaited the return of the Dervish horse before attacking, and the outcome of the fighting will probably be in the Mullah's favour.

He has established the Bagheri at Wal Wal (100 miles south-west of Bohotleh) and probably reinforced them. The report of K.4 is reliable and defines the Mullah's

future movements, provided the Bagheri force at Wal Wal is not driven back by the Ogaden (Abyssinian subjects).

From our point of view the political situation is unchanged, but it would be unwise to overlook the delicate and inflamed condition of the situation, which in a measure is due to the Ogaden raid, and owing to this abnormal condition any movement on our part is felt on the frontier in a more marked manner than usual.

I am certain that if the leaders of the Dervish horse are given the slightest reason to think we are going to take aggressive action, that moment they swoop.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,
First Assistant Political Officer.

Countersigned.

H.E.S. CORDEAUX,
His Majesty's Commissioner.

Copy forwarded to the Resident, Aden,
Berbera;

The 26th October 1906.

Extract from Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the January 5, 1907.

Prot. No.307.

The Italian Consul has returned from the Somali Coast, where his negotiations between the Mullah and the Mijjertain are said to have been this time attended with some success.

Extract from Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the 19th January 1907.

Prot. No. 308.

Intelligence Report No. 6.

Dated Sheikh, the 3rd January 1907 (Confidential).

From—F. SMITHEMAN, Esq., First Assistance
Political Officer,

To—The Political Resident at Aden.

Movements of the Dervishes—The Mullah has

established posts in the Nogal covering his herds reported to be grazing in the vicinity of Garrowei (120 miles east of Bohotleh).

On three occasions the Dervish horse attacked the Northern Mijjertain, but were driven off with loss.

A combined force of Bagheri and Dervish raided the Ogaden (Abyssinian subjects) carrying off stock and following the Ogaden to within two days' march of Mil Mil. The Ogaden fled, although many of them were armed with rifles, and the raiders only lost one man killed.

The presence of a large party of *Miskens* (refugees), some 500 strong, is reported in the Nogal between our tribe and the Mullah.

Nur Jama with some 100 *Kurias* of the Northern Mijjertain moved in our territory; they are well organised, being in possession of three hundred rifles; on all occasions they have shown themselves able to cope with the Mullah's horseman, provided there is no treachery in their rear. At present they are at Hagri (600 miles east of Eildab). The Italian representative is conducting negotiations with them as to their return to Italian territory.

K. 5 reports Wal Wall clear of Bagheri scouts.

K.2 reports Galkayu and Galadi watched both by Mijjertain and Dervish scouts.

Arms Traffic.—Nil.

Political.—One man of the Ibrahim *Ergo* returned with Abdulla Shahari to Burao, reports that the other men that accompanied him preferred to remain in the Mullah's camp.

Abdulla Shahari, the Mullah's representative, came through our tribes from the Mullah with a letter for the Commissioner and the Italian Consul.

The repeated reverses sustained by the Ogaden show that they are without a leader, and unless they develop one shortly the Mullah will have attained his object,

namely, the control of the Ogaden through the Bagheri; it still remains to be seen what step the Abyssinians intend taking.

Extract from Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the 9th February 1907.

Prot. No.309.

I enclose the latest Somaliland Intelligence Report. A Native correspondent informs me that some Somalis of the Essa tribe have recently murdered two Frenchmen who were on a sporting expedition in the Djibouti Hinterland, and that the authorities are preparing to punish them.

The murdered men were Mr. Douglas Cleroy—Director of the Comptoir de Jibuti, and a Naval Officer (Enseigne de Vaisseau) named Perben. They were out shooting gazelle at a place called Daba Libah only about ten miles from Djibouti, and the affair commenced by M. Cleroy being shot by his servant who was an Aysa Somali.

The motive for the crime is not known, but is probably not connected with railway affairs. The French have demanded the surrender of the offenders and refused an offer of blood-money made by the tribe.

Intelligence Report No. 7.

(Confidential.)

Ber,

The 27th January 1907.

Movements of Dervishes.—The post covering the Mullah's herds grazing at Garrowei (120 miles east of Bohotleh) are still in position.

Nur Juma (sic), leader of the Northern Mijjertain, now grazing their herds in our territory at Hudin, reports the presence of Dervish scouts 20 miles east of Hudin.

Political.—A woman, a refugee from the Mullah, reports that on three occasions last month the Mullah's horsemen caught their ponies and asked to be allowed to raid our tribe.

Our tribes are grazing well in advance of the Bohotleh Hildab Line.

Nur Juma, leader of the Northern Mijjertain now in our territory, is on his way to Berbera to see the Commissioner and meet the Italian Consul.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,
First Assistant Political Officer.
Countersigned.

H.E.S. CORDEAUX,
To

The Political Resident, Aden.

Extract from the Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the 2nd March 1907.

Intelligence Report No. 8.

Confidential.

Political Head-Quarters,
Sheikh,

18th February 1907.

Movements of Dervishes.—The posts covering the Mullah's herds grazing at Garrowei (120 miles east of Bohotleh), are still in position.

Nur Jama's men report the presence of Dervish scouts 20 miles east of Hudin (50 miles east of Eildab)

Raiding party No.2 surprised Yusuf Ali, Southern Mijjertain, and carried off large number of livestock, Yusuf Ali (Sultan, Southern Mijjertain) concentrated, followed the raiders and recaptured the stock, the raiders fled, refusing battle.

K. 5 reports:-

At Wal Wal (120 miles south-west of Bohotleh) large number of refugees of various tribes living on game and roots. On his arrival he found them eating a camel looted from the Bagheri (Mullah's Ogaden following); he gathered that the Bagheri were living a hundred miles south of Wal Wal, and located a party of their scouts drinking at a small well near Wal Wal (120 miles south-

west of Bohotleh); he watched the vicinity of the well for two days and discovered track of a camel carrying water to Bagheri outpost. Following the tracks he located the post at Haggri (20 miles east,—north east of Wal Wal) and found it to consist of four riflemen and four spearmen; he held the post under observation for two days and then missed the spearmen. Casting around to their front in the thick bush he picked up the tracks of the four spearmen proceeding in a north-easterly direction; he followed their tracks for 20 miles, when they separated, two going north-west in the direction of Danot (50 miles north, north-west of Wal Wal, the others continuing in the direction of Bohotleh; he followed the tracks going in direction of Bohotleh, but lost them 25 miles to the south-west owing to the stony nature of the ground. He also reports that the reinforcements despatched to the Bagheri by the Mullah returned to the Haroun at Illig.

Some 15 days ago four strangers, well fed, arrived at Bohotleh when he was there and proceeded in the direction of Eildab; when questioned they refused to speak.

K. 2 reports:-

On the 12th January I was hiding at Duddub (20 miles east of Galadi), and saw a party of Dervish horsemen water their ponies and proceed in an easterly direction; later a convoy of six loading camels followed them without watering. I then proceeded in an easterly direction to Bera Weina (40 miles east of Duddub), there I met a Midgan and a refugee Mijjertain and gathered that Yusuf Ali Sultan of Mijjertain, had lately collected all the refugees living in the vicinity and taken them to Obbia; they also said that a large party of Dervish horse passed Bera Weina going east with a great number of livestock looted from the Marehan.

The Mijjertain refugee also said that a party of Dervish horse carried off a quantity of stock belonging to the Southern Mijjertain, but the Mijjertain concentrated

and followed the raiders (party No.2—see Intelligence Report No. 7 of 27th January) recapturing stock after severe fighting.

Galkayu is still closely watched by both Mijjertain, Dervish and Marehan scouts. On my return I passed the *kurias* of the Dolbahanta Rer Hagar and they informed me nine camels had been looted and the tracks went in an easterly direction.

K. 4 reports: -

Another meeting of the Ogaden at which they decided to combine and attack the Bagheri, he gathers also that the Mullah's position is not so strong as it was, as he has decided not to move west (see Intelligence Report No. 4) and also given the Bagheri to understand, that he will give them ammunition, but they must give him men, as the Mijjertain are pressing him.

Arms Traffic.— Nil.

Political.—Nur Jama, leader of the Northern Mijjertain, has proceeded to Aden to interview the Italian Consul.

A man, an Ogaden, Bahawadleh, came into Ber and reports that a portion of the tribe wish to join the Dolbahanta Rer Hagar and live in our territory.

The four mysterious strangers that arrived from Bohotleh from the south-east, and proceeded to Bildab, caused a certain amount of uneasiness in the tribes, as they thought they were spies from the Mullah; I do not agree with this, but think we shall find that they have come from Yusuf Ali, Sultan of the Southern Mijjertain, to confer with Nur Jama, who is at present in our territory, and probably wish him to move down and join the Southern Mijjertain.

G.G. GILLIGAN,

Assistant Political Officer, Sheikh,

For First Assistant Political Officer.

Countersigned.

H.E.S. CORDEAUX,

His Majesty's Commissioner.

To The Political Resident, Aden.

Extract from the Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the 16th March 1907

Prot. 312.

From a native dhow which has just arrived from Bunder Cassim, I hear that the Italians have arrested the Chief of a small Mijjertain tribe who recently burnt a flag of theirs at a place called Kundala (sic), and have taken him to the Mijjertain Sultan to be punished.

Intelligence Report No. 9.

(Confidential)

Political Head-Quarters;

Sheikh,

13th March 1907.

Movements of Dervishes. The Mullah's herds have moved west from Garrowei and in some instances ours and the Dervish Kurriars are only one day's journey apart.

Four Dervish riflemen visited Damot (40 miles south-east of Bohotleh) and met some Miskeens (refugees) there, evidently a party of scouts.

K. 2 reports: -

At Dudub (120 miles east of Galadi) I saw tracks of about 30 footmen, 20 camels, 3 horses and 1 mule. They came from Bagheri (Mullah's Ogaden following) and went east in the direction of the Mullah's camp. He gathered that a party of Southern Mijjertain successfully raided the Mullah's herds, recapturing the stock looted by raiding party No. 3; the Dervishes collected and followed the raiders who gave battle and after severe fighting the Mijjertain brought the stock away.

K. 2 also saw a party of riflemen at Galkayu, and as they were without turbans he concluded that they belonged to Yusuf Ali (Sultan of the Southern Mijjertain).

Arms traffic.—Nil.

Political.—An inter-tribal fight occurred at Bohotleh

between the Dolb Rer Hagar and Alighari; rifles were not used.

A party of Mijjertains looted the Dolb Jama Sayad and carried off 70 camels to Bosaso.

A convoy which went from the Warsangali to the Mullah's camp has returned and both the Warsangali and Dervish appear to be satisfied; the Warsangali propose to despatch another convoy shortly.

A party of men with letters for the Mullah from the Italian Consul left Berbera for the Haroun on 11th March.

K.6 reports: -

I went back on the tracks of the four men that arrived at Bohotleh from the south-east; they came from Mudug and had been living with the Southern Mijjertain. I gather they are merely visiting their tribesmen at Eildab

Nur Jama is still in Aden.

There is a curious lull on the frontier and also a dearth of information from the Mullah's camp; this is probably due to the season, as water is very scarce, and no wild fruits available to enable men to travel; also the Mullah's position is weaker; therefore he cannot allow information to leak out; the situation is interesting and the Mijjertain have another opportunity of seizing the initiative.

From our point of view the prospect for a time has cleared, as the Mullah will be employed with affairs in the vicinity of his camp.

The Bagheri (Mullah's Ogaden following) have evidently responded to the Mullah's call for men.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,

First Assistant Political Officer.

Countersigned.

H.E.S. CORDEAUX.

His Majesty's Commissioner.

To The Political Resident, Aden.

(Confidential)

Translation of a letter by DRAGOMAN MUHAMMAD

YUSUF from SAYYID MUHAMMAD ABDULLAHI and all the Dervishes to the British Government.

After compliments.—I have sent people to you, I believe, were on my side as well as on your side, But I now find that they are likely to make mischief between us. They do as they like and give troubles to me; therefore I will not be responsible for their doing. I do not trust in them. Secondly, I have sent one of my confidants to you and his name is Osman Dervish, and I have ordered him to state what you may ask him, and what you think proper you may believe. If you will not believe this man I now send, I shall in future send another one in his place. Thirdly, regarding Adan Ali Goroh-Dolbahanta Jama Siad. This man came to me last year and made mischief between us (Dervishes and Government) and said to the Dervishes and swore that he would make mischief between the Dolbahanta and the Government, and said he would bring arms that were with the Dolbahanta to the Dervishes. This news I came to know when he left the *Tarika*. I then wrote a letter to the Government giving all this information, but the Government did not mind what I wrote. Fourth, I have to inform you that one Dolbahanta man ran away from you with his rifle and came to us. I took his rifle and kept it with me, and will return it to you when you send a reliable man. Fifth, one man Dobahanta Khayat ran away from us. His object is to kill one of your big men. He tries to create mischief between us. You should try and find this man out and kill him, and the mischief-makers will then have a good lesson from this. I shall always keep you informed of the mischief-makers when I know, as I wish to have your help and friendship. Sixth, I have a complaint against Khaboleh, Osman Nur, Isa Musa, Muhammad Arab and Sheik Muttar and all the Mullahs, as they have no knowledge or sense or a spark of religion, and in fact knew nothing. The reason is these people always trouble me in sending bad words to

me. I am therefore very much against them. This I make known to you and should give him a rifle that will hold 15 rounds of ammunition and a revolver.

If you will do all this for me, you will greatly oblige me.

SAIYID MUHAMMAD ABDULLAHI,
And all the Dervishes.
Intelligence Report No. 10
Confidential.
Political Head-Quarters,
Sheikh,
7th April 1907.

Movements of Dervishes.- The Mullah's herds are still in the vicinity of Garrowei.

A party of Dervish riflemen visited Damot (40 miles south-east of Bohotleh) and met a party of Marehan; they were very friendly, and in the course of conversation said that there had been no desertions from the Mullah's camp.

Arms traffic.—Nil.

Political.—K.S. reports:-

The Italian Consul visited Yusuf Ali at Obbia and said that as the Mullah would not keep the peace, Yusuf Ali had better take steps to defend himself.

Yusuf Ali's (Sultan of Southern Mijjertain) son, Ali Kanadeet, speaking at a meeting of the tribe said that the day had come for them to decide on their future, and he had personally decided to join the Mullah or fight him; the tribe said that they would combine and oppose the Mullah.

K.S. also met at Wal Wal a party of Mijjertain from Yusuf Ali proceeding to the Ogaden to ask them to co-operate in opposing the Mullah.

K. 2 reports:-

At dawn, as I approached the wall at Dudub (120 miles east of Galadi), I noticed kites flying and moving forward

cautiously; I heard voices and discovered 30 horsemen wearing white turbans, evidently Dervishes. They left at 12 A.M., going in the direction of the Bagheri *Kurias*. I then proceeded in the direction of Berra (40 miles east of Dudub). There I saw two Miskeens who said that the Mullah's horsemen were watching the well. At Galkayu I saw a party of footmen cleaning out wells that had been filled in by the Mullah, and I gathered that Yusuf Ali had ordered his *Kurias* to move out in the direction of Galkayu, so that the men could rebuild the fort and garrison it. He also heard that a party of Narehan (sic) and Mijjertain successfully looted the Bagheri.

A universal rumour is current that Nur Nudik, a leader of the Dervish horse, has deserted with a number of men, ponies and rifles, to the Southern Mijjertain.

From a reliable source I hear that the Mullah has arranged to marry Warsangali Sultan's daughter, and she leaves for the Mullah's camp shortly.

E.K. reports that Warsangali and the Dervishes are on very friendly terms and adds that large desertions have taken place from the Mullah.

An inter-tribal fight took place between the Ibrahim and the Dolbahanta at Bohotleh; rifles were used by the Ibrahim, and the Dolbahanta, it is said, lost three men killed with rifles.

A.P.O., Western, visited the Ogaden and co-operating with the Abyssinians settled a number of political border cases; he reported the Ogaden peaceful.

The political situation has improved and K. 4's information is confirmed. The rumour of large desertions from the Mullah lacks confirmation at present, and I consider that efforts will shortly be made by both Mijjertain and Mullah to deal a decided blow. The Southern Mijjertain appear to have developed a leader in Ali Kenadeet, Yusuf Ali's son.

The Mullah is also busy improving his relations with

the Warsangali and their attitude should show us the true condition of affairs in the Mullah's camp.

FRANK SMITHEMAN,
First Assistant Political Officer.
Countersigned.
H.E.S. CORDEAUX,
His Majesty's Commissioner.

Extract from Aden Residency weekly letter, dated the 12th may 1907.

Prot. No.316
Intelligence Report No.11.
Confidential.
Political Head-Quarters,
Sheikh,
29th April 1907.

Movements of Dervishes.- The Mullah's herds are still in the vicinity of Garrowei (120 miles east of Eildab).

The Bohotleh Observation post report the presence of the Dervish scouts at Damot (40 miles south-east of Bohotleh).

The Baghieri scouts (Mullah's Ogaden following) are very active in the vicinity of Wal Wal and Wardair.

The Mullah's ponies are grazing at Kalis (160 miles east of Bohotleh). The Dervish women and children have moved out to the Nogal and are living with the herds.

Arms Traffic.—Nil.

Political.—From a reliable source I gather that the Haroon is now 500 yards square, the Mullah's ponies are concentrated in the rear of his camels and are 1,000 strong; rifles have been issued to his followers some six months ago, and the ammunition is stored in different places to avoid loss by fire. The Dervishes do not appear to fear the Mijjertains, but show a certain amount of anxiety when discussing the attitude of our tribes.

An unconfirmed report says that a party of

Warsangali looted some camels from the Dolb Jama Sayad (our tribes), the Jama Sayad followed the raiders and were joined by some Dervishes; the combined force attacked the Warsangali killing two and recapturing the camels.

K. 5 reports :—Heavy rains to the west of the Ogaden, and south-west of Bohotleh. The Ogaden Bahawadleh are now in the vicinity of Wal Wal; a party of five men left with the intention of looting stock from the Bagheri; they failed and four were killed.

A party of Bagheri left Goladi on 3rd April going in the direction of the Mullah's camp.

The Bagheri scouts have been very active of late, and captured a party of Ogaden, killing four and carrying off one man to their Kurias.

The party of Mijjertains that went west to ask the Ogaden to co-operate with Yusuf Ali have been disarmed and their animal confiscated by an Abyssinian Ras at present on tour near Bulali (140 miles N.W.-E. of Bohotleh).

Rumours of the desertions of Nur Hedik (leader of the Dervish horse) and his following are still current.

The Warsangali and the Mullah are still on very friendly terms and presents are continually passing.

Commander H. Christian, Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division, some time in June 1907, along with another official, Mr. Thompson, visited Laskhorai.

On landing at Laskhorai, he found the Sultan of the Warsangeli tribe accompanied by about 20 to 25 of the Mullah's men led Ibrahim Hassan, who was one of the Mullah's chief men and advisers. They prevented the Sultan conversing with Mr. Thompson on a subject on which Thompson was anxious to gain information, namely, what advantage had been taken by the Mullah of the north-east monsoon for importing arms through the

Wansangeli port of Laskhorai, the Mijjertein having closed their ports to the Mullah's dhows.

The Commander reported that the Mullah last summer married into the Warsangeli tribe on purpose, according to the Commander, "to obtain a trading port, which I have no doubt he has made every use of, as there is no British port on the coast further eastward than Berbera, and therefore nothing to stop him running arms except the two armed dhows belong to the Somaliland Protectorate, which are so well known as to be practically useless.

"Ibrahim Hassan and his men have since our visit left to join the Mullah."*

Following is an Intelligence Report on the movements of the Sayyid Mohamed and his followers No 18, December 1907:

(a) Eastern District—The concentration of large parties of Dervishes near Damot and in the Erego District seems to have been simply with the object of raiding in the Ogaden. The rumour that they intended to loot our tribes was, I think, quite groundless. With looting parties in close proximity to our people scares of this kind are certain to arise.

Another big Dervish raid against the Rer Dalol near Hodayu was recently reported here, but has not been confirmed.

("It should be noted here that when the British officials reported about the attack on their positions by the Dervish forces, they chose to describe these as looting or raiding. These attacks, on the contrary, were to liberate the territory from the British," the author)

The report written by H. du B. O'NEILL, continues:

* Proceedings of the Foreign Department, July 1907, NAI, New Delhi.

“The Dervish communication with Aligheri- The Aligheri are said to be still in communication with the Dervishes near Damot and in the Haud.

The Khayad raid- The Kahayad raiders have now left Bohotleh and returned to the Nogal, their *Karias* are also returning to Eildab, owing to scarcity of water at Bohotleh. Their Headman, Atteye Elmi, has since been to see me at Ber.

He expressed a hope that (after some deductions had been made for the cost of the rifles lost) their subsidy might be continued.

Attitude of Khayad—He promised to bring in at once all his remaining rifles; he admits that they have about 50 cows in their possession. These people have got practically nothing out of their raid and have lost heavily, it is therefore in their best interests to remain on the side of Government.

Detention of Hersi Guleid by the Mullah—There is still no satisfactory information regarding Hersi Guleid, there are rumours that the Mullah has ordered his release, and that he is not kept a close prisoner, but it is a fact that he still remains in the Mullah’s Camp.

Hersi Guleid and his men followed up the looters to Bohul Warabur and it was here that he was captured by the Dervishes, who it is said were actually with the looted camels at the time. But, later, the Acting Commissioner, W. Malcolm Jones, said: “I can find no evidence whatever that the Mullah has in any way identified himself with these outcast raiders, and if Hirsi Guleid as a Government Akil thought that such was the case, his duty was to report to Major O’Neill and not to follow up the raiders as far as Bohul Warabur.”

Later information received by the British authorities from their spies living among the Dervish “*Karias*” was to the effect that the Mullah intended to keep these men, and that they have been offered large rewards to become

Dervishes and to remain with the Mullah, and in this way to attract other of the Jama Siad to do the same.

According to British assessment, Hersi Guleid was a man of influence and his family which was a large one, had a quantity of stock. The British officials thought that if Hersi Guleid was really persuaded to remain with the Mullah, this would seriously affect the attitude of the Jama Siad, and more specially that of the Rer Warsama and Hersi Guleid' own *Jilib* the Rer Farah Der.

The British official, H. du B. O'Neill, wrote:

"I have since seen several "Akils" and Headmen of Dolbahanta and Habr Toljaala from the "Karias" in the extreme East, who have come in to report the situation. They are convinced that the Mullah could have put a stop to the looting which has been going on, and they are of opinion that its continuance shows that the Mullah has become reckless with regard to keeping faith with us, and that he is now listening to other advisers, who tell him that he has nothing to fear from the British Government, and that in the event of raids upon our tribes, no reprisals would ever be made."

"I consider this is altogether an exaggerated view and there is no immediate cause for anxiety", he said.

For a moment, the British thought that the Mullah has shown nothing but a desire to keep peace and it seemed unlikely that he would suddenly change his policy, or, as the British official put it "even risk breaking present friendly relations."

"At the same time the situation is not satisfactory", the British Official reported, adding: "It now remains to be seen whether or not the Mullah still intends to act in good faith. If Hersi Guleid and his men and the looted camels are returned, confidence will be restored, and there will be no reason to fear a breach of peace. If this is not done I think relations will be considerably strained."

Meanwhile Commander H.W. James, Senior Naval

Officer, sent a confidential report from Aden on September 6, 1908, to the Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty's ships and vessels, East Indies. He informed:

"A somewhat serious condition of affairs had arisen in the Protectorate, owing to the attitude of the Warsangli tribe, who are now practically acting under the order of the Mullah, and announced their intention of co-operation with his forces against the British if necessary.

"The Mullah has threatened to attack our Eastern advanced posts, should they not be withdrawn shortly.

"It is rumoured that a large consignment of arms and ammunitions (is) expected on the Warsangli coast before long.

After receiving this alarming report, the Secretary of State for India, sent an urgent message to the Political Resident at Aden stating that: "On the 25th August 1908, the Colonial Office intimated that, "in certain eventualities, ammunition for maxim guns in Somaliland, may be required, and that Commissioner has been instructed to apply to you if advisable. If application is made please render all possible assistance."

On October 5, 1908, the Secretary of State for India told the Viceroy that the situation was still alarming. "Please hold in readiness from Aden to start at once, if required, half a Native Infantry Battalion, and so that Commissioner may arrange for camels to be ready at Berbera; telegraph how many camels carrying 300 lbs. each would be required as transport for the half battalion with one month's rations, tents and 200 rounds reserve ammunition."

Three days later, the Viceroy replied: "Four companies will be held in readiness. The number of camels required will be three hundred and twenty and, in addition for seven days' water-supply, two hundred and ten."

An informant, Ali Saeed, former Interpreter at Aden, sent on March 25, 1908 the following information to the

British Vice-Admiral Sir G.L. Atkinson-Willes:

“Sir,

“I respectfully beg to inform Your Honour that I have received information that the Mullah’s camp is ten miles inland from the shore at Illig; and the place where the naval force landed at the river between the two cliffs has now got two watch houses on the tops of the cliffs, and when your Honour landed the previous naval force at Illig, it taught the Mullah a lesson and he has become afraid that a force would come from Berbera and one from Illig, and compel him to retire far inland away from the “Nogal”; he is afraid of this as all his camels and horses would die. And from the time Your Honour has left the Station, the Mullah has been fighting the Mijertain Sultan up to the present, and great loss has occurred on both sides; this is because he wants to force the Mijertain Sultan to join his army with that of the Mullah, and as he (the Mijertain Sultan) refuses, he (the Mullah) has fought against the Mijertain Sultan from the time your Honour left the station up to the present. On about 20th February there was a battle between the Mullah and Mijertain at a place called “Bil-bil-ah” near Bunder Casim and the Mullah lost about 200 men and the Mijertain lost 50. And now the Mullah cannot get provisions and arms, etc. from the Mijertain so he has made friends with the Warsangli and they trade with the Mullah. The Commissioner has now blockaded all Warsangli ports and no goods or provisions go from any British ports to Warsangli Coast. The reason for this is that they fired from the shore at Lascovia (sic) upon two British dhows, this is the reason for the present blockade. There is no man-of-war but two British armed dhows are blockading the Warsangli Coast. The Sultan of Mijertain hears that the Italian is coming to build a Custom House in his country, and the Mijertain says that if the Italians do like this, that they will join the Mullah. This Mijertain is a very very large tribe, and

nearly all are heavily armed, and this is the reason why the Mullah wants them, so it would be best for the Italian not to go now, but wait until he (the Mijertain Sultan) has done fighting with the Mullah, if not, they will force the Mijertain to join the Mullah through their action. The Mullah gets all his arms and ammunition from Maskat. I respectfully beg to inform your Honour that this is all the information I have been able to collect up to the present.

I beg to remain, etc.

ALI SAEED,

Navy Interpreter

On August 25, 1908, the Colonial Office in London informed the India Office that the Commissioner of Somaliland received a letter from the Mullah threatening the renewal of hostilities in certain eventualities. It reported that the ammunition in the possession of the troops in Somaliland is defective and the Secretary of State has accordingly instructed the Commissioner, if he thinks it advisable, to apply to the authorities at Aden for ammunition for the Maxim guns pending the receipt of fresh supplies, being careful, however, not to give any impression that hostilities are intended.

In a confidential letter dated Aden, September 6, 1908, the Commander H.W. James, Senior Naval Officer, told the Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty's ships and vessels, East Indies, that somewhat serious condition has arisen in the Protectorate, owing to the attitude of the Warsangli tribe, "who are now practically acting under the order of the Mullah, and have announced their intention of co-operating with his forces against the British if necessary." James reported that the Mullah "has threatened to attack our Eastern advance posts, should they not be withdrawn shortly." Alarmed James wrote: "It is rumoured that a large consignment of arms and ammunition is expected on the Warsangali coast before long."

Taking note of these reports, the Secretary of State

for India sent a message to the Viceroy stating: "Apprehensions of an attack by the Mullah are entertained in Somaliland where great unrest prevails. Would it be possible to spare for temporary service in Somaliland, the Aden troop and a force of native troops in the event of such (an) attack? If so, can they (be) held in readiness to be despatched for defence of coast ports and short line of communications, if asked for by Commissioner of Somaliland?"

C. P Lucas of the Colonial Office wrote to India Office in September, 1908 "I am directed by the Earl of Crewe to state, with reference to your note of 2nd of September, that the Commissioner of Somaliland has reported that he has received 20,000 rounds of ammunition from the Resident at Aden.

"The Crown Agents for the Colonies have been instructed to send 20,000 rounds of Mark VI ammunition to the Resident at Aden in replacement of that sent to Somaliland"

The Crown Agents for the Colonies sent the following letter on September 12, 1908 to the India Office:

"I have the honour to state that we are shipping 358 boxes of safety cartridges, 24 of which are for the Resident, Aden, on behalf of the Government of Somaliland by the S.S. *Matiana* leaving London today, and to ask you to be good enough to arrange for the necessary permit to allow the goods to be landed(at) Aden and for transshipment of 334 boxes to Berbera, as our shipping agents inform us that they understand there are some restrictions under the Indian Ammunition Act respecting the landing of cartridges at Aden.

(Signed) P. EZEKIEL, for Crown Agents."

As they were unable to cope with this formidable man, the British were looking for any weakness of Sayyid to take advantage of. The Captain and Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division, A.T. Hunt, reported on October 10, 1908 "I

have the honour to report that His Majesty's Commissioner returned to Berbera on 5th October from Burao; everything is quiet at present, probably owing to Ramadan.

"The Mullah is said to be getting short of stock and to have made friends with the Mijertein, and the Commissioner think it likely that he may make a raid in force. Should this occur, the Government are prepared to send reinforcements to enable the line Sheikh to Burao to be held and a battalion of King's African Rifles at Nairobi and the Aden Troop are ready to proceed to Berbera, pack animals are being collected in readiness.

"Some action must be taken to punish the Warsangli for the late raid, but the home Government are loath to commit themselves to any action. This inaction will probably lead to further trouble, even if the Mullah does not move.

"The wounded officer has returned home and all the protectorate officers now on leave have been recalled. Wireless communication is maintained with Aden, but atmospheric interfere for many hours a day."

Meanwhile, the Commissioner in Somaliland, informed that he received on October 20, 1908, "a rather alarming telegram from Harrar, where the Europeans are in fear of Abyssinian disturbances."

In a letter to his superiors, Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division, reported: "It appears that the King of Abyssinia is seriously ill, and it is almost certain that, should he die there will be civil war in the country. Already there are signs of it, and in the Harrar district there is much ill-feeling against Europeans, many of the Abyssinians openly siding with, and supporting the Mullah." He further informed that "the Ogaden tribe, to the south of British Somaliland, is reported to have been badly raided by the Mullah's men, assisted, it is believed, by the Abyssinians. Many of the Ogadens were killed, and

quantities of live-stock looted; and numbers of the Somalis have fled across the border into British territory.”

“A Native arriving on the 16th instant at Berbera, reported the Mullah’s force to be camped at a place called Jedbali, his *harem* being left near Illig.

“No important developments are expected to take place until after Ramadan, but our scouts have been in touch with the Mullah’s in British territory.

“With reference to your telegram No. 15, the Commissioner proposes to impose a heavy fine on the Warsangli and give the Sultan a month in which to pay. In the meantime all his ports would be closed except Lashkherai (sic) where every dhow would be searched.

“On testing the 3-powder ammunition belonging to the protectorate dhows, I found none of it serviceable, so have lent some for present purpose.”

The British authorities were gathering information about the prevailing conditions for possible pointer for future developments. R. C. Corfield, Assistant Political Officer, Eastern District, in his Intelligence Report dated Ber, August 31, 1908, stated:

“Warsangli.—On the 21st of last month a band of Budaad, 30 strong, composed of Warsangli, attacked a Rer Hagr *zariba*, 3 miles from Wadamago, killing 1 man, wounding three, and driven off 80 camels. This stock was driven to Higloli and thence to Jahelli.

After being rested there for three days it was taken to the Warsangli “*Karias*” at Haisamo.

On the 30th another band of Warsangli looted a small herd of cattle from the Barkat “*karias*” at Eildab. These were first driven off nearly due south apparently to avoid Nur Jama and the Mijjertein and then up to Haisamo.

The Warsangli “*karias*” are reported to have moved to Gorei and to be anxious to move to Hudin, where grazing is reported good.

About the 25th a part of Dolbahanta Nur Ahmed

under Yusuf Godhed made a raid on the Warsangli at Haisamo but only succeeded in driving off some 400 sheep with the loss of one man killed.

The following Mullah's headmen are reported in the Warsangli "karias" at Haisamo:—Asker Doreh, Mijjertein, and Abaim Mahomed Suggulleh, Dolbahanta Ba Ararsama.

Eighty Ba Mijjertein horsemen are reported to have arrived from Al and to be now near Haisamo. One Gras rifle has been recovered from two Warsangli "karias" living in Baladis (Burdah hills, north of Eildab) with Nur Ahmed.

These are part of some Warsangli Magans of the Jama Siad, who have been living with them for some four years. When the Warsangli started raiding the Dolbahanta and Isaak tribes, two "karias" went back to the Warsangli country and two remained with our tribes.

Mijjertein Esa Rirole.—I visited Nur Jama, the Esa Rirole, at Agoed near Badwein last month; on my return to Wadamago, the Esa Rirole moved to Goisaweina. At the beginning of September, fearing the Government meant to disarm him, Nur Jama again moved North-East to Bun-Ad. This he has done in spite of assurances that he would move back to Jidbali

In answer to a letter inviting him to Wadamago, he has made no direct reply but said he feared the Government wishes to deprive him of his rifles.

It is reported that the caravan of 45 rifles expected from Bosaso has been looted by Dervishes in the Warsangli country and everything including the escort of 10 men taken to the *Haroun*.

Dervishes.—Hersi Liban left Wadamago with His Majesty's Commissioner's reply to the Mullah's last letter on Monday, August 31st, and went to the Warsangli at Haisamo.

A Barkat "ergo" hoping to recover the cattle looted

from them at Eildab went with him. The “ergo” has not yet returned.

Hersi Liban expected to arrive in the Haroun on September 14th.

There are no Dervishes reported at present nearer than Las Bohul.

Aden Yusuf Dolbahanta Ba Idris, who arrived in the Jama Siad “Karias” last month, is still near Kalin Der.

A Jama Siad tribesman deserted from the Mullah and arrived in Nur Jama’s “Karias” at the end of August.

He brought 12 camels which he had stolen. He reported that Sherri Ali Dolbahanta Jama Siad, Ali Douwa, Dolbahanta Be Idris, and other Mahomed Gerad tribesman who have lately gone to the Haroun, are now under arrest and that the Mullah is displeased with the Mahomed Gerad for not openly espousing his cause and obeying his orders in the same way as the Warsangli have done.

Ghaoli (Budaat).—Since the Warsangli have declared themselves Mullah’s people, the “ghaoli” have become practically identical with the former. Both having for their object the raiding of friendly protected tribes and acting under the orders of the Mullah.

“Ergo” from Warsama Islam confirms news of Dervish defeats at hands of Yusuf Ali—1,000 rifles said to have been taken.

R.C. CORFIELD,

Assistant Political Officer, Eastern District.

The Assistant Political Officer in charge of the Central District, F.W. Bell, reported:

“Dervishes and Bagheri.—The Bagheri are now living a few hours to the south of Gerlogubi. It is reported that caravans are constantly passing between them and the Mullah.

Ba Hawadleh.—The Ba Hawadleh owing to the hostile attitude of the Bagheri are now in the vicinity of Sesasbani

and Bulali; their "*illaloes*" (spies) on the 27th were at Gerlogubi watching the movements of the Bagheri.

Rer Abdilleh Miskeens.—At Gerlogubi there are a number of Rer Abdilleh "*miskeens*" living in hiding in the Hills and Bush. They report one of them killed and one woman looted by the Bagheri.

Midgans and Gumadleh. A party of 26 made up of Midgans and Gumadleh recently left Wardair on a looting expedition presumably to try and pick up any isolated stock belonging to the Bagheri.

Abyssinian. A party of Abyssinians are now collecting the annual tax from the Ba Hawadleh.

F.W. BELL,

Assistant Political Officer, Central District.

ODWEINA.

Major General R. I. Scallon, Secretary to the Government of India informed the Chief of the Staff that the Government of India had sanctioned immediate despatch of the 127th Balouch Light Infantry from Poona to Somaliland.

He said that "full Field Service concessions will be allowed from date of embarkation. Two months' rations should accompany the troops, who should proceed at full field service strength and on field service scale of baggage and equipment, less officers' charges, 200,000 rounds of 303 ammunition and metal *pakhals* for water, which will be provided locally.

Scallon said that all charges in connection with this measure will be borne by the Colonial Office. He told the Chief of Staff: "I am to request that full information may be furnished to the Government of India at the earliest possible date regarding the embarkation of the troops; all particulars as to the strength of officers, fighting men, and followers, and the exact amount and weight of ammunition, kit, and stores for which arrangements will be required in Somaliland, will have to be communicated

to the Commissioner by telegram and should be reported to the Government of India without delay.”

On his part, the Secretary of State sent a telegram on November 16, 1909 to the Viceroy (Army Department) in which he said that one battalion Indian Infantry is required for Somaliland to replace certain detachments of the King's African Rifles and effect withdrawal to coast for purposes of limiting administration of country to occupation of few important coast towns. The troops will be under an Indian Officer and the post of Civil Commissioner will cease to exist.

The Secretary of State told the Viceroy : “As the whole Civil and Military Administration will devolve on the Officer Commanding, a very senior and experienced officer is required, and General De Brath, Commanding at Aden, appears suitable for the post. If you agree, please order General De-Brath to proceed to Somaliland at once to make himself acquainted with local conditions and discuss matter with the Commissioner before the latter's departure, and inform me by wire that you have done so. General De-Brath will receive pay equivalent to his total emoluments at Aden. The battalion should consist of first class fighting material. Punjabi Mohamedans are considered specially suitable to the country.

“Full Field Service concessions will be allowed from date of embarkation. Two months' rations should accompany troops who should go at full Field Service strength on Field Service scale of baggage and equipment less officers' charges and two hundred thousand rounds 303 ammunition which will be provided locally. Surplus baggage can be stored at Berbera.

“Full equipment for machine gun mules should be taken but the mules will be supplied locally. All other transport which will consist of camels with equipment and attendants and all necessary water tanks will be provided locally, and to permit this being arranged, please

inform Commissioner, Somaliland, by telegraph, of embarkation, of strength of officers, fighting men and followers, and also exact amount and weight of stores, kit, ammunition required by battalion for service in interior under headings Officers' kit, men's kit, forage, rations, ammunition separately.

In the end he said : "The Colonial Office will bear all charges. The Battalion should start as soon as possible."

Instructions were issued to Major-General E. De-Brath, Commanding Aden Brigade, to proceed at once to Somaliland to make himself acquainted with the local conditions there and discuss matters with His Majesty's Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, with a view to his employment temporarily by the Colonial Office.

Despite all the military power they had at their disposal to fight against the forces of liberation of the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan, the British authorities kept panicking whenever there was news of the movements of the Dervishes.

On January 18, 1910, the Secretary of State, told the Viceroy that he should hold in readiness for embarkation to Somaliland 300 camel transport attendants without camels, to be despatched on receipt of direct request from the Commissioner of Somaliland and without further reference to the Secretary of State. The Secretary ordered that two months' rations should accompany them and Field Service Concessions to be given from date of embarkation. He told the Viceroy that "as a measure of precaution you should be prepared to despatch to Somaliland two squadrons Indian Cavalry, preferably Punjabi Mohamedians."

Meanwhile, the Chief of the Staff, said in a telegram on January 19, 1910, to the General Officer Commanding, 6th (Poona) Division and others, that the Head-Quarters and the two Mussalman squadrons of the 34th Poona Horse will be held in readiness for despatch to Somali-

land. If they are ordered to proceed they will go on Field Service scales of establishment, baggage and equipment, with tents, mobilised as for a minor expedition, but without camels, which will be supplied locally.

The Chief of Staff ordered: Seven hundred rounds of ammunition per rifle will be taken. Winter scale of clothing, if despatched, two weeks' sea rations and two months' full Field Service rations including grain and fodder will be taken, and they will receive Field Service Concession from the date of embarkation. The following baggage in addition to Field Service scale can be taken to Berbera; British Officers 1 1/2 maunds, Native Officers 1/2 maund, other ranks 20 lbs., followers 10 lbs.*

H. A. Byatt, the British Acting Commissioner at Berbera informed the Political Agent, Aden, on December 10, 1910, that : "certain reports have been received by me during the last few days, to the effect that the Mullah is collecting a large force, his intention being to make an attack on the town of Berbera; these reports have, I believe, also reached Aden." The Acting Commissioner reasoned: "This renewed activity on the part of the Mullah is not unexpected and in fact an advance against our tribes has been counted on for several months past. I do not, however, believe that the Mullah is at present sufficiently strong to make any very important movement, or that he will be able to obtain a sufficient accession of strength to render his threatened attack on the coast possible.

However, the Commissioner cautioned that : "At the same time it must be clearly recognised that the progress of events may not turn out as expected, and I would therefore like to be given a guarantee that it will be possible, should the occasion suddenly arise during the next three months, to obtain from Aden, subject to the consent of His Majesty's Secretary of State for the

* Foreign Department, February 1910, NAI, New Delhi.

Colonies and of the Government of India, temporary reinforcements which would be sufficient to render secure the coast towns of Berbera and Bulhar.”

On December 10, 1910, the General Officer Commanding, Aden Brigade, told the Chief of Staff that he has informed the Commissioner of Somaliland that he can send him 400 troops, two fifteen-pounders, and six maxims, within 18 hours of his asking for assistance. However, the Secretary of State for India in London, in a telegram dated May 10, 1911, informed the Viceroy that, “while in the event of emergency such assistance as might be possible at the moment would be rendered by India no guarantee can be given that for the purpose troops will always be available; and that for the safety of Berbera or Bulhar no responsibility can be accepted. Byatt, reported from Berbera on November 4, 1910, that there has been, a strong revival of, what he called, “the illicit arms trade” between the Arabian littoral and the coast of the Protectorate. He said that an earlier seizure of a dhow had a temporary effect in discouraging this traffic, but the example in that instance does not appear to have been sufficient to stop illegal imports for a very long period.

With all the control the British authorities tried to impose over the movements of (arms) the Somalis managed to import arms from abroad. Two or three cases of arms were landed on the coast, but Commissioner Byatt said that “the information about it was received too late to enable any effective interference to be made”

In September the Acting Commissioner had received news from “certain sources” that men of the Habr Yunis tribe intended to procure arms from Arabia. Their movements were closely followed both in Berbera and Aden, and he was informed that arms had been obtained and were to be run on a certain date in either one or three dhows, and to be landed within 60 miles to the west of Berbera at a spot not known. The Commissioner sent out

the Protectorate's armed dhows to patrol, but did not intercept the Somalis, who successfully landed their cargoes during the night.

Byatt reported: "I believe, in fact, that the smuggling of arms to the west of Berbera may now cease, but to the east the problem is more difficult. Now that the north-east monsoon has set in, Warsangli and other dhows have resumed trading, and a large number of vessels are avoiding Aden and Berbera and are sailing direct to Mokalla, where they have no difficulty in procuring fire-arms. The Warsangli have recently, to my knowledge, obtained from this source and forwarded to the Mullah either five or ten boxes of Gras ammunition, and there is nothing to prevent their obtaining more, since we now have no administrative post east of Berbera, and it has been proved that the Protectorate armed dhows are unable to exercise any effective control over native craft.

"In my opinion it is much regretted that the calls upon the services of His Majesty's navy elsewhere have resulted in the withdrawal of the cruiser formerly stationed at Aden for the purpose of patrolling the Arabian and Somali coasts. With the exception of formal visit paid by the naval commander-in-chief in the autumn of last year, no war-ship has visited this coast during the past two years, unless when specially detailed for special service, such as the definite blockade of the Makhir coast or the maintenance of wireless communication. Natives are not slow to remark upon this state of affairs, and it is common talk among them that the continued absence of a cruiser renders gun-running a matter of small risk."

"At the present moment, with the Mullah in a state of undoubted weakness, it is, I think, specially necessary to prevent his obtaining further supplies of arms and ammunition, and I would strongly recommend that the Admiralty may be approached with a request that, as soon as practicable, a cruiser may again be stationed at Aden,

whence she could pay special attention to native craft visiting the many small ports on the Arabian coast which are notorious centres of the arms trade.”*

The Secretary of State for the Colony forwarded to the Viceroy (Army Department) a telegram dated February 27, 1912 received from the Commissioner of Somaliland. The Commissioner informed him that after a period of quietness three letters had arrived from Mullah that were “truculent in tone”. He wrote . that “there is evidence of Dervishes being in vicinity of Berbera last night” and asked that troops be brought from Aden. The Commissioner considered the information in the telegram “vague, but alarming” and had telegraphed for more details. He proposed to return to Berbera at once. He informed that he was arranging with General Officer Commanding Aden to have troops ready to despatch at once if he telegraphed necessity. He further added that he would divert His Majesty’s ship “*Dido*” and would further inform the Secretary of State by telegraph.

The Viceroy informed the Secretary of State on (Telegram, No.48), March 2, 1912:

“Your telegram of 1st March regarding Berbera. Political Resident, Aden, reported on 29th February that he had despatched 320 men of 18th Infantry from Aden to Berbera in accordance with the request of the Commissioner of the latter place.”

While some people were busy with the war situation, Secretary Harcourt of the Colonial Office was agitated because an exhibition had opened in London at which some 50 or 60 Somali men, women, and children were on view. The irritated Secretary wrote to Byatt: “It appears from informal enquiries that these Somalis are drawn mainly, if not entirely, from British Somaliland, but that their engagement for exhibition purpose was actually

* Acting Commissioner Byatt to the Earl of Crewe—Berbera November 4, 1910, NAI, New Delhi.

effected in Aden." Harcourt expressed "grave" objection to the employment of native races for purposes of this kind. He said: "I should be glad if you would take such steps as lie in your power both to prevent any recruiting for such purposes actually taking place in the territory under your administration and to deter natives from leaving British Somaliland with a view to entering into engagements of the kind elsewhere."

The Somalis may be divided into two classes, viz., those who are natives of Aden and those who are not. With regard to the first class, such emigrants come under the provisions of Section 75 of the Indian Emigration Act, 1908. They should not be permitted to depart for exhibition purpose from Aden, which is not a port from which emigration is lawful.

With regard to those Somalis who are not natives of Aden and who do not therefore come under the purview of the Emigration Act, the Government of India considers that the Resident will be in a position to discourage their emigration in various ways.

Responding to Harcourt's objection, Byatt proposed issuing a circular informing the shipping agents in Aden that Government have prohibited the engagement of Somalis for purpose for this kind and no passages to Europe should be issued to them without written permission from the Resident's office.

The Political Resident found no difficulty in securing compliance with the circular as the Shipping Agents generally insisted on natives leaving Aden having some sort of passports. But, Byatt thought that if he refused Somalis permission to go to Europe, they could go to Jibouti (French) and Massowah (Italian) and take passage from these ports. Similar case occurred when Sir James Bell at the request of His Majesty's Commissioner in Somaliland refused certain Somalis permission to go to Europe for exhibition.

On August 23, 1912, Wilfred Thesiger, the Head of the British Legation in Addis Ababa, forwarded to Sir Edward Grey at the British Office in London a summary of an interview the British Official in Harrar, Dodds, had with the Abyssinian Principal Chief of Harrar. In the aforesaid interview the the Abyssinian chief reminded Dods his earlier warning that (the) "increasing influence of the Mullah among the Ogaden tribes promised to be a serious danger in the near future both to our tribes and to the Abyssinian Government."

During his interview with Dejaz Teffari, Fitawarari Gabri, Abdallah Dahir and Fitwarari Abba Shawil, Dodds remarked "By the courtesy of the Dejazmatch we are met here to-day to discuss a matter which, in my opinion, cannot be too seriously considered. I refer to the situation in the Ogaden." The affairs in this part of Abyssinian territory "have undergone a change during the last eight years which does not augur well for future peace and prosperity of the Harrar district." "The situation is most serious," he said and added: "various factors have brought about this change, chief among these is the arming of the Ogaden tribes."

The British official expressed his worries about the arms in the hands of the Somalis who were fighting with Sayyid Mahamed. He said: "Eight years ago the Ogaden were without arms and ammunition. To-day it would be impossible to give an estimate of the more or less modern weapons in possession of the Ogaden peoples; I cannot but blame your laxity in the supervision of the arms traffic. Arms and ammunition have gone out of this town in great numbers."

"Your soldiers have sold their arms," Dodds told Dejaz Teffari and his colleagues with whom he was meeting. "You have been blind to the consequences with which you are now faced. Your leaders in the Ogaden admit their difficulty and in some cases their inability to collect the

taxes due by the people, some have asked for reinforcement to their garrison; eight years ago you had no such difficulty; the taxes were collected by a few soldiers, and these came in with regularity.”

Dodds warned the Abyssinians: “The effects of the illicit arms traffic are most dangerous; you do not appear to have realised that these arms which have passed through your town and out of the hands of your soldiers, would one day be used against your interests.”

At the beginning of the meeting, Dodds only beat about the bush, but then soon came to the real point that was Britain’s own worry. He said: “As you say, you are having difficulty in getting your taxes collected. That is serious. But there is a matter which is more serious; and now I will speak of the Mullah Abdullah Hassan and his connection with your people and your country. Within the last four years the attitude of the Ogaden tribes towards the Mullah has entirely changed.

“Four years ago it was dangerous for a Mullah’s man to enter the Ogaden country. Nowadays the Mullah’s adherent have safe access through that country.

“This change has been brought about by the diplomacy of the Mullah’s uncle, Amir Argoleh. Abdullah Hassan sent Amir to live with the Ba Gheri three years ago.

“The object of this move was obvious. You, Fitawarari Gabri, and you, Fitawarari Abba Sahawill, who have such intimate knowledge of the Ogaden, know well why Amir Argoleh was sent. He was sent to enlist the tribes of the Ogaden in the cause of Abdullah Hassan.”

“With the Ba Gheri he had no difficulty, with the Ba Hawadleh the rer Amaden, rer Ali, rer Haroun, he had more trouble. But with fair words and presents of cattle he had persuaded these tribes of the advantages they will gain by throwing in their lot with the Mullah. Amir Argoleh has done his work well. Although these tribes have not actually taken any oath of allegiance to Abdullah

Hassan, they are shown by their actions to be in full sympathy with his cause.

“They have supplied him with his requirements. He was in need of arms and ammunition. He sent Amir, who had no difficulty in obtaining a good supply from the rer Amaden. This is true, I can tell you the prices that were paid. Amir gave five cows for one rifle, and one cow for twenty rounds of ammunition. The rer Amaden got the arms and ammunition through Harrar. If the rer Amaden are in a position to sell arms, they must have a very large supply.”

The British official continued: “Now let us consider the attitude of the Mullah himself. At the beginning of this year he sent you a deputation to talk with you; they brought a present of cows. He also wrote you a letter.

“It is well to examine closely the motives of the Mullah in doing these things. His attention has been directed to the Ogaden country for a considerable time. He is tired of the country in which he is at present living because it is difficult there for him to get his supplies. The strategical position moreover is not advantageous, his attention is directed to a better country from every point of view. That country is the Ogaden. I will leave you to imagine the great advantage he would gain by moving his Haroun to Milmil for instance.

“The advantages are obvious, and he must realise them; and therefore the contingency must be met, not later on but now. With this object in view he sent Amir to the Ogaden, the first step has been won, he has gained the sympathy of the tribes. For the same reason he sent you his deputation with a present. You refused his present and sent back his deputation; incidentally I may mention that the deputation did not return empty-handed. They took with them a certain amount of ammunition. You caught one man red-handed.

“Now the Mullah must know that he cannot expect to

come to terms with your Government any more than he can expect to come to terms with my Government; the Mullah has always been the enemy of our Governments, and always will be.

“That being the case, we must consider his words which he has spoken on more than one occasion. It is well to consider all things that bear on such a matter. The Mullah has said that he will not be satisfied until he comes to Harrar. He has sworn to come to Harrar—with all his forces!

Dodds told his Abyssinians interlocutors: “Now this seems absurd and impossible, but nothing on this earth is impossible; thirty years ago the world laughed at the idea of flying in the air; to-day many people fly long distance.

“The Mullah has also sworn to go to Berbera; although this also seems absurd, we have arranged for such a contingency. You, too, must study the contingency,” Dodds told the Abyssinians adding: “At the present moment I think we may safely assume that the Mullah cannot come to Harrar. But in the future we must look. Do you think that when the Mullah has settled at Milmil, and when the Ogaden people have openly avowed their allegiance to him, that the possibility of such a move would be greatly facilitated? I think so, and that is the reason I speak of the matter now; there is time now to talk; there is never so much time to talk when things are happening.

“The Ogaden country is Abyssinia territory, and what goes on there is not my affairs. But the affairs of Abdullah Hassan are another matter, and are my affairs. It (is) my duty to tell you what I know about him and his motives. For this reason I have told you of these things of which I know.

“From what I have said it is obvious that the situation is most serious, and requires your careful and immediate attention” He advised the Abyssinians to take the

following steps:

“1. Turn Amir Argoleh out of your country at once or imprison him.

“2. Stop the traffic of arms and ammunition absolutely.

“3. Reinforce your garrison in the Ogaden country without loss of time, and so bring the Ogaden people again under your command. Remember the arms your Ogaden tribes have got are useless without ammunition. Their supply of ammunition must soon be exhausted.

Dodds concluded by saying:“If you do these things you will save much money and much trouble,”

The Head of the British Legation in Addis Ababa, Wilfred Thesiger, while forwarding Dodds’ report to the Foreign Office in London said that from Dodds’ memorandum it would be seen that the Abyssinian chiefs in the Ogaden were already experiencing difficulties in dealing with their tribes and were asking, apparently with very little success, for the increase of their garrisons. This showed that at Harrar the question is not being faced in a serious manner, and at the capital it was ignored altogether by the Central Government.*

CORFIELD KILLED

Back again to the war situation. On August 9, 1913, the Dervishes of the Sayyid Mahamed dealt the heaviest blow to the British forces. They attacked the British colonial forces—Camel Corps—chanting “*Allahu Akbar*”. They came on in waves. They went just forward despite the fierce fire of the enemy. What they saw was just the right cause for which they were waging the war against the colonial power. For them this was a Holy War, a

* Foreign Department, Letter No.72, dated Addis Ababa August 23, 1912, NAI, New Delhi.

Jihad, for the liberation of the motherland from evil forces.

The severe defeat the Somaliland Protectorate Camel Corps suffered at the hands of the Mullah's men forced the colonial authorities into sending a flurry of messages for immediate reinforcement. Following telegram—P. No. 916 has been sent:

From—The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Dated the 12th August 1913.

Resident at Aden telegraphed on August 11th as follows: "Acting Commissioner of Berbera sends message to (the) effect that he is proceeding to Burao to endeavour to relieve Camel Corps which has been mutilated. Officers Corfield killed, Dunn wounded. Whatever garrison there is in Berbera has left for Burao and two Double Companies of 18th Infantry are today embarking in hired steamer from Aden for Berbera. Had men of war *Dalhousie* been present valuable help might have been rendered."

Addressed to Political Department, Bombay and repeated to Secretary of State for India. We await further particulars.*

On August 11, 1913 troops were sent from Aden to Berbera for which the Government of India—Army Department—conveyed to the Resident at Aden the thanks of Mr. Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies for the prompt action in the despatch of the troops.**

* Foreign Department, 1913, NAI, New Delhi.

** Letter from B. Holloway, Depy. Secy to the Govt. of India, dated Simla the 11th November 1913-NAI, New Delhi.

Ray Beachey in his book *The Warrior Mullah** wrote: “A few excitable spirits among the Camel Corps, unable to stand the strain, darted forward in the interval between the waves of attack, and had to be rescued and brought back. Suddenly, caught unawares by a sharp change of Dervish tactics and weakened by the flight of the Dolbahanta, the Camel Corps were enveloped on their right flank. The result was disarray and panic. Some 25 of the Camel Corps fled, later to be dismissed with ignominy from the service. More serious, the Maxim gun, on which so much depended, was manhandled (sic) and scarcely brought into position before it was silenced by Dervish fire”. Richard Corfield, the Commander of the British force, “struggled manfully to unsnarl the feed block, and while doing so was shot through the head and killed.”

Professor Ray Beachey has described the ghastly scene in the British camp thus: “in the *zariba* the dead were more in number than the living. “Among the survivors were Mr. Dunn, looking almost comically surprised and he had come through it all, Captain Summers, in sore need of medical care, and some 40 fighting men, scarcely any of whom went unscathed, and were slightly or seriously wounded. Of seven personal servants—‘followers’—only one was living: Corfield’s two attendants (including the loyal Dualeh who had followed his master from Somaliland to Nigeria and back) lay dead at his side. Out of 110 Constabulary who had so blithely left Burao the evening before, 10 had fallen out on the road, 35 had been killed in action, 17 were seriously wounded and 24 had deserted.”**

When the news of the death of Corfield was reported to him, Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan composed the

* Ray Beachey, *The Warrior Mullah The Horn Africane*, Bellow Publishing, London 1990.

** Ray Beachey, op. cit., p. 412.

following poem:*

1. Adaa jiiṭay aan, Koofiyow (Corfield)	dunida joogayn e
2. Adigaa jidkii Lagugu wacay	jimic la'aaneed e
3. Jahannamo La geeyo, haddaad	Aakhiro u jahato
4. Nimankii Janno u kacay war bay	jerin inshaalleeye
5. Jameecooyinkii iyo haddaad	jawhartii aragto
6. Sida Eebbahay Kuu jirraabay	mari jawaabteeda
7. Daraawiish jigraar naga ma deyn	tan iyo jeerkii dheh
8. Ingiriis jab iyo waxaa ku dhacay	jac iyo baaruud e
9. Waxay noo jajauunteen na waa	jibasho diineed dheh
10. Jigta weerar bay goor barqo ah	nagu jiteeyeen dheh
11. Aniga jikray ila heleen	shalay jahaadkii dheh
12. Jeeniga hortii ay rasaas	igaga joojeen dheh
13. Jiraayad ay ila dheceen	jiricafkoodii dheh
14. Siday Kuugu jeexeen magliga	jararacdi sheego
15. Billawuhu siduu kuu jarjaray	jeerarka u muuji
16. Naf jaclaysigeed baan u iri	jaalow igag daa dheh
17. Jaljalleecadii baa wadnaha	jeeb ka soo ruqay dheh
18. Jeedaaladii baa indhuu	kor u jillaadmeen dheh
19. Jimic ka ma helin tuigmadaan	jeriyay ruuxii dheh
20. Kolkaan juuq iraaqdo ba afkay	iga jifeeyeen dheh
21. Wax badan baan jalleecce dhegaan	jalaq la ii siinin
22. Goortaan jarreero na gafoo	nolal ka jaan qaaday
23. Sida janannadii hore tashigu	igu jaguugnaa dheh
24. Taladii jinnigu ii hor maray	jaasadeed helay dheh
25. Jiidaha xanuunka leh markii	la igu jeeraarshay
26. Jibaadka iga soo baxay dadkii	jiifka qaban waa dheh
27. Kolkay rubaddu jow tiri or bay	iga jiibsheen dheh
28. Jirkaygii na bahal baa cunoo	jiiṭay hilibkii dheh
29. Jurmid iyo baruurtii dhurwaa	jugux ka siiyaa dheh
30. Jiiljiilad iyo seedahay tukuu	igaga jaadeen dheh
31. Haddaan la-is jikaarayn tolkay	laga jiilroonaa dheh
32. Weligood waxaa lagu jaraa	jilib dhig duulaan dheh
33. Daraawiishi waa jibin dhowga iyo	jowga soo bixi dheh

The English translation:

1. You have died (gone), Corfield, and are no longer in this world.
2. A merciless journey was your portion.
3. When, Hell-destined, you set out for the Other World

* From B.W. Andrazejewski and I.M. Lewis, SOMALI POETRY, Oxford, 1964.

4. Those who have gone to Heaven will question you, if God is willing;
5. When you see the companions of the faithful and the jewels of Heaven,
6. Answer them how God tried you.
7. Say to them: 'From that day to this the Dervishes never ceased their assaults upon us.
8. The British were broken, the noise of battle engulfed us;
9. With fervour and faith the Dervishes attacked us.'
10. Say: 'They attacked us at mid-morning.'
11. Say: 'Yesterday in the holy war a bullet from one of their old rifles struck me.
12. And the bullet struck me in the arm.'
13. Say: 'In fury they fell upon us.'
14. Report how savagely their swords tore you,
15. Show these past generations in how many places the daggers were plunged.
16. Say: "'Friend," I called, "have compassion and spare me!"'
17. Say: 'As I looked fearfully from side to side my heart was plucked from its sheath.'
18. Say: 'My eyes stiffened as I watched with horror;
19. The mercy I implored was not granted.'
20. Say: 'Striking with spear-butts at my mouth they silenced my soft words;
21. My ears, straining for deliverance, found nothing;
22. The risk I took, the mistakes I made, cost, my life.'
23. Say: 'like the war leaders of old, I cherished great plans for victory.'
24. Say: 'The schemes the *djinn*s planted in me brought my ruin.'
25. Say: 'When pain racked me everywhere,
26. Men lay sleepless at my shrieks.'
27. Say: 'Great shouts acclaimed the departing of my soul.'

28. Say: 'Beasts of prey have eaten my flesh and torn it apart for meat.'
29. Say: 'The sound of swallowing the flesh and the fat comes from the hyena.'
30. Say: 'The crows plucked out my veins and tendons.'
31. Say: 'If stubborn denials are to be abandoned, then my clansmen were defeated.'
32. In the last stand of resistance there is always great slaughter.
33. Say: 'The Dervishes are like the advancing thunderbolts of a storm, rumbling and roaring.'

Richard C. Corfield, Assistant Political Officer, Eastern District, commanded the Camel Corps in its role as a constabulary force and had served in Baden Powell's Scouts in South Africa. He had experience as a political officer in Somaliland and in Nigeria. It was for the second time that he had been sent to Somaliland.

On August 11, 1913, the Secretary of State for India, instructed the British Resident at Aden to act urgently on request for three hundred troops to reinforce Berbera made by the Somaliland Government.

"This action has been taken" he informed "on the urgent request of the Colonial Officer in consequence of the report of heavy loss of the camel company in attack by Dervishes between Berbera and Odwein. The Indian contingent at Berbera has been ordered to proceed to the assistance of the remnant of the camel company."

A day later, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, sent a telegram* to the Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department, in which he said:

"At urgent request of Admiralty I have been compelled to order H.M.S. "*Espiegle*" to Berbera from Muskat at once in consequence of disaster reported to Somaliland

* Foreign Department, No. 40 dated 12th August 1913, NAI, New Delhi.

Protectorate Camel Corps.”

On August 21, 1913, Colonel B. Holloway, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, told the Chief of the General Staff, that the Government of India “are pleased to authorise the move(ment) of a detachment of the 18th Infantry, 3 British officers and 315 rank and file, from Aden to Berbera to augment temporarily the force under the orders of the Commissioner of the Somali Coast Protectorate.”

And on October 15, 1913, Army Department in Simla said that the Government sanctioned relief of detachment of the 18th Infantry at Berbera by similar detachment from 73 rd Carnatic Infantry.

After having been defeated by Sayyid’s forces, the British decided to modify the Camel Corps on military lines and renamed it the ‘*Somaliland Camel Corps*. Ray Beachey noted in his *The Warrior Mullah* : “Attempts to obtain recruits for it in Ethiopia, Arabia, Nyasaland and the Sudan proved singularly unsuccessful, owing to repugnance for service in Somaliland with its impossible climate and low salaries. Instead, 450 Somalis were enlisted, with a reserve of 150 men of the Somaliland Indian Contingent: a combined force of 600 men—two companies of camelry and one of cavalry, the whole being under 18 British officers seconded from the Indian and Regular Army.”

At the request of the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India sanctioned the despatch of two British officers and 214 Indian ranks of the 109th Infantry from Aden to Berbera for a period of two months pending the arrival of the Indian Contingent being raised for service in Somaliland.*

On March 19, 1915, the Secretary of State for India

* Foreign Department, Letter Prot.108 signed by B. Holloway, Colonel, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, NAI.

asked the Viceroy whether he would raise any objection to the deportation to Aden from Kismayu of 33 Somali Scouts considered by the British authorities “disaffected and intriguers against the Government.”

The Viceroy replied* that for military and political reasons, and “as large numbers of Somalis are employed at Aden and the area is very restricted, the G.O.C., considered the accommodation of disaffected Somalis at Aden as inadvisable.

* Foreign Department, Telegram dated Delhi, the 25th March 1915, NAI, New Delhi.

Tragic End of A Hero

The British colonial administration at this juncture decided on a change of guards as part of their ongoing effort to put in place their plan for an attack on Dervishes. On May 2, 1915, Geoffrey Francis Archer, the Commissioner of Somaliland arrived at Aden. He was to consult the General Officer Commanding Aden, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cubitt. The Colonial Office considered it inadvisable to take any action before the arrival of Archer at Aden.

A letter the Secretary of State for India addressed to the Viceroy (Army Department) on April 27, 1915 stated: "In regard to Naval arrangements, Mr. Archer is authorised to communicate with the Officer Commanding His Majesty's Ship "*Philomel*", and as regards these arrangements neither you (Viceroy) nor Aden need take any action."

"The command of the operations will be carried out by Colonel Cubitt, and the responsibility of the General Officer Commanding Aden, will be confined to places at his disposal, the troops and other details authorised in accordance with the arrangements which will be made at the consultation to be held at Aden on Mr. Archer's arrival there." The letter further instructed : "In order to prevent the Dervishes from anticipating the attack, it is very

important that secrecy as regards the proposed operations should be observed.”

The General Officer Commanding Aden told the Chief of the General Staff* that “Lieutenant-Colonel Cubitt, Officer Commanding troops and acting Commissioner, Somaliland, is of the opinion that Berbera should be the place of disembarkation for the whole force, which should move on its objective via Las Dureh and re-embark at Hais. To land the force from Aden at Bagdaria and then advance inland is impossible. The time estimated as necessary for the whole operation is six weeks at the least. Three Officers are all that are now required for the Camel Corps and three officers, to act as Supply Officers with supplies for six weeks should be sent without delay to Berbera. Can you please give me further instructions regarding your telegram S/8186 of 21st April 1915.”

The General Officer Commanding, Aden, replied : “Owing to the necessity of supplying equipment and medical personnel for the whole expedition, my movable column will for the time being be unable to move beyond Sheikh Othman. I have canceled the appointment of Colonel Wooldrigge to command the Aden force as the Secretary of State for Colonies has told the Commissioner Somaliland that the operations are to be directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Cubitt.”

On May 3, 1915, the Political Resident at Aden, after discussing with Archer, sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India informing that Archer required the following troops from Aden to complete his force:

“(a) One composite battalion of composite headquarters units, two companies 126th infantry, four companies 109th infantry. (b) three officers for duty with Camel Corps. Two officers, and one conductor for supply

* Foreign Department, Telegram—P. No. 1865.G.O. dated the 28th April 1915, NAI, New Delhi.

and transport work. (c) half company 23rd Pioneers to provide explosives and road making parties. (d) one signalling officer and 13 signallers for improvised signalling unit. (e) one improvised section (of) Indian field ambulance to provide (for) 30 British 1200 native. (f) Captain Gwyer, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Aden, as Staff Officer, Field Force. (g) approximately 100 mules, accompanying above."

The Political Resident, Aden, replied: "It will be difficult for Aden moveable column move beyond Sheikh Osman, if Aden supplied above, and Aden would have only garrison of 6th Kolhapur Infantry, 4 fifteen pounders for land defence." He believed that this was not an opportune time to denude Aden of troops. The Mullah's success had scared the British office.

MANIFESTO IN SUPPORT OF SAYED MOHAMED

On June 15, 1915 Archer wrote from the Commissioner's Camp at Lower Sheikh to A. Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the Colonies. Along with his letter he transmitted a copy (an English translation) of a manifesto in Arabic which he alleged to have emanated from Turkish source in Abyssinia and being put into circulation amongst the Somali tribes. Archer had received both the English and the Arabic versions from Major Dodds in Harrar. Archer characterized the manifesto as "inflammatory".

Archer wrote "You will observe that the document is of a most virulent character, but I am of opinion that (it) will not result in any serious defection so far as our tribes, the Ishaak, are concerned. The preaching of a Jihad, couched in such language, is well calculated to impress a few fanatics in the country, but in the main I believe our friends to be loyal. On the other hand, the situation is

certainly developing rapidly along the lines which for a long time I have foreseen and have from time to time indicated in my despatches to you.”

Archer then went on to report: “All reports seem now to agree that Lij Yasu, the Prince is consumed with the ambition to found and rule over a new Mohammedan Empire, and with this end in view his object is to co-ordinate the conflicting tribal element amongst the Somalis and form a strong pro-Islamic confederation on his borders under his protection. The mistake he and our enemies in Abyssinia make is that they believe the Mullah, Mohomed bin Abdilla Hassan, is held in veneration and respect by the Somali tribes. They are exhorted in this manifesto to unite under his leadership. But this they will certainly never do willingly”, he said and added “However, tribal dissensions amongst Somalis are very strong. If the Mullah succeeded in commanding the adherence of these people it would be by force, not by persuasion. For this reason, if for no other, I think that there is for the present no danger to be apprehended from this latest Turkish effusion, provided that there is no great increase in the Mullah’s fighting capacity.”

Archer reasoned: “First and foremost, if we succeeded in overthrowing the Mullah, the whole plot would automatically fall to the ground. The Pan-Islamic propaganda on the other side has presumably been dealt its death blow...”

The manifesto expressed its conviction that: “Three of the Christian nations England, France and Russia, our strongest enemies since the beginning, made an alliance together in order to destroy Islam; and their intention was the conquest of the Haramain-el-Charifien (Temples of Mecca and Medina) and the destruction of the Mauslemeus of the Lord of the people of the universe, and moreover the demolition of the prestige of the Khalifat and the influence of the Koran, together with the

humiliation of all believers.” Addressing the Somalis, the manifesto said

“Oh Somali Moujahedin, (Fighting Muslims).

“You are famous for your solid religiousness and calm temper. Present day is the day of trial you have been ordered to fight, and every man with the capacity is firmly and absolutely bound to do so by the wish of our Almighty God, because the Sheikh-ul-Islam has delivered in the Residency of the Khalifa *Fetwas* showing the impellent necessity of the universal *Jihad* against England, France and Russia. This represents a great way of God; be confident in the power of God; collect yourselves and be united under the flag of the Messenger of God; throw down the fortifications of Berbera and Zaila and Djibouti and Bulhar, because they are but the signs of infidelity and wrong-doing; put the flag of the victorious Khalifa upon the Banader (Coast towns) of the Somalis; fight against the English and French soldiers and throw them out because they are living there as the usurpers of the rights of the Khalifa of Islam, and are persecutors of your religion, the honour of your families, and yourselves.”

“Today is the day of vengeance, Oh believers in one God”.

“Our enemies have occupied the countries of the Muhammedans by subterfuge only, and crushed the forces of the believers by their intrigues and maliciousness, and with the ways of their disaggregation of our society; but the separation of the Musliman is a sin, and is attended by losses and defeat; especially now-a-days division and hate are more condemnable than all the forbidden things and the sins. Give up the last quarrels between yourselves, because your God, your religion and your object are the same; concentrate your force under the command of the Said Muhammad bin Abdulla bin Hassan—let his happiness be lasting; He is now holding the standard of our Khalifa in the Somali

countries; consult him and do not disobey his will; follow his opinion; do not be unjust to your Muslim brethren, and do not rob the properties of the believers without legal right; do not be jealous not vindictive among yourselves, and do not go backwards; maintain a state of brotherhood; incline yourselves to equity; because it is nearer to piety; make the *Jihad* in the way of God in ranks, as if you were a solid building, let it be known to you that the enemies of the Khalifa in this country are the English and the French, who occupy the sea coast; rise up against them and fulfill your eternal engagement and your duty.”*

Soon after sending the letter to the Colonial Office, Archer, went to Hargeisa to meet with the Somalis and to discuss with them the anti-British manifesto. He informed his superiors: “I intend to summon a meeting of the leading Somali Sheikhs, place before them the anti-British manifesto, and arrange for the issue and circulation in their name of an address of loyalty to the British Government, to counteract its effects.”

Elaborating his plan of action further, he said: “Beyond this, clearly our policy should be directed towards weakening in every way possible the hold which Lij Yasu has over the Ogaden. An arrangement has already been made with these people, independently of the Abyssinian authorities, to come to Hargeisa at the end of this month with a view to a friendly settlement of their differences with our tribe under British auspices.”

“If this meeting can be arranged and good results are obtained, something material will have been done to improve our position and to sow the seed of discord between these people and their nominal rulers.”

After his meeting he wrote “It will be realised that the Ogaden Rer Ali, Rer Haroun, and Bahawadleh who

* Foreign and Political Department, External “B” Secret, June 1917, No.93/96, NAI, New Delhi.

attended this conference, are nominally Abyssinian subjects. Their leaders Abdi Gerad, Sayed Omar and Abdi Ali, well known and influential men, came to Hargeisa of their own accord, full of expressions of good-will towards us, with a desire for the settlement, with our assistance of their differences with our tribes. It is not to be expected that this incident will pass unnoticed at Adis Ababa. Clearly the ground is cut from under Lij Yasu's feet, if, as I believe to be the case, he is aiming at a Somali confederation on our borders, headed by the Mullah and inimical to us."

Archer finally informed London that before the envoys departed "I took the opportunity to have a friendly conversation with Abdi Gerad who has promised his assistance in intercepting and delivering to me letters passing between the Mullah and Lij Yasu. He has also undertaken to raid ammunition convoys despatched from Abyssinia to the Haroun; and with a view to getting information in advance he proposes to keep men posted at Harrar. It is thus possible that he may be able to render us very valuable service."*

Major Lawrence, political officer, was in charge of the District of Hargeisa and he had a Company of the Camel Corps with the strength of two British Officers, 150 rifles, and two maxims stationed in Hargeisa.

Archer arrived at Hargeisa on July 8, 1916. He claimed that he received "a cordial welcome" from the assembled tribesmen and "I find that there is at present no sign of unrest or discontent. Indeed, the Somalis here seem not only well disposed and full of loyal protestations, but also extremely respectful and well under control."

Archer was later promoted by the King to the post of Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Protectorate, and he assumed the office on November 4, 1919.

* Foreign and Political Department—External "B" Secret, June 1917-No. 93/96, NAI, New Delhi.

It was clear that the Sayyid's forces were giving hard time to the occupying power. The British kept increasing the troops in the area. The Colonial Office requested an early despatch to Somaliland of 600 Natives Infantry to co-operate with the forces which were already at Jid Ali against the Dervishes. They estimated three weeks as the limit of the operations. The temporary services of a few officers of the Aden garrison with the Somaliland Camel Corps was also requested.*

The Prime Minister sanctioned the attack on Jid Ali and the Colonial Office had already arranged with the Admiralty for the provision of a warship and two 3" guns. Considerable importance was attached to this operation by the Colonial Office.**

On April 15, 1915, the Viceroy (Army Department) in Simla informed the Secretary of State for India that they will send 2 Sunni Companies of 126th and 4 Companies of 109th to Somaliland to co-operate in the operations against the Dervishes at Jid Ali, and will also spare the services of 6 officers to the Camel Corps.

The Viceroy pointed out: "We would remark that we cannot answer for the behaviour of the men of the 126th in face of brother Mahomedans."

According to telegram No. H-4382 dated April 21, 1915, the following is how the British planned the operation against the forces of Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan:

The Viceroy (Army Department) forwarded to the Secretary of State for India following telegrams from the General Officer Commanding, Aden Brigade:

First: The Officer Commanding and Acting Commissioner, Somaliland has furnished the following

* Telegram -P. dated the 10th (recd. 11th) April 1915 from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy (Army Department).

** Telegram—P. No.M-12708 dated the 13th (recd. 14th) April 1915, NAI, New Delhi.

summary of information :

“Operations will commence about the middle of May. The force from Aden will operate on the same lines as the troops from the Somaliland Protectorate. All supplies will be furnished by the Aden Force, also two medical officers with complete equipment for sick and wounded, medical equipment is non-existent in Somaliland. I am maintaining secrecy in this matter although it is not essential. Maps are available in Somaliland.” The second telegram which was addressed to the Commissioner, Berbera, and repeated to the Chief of the General Staff stated:

“Arrangements are being made by me on the supposition that the force will be required to land about the 15th May 1915 at Baghdari, and I rely on you for information of any change of date. All arrangements for shipping and transporting the force from Aden complete to Baghdari are being made by me, and I will endeavour to arrange in communication with the Navy, a reconnaissance of the landing place. Any local information you are in possession of should please be forwarded to me by post as early as possible.”

The third telegram read as follows:

“May all further arrangements be carried out by me in direct communication with the Commissioner, Berbera. As I am in constant touch with the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Squadron, regarding the Southern Patrol Ships in the Red Sea, I can probably arrange with him for the necessary reconnaissance of landing places and for transportation on one of the ships referred to. It is necessary that transport arrangements should be made early, as some date prior to the 15th May 1915 is mentioned by the Commissioner.”

“In regards to Naval arrangements, Archer is authorised to communicate with the Officer Commanding His Majesty’s ship “*Philomel*”, and as regards these arrangements neither you nor Aden need take any action.”

India Office sent a letter on October 6, 1915 to the Colonial Office enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy relating to the prohibition of the landing of Somalis at ports of the British East Africa Protectorate on or after October 6. The Colonial Office approved Viceroy's proposal and requested that a notification relative to the prohibition be published in Aden and Bombay.*

MENELEK DIES

In Abyssinia, Menelek died on December 12, 1913, and was succeeded by Lij Yasu, who was, however, not crowned because according to a British report "soothsayers foretold that his death would follow his coronation."

The British Legation Official in Addis Ababa, Thesiger, according to his son, "was increasingly concerned by an evident predilection for Islam on the part of Lij Yasu, who was consorting more and more with the Muslims of his empire." Wilfred Thesiger wrote in his autobiographical account: *The Life Of My Choice* "Lij Yasu's partiality for Islam was apparently more than a question of convenience. He had married the daughters of several important Muslim chiefs and was in frequent communication with the "Mad Mullah" in Somaliland, supplying him with rifles and ammunition to help in his long-drawn-war against the British. He evidently hoped to secure the Mullah's daughter as a bride; it was believed that he even aspired to marry the Caliph of Islam's daughter."

Thesiger wrote: "In Dire Dawa Lij Yasu attended the Islamic festival of the Eid of Bairam, prayed publicly in the mosque and presented three camels and five bullocks to the Muslim community for the feast. He then went to

* Foreign Department Letter signed by H.J. Read, for the Under Secretary of State, NAI, New Delhi.

Jig Jigga, where at a mass meeting of Somalis he swore on the Koran that he was a Muslim." He recorded: "In June 1915, my father commented: "I am coming to the conclusion that the heir to the throne of Solomon is at heart a Moslem and is entertaining dreams of one day putting himself at the head of the Mohammadan Abyssinians, and of producing a Moslem kingdom that will stretch far beyond the frontier of his present empire."

Meanwhile the Officials at the British Legation in Addis Ababa were reporting to their Government that there was an unfavourable change in the general attitude towards the British in Addis Ababa. One official C.H.M. Doughty Wylie considered the appointment by the Abyssinian Prince Lij Yasu of Abdullah Sadik as Sub-Governor of the Ogaden as an anti-British act. He wrote: "the appointment of Abdullah Sadik "is very regrettable and gives rise to a natural anxiety in Somaliland. He wrote to his Government on December 20, 1914 that "this man's history shows him to be suspected reasonably of being a preacher of Pan Islam, to have been a messenger between the Sultan Abdul Hamid and the Somali Mullah, and between the latter and the Amir of Afghanistan (unsuccessful) and a visitor to England, Germany, America and Japan."

The British Commissioner of Somaliland suggested to the British Legation in Addis Ababa to make a formal protest against the appointment of Abdullah whom they considered as too close to the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan whom the British considered as their enemy.

In 1906, when he was the Governor of Harrar, Amir Abdulla Sadik, while visiting India was ordered by the British to leave India and subsequently detained at Aden under warrant issued under Regulation 25 of 1827. In May 1908, when he wanted to visit the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan via Aden and Berbera, the British and the Italian Consuls agreed that the visit should be

prevented because they believed it to be an offensive and defensive alliance between Mullah and Menelek against the British and the Italians. When the message of the Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay reached the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, the Bombay Government replied on May 6: "Proposed action approved. Warrant will be forwarded to you by post."

For the British "the danger of Abdullah's appointment lies in fresh fanatical intrigues with the Somali tribes, and in the sale of arms to the Mullah. This is also the view of the Italian Minister, who as regards the Ogaden is equally interested with us for the sake of Italian Somaliland and the money invested in Brava and Mogadishu."

The British Official reported that he talked over the appointment of Abdullah with his French colleague, who, the English said, volunteered a statement that "if we found that Abdullah sold arms to the Mullah, he would be ready to close Jibuti." But the British official said: "I confess I do not put very much reliance on this amiable offer, because Jibuti is full of smugglers, who are said to be the principal merchants of the town; also because Abdullah's arms could come from the Abyssinian Government and be never detected; also because it seems our interest to keep on as good terms with Abyssinia for the time, and nothing would excite them more than even a perfectly ineffective closing of Jibuti at our request."

The British thought of other method to deal with Abdullah.; "the use of Dejaz Taffari. Taffari's father Ras Makonnen disliked and mistrusted Abdulla Sadik. Taffari's private interest is opposed to Lij Yasu's, whose heir he is, is Christian Shoa as against Moslem Wollo. As Governor of Harar he will dislike a powerful and intriguing subordinate. He will not, I hope, be anxious to arm the Mullah, nor to quarrel with England and France

whose support he may some day want.”

Thinking on these lines, the British official did not make the formal protest suggested by the Commissioner of Somaliland. Thesiger, Head of the British Legation at Addis Ababa, in a Memorandum dated March 16, 1916, said: “As regards the relations between the Abyssinians and the Mullah, the situation, owing to the very pronounced Moslem sympathies of Lij Yasu, has become decidedly worse of late and threatens, if one can judge by recent exchanges of presents and professions of friendship.”

Thesiger discussed at length Jibuti, French Somaliland, and described it as “the key to the whole political situation, not only in Abyssinia but in Somaliland, Jubaland and on the southern and Sudan frontiers. But he warned: “So long as it is held by the French, who have no territorial interests in the hinterland to be affected, it will be used mainly as an arms depot from which to flood the interior with rifles and ammunition, whereas in British hands it would have a direct political influence on the future of Abyssinia and would insure the peace and safety of our frontier districts.” He therefore concluded that it was evident that “while this traffic in arms is a serious impediment to any hope of reform in this country (Abyssinia) as well as a grave danger, not only to the neighbouring British and Italian territories, but also to Abyssinia herself, it is and will always remain for France, not only a source of immense profit, but a safe insurance policy against many possible contingencies.

“We can therefore, I consider, neither hope to accomplish any amelioration in the condition of Abyssinia, or succeed in arresting the progress of illicit dealing in arms until French influence is eliminated in this country, and this can only be accomplished by exchanging French Somaliland for territory elsewhere.” He reminded that : “In 1914 when I first brought forward

this proposal I suggested Gambia as the medium of exchange, but the scheme for certain reasons did not commend itself to his Majesty's Government." Thesiger also believed that the exchange would be of the greatest benefit to the British in their political relations with Abyssinia.*

The most unfortunate fact was that some Somali tribes were used by the colonial powers to fight against the fellow Somalis who were struggling to eliminate the colonial domination. Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan's war of liberation against the British and the Abyssinian colonialism was portrayed by the British as a war between the Somali tribes. The fact however was that in most of the places where the British positions were attacked by Sayyid's forces, there were Somali tribes—either the so-called the defenders of the British Empire or simply civilians- who suffered as the result of the attacks. But the aim of the attacks were very clear—they were against the occupying forces.

As the British officers were, in most cases, either on board of their ships or at a distance place from the war zone, the majority of the victims were always Somalis - pro-British tribes, innocent people or other forces brought in from different countries who were sent to the front to face the forces of Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan.

On May 9, 1916 the Commander of HMS *Northbrook*, Lancelot N. Turton, received orders from "FOX" and proceeded to Las Korai to investigate and to take action in connection with the reported attack of the "Mad Mullah's tribesmen on the Warsangli Tribe." He arrived off Las Korai about 8 a.m. on May 10 for a one day visit and found the town in disorder. Turton wrote: "Several natives immediately swam off to the ship and informed me that the Mullah's tribesmen were retreating". "I

* Foreign Department, Despatch No 3 of the 1st January 1914, NAI, New Delhi.

waited for no further information”, he said, “and following the coast to the Westward in the ship, opened fire with lyddite on the retreating body of men who appeared to be in a fairly compact mass, and amounting in numbers from 1000 to 1500.”

According to Turton’s account, two lyddite shell burst right in the middle at a range of 6200 yards, after which the whole body of men broke up and dispersed, taking cover, retreating towards the hills Westward. The British official said to have expended 24 Rounds causing considerable casualties. He claimed that the death caused by shell fire was 171 and the majority of those killed were found in the pass by which the Mullah’s men escaped. There were also many wounded who were taken away by their own tribesmen.

Turton said he had a lengthy interview with the Sultan who appeared most grateful for the assistance rendered (by the British). The Sultan told him that “he was attacked by the Mullah’s tribe of 2500 strong on the evening of Saturday the 6th May 1916, who descended on his town from the hills to the Westward, and gradually surrounded his whole force which originally amounted to 300, and were shortly afterwards supported by an additional 900 men.”

Sultan Mohamud Ali Shireh of the Warsangli narrated to Turton: “The Westward part of his town was immediately captured by the enemy, and about 300 women and children murdered, and since then intermittent fighting has been going on.” He stated that the actual killed were as follows:

Mad Mullah’s Tribe	93
Warsangli Tribe	32

Turton wrote in his report of May 11, 1916: “The Sultan appeared very despondent owing to his lack of rifles and ammunition, and stated that for 5 1/2 years he had been fighting for the British Government off and on,

and had—received practically no assistance, and also that his fighting force had decreased from 5000 to 2000 men. The total number of rifles in the Sultan's possession were 50 British Le Enfield Carbines and 1500 French rifles, and his ammunition was nearly exhausted. Turton went on:

“The Sultan stated that a Somali man named Haji Hirsi of Mait, belonging to the Moosa-Areh tribe at Mokhalla is an Agent of the Mullah's for buying ammunition, foodstuffs, etc. and is sending them to him through Mait.”

“The above man, together with another Somali of Aden called Bulhan Ali, who belongs to the same tribe (and who was arrested in Aden 2 months ago) are working for the Turks, and they are the instigators of the attack by the Mullah on the Las Korai Tribe, organised with a view to helping the Turks by giving trouble to the British.” The Sultan further stated that he was afraid of attack from the Mijertein Tribe as he had reason to believe that they were friendly to the Mad Mullah, and requested that representation should be made to the Italian Government.

During the fight the Mullah's party had captured the only fresh water well near the town, and for 5 days his people had been practically without food and water. The British officer reported: “I landed provisions including sheep and water in sufficient quantities to assist their immediate needs and 5000 rounds of ammunition.” Turton then went ashore and accompanied by the Sultan thoroughly inspected the whole town with a view to verifying the truth of the statements made to him.

In the post script to his letter Turton wrote: “The Sultan also stated that he was very doubtful as to the loyalty of the Mijertein tribe, under Italian protection, and which country immediately adjoins his.”

“He was (of) the opinion that the Mullah was possibly being supplied with ammunition and foodstuffs through

Bosasa (sic) and expressed a wish that a warning should be given to the Sultan of the Mijertein tribe to this effect.”*

Turton arrived at Las Korai again at 6:30 a.m. on Sunday the 14th. The Sultan visited him on the same morning and informed him that there was no further attack from the “Mad Mullah’s tribesmen” but he told him that in the earlier action the casualties to “Mad Mullah’s tribe (excluding the wounded who were carried away by their own tribesmen) numbered considerably over 300.

In his report of May 14, 1916 Turton wrote: “On leaving Las Khorai on Wednesday the 10th, I requested the Sultan, as a personal favour, to endeavour to procure for me any wounded Mullah’s men that were picked up with a view to questioning them and obtaining any possible useful information as regards the Mullah’s movements and possible intentions.”

“I have to represent that the Sultan has kept his word and on my arrival on May 14th produced two, whom I am conveying to Berbera,” Turton stated that he explained to the Sultan that he procured 8000 rounds of Le Gras ammunition and 2500 rounds of .303 from Aden. The Sultan expressed his gratitude for all that had been done and pointed out that he still had 1000 fighting men without rifles, and if he could be given an extra 1000 rifles and more ammunition he felt able to meet any further attack from the “Mad Mullah” without assistance.

The British Acting Commissioner in Somaliland, G.H. Summers sent to the Senior Naval Officer at Aden a copy of a secret report he sent to the Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies in regard to the operations carried out by the H.M.S. “*Northbrook*” at Las Khorai and request that the contents be communicated to Commander Turton. The report dated May 16, 1916 stated:

* Foreign and Political Department External-B, August 1916 Nos. 17-26, NAI.

“On the 28th April last I received telegraphic information from the Resident at Aden that Warsangli arriving in Aden from Las Khorai reported that the Dervishes were attacking Las Khorai.

“This proved to be untrue. The Warsangli had themselves attacked the Dervishes at Jidali and attempted to loot stock. They were beaten off and anticipating retaliatory measures spread the above report in Aden.

“About the 6th May the Dervishes having been reinforced from Haroun at Taleh attacked the Warsangli and avoiding the defended town of Musha Aled surrounded the port of Las Khorai.

“On the 9th May I received a cipher telegram from the Senior Naval Officer at Aden informing me that he had received reliable information that the Dervishes were attacking Las Khorai and offering to send H.M.S. “*Northbrook*” to Las Khorai, should I considered the situation required it.

“I replied that if the information was true regarding the attack on Las Khorai I considered it most desirable that H.M.S. “*Northbrook*” should proceed there to clear up the situation. Having in view the previous report, I added that I believed the situation to be exaggerated. After his visit to Las Khorai on the 10th instant, Commander Turton, R.N., Commanding H.M.S. “*Northbrook*” reported to me by wireless telegraph stating the steps he had taken, that he proposed to return to Las Khorai on the 14th and that he could meet me in Berbera on the 15th. I consequently proceeded to Berbera from Burao and discussed the situation there with him. I attach his written reports for your information as well as medical reports by Surgeon C.R. Mc.Cowen, R.N., who attended the wounded.

“I now have the honour to put before you the following comments which in my opinion are based on accurate information.

“Towards the end of April 1916, the Warsangli Sultan sent a party to hold the Dervishes in their fort at Jidali while another party looted the Dervish stock. This they did and also some stock belonging to the Habr Toljaala Abdurahim and Habr Yunis Saad Yunis lately living near Jidali on more or less friendly terms with the Dervishes.

“Dervishes from the forts at Surut and Harsheida attacked the party besieging Jidali and the latter fled. All the Dervishes in this neighbourhood then succeeded in recovering most of the stock looted by the Warsangli.

“Reinforcements about 600 in number having arrived from the Haroun at Taleh, a force composed of some 1500 in all under Ibrahim Bogul, Adan Madoba, headman of Jidali, proceeded to attack the Warsaangli. The force was made up of Dervishes and Abdurahim and Saad Yunis tribesmen.

“Keeping in view the past history of Mahmood Ali Sherri (sic) and his Warsangli subjects, their constant intrigues with the assistance given to the Dervishes and the fact that only since the building of the fort at Jidali has there been any quarreling between them, I do not consider a defeat of the former at the hands of the latter seriously affects the situation in Somaliland. The Sultan is a brother-in-law of the Mullah and was made Sultan by him. His attitude towards the British Government has been most unsatisfactory except at moment when he has required ammunition or money. The Warsangli have at this moment a mission in Abyssinia to the Prince Lij Yasu, though the object of this mission is not known. When once the Dervish question in this country has been settled, it would probably be desirable to deal with the Warsangli in such a manner as to ensure their future good behaviour.

“If, however, the Dervishes had succeeded in crushing the Warsangli, the Mullah’s following would perforce have been increased and the Port of Las Khorai would

have been in his hands. As it is, though the Warsangli has suffered heavily, the Dervishes have been severely defeated with considerable loss, and they have had a lesson to teach them that the Makhir Coast, is not likely to prove a healthy locality for them in the future. I do not consider it likely that the Dervishes will again attack the Warsangli at Las Khorai at an early date.

“Though on principle I do not consider that the issuing of ammunition to Somalis is in our best interests, the amount issued by Captain Turton to the Warsangli only replaces a portion of what they have expended in the recent fighting, and will enable them to put some resistance should the Dervishes again attack them. I have no more ammunition of the Le Gras pattern with which to issue them, and it is this and not .303 of which they stand in greatest need. I have advised the Sultan of the Warsangli to refrain from offensive action against the Dervishes and have pointed out the reason for their recent misfortunes. At the same time I have offered to give him a supply of food for the people who have been rendered destitute by the recent fight and advised him to address himself further to Mr. Archer on his return next month.*

It is a known fact that in any war women and children happen to become the victims, but to discredit the Somalis and particularly the Dervishes, the British described this as “an unhappy feature of most Somali fighting and an invariable occurrence where the Dervishes are concerned.”

According to Ray Beachey, “The new Warsangli Sultan, Ina Ali Shirreh, failed to unify and protect his people and was making overtures to the Mullah despite promises to Archer earlier in the year to refrain from such. He was summoned to Las Khorai where it was proposed to arrest him. Alerted in advance, Ina Ali

* Foreign and Political Department External-B, August 1916 Nos. 17-26, NAI.

Shirreh retired to his fort at Musha Aled, 30 miles inland. On August 17, 1919 the Las Khorai garrison swooped down on him. He was arrested and taken to Berbera, and then exiled to the Seychelles, a place where the British regularly sent difficult personages, such as Prempeh of Asanta, Kabarega and Mwanga of Uganda and, later in time, Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus. The British appointed as Ina Ali Shirreh's successor the aged Gerard (*sic*) Ali Shirreh, a mere figurehead.”*

The colonial authorities' action indicates that Mohamoud Ali Shireh, Sultan of the Warsangali Tribe, was hostile to the British occupation of Somaliland. He was arrested and sent to the Seychelles, where he arrived on HMS *Odin* on May 3, 1920. Eight years later, on 20th May 1928, the Sultan left Seychelles on SS *Karapara* for Bombay and from there to Somaliland via Aden.* *

The British continued the policy of keeping closed all the doors from which arms could enter, fearing that they might fall in the hands of the Somali tribesmen and particularly in the hands of the Sayyid's Dervishes.

The Foreign Office in London, in a letter to their Ambassador in Rome, Rodd, dated June 23, 1916, stated that “the arms coming to Abyssinia through the French Port of Jibuti, which has repeatedly engaged the attention of His Majesty's Government in past, has recently assumed additional importance owing to the international situation in the above named country.”

The Foreign Office Official, Maurice De Bunsen, who signed the letter for the Secretary of State, told Rodd: “As your Excellency is aware, the pro-Muslim policy now actively pursued by the Prince of Abyssinia has given rise to considerable apprehension on the part both of His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government, and

* Ray Beachey, *The Warrior Mullah*, p. 129.

** Exile No. 5—1920. Seychelles 1997, Phonebook INFORMATION 95.

the opinion has been expressed by His Majesty's Minister at Adis Ababa that if Lij Yasu continues to follow his present line of conduct serious developments may be anticipated.

"In these circumstances the influx of arms into Abyssinia has become a matter of grave concern to His Majesty's Government, especially as recent reports show that a large number of the imported rifles are finding their way into the possession of the Somali tribesmen, and the question of taking steps to lay the matter before the French Government is in contemplation.

"Before action is taken, however, I am desirous of ascertaining the view of the Italian Government on the subject and of learning whether they would be willing to join in presentations at Paris, and, if so, what form they consider that these representations might best take."

In the meantime, the British authorities decided to restrict the navigation of Italian *sambuks* between Aden to Somaliland.

British ambassador in Rome, Rodd, sent a telegram on June 20, 1916 to Sir E. Grey saying that: "It is stated by the Italian Minister of Colonies that the Sultan Osman Mahmud of Mijertein is loyally co-operative with Warsangli against Mulla; but the Consul for Italy at Aden reports that restriction of navigation of Italian *sambuks* between Aden and Somaliland is contemplated by the British authorities. Dangerous agitation in Italian protectorate would result from such a measure, and the Italian Government request that instructions may be issued to authorities at Aden to abstain from enforcing it. Arrangements have been made with the Sultan of Mijertein by the Governor of Italian Somaliland for a strict watch to be kept on *sambuks* from Mijertein and the transport of goods between the interior and Bunder Cassam, and any suspected caravans will be stopped.

"The arrival of the Italian gunboat which has been

ordered to Northern Somaliland will greatly help on the execution of measures decided upon," the Ambassador concluded.

Sir E. Grey replied to the Ambassador on July 5, 1916 that "No restrictions are now being enforced" and that: "The Italian Consul has been informed accordingly by the Resident at Aden."

Generally, the Europeans supplied arms to the Abyssinian rulers for their use against the Somalis as well as against their own subjects, but then, according to the British letter, a large number found their way eventually to the Dervishes who used the guns against the Colonial Powers.

The Foreign Office letter stated: "This abuse of the facility provided by Article X of the Brussels Act for the importation of arms into a country not having access to the sea, coupled with the Moslem tendencies of Lij Yasu and his intrigues with the Mullah, afford ample justification for a refusal by the three Powers whose Colonies march with Abyssinia to permit the entry into that country of any further supply and it is a matter for consideration whether the French Government should not be asked to prohibit it entirely as long as the conditions referred to exist and even to cause the stock not required for bonafide use in the French colony to be re-shipped to the country of origin."

The Ambassador was asked to discuss the question with the Italian Government laying emphasis upon the great menace to Italian as well as British interests constituted by the presence of large quantities of arms in Abyssinia during the European war, particularly in view of the hostile policy of Lij Yasu and "I shall be glad to receive the views of the Italian Government concerning the availability of joint representations at Paris," said Foreign Office Official.

Lij Yasu's pro-Islam attitude must be considered as

being more genuine than a matter of convenience, otherwise the European colonial Powers would not have hated him so much. The British believed: "Lij Yasu himself by birth and tradition, as well as by certain personal friendships, has many links with Islam."

C.H.M. Doughty Wylie from the British Legation in Adis Ababa wrote: "His Moslem friends may be dropped, or may never be able to persuade him to a move which might for internal reasons easily cost him his crown."*

Earlier in 1912, the Head of the British Legation at Addis Ababa, Wilfred G. Thesiger had suggested to the *Abuna* (the Church Head) that "Lij Yasu should have some knowledge of Europe and see for himself what civilisation could do for a country and understand the strength of the new influence which was beginning to play upon his country and asked him whether he had never thought of suggesting that Lij Yasu should visit England, France and Italy."

Thesiger had also written to Sir Edward Grey: "It is very advisable that such influences should be counteracted before it is too late, for, as I pointed out to the *Abuna*, Abyssinia is now at the parting of the ways; the old feudal system is worn out and can never be re-established; new influences are at work and new desires have been created among the people and the country must either accept civilisation or drop out of existence as an independent Power. Modern ideas are getting a certain hold upon the younger generation, but are strongly opposed by the old chiefs of Menelik's best days, who would resist all innovations by force if necessary.

"Lij Yasu will have to decide very shortly which of these two parties he will fall in with, and, I would strongly recommend that, before he has taken a decision, he should be induced to accept the chance of seeing what the strength

* Foreign Department Letter No. 87 from British Legation Adis Ababa, 20th December 1914, Confidential, NAI, New Delhi.

of modern civilisation is. He is now of an age to appreciate what he sees, and if his tour through Abyssinia were to be followed by a visit to England, France, and Italy, I believe the lesson he would learn would have an incalculable effect on the future of Abyssinia," Thesiger wrote.*

Anyhow, whether his pro-Islamic tendency was genuine or otherwise, on September 27, 1916, the Shoan chiefs, assembled at Adis Ababa, issued a proclamation deposing Lij Yasu on the ground of his anti-Christian intrigues, and proclaiming as Empress in his stead Waizaro Zauditu, a daughter of Menelik, with Dejazmach (now Ras) Taffari, son of Ras Makonnen and grandson of Sohala Selassye, as heir to the throne.

The Empress was crowned at Adis Ababa on February 11, 1917. But to a great extent the exercise of power was in the hands of Ras Taffari, who acted as Regent.

Sir R. Wingate, British Governor in Cairo, forwarded to the Foreign Office in London, a telegram (No.1008) he received from their Legation in Adis Ababa, dated September 25, 1917, which read:

"I have credible information that Lij Yasu is really dead, but Ras Taffari wishes it kept secret.

"Counter revolution against Ras Taffari in which Empress implicated is arranged for this week.

"It should fail."

And the Foreign Officer replied to Captain Thesiger, British Legation in Adis Ababa in a telegram No. 66 dated October 16, 1917 in which it stated :

"Your telegram No. 1008 (Of September 25th. Fate of Lij Yasu).

"Your Italian colleague has reported that Lij Yasu is in the plains and is trying to reach Arabia.

"Can you confirm the report?"

According to British records, the Italian Embassy in

* Foreign Department, Letter No. 64. Adis Ababa, July 26, 1912, NAI, New Delhi.

London handed over the following note to the British Foreign Office: "The Italian Legation at Adis Ababa has informed the Italian Government that Lij Yasu with a small escort has left Batie and that he is now in the plain at some point not precisely known.

It appears that the Danakils gave the Prince a bad reception and that he is now trying to reach the Arabian coast.

The Italian Government communicated the foregoing information to the British Government with the view to their adopting the necessary vigilance to prevent the fugitive from attaining his objective.*

In December 1916, Wilfred G. Thesiger reported that Ras Taffari hinted that he was disappointed in not having received any active support from the British Government. Thesiger asked frankly what kind of assistance he required.

In a conversation which Thesiger had with Ras Taffari on December 6, 1916, the latter again brought up the question of the loan of two aeroplanes for a period of six months declaring that the knowledge that he had two armed machines at his disposal would, by enhancing his prestige, have a very great effect on the country, whether in the north in Somaliland, and so tend to peace and the restoration of order, and he asked most earnestly whether it could not be managed.

"I pointed out", reported Thesiger "the only reason why we had been unable to meet his wishes in this respect was that, owing to the many countries in which we were carrying on the war and the important role played by aeroplanes, it was absolutely impossible to dispose either the men or the machines; that it was very uncertain to what extent aeroplanes could be used in Abyssinia, as the

* Foreign Department, Italian Embassy, October 5th 1917-London, NAI, New Delhi.

questions of altitude, the rarity of the air and wind currents would need to be studied beforehand, and that landing places and so forth would require much preparation before any use could be made of them.

“Ras Taffari, however, has set his heart on having two machines at his disposal and again asked if I would write to Your Lordship on the subject.” The British Official’s opinion was: “There is no doubt that, if two machines with pilots and the necessary experts could be spared from anywhere, the loan of them for six months would be a great political asset. The Abyssinian Government want some open mark of our willingness to help them as a pledge of our friendship and have, perhaps unfortunately, set their hearts on this scheme from which I have in vain tried to divert their attention.”

He told his superiors that the French Government have shown their willingness to supply arms, adding: “and I learn from Count Colli that an aerodrome is to be established in Asmara with machines specially designed to cope with the question of altitude, and therefore if we cannot grant their request it is quite possible the Italians will do so to the great benefit of their prestige here.”

Ras Taffari then brought up the question of arms and asked whether the British Government would be prepared to assist him in procuring rifles and machine guns.

Thesiger said: “I reminded him in this connection that I had warned him before now that this was the sole question between our two governments on which difficulties were likely to arise, and I recapitulated briefly the history of the arms traffic and of the harm it had done to us on our various frontiers.”

He then told the “Ras” that the British Government had not the slightest intention of preventing his Government from obtaining such arms as were required for legitimate purpose under the terms of the Brussels Act,

but that, owing to the way in which the Abyssinians had violated the conditions of this act and the freedom they had allowed to traders to deal openly in rifles, the whole question of the restrictions to be imposed in future would need to be carefully discussed before he could answer him.

The British Official pointed out :“practically all the supplies of rifles and guns in Abyssinia were in his hands, and this gave him an overwhelming superiority in armament over any chief or tribe with whom he could possibly have difficulties, and therefore he could have no immediate need of new rifles.”

The British objection to the fresh orders for rifles was because they believed that the old ones were brought to the market and sold on the frontiers to their detriment. Therefore Theziger asked Ras Taffari what assurance he could give the British that the old state of affairs would not be allowed to continue.

Ras Taffari said that he was prepared to guarantee that in future all orders for arms should be placed by his Government with a foreign Government through the mediation of the Bank of Abyssinia, thus eliminating the private dealer and that for every thousand rifles so ordered he would be prepared to hand over to the Legations a thousand old rifles to be destroyed or shipped out of the country as they wished, the value of the old rifles being estimated and deducted from the price of the new ones.

The British Official responded to this proposal by pointing out that the last condition seemed to him unfair, as the destruction of old rifles, in order to prevent them being sold, was to the benefit of both countries and that Ras should be satisfied with the economy to be effected in the elimination of the middleman and his exorbitant profits which were in the end paid by the Government.*

* Foreign Department, Letter No.123—British Legation, Adis Ababa, December 7th, 1916, NAI, New Delhi.

A Cypher telegram No. 30 to Mr. Thesiger from the Foreign Officer, on April 21, 1917, 6 p.m. said:

“French Minister at Adis Ababa informs his Government that Ras Taffari is about to ask the Entente Powers for further arms and munitions. French Government suggest that advantage should be taken of this opportunity to obtain from Abyssinian Government promise to order arms only through the Allied Governments and not direct from private persons or firms, and Italian Government agree.

“Do you concur, or are you still of opinion that no further consignments of arms should be allowed to enter Abyssinia, even if destined for Ras Taffari?”

Thesiger replied:“Before granting permission the whole question of this traffic should be regulated. I propose:-

1. Arms to be ordered only through Allied Governments and not through private persons.
2. Absolute prohibition for any firm or private person in Abyssinia to sell arms, with definite penalty attached.
3. Abyssinian Government to hand over equal number of old rifles for destruction in return for each consignment of new rifles.

Third point most essential as otherwise trade on frontiers will continue unabated. It might be worth while to grant compensation for all rifles.

On the Somali front, the British were working on the question of the cession of the British Somaliland to Italy as part of the general arrangement for territorial re-adjustment after the war.

In a telegram dated April 21, 1917 (received on 22nd) to Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, E.S. Montague, Secretary of State for India, said: “In connection with territorial changes after the war question is under consideration of possible cession of British Somaliland to Italy. Please telegraph reply with

least possible delay how meat supply of Aden would be affected.”

The Viceroy replied that Aden would in peace time continue to obtain meat supplies by contract from Somaliland as heretofore, provided Italy proved capable of maintaining order on Somali coast. “In war time,” the Viceroy said, “(it) would have to be sent from Egypt, India or Australia if Italy were neutral or hostile.”

Both the military and civil population at Aden depended practically on British Somaliland for their meat and the trade and navigation of Aden 1915-16 indicated that 93,000 animals were imported from British Somaliland mostly by dhows. Military supply were obtained from India. No goats or sheep were obtainable from Abyssinia and the export of cattle were prohibited by the Abyssinian Government and very small number of animals were available from the Aden hinterland.*

The Foreign Office (Military) sent the following telegram to the British Governor General in Cairo, Sir R. Wingate:

“Since the receipt of your telegram No. 743 telegraphed by Sir H. MacMahon in his No. 938 of October 25th, the situation in Abyssinia has been modified and in any circumstances His Majesty’s Government would be indisposed to depart at the present juncture from the principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of Abyssinia, which would have the effect of dividing it into sphere of political interest.

“You will therefore perhaps desire to reconsider your views as to Italian compensations.

“The Foreign Office members of the committee propose to suggest the abandonment of Jagbub to Italy in return (1) the rectification of the boundary line so as to

* Foreign and Political Department, Secret-E., Nov. 1917, n. 4-11, NAI, New Delhi.

include Pardia in Egyptian territory or (2) so as to improve the strategic position of the harbour of Sollum.

“This, however, cannot strictly be described as compensation to Italy and perhaps you can suggest some addition to the concession.

“As regard Eritrea, they propose to say that no concession can be made on the Sudan frontier but that Italian proposal would have to be examined.

“As regards Somaliland, they suggest that in the event of our being able to obtain by exchange French Somaliland, we might give British Somaliland to Italy.

“I should be grateful for your views as to this proposal and as to whether we could in any case surrender British Somaliland, supposing we did not acquire French Somaliland.”

In January 1914, Thesiger had first reported that he could see no prospect of any amelioration in the situation unless the British persuaded France to exchange French Somaliland for territory elsewhere. When he brought forward this proposal, Thesiger had suggested Gambia as the medium of exchange, “but the scheme for certain reasons did not commend itself to His Majesty’s Government.”*

“The Foreign Office representatives point out that Italian aspirations are probably directed to British East Africa and they recommend that if such proposals are received, they should be considered.”**

For nearly two decades, the British with all their mighty forces from different countries, including the Somali Camel Corps, King’s African Rifles and Indian Army, could not defeat the forces of Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan.

* Inclosure in Mr. Thesiger’s despatch No.34 of March 16th 1916- NAI, New Delhi, India.

** Foreign and Political Department, Nov.1917- NAI, New Delhi, India.

In January 1918, General Hoskins visited Somaliland to report on the position there but on January 13, 1919, the Secretary of State sent a telegram to the Viceroy (Army Department), that no decision regarding the operations has been arrived at. He also told that: "Any request for re-inforcements on the ground that military operations are impending is premature."*

But the General had in mind a large force to be sent against the Sayyid Mahamed and his Dervishes. His plan provided for three RAF (Royal Air Force) squadrons and six warships for coastal action and three battalions of the King's African Rifles, two Indian infantry battalions and an Indian cavalry unit, a company of sappers and miners, five wireless sets with 200-miles radius and a general wireless set. There were to be 40 Ford vans for motor transport and ambulance work, and a stationary hospital. There would be 3.7-inch guns and 16 Hotchkiss guns. Most notable was the provision for an Aden-based flight of four-engined Handley Page bombers. Finally, there would be five companies (900 mounted troops) of the Camel Corps.**

THE AIR RAIDS

Out of frustration for not being able to bring the Sayyid to his knees in classical warfare, the Colonial Power in September 1919 decided to use more sophisticated method "to end the Somaliland situation once and for all." Accordingly, the British created air detachment that had 12 DH9 bombers, two of which were modified to become air ambulance to be used for immediate evacuation of field casualties. The Air detachment was under the command of Group Captain R.G. Gordon, whose chief of staff was Wing Commander F.W. Bowhill.

* Diary No. 3789, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.

** Ray Beachey, *The Warrior Mullah*—page 124.

Besides the Air detachment, a special formation was also created to be known as "Z" Force, to include the already existing group troops with reinforcements.

At the beginning the British were to use Las Khorai as the main air base from which to mount raids on the Sayyid's headquarters at Jid Ali and Medishi but later they found that the place was unsuitable, because it badly suffered sudden sandstorms reaching up to 300 ft high. They selected Berbera as their operation base, while advanced landing ground was established at Eil dur Elan.

At Berbera the crated aircraft were unpacked and assembly commenced on January 1, 1920. By January 8 three aircraft had been air tested and by the 20th a total of eight bombers were ready for operation including the two ambulance DH9s, D3117 and H5551, the latter were fitted to take two patients at a time.

All eight aircraft were flown up to Eil dur Elan on January 20 and on the following day the first bombing raid was made on DH9s against Jid Ali and Medishi Forts.

According to *Aircraft Illustrated Extra*, the aircraft dropped bombs over the main buildings of Medishi Fort and "exploded in the very room occupied by the Mullah killing an aide standing next to the rebel leader and singeing the latter's clothing."

The British claim that no opposition was met but one bomber was forced to land at Las Khorai due to engine trouble. They said engine trouble claimed another victim when one DH9 was forced to land in wild scrubland. Its crew walked 12 miles to the coast where they were rescued by HMS *Odin* and delivered to Berbera safely.

On the ground, the British had Somaliland Field Force, comprised of elements of the Camel Corps, the King's African Rifles and the 101st Grenadiers, Indian Army.

Supported by aircraft, the ground troops succeeded in

occupying Jid Ali Fort on January 28 and the DH9s bombed Galibariboa Fort on the next day.

D. Jardine, wrote that His Majesty's Government sanctioned offensive operations in the autumn of 1919 for the following January, with a view to the final overthrow of the Dervish power. He said the forces at the disposal of the Government of the Protectorate for the purpose consisted of one flight of aeroplanes (D.H.9), Royal Air Force, known as "Z" unit, the Somaliland Camel Corps, (700 riders), a King's African Rifles Contingent (700 rifles). 1st Grenadiers, Indian Army (400), and His Majesty's ships *Odin*, *Clio*, and *Are Royal*. On the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th January Medishi and the neighbouring fortresses Jidali were bombed twice daily, but the Mullah found sanctuary in a cave in the hills behind Medishi.*

For the Somali hero, Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan and his fighters, these flying objects were things that they could never imagine its existence and the reaction was described in the following poem:

"Comaadi duulayaay Cadan ka keeneen,
"Dhulka iyo Cirkaa is qabsaday Cararaqdoodii;
"Adiguba Caqlaad Leedahee, Carar Maxaa Dhaama."

The author's translation:


(They—the British—brought flying hawks from Aden;
Their thunder has shaken the earth and the sky;

You are clever enough, what's better than withdrawal?)

That was, in war language, a tactical withdrawal.

The British knew that the Somalis could not match their air power, therefore, the bombers continued to harass the retreating supporters of the Sayyid. But they could not arrest the hero, Sayyid *Maxamed Cabdille Xassan*.

* "The Mad Mullah of Somaliland" Vol.208, pp.109-121, July 1920.



DE HAVILLAND D.H.9 AIRCRAFT

However, in their Catalogue "*de Havilland*", No.1164, (1996 Squadron/Signal, Publications) the Royal Air Force (RAF) Museum in London published a wrong and baseless information about the Somali Leader's fate. It says:

"The last RAF D.H.9s to see action were the twelve aircraft serving with "Z Force", a British unit operating with the Camel Corps against the "Mad Mullah" in Somaliland for three weeks in January and February of 1920. *Bombing missions by D.H.9s led directly to the Mullah's capture.*"

This is misinformation and distortion of a historic fact. The Sayyid was not captured by the British or by their puppets. The Sayyid and his Dervishes fought against the mighty British and their allies, local and international for twentyone years.

STARVED TO DEATH ?

The last information about the Sayyid was sent by Claud Russell, of the British Legation in Addis Ababa to

the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, in a letter on December 31, 1921, received in London on January 24, 1922. In fact, it confirmed that the Sayyid was not captured by his enemies. It stated:

“I have the honour to state that the agent referred to in my despatch No.137 (*I tried hard to find it, but failed, Author*) of the 1st October has returned here, and reports as follows:

“Mohammed-bin-Abdullah Hassan, accompanied by his wives, brothers, and about 100 Somalis armed with rifles, arrived at Goanneh, near Imi, on the Webi Shebeli, early in October 1920. A fort was built by them with a wall 6 feet high and 4 feet thick, with two entrances. They made it as strong as possible, and cleared a space in front of the fort. As soon as news of the Mullah’s presence reached Fitaaurari Seyoum, who was in command of the Abyssinian garrison at Ginir, he sent one of his officers, Garazmatch Ayale, to find out who the invader was and why he had entered the Abyssinian territory. The Mullah received this messenger well. He said that he had been beaten in battle by the English, and had come to Abyssinia in search of protection. After two days Ayale returned to Ginir. He took with him as presents from the Mullah two rifles and a revolver for himself and two Lee-Metford rifles for the Fitaaurari. Before leaving he undertook to send provisions to the Mullah. Fitaaurari Seyoum reported the matter by telephone to Ras Taffari who gave orders not to attack the Mullah, but to keep him under observation, and prevent his escape. The promised provisions were not given, and the Mullah sent one of his brothers and a follower, Abdi Sheikh, to ask the Fitaaurari for food. The latter, acting on the orders of the Central Government, threw these envoys into chains. Sickness and famine fell on the Mullah’s camp. In December he died; his death was caused by bleeding and vomiting blood. He was buried in a hut at Goanneh. In accordance

with Moslem custom, a small oval mound was erected over his grave. The spot is not regarded as holy, nor is it a place of pilgrimage.

Many of his followers died at the same time of sickness and hunger. Among the survivors were Abdi Sheikh, Ussuf Sheikh, Sultan and Jama. Subsequently they were raided by men of the Karanle tribe, who looted what little property remained to them. A hundred and seventy-six rifles were found in the fort. These were appropriated by Fitaaurari Seyum. There are still a few of the Mullah's kin and followers in the district. They eke out a precarious livelihood by begging."

(Copy sent to Berbera)

I have, & c.

CLAUD RUSSELL.*

That was the history of a great man who believed in his country's freedom. If all the Somalis had followed his example, the Somali people would not have been subjugated by either black or white colonialism. If some one tries to erase this Hero, that the colonialist called the "Mad Mullah", from the Somali history there will be no history left for Somalia, because there is no one else who made such a history in the struggle for independence of this country and there is no one else who stood against colonialism for such a long time.

D. Jardine, in a footnote in his publication "*The Mad Mullah of Somaliland*" spoke about "the friendly tribes which espoused the infidel's cause" and those who have been used by the colonial powers, in one way or another, to oppose the man who took the road of the liberation. If they did not want to be part of Sayyid's struggle, they should have formed their own forces to fight against the alien rule instead of joining the colonial power. All the

* Foreign and Political Department, External, File No. 740, No. 1-7, 1923, Confidential, NAI, New Delhi.

Somalis, even in different groups, independent from Sayyid's force, but united in their objective, would have denied the foreign forces, in this case, British, Italian, French and Abyssinian, the continuation of their subjugation of the Somali nation and the occupation of the Somali territories. The colonialists defeated Sayyid Mahamed, not because they were powerful, but because the Somalis were not united in the struggle for freedom which was under taken by this great hero who engaged the combined and formidable forces composed of local levies, King's African Rifles, Indian Infantry as well as Abyssinian forces led by officers from Britain, Italy and Abyssinia in a bitter struggle for over twenty years.

The question is: how sickness and famine fell only on the Sayyid's camp. The Ras Taffari gave orders "not to attack the Mullah, but to keep him under observation, and prevent his escape". The promised provisions were not given meant to hold them in the camp until death. The British Diplomat, Russell stated: "Many of his followers died at the same time of sickness and hunger."

Describing the characteristics of the Somalis, Douglas Jardine said in his "*Somaliland: The Cinderella of the Empire*"*:

"The Somali regards himself as the inferior of no man. He is a very fanatical Muhammadan, and, as such, he either scorns or pities the infidel, and also most other Mohammadans, whom he regards as unorthodox. This spirit of superiority and independence, coupled with religious fanaticism, had made the Somali ultra-conservative and suspicious of all change. For example, like all other natives of Africa, he is fully alive to the advantage of education as adding to his wage-earning capacity; but when discussing the question of establishing a school in the Protectorate he is apt to become mistrustful and

* V25, 1924/1925, pp.100-109.

suspicious and to fear that any school established by a Christian Government might prove to be an institution aiming at the christianisation of his children.”

If Sayyid was recognised by the infidels themselves as being a “Mad Mullah” or as Rennel Rodd called him “the fanatic Mad Mullah”,* and Sayyid himself told the British “I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion”, then what was the problem between Sayyid and the Somalis who waged war against him, and what was the factor that caused some Somalis, who were also Muslims, to support the foreign forces, the infidels, against the Dervish movement that was Muslim as well as national.

According to the Italian Consul Pestalozza, to start dialogue with the British, “*Mullah metteva per prima condizione la proibizione alle missioni cristiane di dar ricovero a ragazzetti somali cui si cambiava la fede musuulmana*”

*(To start dialogue with the British, the Mullah was asking as first condition the prohibition of the Christian missions to shelter somali children who were converted from their muslim faith)***

Jardine, compared the Mahdism in Sudan with the Dervish movement in Somaliland. He wrote: “The rebellion of the Mahdi was primarily a revolt against the injustices and corruption of the Egyptian officials, which had turned fertility into scarcity, and the native content of the savage into the misery of the oppressed. The Dervish movement in Somaliland was also a revolt against the rule of the foreigner, but against a foreigner who had come to give peace to warring tribes, to replace corruption by justice, and penury by prosperity.”

* Social and Diplomatic Memories, 1894-1901.

** Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di S.M./Ufficio Storico, SOMALIA, Vol.I dalle Origini al 1914, p. 317.

But then what happened? After their “victory” over the Sayyid in 1920/21, Britain stayed in the Protectorate for nearly 40 more years without interruption until 1960. What prosperity the British brought to Somalia after 76 years of colonisation or 133 years since the first treaty they signed with the Somalis in 1827? Have there been any development project /infrastructure undertaken by the Administration in any part of the territory, Hargeisa, Berbera, Bulhar or Zaila which were the regions they exploited/subjugated most?. Let alone towns in the interior. In 1960 what did Hargeisa, which was to become the capital of the Protectorate, had upon the British departure?

During the same period, from 1900 to 1940, Italy, poorer than Britain, which occupied the southern part of the territory built infrastructures, houses, public and private, harbours, streets as well as a Railway from *Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi (Jowhar)* to Mogadishu, which British Administration took over in 1941 after they defeated Italy in the Second World War. (Photos at pp. 495-496)

The critics of his movement claim that the Sayyid has done more harm than good to the Somali people and also accuse him of killing innocent persons including those who had supported him at the beginning of the struggle. But even Jardine, his severe critic, has noted that : “Yet, in the House of Commons, a distinguished Nationalist once described the Mullah and his Dervishes as ‘brave men striving to be free’.*

Prof. Said S. Samatar, a more objective analyst than the biased Jardine, wrote:“The Sayyid is today a towering figure in Somali eyes, the hero of Somali nationalism and one of their finest poets. If he failed in his objective of ridding his country of alien rule, his failures are regarded as ‘failures of the tragic hero’—at once sad and inspiring.”**

* D.J. Jardine, *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland*, July 1920.

** Prof. Said S. Samatar ‘*Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism*’.

The British call the Somalis, the *Irish of Africa*. The reason is, probably, because the Somali war against the British, caused the same hardship to British as the Irish liberation struggle did. When I read the history of Ireland, I discovered that, Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan's call for self-rule occurred, incredibly enough during the same period, as "*The Growth of Nationalism*" in Ireland (1900-1921). In Ireland in 1899, Arthur Griffith, a Dublin journalist, started a weekly newspaper called *The United Irishmen*, in which he advised the people of Ireland to be more self-reliant. Griffith founded a party called Sinn Fein. In Somalia, the activities of the freedom fighter Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and his Dervish Force started in the same year 1899 and advocating self-reliance told the British: "I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion." Both the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Dervish Force waged bitter guerrilla warfare against the British and both movements imported arms from abroad. Both the Irish and Somali campaigns against the British Empire, ended, although in different ways, in the same month of December of 1921. I believe that because of these similarities between the Irish and the Somali war of independence, the British call the Somalis "*The Irish of Africa*".*

* The History of Ireland, *The Growth of Nationalism* (1900-1921)—Website, page posted by Ciaran Flynn—Homepage.

Somalis Convicted by British Court

Feeling proud of the success achieved at the end of the twenty-one years war against the forces of Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan, Britain continued its normal colonial administration of the territory.

Meanwhile, in February 1919, a number of Somalis, natives of the Somaliland Protectorate and as such British protected subjects were arrested in Aden. After the signing of the armistice, these Somalis had come to Aden from Lahej, the headquarters of the Turkish Commander. They were tried by a British Military Court at Aden and were charged with fighting in the war on the side of the Turks in the Aden hinterland. According to the General Officer Commanding, Aden Field Force, "they were tried for being actively in arms against His Majesty, or as an alternative charge, actively assisting the enemy." The General Officer Commanding wrote:

"In the trial, the following fact were established:

"(1) That all the accused were guilty of the charge.

"(2) That they came into Aden of their own accord.

"They have, therefore, been rightly condemned to death, but they might have escaped into the interior, and faced the treatment that was awaiting them there. That

is one extenuating fact.

Other extenuating circumstances are:

(a) The condition of British Somaliland, and the want of complete protection against the Mullah.

(b) That it is possible the proclamation made in Lahej, when interpreted into Arabic, gave them a false hope of amnesty.

One hundred and fifty-four of them were convicted and sentenced to terms of rigorous imprisonment varying from five to ten years. For lack of accommodation in the jails at Aden, they were sent to jail in the Bombay Presidency to serve their sentences.*

According to a letter from the General Officer Commanding, Aden Field Force, to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi, No. 2769-S. dated the 16th March 1919:

“The Military Court was held in accordance with the Martial Law Regulations in force at Aden on February 14, 1919 for the purpose of trying the Somalis. They were tried and condemned to death. But the General Officer Commanding commuted the death sentences in all cases into sentences of rigorous imprisonment varying from 5 to 10 years with the exception of eighteen individuals.

The General Officer Commanding said in his letter to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi, No.2769-S. dated the 16th March 1919:

“Of these 18 individuals, I have remitted the sentence passed by the Court on five for having turned King’s Evidence, twelve I have ordered to be deported to British Somaliland to be dealt with by the High Commissioner of that Protectorate, and one I have ordered to be deported to Abyssinia to be dealt by the authorities there.”

Following is the statement showing the conduct in jail

* Doc. No.7 of 1922—Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, General- NAI, New Delhi.

of 146 out of 154 Somali prisoners confined in the jails in the Bombay Presidency. The remaining eight have since died. One more prisoner, Yusuf Mahamood died in the hospital attached to the Thana Special Prison on March 16, 1920.

The Somali Prisoners of War were distributed into four jails: Fifty one were in Yaravda Central Prison; Thirty six were in Ahmedabad Central Prison; Twenty nine were in Hyderabad Central Prison and Twenty nine were in Thana Special Prison.

Following Somali PoWs were in the Yaravda Central Prison and their conduct was recorded as "Good":

1. Mahamed Ali; 2. Ismail Jama; 3. Jama Farah (Convict Officer); 4. Mahamed Isa (Night Warder); 5. Abdi Ali; 6. Gualid Mahamed (Convict Officer); 7. Abdul Ruhman Mahamood (C.O.); 8. Isa Ali (C.O.); 9. Osman Ahmed; 10. Khalid Mussa (C.O.); 11. Mahamood Mahamed (C.O.); 12. Mohamed Nuh (C.O.); 13. Hussein Mahamed (C.O.); 14. Mussa Mahamed (C.O.); 15. Ali Abdi; 16. Hassan Tismahshah (Timasham?); 17. Adan Deef (C.O.); 18. Abdulla Mahamed (C.O.); 19. Ali Jama (N.W.); 20. Botan Hassan; 21. Ahmed Farah (C.O.); 22. Jama Yusuf (C.O.); 23. Ali Mahamood (N.W.); 24. Mahamed Osman; 25. Saleh Gamaureh; 26. Adan Elmi; 27. Adan Mussa; 28. Mahamed Ahmed; 29. Ahmed Mahamed; 30. Aban Abdi; 31. Mahomed Abdulla; 32. Dualeh Nuh; 33. Saleh Jama; 34. Saleh Deef; 35. Hussein Farah; 36. Mahomed Mahmood; 37. Saleh Jama; 38. Jama yusuf; 39. Adan Hassan; 40. Saleh Hussein; 41. Farah Adan; 42. Abdulla Ali; 43. Jama Abdulla; 44. Mahamed Hassan; 45. Abdulla Tawkal (Dunkal?); 46. Gualid Ali; 47. Ahmed Jama; 48. Hassan Ali; 49. Mohamed Jibrail (Jabreel?); 50. Ismail Abdi; 51. Mahamed Isa.

Following were in Ahmedabad Central Prison and their conduct was recorded as "Very good".

1. Saleh Farah; 2. Hassan Mahamed; 3. Ahmed Jama; 4. Elmi Ali; 5. Dualat Abdulla; 6. Ahmed Mahomed; 7.

Ismail Jama; 8. Ali Awad; 9. Abdullahi Doma; 10. Deria Ali; 11. Mahamood Yusuf; 12. Ahmed Saleh; 13. Nur Adan; 14. Amer Yussuf; 15. Ali Ahmed; 16. Mahmud Ali; 17. Samantar Ibrahim; 18. Abdulla (Araleh?) Arabh; 19. Adan Hussain; 20. Ali Ahmed; 21. Mahomed Shirreh; 22. Hassan Ismail; 23. Dualeh Goolaid; 24. Mahomed Awad; 25. Mahomed Ali; 26. Yussuf Mahomed; 27. Ahmed Hussein; 28. Mohomed Deria; 29. Ali Jama; 30. Adan Mahomed; 31. Yussuf Hassan; 32. Hoosain Abdi; 33. Abdi Gulaid; 34. Atteya Ali; 35. Mahomood Hirsi; 36. Mahomood Mahamad;

Following were in the Hyderabad Central Prison and their conduct described as marked :

Ali Uma (Good); 2. Yussiif Abdullah (do); 3. Mohamood Abdulrahman (do); 4. Usman Umar (do); 5. Yakub Umer (Osman?) (Bad); 6. Abdullah Mahomood (Good); 7. Amer Ahmed (do); 8. Hassan Mireh (do); 9. Mussa Ahamed (do); 10. Ismail Mohamad (do); 11. Saleh Ali (do); 12. Ali Gulaid (do); 13. Doolar Alu (do); 14. Farah Ahmed (do); 15. Umar Mohamood (do); 16. Hussan Ali (Fair); 17. Mussa Mohamood (Good); 18. Sulaiman Mohamad (do); 19. Salal Mohamad (Bad); 20. Mohamad Ismail (Good); 21. Isa Mohamood (do); 22. Mohamad Ali (do); 23. Saleh Mohamad (Bad); 24. Gulaid Yusuf (Good); 25. Hirsi Saleh (do); 26. Mohamed Hassan (do); 27. Yausal Mahomad Ali (do); 28. Farah Mahomed (do); 29. Juama Mahomad (do).

Following were in the Thana Special Prison and their conduct were described "good" with the exception of three:

1. Abdulla Jabreel (Fair); 2. Mahomed Ali; 3. Ahmed Gabreel; 4. Mohomed Ismail; 5. Adan Ismail; 6. Musa Hussan (Very fair); 7. Hassan Nalaya; Yussuf Saleh; 8. Ali Dualeh; 10. Abdi Abdullah; 11. Hirsi Yusuf (Very fair); 12. Suleiman Yussuf; 13. Ahmed Mahomed; 14. Artan Ismail; 15. Yussuf Awad; 16. Abdi Abdulla; 17. Mohamad Isa; 18. Yusuf Isa; 19. Adan Ahmad; 20. Jabreel

Mahmood; 21. Saleh Farah; 22. Mahomed Hassan; 23. Farah Mahamood; 24. Isa Mahamood; 25. Abdi Ismail; 26. Jama Mahmood; 27. Jama Ali; 28. Ali Mahmed; 29. Adan Aboker.

Following are the names of the Somali prisoners who died in Prison Hospital:

AHMEDABAD CENTRAL PRISON:

1. Farrah Osman —died on 17th April 1919.
2. Yussuf Farah —died on 19th February 1920.
3. Dwaleh Yusuf —died on 11th February 1920.

THANA SPECIAL PRISON:

1. Hassan Warsana —died on 3rd June 1919.
2. Farah Abdi —died on 27th September 1919.
3. Fahiya Alli —died on 9th June 1919.
4. Jama Samantar —died 11th December 1919.

In August 1921, 140 Somali prisoners were repatriated to Berbera. Earlier* the Governor of British Somaliland, G. Archer advised that the remainder of the sentences be commuted in all cases except two. The two exceptions were prisoners No. 1 Adam Elmi and No. 160 Jama Ali who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years on commutation from the death sentence. "In their case", the Governor said, "I consider the offence was aggravated and I am not prepared to recommend release of these men with the other at the present time."

On August 21, 1922, Adan Elmi, sent the following petition to the Governor of the British Protectorate:

"To His Excellency the Governor, Somaliland.

The humble petition of Prisoner No. 1080, Adan Elmi, Yeravda Central Prison (Poona).

Most respectfully sheweth :

* Foreign Department, Letter No. 195-18 dated Berbera, the 22nd February 1921, NAI, New Delhi.

That the humble petitioner (sic) was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years by the Court of Btalion (sic) Staff Officer Aden on 3.3.1919.

That the fellow-Prisonors (sic) of the humble petitionors (sic) were released by your Excellency's Government on 26.6.21.

That the petitioner (sic) had sincerely confessed his crime before the Court.

That the petitioner (sic) being quite young at the time of accusation was misled by his bad associates.

That the humble petitioner regrets very much for having offended the government and requests the favour of Your Excellency very kindly remitting his sentence and giving him a chance of praying for Your Excellency's long life and prosperity.

August 21st 1922.

Your Excellency's

Most humble & obedient servant

Adan Elmi

Major J.W.S.

Superintendent,

Yeravda Central Prison.

Left thumb

impression

Of Adan Elmi

This petition was forwarded to the Governor of Somaliland by Major, S.W. Jones O.B.E. I.M.S. Superintendent, Yeravda Central Prison, with his letter n. 8282 of 22, through the Inspector General of Prisons, Poona, dated Yeravda September 1922.

A year earlier, on August 4, 1921, the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, J. Crerar, had sent a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India—Foreign and Political Department—forwarding Adam Elmi's petition. He stated that all Somali prisoners with the exception of Adam Elmi, another prisoner Jama Ali, and third prisoner who was in the hospital in Bombay, have been released and repatriated. Crerar said that the prisoner has a maimed left hand and his conduct in jail has been

reported to be exemplary. "The fact that he is the only Somali prisoner in the Yeravda Jail makes his position specially hard", he added.

The Secretary to the Government of Bombay requested the Secretary to the Government of India to move the Governor of the Somaliland Protectorate to make early arrangements for the further disposal of these two prisoners Adam Elmi and Jama Ali.*

* 1922, Simla, Foreign and Political Department, General -N0.7 dated 10th August 1922, NAI, New Delhi.

The Reward for the Collaborators

What kind of reward was reserved for the Somalis who collaborated with the colonial power? Out of all those who collaborated with the colonial power only two were chosen for some kind of rewards for their services in Somaliland.

Writing from his Camp at Sheikh, on June 14, 1920, the Governor of Somaliland, G.F. Archer wrote to his superiors in India:

“My Lord,

“In continuation of my despatch,* I have the honour to represent to your Lordship that it is very desirable to find some suitable reward for Risaldar Major (Senior-most Non-Commissioned officer of the Regiment) Musa Farah, I.S.O., and Ressaïdar (Second Senior-most Non-Commissioned officer) Haroun Ali, the two distinguished Somali Native officers who rendered important services in the recent operations.

Archer said in his recommendation letter that “during the operations, Risaldar-Major Musa Farah was under Gibb, responsible for the formation of the Tribal Levy; and Captain Gibb is the first to admit that, without

* Foreign Department, Military No. 31, of the 19th May 1920, NAI, New Delhi.

his great influence and outstanding personality among the Somalis, the Levy, which attained such great results, would never have started. In effect, a force of 1,500 rifles was organised and led in the field by one British Officer and Risaldar-Major Musa Farah, whose conspicuous abilities were first recognised during Colonel Swayne's early campaigns."

Governor Archer added : "The services of Resaldar Haroun Ali are set forth in the accompanying copy of a memorandum by Colonel G.H. Summers, C.M.G. and I entirely associate myself with his remarks and consider that this would be a suitable opportunity to recognise this Native Officer's long and valuable services."

On the nature of award, the Governor pointed out: "The nature of the reward in the case of Risaldar-Major Musa Farah presents difficulties in that he is already a companion of the Imperial Service Order and received so long ago as 1903 a presentation sword of honour as a mark of the esteem of His Majesty's Government, being at the same time accorded the honorary rank of Risaldar-Major which was at that time the highest which a native could attain."

Therefore he suggested: "What I feel is an award carrying with it some honorific title and I would enquire whether Your Lordship would therefore be prepared to approach the India Office with a request that these two native officers, who were old servants of the Government of India in Somaliland previous to 1898 and as such pensionable in part by them, should be appointed to the Order of British India."

"I recommend Risaldar-Major Musa Farah for appointment to the 1st Class, which carries with it the title of *Sardar Bahadur* and *Ressaidar* Haroun Ali for the 2nd Class which carries with it the title of *Bahadur*. I very much hope that the Government of India, who in the past have always been ready to grant their decorations to

Indian soldiers for their services in Somaliland on your Lordship's recommendation may also be pleased to sanction the two awards now suggested in the very special circumstances. Failing this, I can only recommend a monetary reward which, though doubtless very acceptable to the native officers concerned, would seem far less approachable."

Resladar-Major Haji Musa Farah, after completing 32 years' service with the British authorities in Somaliland has requested in March 1916 to be allowed to retire on account of failing health. Besides, he also met with a severe accident, being thrown from his pony and the authorities feared that the resulting injuries would render him quite unfit to carry on his duties.

The Governor added:

"It can properly be said that his advice in dealing often with complicated political and tribal questions has been of the utmost value to each successive Commissioner, and, speaking for myself, I would add that he is the most distinguished, courageous and loyal native official which it has been my privilege to meet during fifteen years' service in Africa."

Archer commented on what the Somalis would think about those who collaborate with the foreign powers. He said: "In the discharge of his duty Musa Farah has necessarily made many enemies among his own people and there is a likelihood of their attempting to disparage his good name by perverting the reason for his retirement. In order, therefore, to put an end to any misconception in the minds of the natives on this point, I consider it very desirable, if practicable that some further distinction or honorary decoration, should be conferred on Musa Farah upon retirement. Tentatively I would suggest the award of the Imperial Service Order and a purse of Rs.2000. In this way his reputation would be established beyond reproach and his retirement would be made the occasion

of a ceremony befitting the close of so long and distinguished service.*

A testimonial was presented by General Swayne to Ressaldar-Major Haji Musa Farah on June 16, 1905. Swayne told a gathering specially organised for the occasion that he was directed to publicly present to Ressaldar-Major Musa Farah the appreciations of the British Government. He said: "It has been, and will be, the desire of His Majesty's Government to recognise the services of good and loyal servants, and I am especially gratified in being now authorised to convey to you Ressaldar-Major Musa Farah in this *Durbar* the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government and to present to you a Sword of Honour as a special mark of appreciation."

Swayne told Haji Musa that his services have been utilised both in a Political and a Military capacity. "*The exercise of your important duties has especially called for sound judgment and unswerving loyalty.*"

Regarding the other officer, Ressaldar Haji Harroun Ali, Colonel G.H.Summer, Officer Commanding Troops, Somaliland, wrote a confidential report (dated Berbera, April 5, 1920) to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Somaliland Protectorate in which he detailed the services rendered by Haji Harroun during the operations.

Summers said in his report:

"As your Excellency is aware this Native officer has performed the duties of Interpreter on the Military Headquarters Staff and has been employed on Intelligence duties since 1914. (Emphasis added) As Staff Officer and Intelligence Officer while employed on Political duties and subsequently as Officer Commanding the troops, I

* Foreign Department, Somaliland Protectorate, No.26, Government House, Berbera, 2nd March 1916, NAI, New Delhi.

have had a close experience of Haji Haroun Ali for many years. His services have been most valuable always and he has shown himself to be of exceptional integrity and reliability and a loyal and devoted servant of the Government. I would also mention the services that he rendered to Capt. Gibb in the settlement of the difficulty of the Habr Yunis Rer Sugulleh Ba Makahil section last summer. I have spoken to Your Excellency about the good handling of this case by Capt. Gibb and he brought the services of Haji Haroun Ali to my notice at the time.

Summers said:

“During the whole of my experience of this Native Officer I have never known him attempt to take any advantage whatsoever of his position as is frequently the case with Somalis who reach subordinate positions of confidence.”

He suggested that Haji Haroun be given such a present or reward for his services to the British Administration in Somaliland as the Governor may deem suitable.

With all the praise showered on them by their superior officers including the Governor because of the services rendered by them to the British Government, i.e. fighting and spying against their own people, the British authorities in India—Adjutant-General’s Branch—rejected the proposal made by the Governor of Somaliland Protectorate to reward the two Somali Officers by the grant of honorific title.

The Adjutant-General’s Branch admitted that the two Somali officers had rendered very valuable services to the Somaliland authorities and the Colonial Office suggested that one of the officers be granted the O.B.I. 1st class and the other the O.B.I. 2nd class. However, the Adjutant-General’s Branch said that these two officers had rendered no services to the Government of India and they were ineligible for the Order of British India as the award was restricted to Indian officers.

According to official documents the Army Department said they were “not prepared to accept it (suggestion for the conferment of the O.B.I.) and have made alternative suggestion that Indian Civil titles might be appropriate.” It rejected the award to the Somali officers simply because the “titles are not conferred on any but natives of India”. But they made exception for the Nepalese subjects and the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf area. The excuse was that Nepal and Gulf are “infinitely more closely related to India than is Somaliland and the service for which titles are given in such cases always have some direct reference to India.”

If there was no discrimination or other similar reasons, the services rendered by these Somalis were also connected to India and relative to the activities of the colonial power, Britain, i.e. fighting side by side with the Indian troops and under British Officers.

In fact the two Somali officers did more than what any one else did for the British interest. They fought on the side of the colonial power against their own people—the Dervishes and of the Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan— who were rightly fighting for the independence of the country.

During the earlier presentation of the testimonial by General Swayne (June 6, 1905) to the Rissaldar-Major Haji Musa Farah, Swayne admitted:

“I personally do not forget that on one occasion you carried a force of 5000 men across the waterless Haud and without the assistance of any troops or levies, inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, giving valuable assistance to the force commanded by myself.” (Emphasis added)

Swayne gave Haji Musa Farah, what they called “Sword of Honour” and a purse of Rs.2000 as well as “a grant of land for building purpose in the town of Berbera.” Haji Musa Farah received that much in return for having, as Swayne put it, “inflicted heavy loss on the enemy.” And

who was the enemy the English was referring to? The Derwishes of the Sayyid Mahamed, Somalis, Brothers. Haji Mussa Farah was rewarded with a Sword and the few thousand Rupees, a piece of land in the town of Berbera, his own land, not in London or even in Cardiff or Liverpool, while he supported the colonial power, the British, to own the whole Somaliland.

Haji Musa Farah and Haroun Ali were described by the Governor of Somaliland Protectorate as “two distinguished Somali Native officers who rendered important services in the recent operations.” But in the end the Military Department of the Government of India (British) reached the conclusion (Extract para. 9 of an (Army) despatch from the Government of India No.102, dated 2nd December 1920) that the orders instituting the Order of British India, recommended for the two Somali Officers, restrict the membership of this Order to Indian commissioned officers of the Indian Army, for long, faithful and honourable service. But Indian officers of Imperial Service Troops, Frontier Militia Corps and Military Police were subsequently declared eligible.

A team of seven officials of the Army Department also considered the desirability of conferring a civil title such as Khan Bahadur and Khan Sahib, on the two Somali officers. They said these titles, which are purely civil in character and not appropriate rewards for the services in the field, are in the personal gift of His Excellency the Viceroy and are only conferred on Natives of India. In certain exceptional cases these titles have been granted to Nepalese subjects and inhabitants of the Persian Gulf Area in recognition of services connected with the Indian Empire.”

The two officers—Haji Musa Farah and Haroun Ali—were used by the colonial power against their own people and country; and in the end the master refused to grant them even “honorary decoration”. They failed to receive a

straight forward compensation for the duty they performed in the interest of the British Empire. They were treated like racing horse which is disposed as soon as it cannot serve the purpose anymore.


Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan lost the war of liberation against the British not because the colonial power used aircraft to bombard Taleh Fort, or the so called "Z Force", the British unit operating with the Camel Corps, but because of his own "brothers", the Somalis, who sided with the colonial administration instead of joining him in the struggle. They were, unfortunately, the force that broke his back. For twenty one years the mighty Britain could not defeat, the man they called "The Mad Mullah" until they brought in a dozen of Royal Air Force D.H.9s to shell from the air for three weeks in January and February of 1920. That was an operation that the Somalis were not prepared for. As the balance of the power tilted in favour of the British, the Sayyid and his Darawish had no alternative but to withdraw to safer area. But that was not a safe place either. He landed in an Abyssinian controlled territory, Goanneh, Imei (Ogaden) not considering that Abyssinia was on the side of the colonial forces which were fighting against him and wanted him dead. The Sayyid was not captured, as the British Royal Air Force claimed but fell in an enemy trap at Goanne and died there of hunger and vomiting blood. In other words, the Somali Hero and his followers who were with him were starved to death.

The Railway Line ?

It was through Sir Rennell Rodd, the British Envoy at Rome, that the British Government negotiated deals to hand over Somali territories to the Abyssinian Emperor in 1897. In his memoirs* Ambassador Rodd wrote: "Another question we urged in London after our experiences in Somaliland and Abyssinia was the construction of a light railway from Somali coast to the interior. The project for a line from Jibuti to Harrar was still inchoate, and the bulk of the trade was being carried over the old route to Zeila." His proposal was to construct a light railway to the Haud with a branch to Gildessa. He lamented that: "had such a scheme been entertained there is little doubt that the fanatical Mad Mullah would never have become so formidable, and we might have been spared the many valuable lives lost and the millions spent in thankless punitive expeditions against that elusive enemy who gave us so much trouble over a period of twenty years".

The colonial administration of the Italian Somaliland constructed a railway line connecting Mogadiscio with *Duca degli Abruzzi* Village (Jowhar). This railway line


* Social and Diplomatic Memories, 1894-1901, London, 1923, pp. 188-189.



THE RAILWAY STATION



THE RAILWAY TRACK



PASSENGERS WAITING FOR THE TRAIN

apparently existed when the British took over the territory from Italy after the latter's defeat in the Second World War. And now no one is talking about where it has gone. The Italian photo-document printed in 1946 shows the railway line and it means that when the South of Somalia was taken over by the British administration, the railway existed in the former Italian Somaliland. It could not have just disappeared like that.

A photographic document showing the developmental project, carried out by Italy in Somalia, published by the Istituto Agricolo Coloniale (Firenze 1946), included the photographs of the "Railway station, the Railway-branch connecting Mogadiscio with *Duca degli Abruzzi* Village, Natives waiting for the train" as well as the photos of the city of Mogadishu of 1900 and of 1940s. The photos also include those of Merca, Brava and Chisimaio (Kismayo) of the same period.*

* Source: Istituto Agricolo Coloniale, Firenze 1946—Biblioteca Nazionale, Roma.

Powers: Who Takes What

Following the defeat of Italy in the Second World War, Britain, which already occupied the British Somaliland, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) and the Haud and the Reserve Area, as well as Socotra Island and its dependencies also added to its colonial empire the Italian Somaliland. Earlier in 1897, Britain gave the Ogaden to Abyssinia. While another Somali territory, French Somaliland was under the rule of France.

In 1935, to solve the Italo/Abyssinian dispute, the Governments of Britain and France agreed to recommend to the Abyssinian emperor the acceptance of territorial adjustments between Ethiopia and Italy. The British Secretary of State for India sent telegram Circular to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions on December 10 stating:

- (1) Exchange of territories.
- (a) Reformation of distribution.

Cession of eastern T(igre) approximately limited on south by River Gheva and on west by a line running from north to passing between Axum (on Ethiopian side) and Adowa (on Italian side) to Italy.

- (b) Rectification of frontiers between Eritrea and Danakil (Dankali) country leaving Aussa and extent of Eritrean territory necessary to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea to be defined below to south of boundary line.

(c) Rectification of frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ogaden. The new Italo-Ethiopian frontier starting from Tri-Junction point between frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya and Italian Somaliland would follow a general northwesterly direction cutting western Shebeli at Iddidole leaving Gorahei to east, Warandab to west and meet Frontier of British Somaliland where it intersects the 45th meridian.

It is understood that right of tribes of British Somaliland to use of grazing areas and wells situated in territory granted to Italy by this delimitation will be guaranteed.

(d) Italy will guarantee to Ethiopia an outlet to the sea in granting to it port Assab and a strip of territory giving access to this port along northern frontier of French Somaliland.

Should Ethiopia raise insurmountable objections to this solution the Governments of United Kingdom and France maintain offer which they made to Ethiopian Government to provide a corridor taken from territory of their respective colonies and leading to Port of Zaila.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France will endeavour to obtain from the Ethiopian Government (1) guarantees for fulfillment of obligations which devolve on them regarding slavery and arms traffic of territories acquired by them. (2) An undertaking not to construct a railway from E(thiopian) P(ort) running towards interior and an engagement to conclude with French Government all necessary arrangements to safeguard interests of Franco-Ethiopian Railway and of Port of Jibuti.

2. Zone of economic expansion and colonisation. The United Kingdom and French Governments will use their powers at Addis Ababa and at Geneva to end that His Majesty the Emperor will accept and League of Nations approve formation of a Zone of economic expansion and colonisation in Southern Ethiopia reserved to Italy.

The limit of this zone would be: on North the eight parallel: on South the frontier between Ethiopia and Kenya: on East, the rectified frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland: on West the thirty-fifth meridian:

Italy would within this zone, which would form an integral part of Ethiopia, enjoy exclusive economic rights which might be administered by a privileged Company or by any other like organisation, to which would be recognised the right of ownership of unoccupied territory, the monopoly of exploitation of mines, forests etc., subject to acquired rights of natives and foreigners. This organisation would be obliged to contribute to economic equipment of country, and to devote a portion of its revenue to expenditure of a social character for benefit of native population.

The control of Ethiopian administration in zone would be exercised, under sovereignty of Emperor, by services of scheme of assistance drawn up by League of Nations. A preponderating, but not an exclusive, share in these services which would be under direct control of one principal Adviser attached to the Central Government would be given to Italy. The Principal Adviser in question, who might be of Italian nationality, would be Assistant for affairs in question of Chief Adviser delegated by League of Nations to assist Emperor. The Chief Adviser would not be a subject of one of Powers bordering on Ethiopia.

To ensure safety of Italian subjects and free development of their enterprises would be regarded as one of their essential duties by the services, of scheme of assistance in Capital as well as in reserved zone.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and France will willingly endeavour to ensure that the interests of Italy in this region are fully safeguarded by this organisation the details of which must be elaborated by League of Nations.*

* Foreign and Political Department- Secret -1935, Serial n. 1-40, File n. 536-N, NAI, New Delhi).

Bevin Plan for Greater Somalia

The Somali territory has been fragmented in so many parts by colonial powers during the scramble for Africa and after. Britain has been the main culprit responsible for these disastrous acts. It not only partitioned but also handed over Somali territories to other governments. And since independence, whenever the successive governments in Somalia, have tried to claim their lost territories, countries in possession of their territories have accused Somalia of expansionism.

Surprisingly enough, Britain, whose actions were totally against the interests of the Somali people throughout the history, came out with a rather highly pro-Somali plan of bringing all the Somali territories together under one administration, the British Administration, and called for a *Greater Somaliland*.

The architect of the plan, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, defended it in the British House of Commons on June 4, 1946 against the objection of M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign Minister, accusing Britain of expansionism. Bevin said that Molotov's accused that "we were trying to expand the British Empire at the expense of Italy and Ethiopia, and to consolidate what he calls the monopolistic position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and Red Seas". But, Bevin said that the

accusation was “unjust”. In the latter part of the last century the Horn of Africa was divided between Great Britain, France and Italy. Bevin declared: “At about the time we occupied our part, the Ethiopians occupied an inland area which is the grazing ground for nearly half the nomads of British Somaliland for six months of the year. Similarly, the nomads of Italian Somaliland must cross the existing frontiers in search of grass. In all innocence, therefore, we proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of decent economic life, as understood in that territory.”

“But what attracted M. Molotov’s criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that Great Britain should be made the administering authority. Was this unreasonable?” Bevin asked.

“In the first place,” he continued “we were surrendering a Protectorate comparable in size to the area we hoped that Ethiopia would contribute. Secondly, it was a British force, mainly East African and South African, which freed this area; and it was a British, Indian and South African forces which bore the main brunt of restoring the independence of Ethiopia and of putting the Emperor back on his throne after several years’ sanctuary in this country. We do not seek gratitude on that account, but I think it right to express surprise that our proposals should have met with such unjustified criticism. After all, when we were defeating Italy in East Africa, Britain was open to invasion, and we were fighting alone. I hope the deputies at the Paris Conference will now consider a greater Somaliland more objectively.”

“All I want to do in this case is to give those poor nomads a chance to live. I do not want anything else. We

are paying nearly Pounds 1,000,000 a year out of our budget to help to support them. We do not ask to save anything. But to have these constant bothers on the frontiers when one can organise the thing decently well, after all, it is nobody's interest to stop the poor people and cattle there getting a decent living. That is all there is to it. It is like the Englishman's desire to go into Scotland to get a decent living. We must consider it objectively. If the Conference does not like our proposal, we will not be dogmatic about it; we are prepared to see Italian Somaliland put under the United Nations trusteeship.”*

It seemed that Britain wanted to mend its negative policy towards the Somalis when their Foreign Secretary announced at the Kingdom's highest legislative organ, the House of Commons, the “Bevin Plan”. The Plan indirectly called for the withdrawal of Ethiopia from the Somali territories that Britain itself ceded to Abyssinia in 1897 through Britain's Special Envoy, Rennell Rodd.

In 1946, Britain controlled most of the Somali territories—British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, their last conquest, Haud and Reserve Area as well as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in the East-African colony, except French Somali Coast, which was under France. As for the Ogaden, Bevin stated: “In the latter part of the last century the Horn of Africa was divided between Great Britain, France and Italy. At about the time we occupied our part, the Ethiopians occupied an inland area ...” (It is what the British gave to Ethiopia. The author.)

Unfortunately, by design or by default, the British delegation at the Paris Conference did not bring up the proposal of their own Foreign Minister regarding the

* Statement of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the House of Commons, London, 4 June 1946 (Foreign Affairs) Minutes, pp. 1840-41.

Somali territories. In fact it did not even mention the Bevin Plan, meant to be tabled at the Paris conference.

At the Paris Conference in 1946, only the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, namely Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, were discussed. The fate of the British Somalilands, Ethiopian Somaliland French Somaliland and Socotra were completely ignored. Only three weeks earlier, on June 6, 1946, the British Foreign Minister told the House of Commons in London "I hope the deputies at the Paris Conference will now consider a greater Somaliland more objectively."

Instead the British delegation at the conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris proposed the following Draft articles for inclusion in the treaty:

"1. Italy renounces all right and title to her territorial possessions in Africa.

"2. Pending their final disposal, the said possession shall continue under their present administration.

"3. The final disposal of these possessions shall be determined jointly by the four principal Allied powers within one year of the coming into force of the present treaty, in the manner laid down in the joint declaration of today's date issued by the four principal Allied Powers."

Draft declaration to be signed by representatives of the four Powers:

1) The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and France agree that they will within one year from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy bearing this day's date, jointly determine the final disposal of Italy's territorial possessions in Africa to which, by the said Treaty, Italy renounces all right and title.

2) The final disposal of the territories concerned shall be made by the four Powers in accordance with one, or any combination of, the following solutions, whether

applicable to the whole or any part of the territories concerned as may appear, in the light of the wishes of the inhabitants and the views of other interested Governments, to be appropriate:-

- (1) Independence;
- (2) Incorporation in a neighbouring territory;
- (3) Trusteeship, to be exercised either by the United Nations as a whole, or by any one of the United Nations individually.

4) In the event of the four Powers being unable to agree, the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation, and the four Powers hereby agree to accept that recommendation and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it, bearing in mind the pledge given to the Senussi by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom during the war.

5) The deputies of the Foreign Minister shall continue to consider the question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies in Africa and are empowered to despatch Commission of Enquiry to all or any of the ex-Italian Colonies with a view to ascertaining the view of the local inhabitants and to supplying the deputies with the necessary material on which to base a recommendation to the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the ultimate solution of the question.*

On its part, the Italian delegation at the Paris Conference, presented the following memorandum on the Italian colonies:

1. Italy considers the question of her four African territories with the same deep interest (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Eritrea and Somalia).
2. Tripolitania. The situation is actually as follows:

* External Affairs Depart. Secret. File 62-X/46-British Delegation's telegrams to the Foreign Office, dated 30th June 1946- NAI, New Delhi.

(a) The Senoussi are not a tribe or an Arab population: on the contrary, they are a Moslem religious brotherhood. To entrust them with administration of a State would mean going back to a system of government similar to that supplied by the Jesuit Fathers in Paraguay during the seventeenth century.

(b) The religious brotherhood of the Senoussi have anyhow their institutions in Cyrenaica and do not spread in anyway over Tripolitania. Therefore, even from this particular religious point of view the situation in Tripolitania is totally different.

(c) The origin of the population of Tripolitania varies to a great extent. Out of a total population of 500,000 there are:

About 50,000 Italians (numerically one tenth of the population, regardless of their decisive value to the economy of the territory)

More that 30,000 Jews whose position in a Senoussi State can be easily foreseen.

There are also about 40,000 Berbers and large group of Cologhli (Immigrated Turks).

There is therefore no practical foundation for the incorporation of Tripolitania in a Senoussi State in union with Cyrenaica.

3. Somalia.

Italian Somalia has nothing in common with British Somaliland.

(a) British Somaliland is inhabited by nomad tribes of shepherds. Italian Somaliland is inhabited by an agricultural population.

(b) British Somaliland is inhabited by tribes of pure Somali stock mixed with a few Arab immigrated from Yemen. Italian Somalia is inhabited by tribes of the most various origin (Somali mixed with Bantu negroes etc.).

(c) The tribes of British Somaliland (are) different

from the tribes of Italian Somalia also from the point of view of the language: in Italian Somalia besides southern Somali also Bantu languages such as Bravano, Bajjuni, etc. and dialects of other families are spoken.

(d) The question of the grazing rights of some boundary tribes in British Somaliland, of which mention has been recently made, is a question of detail concerning the normal relation of good neighbourhood across the borders, and had already been settled by Anglo-Italian agreements.

Italian Somalia where 20,000 Italians are still living at this very moment, owes all its economic life to the activity of the Italians who by building dams and river installations have transformed Somalia into a country of remarkable agricultural production.

4. A fair solution of the question of the African territories should in the present circumstances be based at least on the following points:

(a) Acceptance by Italy of the principles of self-government laid down in the San Francisco Charter as fundamental base of their administration in Africa.

(b) Integral restitution to Italy of Tripolitania and Somalia.

(c) Postponement of the decision concerning the future of Cyrenaica so that Italy may have a fair chance of settling the question directly with the interested parties (e.g. Egypt and eventually, the Senoussi Brotherhood also) in order to find a solution for half local self-government and immigration of Italian farmers.

(d) Re-establishment in Eritrea, possibly for a length of time to be decided upon, and without prejudice to any further definite solution, of the Italian administration under the control of an international commission.*

Humiliated by the defeats in Adowa, Abyssinia, in the

* Ibid.

Second World War, and the fear to see the possibility of its former colony going under the British Administration, together with the rest of the Somali territories, if the Bevin Plan, was implemented, Italy resorted to the argument that the “Italian Somalia had nothing in common with the British Somaliland”, and presented to the Paris Conference unnecessary arguments, which in Italian could be said “disputa che non aveva ne’ capo ne’ coda” i.e. utter nonsense, such as “British Somaliland is inhabited by nomad tribes of shepherds and the Italian Somaliland is inhabited by an agricultural population.” They mentioned the difference of the physiognomy of the inhabitants of the two regions and the dialects spoken by them.

But if these (the activity, the dialect, the feature of the person etc.) were the criterion required to deny the population of the Somali regions their right to be the same nation, then Italians themselves could not form a nation for the same reason. The north of Italy has nothing in common with the South. The north of Italy is inhabited by the population who work in industries while the South is inhabited by agricultural population. The population in the north of Italy are different from the population of the South. The inhabitants of the north of Italy have Germanic and Austrian physiognomy. They are tall and blonde, while the southern people are short and dark.

As for the language, almost all regions of Italy speak different languages. In Sicily, for instance, the people speak a language “Sicilian” which many people in the north cannot understand. In Sardinia, the people spoke only Sicilian and many youngsters had the chance or been obliged to learn the “Italian” language during the 18 months of military service. Most of the population heard the Italian language over the television when it was introduced in early 50s. In fact each Italian region spoke its own language or dialect and the Italian language was

spoken only by the elite class.

It is a known fact that the Somalis are the most homogeneous nation in the whole continent of Africa.

However, at the end of the Conference, only the Italian Somaliland was included in the Draft Treaty with Italy, signed at the Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 17, 1946.

Council of Foreign Ministers

DRAFT PEACE TREATY

WITH ITALY

Palais du Luxembourg, Paris,

17th July 1946

SECTION III—ITALIAN COLONIES

ARTICLE 17

1. Italy renounces all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

2. Pending their final disposal, the said possessions shall continue under their present administration.

3. The final disposal of these possessions shall be determined jointly by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, United Kingdom and France within one year of the coming into force of the present Treaty, in the manner laid down in the joint declaration of (date) issued by the said Governments.*

In the year 1948, a United Nations Four-Power Commission of Investigation for the former Italian Colonies consisting of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, visited Somalia to ascertain the wishes of the people.

The political parties, which met the Commission, expressed conflicting opinion over which Power should be the administering authority under the U.N. Trusteeship. Somalis hoped and expected the United Nations would

* Foreign Department, External Affairs, Paris Conference, 1946, NAI, New Delhi.

discuss the fate of all their territories under colonial rule i.e. those mentioned by the British Foreign Secretary in his statement at the House of Commons as well as the French Somali Coast and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) which Britain administered together with Kenya. (And in 1963, despite a referendum, which decided in favour of Somalia, Britain gave the territory to Kenya).

Instead, to the detriment of the Somalis, in 1949, only the question of Italian Somaliland was discussed at the First Committee of the United Nations. It was felt that only this part of the Somali territories should be placed under the United Nations Trusteeship with a view to preparing the country for ultimate independence. Again, to the detriment of the Somalis, Italy, which was neither military nor economic power; a defeated power, (even by Abyssinnia) was most frequently suggested as the Administering Authority and not Britain which was already ruling most of the Somali territories with the Bevin Plan in hand. Then, unfortunately, Bevin dropped the Colonial Office proposal for United Somalia and supported that only Italian colonies to be turned over to the trusteeship of the United Nations.*

In 1949, while in London, at the head of a Somali Delegation, Abdullahi Issa Mohamud, sent the following letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru:

THE SOMALI DELEGATION,
Morton Hotel,
Russell Square,
London, W.C. 1.
Date:—8th March 1949.
“To: H.E. PANDIT NEHRU,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

* Ernest Bevin by Alan Bullock, London, June 20, 1946.

“Sir,

During the Paris session of the UN General Assembly of last year, the Somali Delegation submitted to the Indian Delegation copies of Memoranda addressed to the Assembly. The Delegation have the honour to submit herewith other copies of the said Memoranda.

Following are our UTMOST DEMANDS:

- a) to avoid the restoration of Italian Administration under any form or guise over our country Somalia; and
- b) unification of all Somalilands.

“We sincerely hope that Your Excellency will carefully consider our just and legitimate demands.

“The reason for our sending you this petition and the enclosed Memoranda is that(we) have witnessed the keen interest voiced by Your Excellency and the new State of India in defence and protection of the rights of subject, weak and poor peoples like ourselves. Besides that, our country Somaliland, as a part of Indian Ocean, has common interest with India. Ancient trade relations between Somaliland and India is worth to be noted. In the past and at present, with the exception of a short period during which Italy adopted an autarchy policy in the last few years of her regime, most of our imports come from India.

“As you know the matter of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies has been postponed until April this year when the second part of the UN General Assembly’s third regular session will be resumed at Lake Success: The Somali Delegation intends to be present when the debate on Somalia takes place. Our Delegation hopes to be able to (be in) contact with the Indian Delegation in order to furnish further details on this subject.

“We close this petition in praying our Almighty God to preserve the independence of India and all those States who fight for the rights of subject peoples.

“We hope to be excused for our troubling Your

Excellency and wasting your valuable time.

(Sd.) Abdullahi Issa,

for THE SOMALI DELEGATION.”*

Also the Somali Youth League (SYL) sent the following letter from Mogadishu, dated June 9, 1949 to the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru:

“To:—The Prime Minister,

Government of India,

New Delhi.

“Your Excellency,

On behalf of the population of Somalia we herewith express to your Government our deepest thanks and gratitude for the support you gave to our cause in the recent Session of the General Assembly. The Big Powers intended to dispense with the wishes and desires of our people and sought to sell or barter us to Italy. Had it not been for your strong and unstinted support our people would have been already sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. The Bevin-Sforza plan to distribute the ex Italian Colonies amongst a few friends failed and its rejection exemplifies to the wide world the strength that the better powers can effectively display in the General Assembly of the United Nations. We rest assured that our cause was the cause of right against wrong, of justice against force; and it was your adherence to the principles and spirit of the U.N. Charter that helped us to vindicate ourselves. We thank you again.

2. As our delegates at the recent General Assembly of the U.N.O. amply exemplified, your Government, we trust, is fully aware of the fact that our party claims allegiance from not less than 95% of the population of Somalia. This fact has been corroborated by the joint report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation.

* External Affairs Department—Secret, 1948—File No.1 (83)
UN II/48, NAI, New Delhi.

Our party has been described in the said report as “a strong progressive nationalist movement which was likely to be the dominant factor in local politics for some time to come”. We feel, and quite rightly so from the bitter experience of the past, that the Italians of today are just the same Italians of by-gone days dressed only in a different garb. The past is too strong with us and we cannot erase its bitter memories when its ill-effects stare us glaringly at every twist and turn—in the economic, social, political, cultural and religious spheres. Our people have been treated as cattle in the past. They were deprived of their lands forcibly and without compensation. Whole villages were set on fire to make room for Italian plantations. Thousands were rendered homeless and whereas a few of them escaped, the majority of them—men and women and children—were all seized and forced to toil as slaves for Italian planters. In being treated as slaves our people were ruined physically, socially, economically, religiously and culturally. We put the welfare of our people as our first pre-requisite. We serve the true interests of the Somali people and we would be failing miserably in our task and duty if we do not oppose Italian return to our territory. We do not believe in the pronouncements issued from Rome by the so-called New Italy. We feel safe to trust that which we known by bitter experience.

3. Our people joined the allies in the war against the Italian enemy. Their blood flowed freely for the cause of freedom which was promised to them. They were then quite naturally shocked, stunned and bewildered to hear and to read that some nations tended to hand over our people and not only them, but also their sons and grandsons to the Italian Government against all principles of decency, justice and humanity. Amongst these Nations Gr. Britain and the U.S.A. gave the lead. It appeared to our people that we were liberated only to be subjugated

again ! This was indeed an attempt to re-introduce the slave-trade on a larger scale i.e. sell a territory completely with its inhabitants! We know the Nations who pay lip-service to democracy and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

4. We beg your Government in the name of GOD and Justice to persist against our subjugation to Italian rule. You and your people who have seen foreign rule intrigue and tyranny know fully well and can best understand our pangs and sufferings. We trust that as in the past you shall continue to support our cause for freedom and justice in an issue which shall decide the fate of our sons and grandsons.

We reiterate that we shall never acquiesce in the return of the Italian Government in any garb or disguise. We want immediate independence or in the alternative we are prepared to accept a temporarily period of international trusteeship for not more than 10 years. We desire a collective trusteeship for many reasons and pre-eminently for the great truth that one Power administration, especially that of an imperialistic Power, tends to convert an UNO territory into its own concern. Experience has shown that territories placed under the League of Nations, with one Power administration, tend to become—gradually—but surely more like colonies, as is the case with Tanganyika, or are amalgamated with the territory of the trustee Power, as in the case of South West Africa. For us trusteeship under the UNO is meaningless if the administering Power is to be one. There is obviously a difference in meaning between the words: ‘trusteeship’, ‘protectorate’, ‘mandate’ and ‘colony’ in any dictionary, but in actual fact we know very well that all such words mean: “the greedy and merciless exploitation of the inhabitants of a territory and its resources for the pure and selfish benefit of the administering Power”. If we are to accept international

trusteeship, therefore, we desire a collective form of trusteeship under the UNO. Such trusteeship will assure us of our birth right to freedom. We are gratified to realize that in fact many Governments are reconciled to this solution of collective trusteeship under the UNO for all the ex Italian colonies. We wish to make it clear beyond doubt that in the event of a collective trusteeship under the UNO, we desire that one Moslem State and one non-Moslem Asian State be included amongst the administering Powers for our territory.

5. We finally beg your Government to give every consideration to our demand for complete and immediate independence, or, in the alternative, for a collective trusteeship under UNO for a period of not more than 10 (ten) years. Any other arrangement, with Italy, as a single Power or jointly with other Power or Powers, is doomed to perpetual chaos and strife. We shall resist such a solution with all the means at our disposal, and with all the strength that GOD has been gracious to bestow upon us, even to the point of extermination; for it is extermination that we would prefer rather than return to the horrible past which is embodied in the very word "Italian".

6. The faith of subject people in the United Nation's Organisation is as strong as ever. Such faith should, however, be maintained. It is in the light of such faith that the problem of the ex Italian colonies should be viewed. A just, humane, disinterested and impartial solution must therefore be found; and the pre-eminent clause in such solution must take into account the interests, welfare and desires of the territories concerned. We have stated aforesaid our demands and desires. We trust that our faith in the UNO will be amply justified. It is quite obvious that a solution based on selfish imperialistic interests on a 'you take' and 'I take' basis, will result in creating in subject people like ourselves a

distrust, once and for all, in the UNO and all that it stands for. A lack of faith in the UNO will result in consequences which will have far reaching affects and will disturb for ever the peace and security of the world. In this connection we beg your Government to consider that Italy is being supported by many nations because she has similar stock, religion, culture and language as those nations. We look upon you as our champion; and we look up to you in the knowledge that your people have experienced colonisation and it horrible effects. Now that you are FREE help us also to be FREE for all men were born to be FREE. In this our hour of trial do not fail us. Our hope and faith lie in your hands, and we rest assured that you shall justify the confidence that we repose in you, your Government and your people.

Praying that Almighty GOD will bestow His choicest blessings on your Government and its people.

We remain,

Your Excellency,

Your most obedient servants.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE S.Y.L.

(Signed):

1. Haji Mohamed Hussein, President.
2. Ahmed Addawe Hussein, V/President.
3. Abdi Rashid Ali, Acting Sec. General.
4. Sheikh Issa Mohamed, Treasurer
5. Dahir Haji Osman, Member.
6. Sheikh Mahamud Mohamed, Member.
7. Ali Herzi Farah, Mermber.
8. Osman Sheikh Omar, Member.
9. Osman Sheikh Mahow, Member.
10. Sheikh Mohamed Osman, Member.
11. Ali Maollim Mahamud, Member.*

* External Affairs Department Secret—1949, File No.7 (47)
AWT/49-NAI, New Delhi.

LETTERS TO PANDIT NEHRU

(31)

D. 2640 (NII/49) (67)

THE SOMALI DELEGATION,
Morton Hotel,
Russell Square,
London, W.C.1.

Date:- 8th March 1949.

D-4515-CR/49

To:-
H. E. PANDIT NEHRU,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

12/3/49 PS. 18/4

Sir,

During the Paris session of the UN General Assembly of last year, the Somali Delegation submitted to the Indian Delegation copies of Memoranda addressed to the Assembly. The Delegation have the honour to submit herewith other copies of the said Memoranda. All our demands are expressed in these Memoranda. Following are our **UTMOST DEMANDS**:-

- a) to avoid the restoration of Italian Administration under any form or guise over our country Somalia;
- a n d
- b) unification of all Somalilands.

We sincerely hope that Your Excellency will carefully consider our just and legitimate demands.

The reason for our sending you this petition and the enclosed Memoranda is that we have witnessed the keen interest voiced by Your Excellency and the new State of India in defence and protection of the rights of subject, weak and poor peoples like ourselves. Besides that, our country Somaliland, as a part of Indian Ocean, has common interest with India. Ancient trade relations between Somaliland and India is worth to be noted. In the past and at present, with the exception of a short period during which Italy adopted an autarchy policy in the last few years of her regime, most of our imports come from India.

As you know the matter of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies has been postponed until April this year when the second part of the UN General Assembly's third regular session will be resumed at Lake Success. The Somali Delegation intends to be present when the debate on Somalia takes place. Our Delegation hopes to be able to contact with the Indian Delegation in order to furnish further details on this subject.

We close this petition in praying our Almighty God to preserve the independence of India and all those States who fight for the rights of subject peoples.

We hope to be excused for our troubling Your Excellency and wasting your valuable time.

Abdullahi Issa,
for THE SOMALI DELEGATION.

19 APR 1949
Dep-5524-
P/N (W) 49

S. Y. L.
SOMALI YOUTH LEAGUE
 Head Office: MOGADISHU (Somaliland)

ص و ش
 وحدة شباب الصومالي
 المركز القومي عندشوه (مومالي)
 صندوق البريد رقم ٣٥٢
 عنوان التلغراف: SYLMOG

P. O. Box No. 352
 Telegraphic Address: SYLMOG

To: *The Prime Minister
 Government of Jordan
 Amman - Jordan*

9th. June 1947
 EA 44
 2/6

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the population of Somalia we herewith express to your Government our deepest thanks and gratitude for the support you gave to our cause in the recent Session of the General Assembly. The Big Powers intended to dispense with the wishes and desires of our people and sought to sell or barter us to Italy. Had it not been for your strong and unstinted support our people would have been already sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. The Bevin-Sforza plan to distribute the ex Italian Colonies amongst a few friends failed and its rejection exemplifies to the wide-world the strength that the better powers can effectively display in the General Assembly of the United Nations. We rest assured that our cause was the cause of right against wrong, of justice against force; and it was your adherence to the principles and spirit of the U.N. Charter that helped us to vindicate ourselves. We thank you again.

2. As our delegates at the recent General Assembly of the U.N.O. amply exemplified, your Government, we trust, is fully aware of the fact that our party claims allegiance from not less than 95% of the population of Somalia. This fact has been corroborated by the joint report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation. Our party has been described in the said report as "a strong progressive nationalist movement which was likely to be the dominant factor in local politics for some time to come". We feel, and quite rightly so from the bitter experience of the past, that the Italians of today are just the same Italians of by-gone days dressed only in a different garb. The past is too strong with us and we cannot erase its bitter memories when its ill-effects stare us glaringly at every twist and turn - in the economic, social, political, cultural and religious spheres. Our people have been treated as cattle in the past. They were deprived of their lands forcibly and without compensation. Whole villages were set on fire to make room for Italian plantations. Thousands were rendered homeless and whereas a few of them escaped, the majority of them - men, women and children - were all seized and forced to toil as slaves for Italian planters. In being treated as slaves our people were ruined physically, socially, economically, religiously and culturally. We put the welfare of our people as our first pre-requisite. We serve the true interests of the Somali people and we would be failing miserably in our task and duty if we do not oppose Italian return to our territory.

2.

We do not believe in the pronouncements issued from Rome by the so-called New Italy. We feel safe to trust that which we know by bitter experience.

3. Our people joined the allies in the war against the Italian enemy. Their blood flowed freely for the cause of freedom which was promised to them. They were then quite naturally shocked, stunned and bewildered to hear and to read that some nations tended to hand over our people and not only them, but also their sons and grandsons to the Italian Government against all principles of decency, justice and humanity. Amongst these Nations Great Britain and the U.S.A. gave the lead. It appeared to our people that we were liberated only to be subjugated again! This was indeed an attempt to re-introduce the slave-trade on a larger scale i.e. sell a territory completely with its inhabitants! We know now the Nations who pay lip-service to democracy and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

4. We beg your Government in the name of GOD and Justice to persist against our subjugation to Italian rule. You and your people who have seen foreign rule intrigue and tyranny know full well and can best understand our pangs and sufferings. We trust that in the past you shall continue to support our cause for freedom and justice in an issue which shall decide the fate of our sons and grandsons.

We reiterate that we shall never acquiesce in the return of the Italian Government in any garb or disguise. We want immediate independence or in the alternative we are prepared to accept a temporary period of international trusteeship for not more than 10 years. We desire a collective trusteeship for many reasons and pre-eminently for the great truth that one Power administration, especially that of an imperialistic Power, tends to convert an UNO territory into its own concern. Experience has shown that territories placed under the League of Nations, with one Power administration, tend to become gradually but surely more like colonies, as is the case with Tanganyika, or are amalgamated with the territory of the trustee Power, as in the case of South West Africa. For us trusteeship under the UNO is meaningless if the administering Power is to be one. There is obviously no difference in meaning between the words: 'trusteeship', 'protectorate', 'mandate' and 'colony' in any dictionary, but in actual fact we know very well that all such words mean: "the greedy and merciless exploitation of the inhabitants of a territory and its resources for the pure and selfish benefit of the administering Power". If we are to accept international trusteeship, therefore, we desire a collective form of trusteeship under the UNO. Such trusteeship will assure us of our birthright freedom. We are gratified to realize that in fact many Governments are reconciled to this solution of collective trusteeship under the UNO for all the ex Italian colonies. We wish to make it clear beyond doubt that in the event of a collective trusteeship under the UNO, we desire that one Moslem State and one non-Moslem Asian State be included amongst the administering Powers for our territory.

5. We finally beg your Government to give every consideration to our demand for complete and immediate independence, or, in the alternative, for a collective trusteeship under the UNO for a period of not

In 1949 at the United Nations, the British Government did not insist on its own “Bevin Plan” envisaging lumping together of all Somali territories “as a trust territory” and Britain to be named as the administering authority. Instead the world body discussed only the former Italian Somaliland’s independence and it was proposed that the country to be an independent sovereign State, at the end of ten years under the International Trusteeship System with Italy as the Administering Authority. Here, the United Nations itself, the highest world organ which was supposed to support the rights of the people under colonial domination failed to recognise the right of the Somali people and accepted the policy of keeping the Somali nation balkanized and separated from each other by not asking Britain, Ethiopia and also France to place under the UN Trusteeship the Somali territories under their control, so that all the Somali territories and islands could be under one umbrella, i.e. the UNO, instead of singling out former Italian Somaliland and letting the rest of the Somali territories and islands to languish under colonial rule.

At the Sub-Committee of the UN, considerable concern was shown with respect to reports that sections of the indigenous population were opposed to any form of Italian administration in Somaliland.*

After hearing the Representatives and Organizations, the first Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations upon recommendation of the sub-committee 16 advised :

“The Somali Conference—Assurance was given that there would be full adherence to any resolution adopted by the United Nations. Independence was asked for within the time limit strictly necessary to assure a wise administration and stable democratic liberties. It was

* The Yearbook of the United Nations, 1949, p. 268.

stated that although the Somali people regarded liberty and freedom as highly desirable, they were not yet ready for absolute independence and would favour a period of United Nations Trusteeship with Italy as the Administering Authority. The Somali youth League was denounced as an extremist and terrorist organization.

The Somali Youth League and Hamar Youth Club—The representatives denounced the so-called Bevin-Sforza Agreement and asked for immediate independence. They expressed a willingness to accept a United Nations Trusteeship for an interim period of short duration but were opposed to any form of foreign rule, particularly Italian administration. It was observed that “demonstrations had already been staged in protest against proposals concerning the return of Italian administration to Somaliland, and it was intimated that further disturbances might follow.”

“The representative of New Zealand was not convinced that adequate regard had been paid to the wishes of the inhabitants, and he suggested that no opportunity be lost in providing for the ultimate reunion of all Somalis under one administration,” the UN report said.

In the end the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Resolution 289A (IV) on November 21, 1949, on the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. It was decided:

“That the Italian Somaliland shall be an independent sovereign State;

“That this independence shall become effective at the end of ten years from the date of the approval of a Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly;

“That, during the period mentioned in paragraph 2, Italian Somaliland shall be placed under the International Trusteeship system with Italy as the Administering Authority;

“That the Administering Authority shall be aided and advised by an Advisory Council composed of representa-

tives of the following States: Colombia, Egypt and the Philippine. The headquarters of the Advisory Council shall be Mogadiscio.”

But unexpectedly, the British Government decided to grant independence to the Former British Somaliland, four days earlier than the date agreed upon by the United Nations to end the Trusteeship in the former Italian Somalia on July 1, 1960. By doing so, the British Government has really effected a real division of the Somali people, the outcome of which is seen by the unilateral declaration of independence in 1991 of the Former British Somaliland. As it was leaving the country, the British Government had to find a legal framework which could keep us divided while united. And today, it is the Somali who is implementing the colonialist's plan to break the unity of the Somali people. Can any reasonable person think that the British relinquished the territory four days ahead of the independence and unity of the two parts, to favour the people of the Former British Somaliland? What was the necessity of doing so?

It was decided that the ten years UN Trusteeship Administration for the Italian Somaliland would end on July 1, 1960. Britain, which retained the British Somaliland under its control, also decided on its own to grant the territory its independence on June 26, 1960; not together with the Italian Somaliland but four days before the Italian Somaliland obtained its freedom on July 1, 1960. As expected the two parts joined together and formed the Republic of Somalia on 1st July 1960. Djibouti, former French Somaliland, gained independence from France on June 27, 1977 and became a separate Republic. During the struggle of the people of the Djibouti for their freedom, every government that came to power in Somalia, since independence, extended both moral and material support to the liberation movements with the hope that it too would join the other two parts which

formed the Republic.

As Ethiopia always opposed the independence and unity of the Somali nation there was no doubt that it would also oppose the union of Djibouti with the Republic in case it gained its freedom. In fact, it preferred the territory to stay under France.

In a BBC broadcast on August 28, 1966, Emperor Haile Selassie is reported to have said: "If Somalis gave up claiming French Somaliland, Ethiopia will thank God; I would like France to stay in the French Somali Coast forever".*

In 1967 France decided to organise a referendum to ask whether the people wanted it to stay on or leave. It hoped that the inhabitants would vote "Yes" for France to continue to administer the territory. Instead, the result was a massive "No". But the French authorities declared the contrary. Angered by the outcome of the referendum, the French Government decided through their Parliament to erase the word "Somali" from the original name of the territory and changed it from "French Somali Coast" to "The French Territory of the Afars and Issas". From "Cote Francaise des Somalis" to "Le Territoire Francais des Afars et des Issas."

Nearly ten years later, France came to the conclusion that it should free the territory . However, it also desired to find the best way to maintain link with it to satisfy Ethiopia. Djibouti was for Ethiopia a vital route to the sea through the railway line since it could not rely on the Eritrean sea ports due to the war of liberation which was being waged at that time by the Eritrean people. It also feared that it would loose the outlet to the sea if the territory joined Somalia. France also wanted to pacify Somalia which considered Djibouti as one of its missing

* Somali Government publication *The Portion of Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonization*, Mogadishu, June 1974, p. 46).

territories. The notion prevailing in the area at the time was that the Somali Government would re-unite Djibouti with the Republic to fulfill its ambition of creating Greater Somalia. France therefore had to find a formula acceptable to all the parties involved. For those whose permanent policy was to obstruct the Somali unity, such as Ethiopia and probably also for some people in the territory itself, the best solution was that if France had to leave, Djibouti should remain by itself and separate from the rest. And the Somali Republic, composed of “the elder brothers”, i.e. the former British Somaliland and former Italian Somaliland and being the main supporter of Djibouti’s right for self-determination and independence, found itself in a bigger dilemma. It had to choose one of two ideas: To accept the continuance of France in French Somaliland, a policy similar to that of Ethiopia, or support the country’s freedom as an independent and separate state; even if that meant the abandonment of the long-standing policy which called for the union of all the Somali territories and the islands in the Indian Ocean under one flag. So, the Somali Government went for the latter, and supported the independence of the territory convinced that the brothers in Djibouti would eventually join the rest. Besides, it was a decision that would satisfy Ethiopia if Djibouti stayed out of Somalia, but at the same time it would also frustrate the negative position and malign feelings of Ethiopia and others who wanted France to stay for ever.

But the agony of being separated from the rest of the Somali territories and peoples continues to prevail upon us. With Djibouti’s independence, there were and still are other Somali territories remaining under alien domination: the Ogaden—under Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District, NFD under Kenya and the Island of Sokotra and its dependencies under the Yemeni control. The Somali people firmly believed that if the

European colonial powers, the masters of the colonial systems, relinquished their control, sooner or later, the “Brothers” will realise that they too have to abandon their colonial policy that they inherited from the European colonialists.

It will be the greatest mistake if these countries, will not reflect a moment and understand the aims and objectives of the colonial powers. In many parts of Africa, just before their departure from the continent, the European colonialists created artificial and biased boundaries according to which they gave territory of one people to another for the sole purpose of setting neighbours against each other, so that there shall be no peace after their departure. The colonialists were far sighted and intelligent, because what is happening today in Africa is exactly what they planned to see: “Border conflict, every where”. In fact, without realising, we, the Africans, are implementing the imperialists objective. The Somali proverb says: *Caqli Gaal iyo indho quraansho lama arkaayo* which means “The intelligence of the European and the Eyes of the Ants are invisible”. Africa should gather the courage to correct the mistakes. It might be painful to do so, but it might lead to a permanent peace in the Continent and peaceful co-existence among ourselves. We have to face the reality and sacrifice the theory which says “if one border is touched the whole continent will fall apart”. That is the colonialists ideology which is also planted in the mind of some brainwashed Africans, which they want us to maintain, so that Africans should always have border disputes.

The Organisation of African Unity, OAU, at the conclusion of its 35th Summit held in Algiers in July 1999, admitted in its “Declaration of Algiers” that “....African countries remain still plagued by problems inherited from colonialism (border conflicts, politico-administrative set-ups based on authoritarianism and ethnic division, poor

infrastructure, illiteracy and poverty—exacerbated by an unfair international economic system causing tensions and instability that must be overcome by them, utilising their own genius and the ancestral values of African culture. In meeting these challenges, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has played a vital role and is called upon to lead the movement for preservation of peace and stability in the Continent and find common solutions, to similar problems, in a spirit of solidarity.”*

As for us, the Somalis, we have been the worst victim of colonisation as the Scramble in the Horn of Africa was mainly the scramble for Somalia and it was more than the Scramble for Africa in general. Because for only one country there were so many powers the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, the Sultanate of Oman, the Italian Empire, the Abyssynian Empire, the Portuguese and Germans competing to have a foot-hold. We were not only occupied but also divided in so many parts among different colonial masters. They knew if we were not divided, we could have been the greatest nation in the Horn of Africa. Because we are strong in our belief. We are the only country in the area where the colonialists failed to do what they wished. Because of that, they divided our country as punishment. And they never wanted us to come up as one of the largest and strongest nations in the Horn of Africa, controlling the entrance of the Red Sea and the largest part of the Indian Ocean. That was the main objective of the various powers, and we should not implement it. May Allah give us the wisdom to understand and to show us the right path. *Amiin Allahayow.*

* Source: Press Release of Embassy of Algeria in New Delhi, dated 20th July 1999.

APPENDICES

SUMMARY OF THE TREATIES AND ENGAGEMENTS Relating to SOMALILAND AND BRITISH

The British protectorate on the Somali coast extends from Lehadu (situated half-way between Ras Jibuti and Zaila on the south side of the Gulf of Tajoura) as far as the forty-ninth degree of east longitude close to Bandar Ziadeh.

The principal tribes along this coast are the Esa, whose limit extends from Ghubbet Kharab to the neighbourhood of Dongarita; the Habr Awal from the last-named place to about thirty-five miles from Berbera; and the Habr Toljaala, thence to about the forty-seventh degree of east longitude. Thence a section of the Habr Gerhajis extends to the west of Wakhderia, and the Warsingli from that point to the forty-ninth degree of east longitude.

The chief ports on this coast are Zaila, Bulhar and Berbera, from the revenues of which a subsidy of Rs. 1,950 per mensem is paid by the British Government to the headmen of the various tribes with which the Agency is brought into contact. These three ports, as well as Karam in the Habr Toljaala country, are customs ports. To the east of Berbera are the flag ports, named Anterad, Karam, Ankor, Raguda, Shellao, Hais, Mait, and Mashow.

Treaty relations with the *Habr Awal* originated so long ago as 1827. A man-of-war having been sent to the coast to exact reprisals for the plundering of a British ship at Berbera, the elders of the tribe entered into a Treaty (No.LXXXIV) of peace and commerce in February of that year, securing reciprocal rights to trade and protection to trading vessels. The Habr Awal agreed to compensate the captain for his losses and to provide for the families of the men who had been killed.

In 1840, shortly after the capture of Aden, it was deemed advisable to secure a commanding position in the harbours of Tajoura and Zaila on the opposite coast. During the revolutions which convulsed Yemen after its evacuation by the Egyptians, the Chiefs of these two places, which had originally been dependent upon the Imam of Sanaa and more recently upon the government of Egypt, and succeeded in making themselves independent, and negotiations were accordingly opened with them direct.

By a Treaty (No.LXXXV) executed on the 19th August 1840, Muhammad bin Muhammad, Chief of Tajoura, bound himself not to enter into any engagement with any other European person or nation without first bringing the subject to the notice of the British Agent at Aden. At the same time the Sultan sold the island of Musa to the British Government.

By a Treaty (No.LXXXVI) concluded in September 1840, Saiyid Muhammad al bar of Zaila entered into a similar undertaking, and ceded the island of Bab.

An expedition was sent in 1854 to explore the country between Berbera and Zanzibar. On the 18th of April 1855 the party were suddenly attacked by Somalis of the Easa Musa tribe; two British officers were wounded, one was killed, and the entire property of the expedition was carried off. A demand was at once made on the Habr Awal tribe for the surrender and punishment of the chief offenders, and the demand was enforced by the blockade of Berbera. The elders of the tribe endeavoured to comply with the demand, but were unable to apprehend the actual murderers, who took refuge in the interior. The British Government at last consented to withdraw the blockade on the Somali binding themselves in 1856 by a Treaty (No.LXXXVII) to use their utmost efforts to deliver up the murderers; to allow free trade with their territories; to abolish traffic in slaves; and to treat with respect any British agent who might be deputed to see that the conditions of the treaty were observed.

In 1855 the elders of the *Habr Gerhajis* and the *Habr Toljaala* tribes of Somali entered into an Engagement (No. LXXXVIII) with the Political Resident at Aden to prohibit the slave trade.

In 1848 Zaila and Tajoura came under the Government of the Turks, who had intervened in the disputes between the Imam of Sanaa and the Sharif of Mokha, and had taken possession of parts of the low country on the opposite coast of Arabia. They continued to hold both places till 1875, when the Porte, on certain conditions, made over its possessions on the Somali coast to the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, who had in the previous year established himself at Harrar in the interior.

In 1884, owing to internal difficulties, the Egyptian Government found it necessary to withdraw their garrisons from this region, and the Porte not being at the time prepared to make any effective assertion of its authority, Zaila came into British occupation, while the French shortly afterwards obtained possession of Tajoura.

At the same time the British Agent was authorised to enter into negotiations with the tribes, with the result that treaties were concluded on the following terms with the Chiefs mentioned below:

- (1) *Habr Awal*, 14th July 1884 (No.LXXXIX). Prohibition to cede, or part with, Territory save to the British Government; free permission to British vessels to trade with all Habr Awal ports; protection of British subjects in Habr Awal territory; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents at Berbera or elsewhere in Habr Awal territories.
Habr Awal, 15th March 1886 (No.XC). Protection by the British of Habr Awal Tribe and territories; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign powers.
- (2) *Gadabursi*, 11th December 1884 (No.XCI). Prohibition to cede, or part with, territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents.
- (3) *Habr Toljaala*, 26th December 1884 (No.XCII). Prohibition to cede, or part with, territory; free permission to British vessels to trade and protection of wrecks and crews of the same; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents.
Habr Toljaala, 1st February 1886 (No.XCIII). Protection by the British; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign powers.

- (4) *Esa*, 31st December 1884 (No.XCIV). Prohibition to cede, or part with, territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents.
- (5) *Habr Gerhajis*, 13th January 1885 (No.XCV). Prohibition to cede, or part with, territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British Subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents.
Habr Gerhajis, 1st February 1886 (No.XCVI). Protection by the British; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign powers.
- (6) *Warsingli*, 27th January 1886 (No. XCVII). Protection by the British; Prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign powers; assistance to wrecks and protection of crews of wrecked vessels; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British agents; assistance to British officers and acceptance of their advice.

In February 1887, after protracted negotiations, the English and French Governments finally came to an understanding in the matter of their respective claims upon the Somali coast. The English protectorate is admitted to extend from the forty-ninth degree of east longitude to a point at the Lahadu wells situated about half-way between Zaila and Ras Jibuti, whence the line dividing the English and French protectorates runs to Abbaswain. Biyo Kabobo, Gildessa and Harrar; the Islands of Musa and Bab are included in the French protectorate by a convention settled in 1888. Neither government is to attempt any interference across the line of division thus defined between them. The caravan route from Zaila to Harrar *via* Gildessa is to remain open to all commerce. Both governments undertake to adopt all necessary measures for the suppression of the slave trade, and to prohibit the importation of powder and arms into the territories subject to their respective influence.

The British Government have no treaty relations with any tribe beyond the eastern boundary of their protectorate; except the Mijjertain Somalis, from whom engagements were taken in 1866 and 1884, the former (No.XCVIII) providing for the abolition of slave trade, the latter (No.XCIX) for the protection of vessels, British or foreign, wrecked upon their coasts, in return

for an annual subsidy of 360 dollars.

In 1889 an Order in Council was prepared for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction and kindred matter upon the Somali coast. But in May 1891 it was desired to defer for the time being any further steps for bringing it into effect.

In 1897, after consideration of the reports of the special mission to Abyssinia, the Imperial Government, in view of the importance which attached to British relations with the Abyssinian Sovereign, at whose court it would probably be necessary to establish a permanent legation, and the bearing which these relations had on the political situation in the valley of the Nile, considered that it might be desirable to transfer the administration of the British protectorate on the Somali coast to the Imperial Government. The Government of India agreed to this and the transfer accordingly took place in October 1898.

(A collection of TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS AND SANADS
Relating to India and neighbouring countries—Vol. XIII, NAI,
New Delhi, India—Library)

Appendix One
**Articles of Friendship and Commerce Between
the Tribe of Habr Awal and England, 1827**

ARTICLES of friendship and commerce signed between J.J. Gordon Bremer, Esq., C.B., Captain of His Majesty's Ship *Tamar*, representing the English nation in Northern Africa, and the Sheikhs of the tribe of Habr Owul.

ARTICLE 1

It is agreed that from henceforth there shall be peace and friendship between the subjects of His Majesty the King of England and the Sheikhs of the Habr Owul tribe and their men, and all other inhabitants of the coast of Africa over which they have authority and influence.

ARTICLE 2

It is agreed that any vessels bearing the English flag which may come to the port of Berbera, (or any other port under the authority of the Sheikhs of the Habr Owul tribe,) for the purpose of trade shall not be molested or injured, but shall receive protection and support from the said Sheiks, that they shall be at liberty to enter into any trade they may think fit to chose, and that they shall be at liberty to depart from the said port at their pleasure without impediment, injury, or molestation.

ARTICLE 3

It is agreed that in like manner any vessels or persons belonging to the said Sheiks of Habr Owul tribe which shall come into any port belonging to His Majesty the King of England shall receive protection and support, and be treated in all respects the same as other vessels or persons trading to those ports.

ARTICLE 4

It is agreed that as an equivalent for the value of the British Brig *Marianne* and her cargo, which was plundered in the port of Berbera, these shall be paid by the said Sheikhs of the Habr Owul tribe to the said Captain J.J. Gordon Bremer, C.B., or to some person duly authorized by him to receive it, the sum

fifteen thousand Spanish Dollars, or produce to the same amount, in three equal payments, that is to say, five thousand Dollars, or produce to that amount, this year 1827 and of the Hegira 1242, and the same sum in each of the two following years, that is to say, on or before the conclusion of the trading season in the month of April, or two hundredth day of the Nowroz.

ARTICLE 5

Two Lascars belonging to the British Brig Marianne having been killed when the said vessel was plundered and destroyed, the Sheikhs of the Habr Owul tribe do hereby agree to pay the sum ofDollars for the support of the families of the murdered men, according to the Mohamedan law in such cases.

Confirmed and sealed at Berbera, in Africa, on the 6th day of February in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ 1827 and of the Hegira 1242, the 9th day of the moon Rujub (Rajab).

(Signed) J.J. Gordon Bremer,
M.E. Bagnold, Pol. Agent, Witness.

Witness:

Shurmarkay Ali Sauleh.

(Signed) by Ismail Gella for himself, and Omar Kadm Hussin Ban and Ismail Goled, Sheikhs of Habr Owul tribe.

Approved by the Bombay Government on 10th May 1827.

(Source: Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds, Vol. VII, pp. 320-321-Calcutta, 1865.

Appendix Two
**Treaty between the Sultan of Tajourra and
British Government, 1840**

In 1839, after the capture of Aden, the British deemed it necessary to secure command of the harbours of Zaila and Tajourra on the coast of Africa, nearly opposite to Aden. Tajourra was a dependency of Zaila, and both places were subject to the Imams of San'a, but during the revolutions at San'a, the Chiefs of Zaila and Tajourra had assumed independence. Following Treaty was signed between the British Government and the Chief of Tajourra:

Commercial Treaty entered into between Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed, of Tajourra, and Captain Robert Moresby, of the Indian Navy, on the part of the Honourable East India Company.

It being advantageous to both parties to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Commerce, and that a mutual good understanding should exist between each other, more especially so, since Aden has become a British port, we, Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed and Captain Robert Moresby, of the Indian Navy, (being fully authorized so to do,) agree to the following capitulations and articles:

ARTICLE 1

That friendship and peace shall be lasting between the State of Tajowra and its dependencies and the British Government.

ARTICLE 2

That the English nation, and all vessels lawfully sailing under the British flag, having merchandise of any description on board, shall be respected and permitted, without slightest prejudice or molestation to their persons or effects, to enter and trade in the port of, and all ports under the Government of Tajowra,, paying a duty of five per cent. upon all produce. The subjects of the Sultan of Tajowra shall also be permitted the same privileges at all British ports.

ARTICLE 3

The port of Tajowra and the adjacent ports, under the Government of Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed, are to be open for the introduction and reception of all goods brought in ships or vessels lawfully trading under the British flag; further, the Sultan of Tajowra will endeavour all in his power to introduce British produce into the interior States of Eiffat, Shoa, and Abyssinia, and in return the Authorities at Aden will endeavour to encourage interior export trade through Tajowra.

ARTICLE 4

Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed, of Tajowra, engages at all times to respect and regard the friendly advice of any authorized person belonging to the British Government, and agrees not to enter into any other Treaty or Bond with any other European nation or person without, in the first instance, bringing the subject to the notice of the Government Authorities at Aden, so that the same may in no ways prove detrimental to his friends, the English, or their commerce. In return for these conditions, the British Government will observe the interests of the State of Tajowra, and do all in their power to assist in improving their commercial resources.

ARTICLE 5

Any subject of either power having committed crime or offence is to receive sentence awarded by their own Laws and Regulations.

ARTICLE 6

Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed, of Tajowra, engages to protect and respect any British subject residing in his territories, provided the sanction of his Government be previously obtained, the British guaranteeing the same privilege to the people of Tajowra and its dependencies.

ARTICLE 7

In entering into any Bond or Treaty, or trading with either European or other powers, Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed engages that no Bond or Treaty shall be acceded to or acquiesced in by him which will, either at the present or at any future

period, prove detrimental or injurious to the interests of the British, either in a political or commercial point of view, and in return for such agreement, the English promise that they will act in no manner which may have an evil tendency towards the State of Tajowra.

ARTICLE 8

We, Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed and Captain Robert Moresby, of the Indian Navy, having met, and being mutually satisfied with each others powers, have ratified the above Articles for the benefit of both powers.

In witness whereof we, this 19th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty, corresponding with the 22nd day of Jemmadi-el-Akhar, in the Hegira one thousand two hundred and fifty-six, have attached our seals and signatures.

Witnesses.	The Signature of MOHAMMED-BIN
ABDUL ROUSSOUL	MOOFOOMUD, Sultan of Tajoura
Agent to the British Govt.	BENYETTA-BIN MOHAMMED
	LOUZW
HADJI SHOOMARKHI,	MAHOMMED ESAAKH.
Shaik of Berbera	ABOU BEKIR SHAIM
	MOHAJMMED SABBARH
(Sd.) MORESBY, Capt. I.N.,	ABOU BEKIR MEERAHN
Comdg. the H.C. Steam Frigate	MOHAMMED-BIN AHMED
“Sesostris”	
August 19, 1840	

Translation of the Deed of Sale of the Island called Mussa, granted by Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed to the British Government.

In the name of the Most Merciful God!

The virtue of this writing is, that I, Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed, Governor of Tajowra, I, for myself and posterity, bargained and granted the Island called “Mussa” to the British Government for ten bags of rice. I agreed to and sold the said Island for the said quantity of rice, and it is belonging and pertaining to British Government.

In the presence of the undersigned witnesses, and God is also witness between us, this 22nd Jemmadi-el-Akhar, in the year one thousand two hundred and fifty-six (1256) Hegira, or 19th day of August 1840.

(Signed) Sultan Mahomed bin Mohummed.

Witnesses:

(Signed) Bemtha eben Mahomed, Minister.

Aboobacker Murjan.

Shomakee bin Ali.

Hajee Abdool Russool,

British Agent at Mocha

(Signed) Robert Moresby, Captain, I.N.,

Commanding H.C.'s Steam Frigate "Sesostris."

The 19th August 1840.

Appendix Three
**Treaty between the Governor of Zaila and
the British Government, 1840**

Commercial Treaty entered into between Syud Mahomed Bar, Governor of Zaila, for himself and posterity, and Captain Moresby, of the Indian Navy, on the part of the Honourable East India Company.

It being advantageous to both parties to enter into a Treaty of peace and commerce, and that lasting friendship and good will should exist between each other, we, Syud Mahomed Bar, Governor of Zaila, and Captain Robert Moresby, of the Indian Navy, on account of the Honourable East India Company being fully authorized to do so, agree to the following capitulations and Articles:

ARTICLE 1

That the English nation and all vessels, ships and boats lawfully sailing under the British flag, commanded by European or Native subjects of the English, having merchandise of any description, shall be respected and permitted, without the slightest prejudice or molestation to their persons or effects, to enter and trade in the port of Zaila and all other ports under the Governor of Zaila, paying a duty of 5 per cent. upon all produce. The subjects of the Governor of Zaila shall also pay the same duty in all English ports.

ARTICLE 2

The Governor of Zaila will endeavour all in his power to introduce British property and merchandise into the interior State of Zaila, and engage at all times to protect, respect and regard the person or persons of English and their subjects and friendly advice of any authorized person or Agent belonging to the British Government, who while at Zaila to be respected and regarded. The English on their part allow the same to be done in their port of Aden, or elsewhere, and to assist the trade from Zaila.

ARTICLE 3

The Governor of Zaila engages not to enter into any Treaty or Bond with any other European nation or person, or allow other Europeans to settle in his territories, or pass through in any numbers, without bringing the subject, in the first instance, to the notice of the British Government at Aden, so that the same may be in no manner detrimental to his friends the English or their commerce, in return for which the English will do all in their power to assist the Governor of Zaila in improving his commercial resources.

ARTICLE 4

Any subjects of either power having committed crime or offence are to be punished by their own laws and customs of the countries they belong to.

ARTICLE 5

Syud Mahomed Bar makes over the Island called Aubad near Zaila to the English Government for the harbour of their ships and vessels without any prohibition whatever.

We, Syud Mahomed Bar, Governor of Zaila, and Captain Robert Moresby, of the Indian Navy, on the part of the English Government of India, do ratify and agree to keep faithfully the above Articles that peace and friendship may be lasting between us: In witness whereof we have set our names and seals.

(Signed) R. Moresby, Captain,
Commanding H.C.'s Steam Frigate "Sesostris."
MOKHA,
The 3rd September 1840.

Appendix Four
Engagement between British and the Elders of
Habr Gerhajis and Habr Toljaala, 1855

In the name of the Most Merciful God, and Him we implore !

The reason of writing this bond is that, influenced by motives of humanity and by a desire to conform to the principles on which the great English Government is conducted, we lend a willing ear to the proposals of our sincere friend Brigadier W.M. Coghlan, Governor of Aden, that we shall covenant with him and with each other to abolish and prohibit the exportation of slaves from any part of Africa to any other place in Africa or Asia, or elsewhere, under our authority.

We, whose names and seals are set to this Bond, do therefore in the sight of God and of man solemnly proclaim our intentions to prohibit the exportation of slaves from Africa by every means in our power; we will export none ourselves, nor will we permit our subjects to do so, and any vessels found carrying slaves shall be seized and confiscated and the slaves shall be released.

PEACE
Signatures

- No. 1. SULTAN MANASSIR BIN BOO BEKR BIN MEHDI, the Oulaki, done at Aour, dated 14th October 1855.
- No. 2. SULTAN ABOO BEKR BIN ABDALLA BIN HEMDI, the Oulaki, Same date and place.
- No. 3. SAYED MAHOMED-BIN-ABADER-RAHMAN EL TIFFERI, as witness to Nos. 1 and 2.
- No. 4. ALI MAHOMED (ZAID Elder of the HABR GERHAJIS tribe of SOMALIS At Mail), done the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.
- No. 5. HIRSEE ALI MAHOMED, Elder of the HABR GERHAJIS tribe of Somalis At Mail, done the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.

- No. 6. OMAR-BIN-AHMED-BIN SAID BA-SHITICH as witness to Nos. 4 and 5 (Mahamood).
- No. 7. MAHAMOOD-MAHOMED, Elder of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Aais, 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with 17th October 1855.
- No. 8. ABOO BEKR-BIN MAHOMED, Elder of the HABR TALJAALA tribe At Rasoda, done the 5th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 17th October 1855.
- No. 9. ABDOO OMAR, Elder of the HABR TALJAALA, tribe at Unkur, done the 6th Day of Suffer 1272, corresponding the 18th October 1855.
- No.10. ALI AHMED, Elder of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Unkur, done the 6th Suffer Corresponding with the 18th October 1855.
- No.11. HASSAN YAUSEF, Elder of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Kurrum, done the 6th day of Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.
- No.12. MAHOMED LEEBAN, Chief of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Kurrum, done the 6th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 18th October 1855.
- No.13. YOOSEF OTHMAN, Elder of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Ain Tarad, done the 7th Suffer 1272, corresponding with the 19th October 1855.
- No.14. AHMED ABOO BEKR MAHOMED SEEBAN, Elder of the HABR TALJALA tribe at Ain Tarad, done the 7th Suffer 1272, corresponding with 19th October 1855.

(True copy of translation)

(Sd.) BRIGADIER,
Acting Political Resident and Consul.

Appendix Five
Articles of Peace and Friendship concluded
between the Habr Awal and East India Company,
1856

ARTICLES of peace and friendship concluded between the Habr Owul tribe of the Somalees on the one part, and Brigadier William Marcus Coghlan, Political Resident at Aden, on behalf of the honourable East India Company, on the other.

Whereas on the 19th of April 1855, corresponding with the 1st of Shaban 1271, a treacherous attack and murder was perpetuated at the port of Berbera by a party of the Habr Owul tribe upon a party of British Officers about to travel in that country, with the consent and under the protection of the elders of the tribe, in consequence of which outrage certain demands were made by the Government of India and enforced by blockade of the Habr Owul coast, and whereas it has become apparent that the said tribe has fulfilled those conditions to the utmost of its ability and has prayed to be relieved from the blockade:

Therefore it is agreed

ARTICLE 1

That the elders of the Habr Owul will use their best endeavour to deliver up Ou Ali, the murderer of Lieutenant Stroyan.

ARTICLE 2

That until this be accomplished, the sub-tribe Esa Moosa, which now shelters, and any other tribe which may hereafter shelter, harbour, or protect him, the said Ou Ali, shall be debarred from coming to Aden.

ARTICLE 3

That all vessels sailing under the British flag shall have free permission to trade at the port of Berbera, or at any other place in the territories of the Habr Owul, and that all British subjects shall enjoy perfect safety in every part of the said territories, and shall be permitted to trade or travel there under

the protection of the elders of the tribe. In like manner shall the members of the Habr Owul tribe enjoy similar privileges at Aden or any other part of the British possessions.

ARTICLE 4

The traffic in slaves throughout the Habr Owul territories, including the port of Berbera, shall cease for ever, and any slave or slaves who, contrary to this engagement, shall be introduced into the said territories shall be delivered up to the British, and the Commander of any vessel of Her Majesty's or the Honourable East India Company's Navy shall have the power of demanding the surrender of such slave or slaves, and of supporting the demand by force of arms if necessary.

ARTICLE 5

The Political Resident at Aden shall have the power to send an Agent to reside at Berbera during the season of the fair, should he deem such a course necessary, to see that the provisions of this Agreement are observed, and such Agent shall be treated with the respect and consideration due to the representative of the British Government.

ARTICLE 6

That on a solemn promise being given by the elders of the Habr Owul faithfully to abide by the Articles of this Agreement and to cause the rest of the tribe to do so likewise, and to deliver up to the Political Resident at Aden any party who may violate it, the blockade of the Habr Owul coast shall be raised, and perpetual friendship shall exist between the British and the Habr Owul.

Done at Berbera this seventh day of November one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six of the Christian era, corresponding with the eighth day of Rubee-ool-Awul one thousand two hundred and seventy-two of the Hegira.

Mark.	(1) MAHOMED ARRALEH,	Ayal Yoonus
"	(2) AHMED ALI BOOKERI,	"
"	(3) NOOR FARRAH,	"
"	(4) AHMED GHALID,	Ayal Ahmed.
"	(5) MAHOMED WAIS,	"
Mark	(6) MUGGAN MAHOMED,	Ayal Ahmed.

- “ (7) ROBBLIE HASSAN, Makahil.
“ (8) ATEYAH HILDER, “
“ (9) FARRAH BENIN, “
“ (10) AWADTH SHERMARKI, Ayal Hamood.

Signed in my presence at Berbera on the 7th November 1856.

(Signed) R.L. PLAYFAIR,
Assistant Political Resident, Aden.

(Signed) W.M. COGHLAN,
Political Resident.

Aden, 9th November 1856.

Ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, at Fort William, this twenty-third day of January 1857.

(Signed) CANNING.

“ GEO. ANSON.

“ J. DORIN.

“ J. LOW.

“ J. P. GRANT.

“ B. PEACOCK.

By order,

(Signed) G. F. EDMONSTONE,
Secretary to the Government of India

Appendix Six
**Treaty between France and the Tribes of
Danakils, Adalys and Debenets, 1862**

The following has been agreed and determined between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty the Emperor of the French and Ding-Ahmed Aboubekr, delegated by Sultan Muhammad-bin-Muhammad, Sultan Ding Koullou-Osman, Ali Ibrahim-Aboubekr-Chahm, Sultan Loeta, Chief of the Danakil, Adel, and Debeneh, and invested with full powers on their behalf.

ARTICLE I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon III, and his successors, and the Danakil tribes dwelling on the coasts of Adel.

ARTICLE 2

The Danakil Chiefs, and in particular Sultan Ding, cede to His Majesty the Emperor the harbour, roadstead, and anchorage of Obokh, situated near Cape Ras Bir, with the plain which stretches from Ras Ali in the south to Ras Dumairah in the north.

ARTICLE 3

This cession is made in consideration of the price stipulated and agreed upon viz., 10,000 talaris, equal to 55,000 francs.

ARTICLE 4

The payment of this sum shall take place, the first half after the convention shall have been ratified by the Chiefs above and below specified, the other half three months after the day on which possession is taken in the name of His Imperial Majesty.

ARTICLE 5

This cession is guaranteed collectively by all the Chiefs of the Danakils, to wit, Sultan Muhammad-bin-Muhammad, Sultan Doing Koullou-Osman, Ali Ibrahim-Aboubekr-Chahm, and

by Sultan Laeta, Chief of the Debeneh tribe, represented by their envoy, Ding Ahmed Aboubekr.

ARTICLE 6

The aforesaid Chiefs engage singly and collectively to facilitate by all means in power the relations of the Frenchmen settled at Obokh with the interior of the country, both by land and water, in case of an ascent of the streams of the rivers Amazo and Haouach.

They will concede to them the right of working the forest for wood and meet their needs, and of using the watering places and streams along the coast in the vicinity of Obokh. It shall be lawful to construct, by mutual agreement, reservoirs of water at points considered suitable, without their establishment giving rise to any claim for compensation.

ARTICLE 7

The French subjects settled at Obokh are at liberty to pasture their flocks at Ambabou on the mountain of Tajourra, at Kassassazele, and at Elo near Cape Jaboutil, (sic) without this right giving rise to any dispute or claim for compensation.

ARTICLE 8

French subjects shall have the right to collect salt from Lake Assal, and from other places where it may be found, without being disturbed or molested.

ARTICLE 9

The Chiefs of Danakils, and other independent tribes of the Adel coast, formally engage to communicate to the French authorities at Obokh any proposal for a cession of territory which may be made to them on the part of any foreign Government. They engage themselves singly and collectively to decline any overtures which may not have met with the approval of the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French.

Concluded at Paris, 11th March 1862.

(Signed in original) THOUVENEL.

Dimy-bin-Sultan Muhammad Hummad, son of the late Sultan Muhammad.

The Wazir Muhammad, son of Sultan Hummad.

The Emir El Hadj Aboubek (sic).
Ibrahim Chahim

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE

In case the harbour, roadstead, and anchorage of Obokh shall be found to be unsuited for the admission of a vessel of large tonnage, Ding Ahmed engages in the name of Sheikh Ali Ibrahim-Aboubekr-Chahm, and the Chiefs named in the treaty, to cede for the price stipulated in Article 3, the harbour, roadstead, and anchorage of Goubout Kharab, or any other, with the territory thereon dependent, and subject to all the conditions inserted in the present treaty.

Concluded at Paris, 11th March 1862.

(Signed in original) THOUVENEL.

Dimy-bin-Sultan Muhammad (L.S.)

Following is the French version of the above treaty between France and the Tribes of the Danakils, Adalys, and Debenets, signed 11th March 1862:

Entre le Ministre Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste' L'Empereur des Francais, et Ding Ahmet Aboubekre, delegue par Mohamed-ben-Mohamed, Sultan Ding Koullon Osman, Ali Ibrahim Aboubakre Chahur, Sultan Moheita, Chef des tribus Danakisles Adalys et Dehenets, et investi de leurs pleins pouvoirs, il a eteconvenur et arrete ce qui soit:-

ARTICLE I

Il y aura paixet amitie perpetuelles entre Sa Majeste l'Empereur Napoleon III, et ses successeurs et les tribus Danakiles etablies sur la cote d'Adel.

ARTICLE II

Le Chefs Danakiles et nommement Sultan Ding, cedent a Sa Majeste l'Empereur les port, rade et mouillage d'Obock, situe pres du cap Ras Bir, avec la plaine qui s'etend depuis Ras-Ali au sud, jusqu'a Ras-Doumeirah au nord.

ARTICLE III

Cette cession est faite moyennant le prix et convenu de 10,000 thalalris, soit 50,000 fr.

ARTICLE IV

Conditions du paiement.

ARTICLE V

Cette cession est garantie solidairement par tous les Chefs des Danakiles, savoir:—Sultan Mohamed-ben-Mohamed, Sultan Ding Koullon Iman, Aly Ibrahim Aboubakre Cham, et par Sultan Hoheita, Chef de la tribu des Debenets representes par leur Envoye Ding Ahmet Aboubekre.

ARTICLE VI

Le Chefs ci-dessus mentionnes s'engagent isolement et solidairement a faciliter par tous les moyens en leurs pouvoirs les relations des Francais etablis a Obock avec l'interieur du pays, soit par terre, soit par eau, en remontant le cours des fleuves Anazo et Hawash.

Ils leur concedent le droit d'exploiter dans les forets le bois necessaire a leur usage et celui d'user des aiguades et eaux courantes qui existent sur la cote a proximite du territoire d'Obock. Il pourra etre etabli, d'un commun accord, des reservoirs d'eau sur les points juges convenables sans que leur etablissement donne lieu a aucune demande d'indemnite.

ARTICLE VII

Les Francais etablis a Obock pourront faire patrouer leurs troupes a Ambabou, sur la montagne de Tadjourah, a Hanassazele et a Elo, pres du Cap Djiboutil, sans que ce droit entraine aucune demande d'indemnite.

ARTICLE VIII

Les Francais auront le droit de prendre du sel au Lac Assal et autres lieux ou il se trouve, sans etre ni inquietes ni molestes.

ARTICLE IX

Les Chefs des Danakiles et des autres tribus independantes de la cote d'Adel, prennent l'engagement formel de communiquer aux autorites Francaises etablies a Obock, toute proposition de cession de territoire qui pourrait leur etre faite de la part d'un Gouvernement etranger. Ils s'engagent solidairement

ment et isolement a repousser toute ouverture qui n'aurait pas reçu l'agrément du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

Fait a Paris, le 11 Mars 1862.

(Suivent les signatures)

Clause Additionnelle.

Dans les cas où les ports, rades et mouillages d'Obock seraient reconnus impropres à la tenue des bâtiments de fort tonnage, Ding Ahmed s'engage au nom du Sheik aly Ibrahim abobekre Shaam et des Chefs désignés au Traité à céder au prix stipulé dans l'Article III. Les ports, rades, et mouillages de Joubout Kharab ou tous autres avec le territoire qui en dépend et sous toutes les conditions insérées au présent Traité.

Fait a Paris, le 11 Mars 1862.

(Suivent les signatures) Present and assisting in the negotiations:

V. RICHERI, Captain,

Commanding the Royal ship C. Colombo.

F. SOLA,

Royal Italian Consul-General at Aden.*

* Proceedings of the Foreign Department, May 1902. NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Seven
**Engagement concluded between the British and
Sultan Mahmood Bin Yoosoof, Chief of the
Mijerteyn Tribe , 1866**

INFLUENCED by motives of humanity and by a desire to conform to the principles on which the great English Government is conducted, we lend a willing ear to the proposals of our friend, Lieutenant-Colonel William Lockyer Merewether, C.B., Political Resident, Aden, that we should covenant with him each other to abolish and prohibit the exportation of slaves from any one part of Africa to any other place in Africa or Asia or elsewhere under our authority. We whose names and seals are set to this bond, as therefore in the sight of God and of men, solemnly proclaim our intention to prohibit the exportation of slaves from Africa by every means in our power: we will export none ourselves, nor permit our subjects to do so, and any vessel found carrying slaves shall be seized and confiscated and the slaves shall be released.

Signed this twentieth day of February one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six (4th of the month Shawal 1282) at Bunder Mareea.

(Sd.) SULTAN MAHMOOD YOOSOOF.

Witness to the above.

(Sd.) Moosa bin Yoosoof Othman.

“ Samunter Othman.

“ Adress Mahmood.

(Sd.) W.L. MEREWETHER, Lieut.Col.,
Poltl. Resident, Aden.*

* Confirmed by order of the Governor-General in Council, dated the 16th May 1866.

Appendix Eight
**Engagement entered into by the Mijjerteyn and
British Government, 1884**

Influenced by motives of friendship and with a desire to conform to principles on which the great British Government is conducted, and wishing to preserve peace and to foster security on our shores, we, the Chief of the Mijjertain Somal, Othman Mahmood, Sultan of the Mijjertain Tribe, Noor Othman, Ismail Othman, Samunter Othman, Ahmed Mahmood, Hajji Idrees Mahmood, Mahomed Shirwa Noor, Yousuf Mahmood, Yousuf Ali Yousuf, Gulaid Yousuf, and Hajji Mahamed Fahiya, Elders, on behalf of ourselves, our heirs and successors, do hereby covenant and agree with our friend Captain James Stewart King, Assistant Resident at Aden, on behalf of the great British Government:

I

That in the event of any steamer or ship or other vessel belonging to the British Government, or to a British subject, or to any other power, or to the subjects of any other power, being wrecked upon our shores, or in distress, protection shall be accorded to her and to all on board, and the latter shall receive good treatment.

II

That should the master, crew or passengers of any wreck or casualty wish to proceed to Aden, we will protect them and conduct them thither, or give them the best means in our power of proceeding there.

III

That should any steamer, ship or vessel be wrecked, suffer casualty, or be abandoned, we will not only protect and guard such steamer, ship or vessel from plunder and wilful (*sic*) damage to our utmost ability, but we will give speedy notice of such wreck to the Political Resident of Aden.

IV

That such steamer, ship, or vessel will be protected by us as aforesaid until instructions in reply to our said notice are given and received from the Political Resident of Aden.

V

That for such acts of good will and friendship and as imposing on us, our heir and successors the obligation aforementioned, we shall receive from the British Government conditionally on our good behaviour and so long as we act strictly up to our obligation, a yearly stipend of \$360 (three hundred and sixty dollars). And we shall also expect to receive such salvage as by any right according to British law we may be entitled to and according as the great British Government through their representative the Political Resident of Aden for the time being may, on the merits of each case, determine by the custom in such cases.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Othman Mahmud, Sultan of the Mijjertain tribe, Noor Othman, Ismail Othman, Samunter Othman, Ahmed Mahmud, Hajji Idris Mahmud, Mahomad Shirwa Nur, Yousuf Mahmud, Yousuf Ali Yousuf, Gulaid Yousuf, and Hajji Mahamed Fahiya, Elders, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, and Captain James Stewart King, assistant Resident at Aden, on behalf of the great British Government, do hereby affix their signatures and seal this first of May one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, equivalent to the 5th day of the month of Rajab 1301 A.H., at Bunder Muraya.

The mark of Sultan Othman Mahmud.

Nur Othman.

The mark of Ismail Othman.

The mark of Samunter Othman.

Ahmad Mahmud.

Hajji Idris Mahmud.

Mohamad Shirwa Nur.

Yusuf Mahmud.

Yusuf Ali Yusuf.

Gulaid Yusuf.

Hajji Mohamed Fahiyah.

(Sd.) J.S. KING, Captain,
Assistant Political Resident, Aden.

In presence of –

(Sd.) ANTHONY GWYN,
Captain, I.G.S. “Amberwitch.”

(Sd.) J.W. YERBURY, Captain, R.A.

(Sd.) RIPON,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India

This agreement was ratified by the Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the twenty-ninth day of July A.D. 1884.

(Sd.) C. GRANT,

Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Appendix Nine
The British and Habr Awal Treaty, 1884

Whereas the Garrison of His highest the Khedive are about to be withdrawn from Berbera and Bulhar, and the Somali Coast general, we the undersigned Elders of the Habr Awal tribe are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons.

Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The Habr Awal do hereby declare that they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control.

ARTICLE II

All vessels under the British flag shall have free permission to trade and the ports of Berbera, Bulhar and other places in the territories of the Habr Awal.

ARTICLE III

All British subjects residing in, or visiting, the territories of the Habr Awal shall enjoy perfect safety and protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the safe conduct of the Elders of the tribe.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the Habr Awal shall cease for ever, and the Commander of any of Her Majesty's vessels, or any other British Officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside at Berbera or elsewhere in the terri-

stories of the Habr Awal, and every such Agent shall be treated with respect and consideration and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

The above-written treaty shall come into force and have effect from the date on which the Egyptian troops shall embark at Berbera, but the agreement shall be considered provisional and subject to revocation or modification unless confirmed by competent authority.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Abdillah Liban and Iamah Yunus (both Ayal Ba-aila), Said Gulaid and Awadh Ali (both Bhandera), Ubsiyeh Jamah and Awadh Liban (both Baho) Ilmi Farah, Yaseen Umar (both ba Eysa Musa), Ahmed Liban and Farah Samanter (both Ayal Shiridon) Hirsi Mahomed, Haid Ahmed, Husain Ali Abokr Ahmed, Ismail Doaly Adan Ismail and Yunus Deriah (all Ayal Gedid), Iamah Farah (Ayal Hosh), Warfah Adowa (Mohamed Yunus), Hirsi Buraid, Ali Mohomed, Husain Gaillay, Magan Said, Mohomed Kabillay and Wais Yusuf (all of the Eysa Musa), Roblay Doblai and Musa Fara (Mikhail), Nur Awadh and Ismail Farah (both of the Awal Hamed),

And

Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, the Officiating Political Resident of Aden, the former for themselves, their heirs and successors and the latter on behalf of the British Government do each and all in the presence of witnesses affix their signatures, marks or seals at Berbera on this twenty-first day of Ramadhan one thousand three hundred and one, corresponding with the fourteenth of July one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER, Major,

Officiating Political Resident, Aden.

(Witness) W.J. PEYTON, Lieutenant, Bombay Staff Corps.

(Sd.) RIPON,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This agreement was ratified by the Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the twenty-third day of August A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four.

(Sd.) C. GRANT,

Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department

Appendix Ten
The British and Gadabursi Treaty, 1884

We, the undersigned Elders of the Gadabursi tribe, are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons.

Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follows: -

ARTICLE I

The Gadabursi tribe do hereby declare that they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control.

ARTICLE II

All vessels under the British flag shall have free permission to trade at all ports and place in the territories of the Gadabursi tribe.

ARTICLE III

All British subjects, residing in, or visiting, the territories of the Gadabursi tribe, shall enjoy perfect safety and protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the safe conduct of the Elders of the tribe.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slave throughout the territories of the Gadabursi tribe shall cease for ever and the Commander of any of Her Majesty's vessels, or any other British officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave, and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside in the territories of the Gadabursi tribe, and every such agent shall be treated with respect and

consideration and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

The above-written treaty shall come into force and have effect from the date of signing this agreement.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Iama Roblay, Mahomed Ali Balol, Ilme Warfa (Ugaz' son), Rogay Kahiri, Waberi Idlay, Roblay Warfah, Doaly Dilbad, Amir Egal, Gailay Shirwah, Warfah Roblay, Yunus Boh,

And

Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, the former for themselves, their heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each and all in the presence of witness affix their signatures, marks or seals at Zaila on the eleventh day of December one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, corresponding with the twenty-fifth Safar one thousand three hundred and two.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER,

Bombay Staff Corps.

Signed in my presence-

(Sd.) PERCY DOWNES

First Grade Officer, I.M.

(Sd.) DUFFERIN,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This agreement was ratified by the Governor-General of India in Council at Calcutta on the twentieth February one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original agreement.

(Sd.) W.Lee-WARNER,

Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 25th February 1885.

Appendix Eleven
The British and Habr Toljaala Treaty, 1884

We, the undersigned Elders of the Habr Toljaala tribe, are desirous of entering into agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons.

Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The Habr Toljaala tribe do hereby declare that they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control.

ARTICLE II

All vessels under British flag shall have free permission to trade at all ports and places within the territories of the Habr Toljaala, and the tribe is bound to render assistance to any vessel whether British or belonging to any other nation that may be wrecked on the above-mentioned shores, and to protect the crew, the passengers and cargo of such vessel, giving speedy intimation to the Resident at Aden of the circumstances, for which act of friendship and good-will a suitable reward will be given by the British Government.

ARTICLE III

All British subjects, residing in, or visiting the territories of the Habr Toljaala tribe, shall enjoy perfect safety and protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the safe conduct of the Elders of the tribe.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the Habr Toljaala shall cease for ever, and the Commander of any of Her Majesty's vessels, or any other British officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside in the territories of the Habr Toljaala, and every such agent shall be treated with respect and consideration and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

The above-written treaty shall come into force and shall have effect from the date of signing this agreement.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond Birir Shaikh Don, Farah Nalaya, Hirsi Bailay, Ahmed Ima, Ali Awadh, Awadh Gaidee, Ashoor Goraya, Guday Awadh, Adan Warsama, all of the Yussuf sub-tribe; Abdulla Muhammad, Adan Muhammad, Adan Awadh, Farah Osman, Yusuf Adan, Adan Yusuf, Hassan Muhammad, Hassan Ali, Hassan Gulaid, Iama Abdy, all of the Adan Madoba sub-tribe; Ali Ahmed, Muhammad Ali, Husainj Abdy, Esa Abdy, Yussuf Adan, all of the Rerdod sub-tribe; Awadh Ali, Farah Abdy, Ahmed Noh, Ahmed Doaly, Ahmed Farah, Hassan Abdy, Wawadlay Muhammad, all of the Sambur sub-tribe; Muhammad Ali, Ibril Muhammad, Ahmed Husain, Shermarki ali, Muhmmad Ismail, Ismail Muhammad Muhammad Ali, Hassan Muhammad, all of the Musa Bukr.

And

Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, Assistant Political Resident, Aden, the former for themselves, their heirs and successors and latter on behalf of the British Government, do each and all in the presence of witnesses affix their signatures, marks or seals at Aden on the twenty-sixth day of December one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, corresponding with the ninth of Rabia al Awal one thousand three hundred and two.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER,

(Witness) F. CRANFIELD,

(Sid.) DUFFERIN

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This agreement was ratified by the Governor-General of India in Council at Calcutta on the twenty-fifth of February one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original agreement.

(Sd.) W. Lee-WARNER,
Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India
FORT WILLIAM,
The 28th February 1885.

Appendix Twelve
The British and Habr Gerhajis Treaty, 1884

We, the undersigned Elders of the Habr Gerhajis tribe, are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient reasons.

Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follows:-

ARTICLE I

The Habr Gerhajis tribe do hereby declare that they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control.

ARTICLE II

All vessels under the British flag shall have free permission to trade at all ports and places within the territories of the Habr Gerhajis, and the tribe is bound to render assistance to any vessel whether British or belonging to any other nation that may be wrecked on the above-mentioned shores and to protect the crew, the passengers and cargo of such vessel, giving speedy intimation to the Resident at Aden of the circumstances, for which act of friendship and good-will a suitable reward will be given by the British Government.

ARTICLE III

All British subjects, residing in, or visiting, the territories of the Habr Gerhajis tribe, shall enjoy perfect safety and protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the safe conduct of the Elders of the tribe.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the Habr Gerhajis tribe shall cease for ever, and the Commander of any of Her Majesty's vessels, or any other British officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of

any slave and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside in the territories of the Habr Gerhajis tribe, and every such agent shall be treated with respect and consideration and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

The above-written treaty shall come into force and have effect from the date of signing this agreement.

In token of conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond Ahmed A Hassan Yusuf, Said Muhammad, Muhammad Jeas, Abdy Hassan Muhammad, Ahmed Ali Nur, Nur Hirsee (all of the Jibril Adan residing at Mait and Ras Katib), Doaly Ahmed (of Muhammad Adan residing at Mait), Hassan Abdullah (of the Ali Said residing at Mait and Ras Katib), Ahmed Saleh, Hagar Araly, Hussain Saleh, Ali Ismail, Said Ahmed, Ali Aman (all of the Yunus Ismail residing at Hashow), Ismail Ali Easa Hassan, Mussa Abdalla (all of Muhammad Adan residing at Shall'ao).

And

Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, Assistant Political Resident at Aden, the former for themselves, their heir and successors, and the later on behalf of the British Government, do each and all in the presence of witness affix their signatures, marks or seals at Aden this thirteenth day of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five, corresponding with the twenty-eighth Rabi al awal one thousand three hundred and two.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER, Major,

(Witness) EDWARD CRANFIELD

(Sd.) DUFFERIN, *Viceroy and Governor-General of India*

This agreement was ratified by the Governor-General of India in Council at Calcutta on the twenty-fifth day of February A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,

Foreign Department.

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original Agreement.

(Sd.) W. Lee-WARNER,

Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

FORT WILLIAM,

The 28th February 1885.

Appendix Thirteen
The British and Easa Treaty, 1884

We, the undersigned Elders of the Easa tribe, are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order and other good and sufficient reasons.

Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Easa tribe do hereby declare that they are pledged and bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control.

ARTICLE II

All vessels under the British flag shall have free permission to trade at all ports and places within the territories of the Easa tribe.

ARTICLE III

All British subjects, residing in, or visiting, the territories of the Easa tribe, shall enjoy perfect safety and protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the safe conduct of the Elders of the tribe.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the Easa tribe shall cease for ever, and the Commander of any of Her Majesty's vessels, or any other British officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside in the territories of the Easa tribe, and every such agent shall be treated with respect and consideration

and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

The above-written treaty shall come into force and have effect from the date of signing this agreement.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond Ali Gridone, Waberi Adam, Worsama Idlay, Fadhli Muhammad, Boh Molla, Ali Shirdone, Nagaya Bidar, Samanter Roblay, Galilay, Ishak, Weil Muhammad, Yunus Fahia, Girhi Egal, Muhammad Bergel, Burray Awadh, Ali Karrat, Khairulla Magan, Boh Hirsee, abdalla ali, Ali Idris, Shirdone Samaduder, Bogay Kayat,

And

Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, Assistant Political Resident at Aden, the former for themselves, their heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each and all In presence of witnesses affix their signatures, marks or seals at Zaila on the thirty-first day of December one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, corresponding with the thirteenth Rabia-al-Awal one thousand three hundred and two.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER, Major.

(Witness) (Sd.) M. EDWARDS, Captain, I.M.,
Commanding I.M.S. "*Amberwitch*."

(Sd.) DUFFERIN,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the twentieth day of May, A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,

Secy. To the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original treaty.

(Sd.) W.J. CUNINGHAM,

Off.g Under-Secy. To the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

SIMLA,

The 22nd May 1885.

Appendix Fourteen
Treaty between France and the Issa-tribe, 1885

(Unofficial translation from French by the Author)

Between Mr. Legarde (A.T.L.), Commandant of the Colony of Obock, acting on behalf of the Government of France, and the following Chiefs of Issas:-

Absi haujdet, Roble Touk, Bare Ali, Bedes Guedi, Guedi bagah, Birane Redis, Roble-Guele, Hassen-Guedi, Guede-Roble, Moussa Seid, Maherame Egue, Oaeis, Garddoub, Guede herse, Chere Djilebour, Allale Ouaeis, Assobi Bonis, Oure Bare-Oaeis - Gouled, Bonhe Berres, who control the territory situated at Gubbet Kharab upto Ambado, near Zaila signed the following treaty:

ARTICLE I

There shall henceforth be eternal friendship between France and the Issa Chiefs.

ARTICLE II

The Chiefs give their country to France in order that it (The latter) may protect it against all foreigners.

ARTICLE III

The French Government undertakes to facilitate trade on the coast and on all Ambaddo.

ARTICLE IV

The Chiefs undertake to assist France on all occasions and not to sign any treaty or conclude any Convention without the consent of the Commandant of the Colony of Obock.

Done at Obock, on 26th March 1885.

The Commandant of Obock,
(Signed) LAGARDE.

The Chief of the Issas:

The French Text: (The original)

ENTRE M. Legarde (A.T.L.), Commandant de la Colonie

d'Obock, agissant au nom du Gouvernement Française, et les Chefs Issas ci-pre designes:

(The above-names of the Chiefs of the Issas)

ARTICLE I

Il y aura desormais entre la France et le Chefs Issas amitie eternelle.

ARTICLE II

Le Chefs donnent leur pays a la France pour qu'elle le protégé contre tout entranger.

ARTICLE III

Le Gouvernement Francais s'engage a faciliter le commerce sur la cote et sourtout a Ambaddo.

ARTICLE IV

Le Chefs s'engagent a aider les Francais dans toutes less occasions et a ne signer aucun Traite ni a conclure aucune Convention sous peine de nullite sans l'assentiment du Gommandand de la Colonie d'Obock.

Fait a Obock, le 26 Mars 1885.

Le Commandant d'Obock,
(Signe) LAGARDE.

Le Chefs Issas:

Appendix Fifteen
The British and Warsangali Treaty, 1886

The British Government and the Elders of the Warsangli Tribe who have signed this agreement being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, C.S.I., Political Agent and Consul for the Somali Coast, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

The said Major F.M. Hunter, C.S.I., Political Agent and Consul for the Somali Coast, and the said Elders of the Warsangli have agreed upon and concluded the following articles: -

ARTICLE I

The British Government in compliance with the wish of the undersigned Elders of the Warsangli undertakes to extend to them and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

ARTICLE II

The said Elders of the Warsangli agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE III

The Warsangli are bound to render assistance to any vessel whether British or belonging to any other nation that may be wrecked on the shores under their jurisdiction and control and to protect the crew, passengers and cargo of such vessels, giving speedy intimation to the Resident at Aden of the circumstances, for which act of friendship and good-will a suitable reward will be given by the British Government.

ARTICLE IV

The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the Warsangli shall cease for ever and the Commander of any of Her

Majesty's vessels, or any other British officer duly authorised, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave, and supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.

ARTICLE V

The British Government shall have the power to appoint an agent or agents to reside in the territories of the Warsangli, and every such agent shall be treated with respect and consideration and be entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.

ARTICLE VI

The Warsangli hereby engage to assist all British officers in the execution of such duties as may be assigned to them and further to act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, the development of the sources of the country, the interests of commerce or in any other matter in relation to peace, order and good government and the general progress of civilisation.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty to come into operation from the twenty-seventh day of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six on which date it was signed at Bandergori by the undermentioned:-

MAHAMED (his mark) MAHMUD ALI GERAD All the Warsangli.

JAMA (his mark) MAHMUD GERAD.

MOHAMED (his mark) IBRAHIM GERAD.

OMAR (his mark) AHMED GERAD.

MAHMUD (his mark) ABDALLAH GERAD.

YUSSUF (his mark) MAHMUD GERAD.

NUR (his mark) ABDALLA. (Of the Ayal Faliti sub-tribe)

EASA (his mark) ADAM. “

MAHMUD (his mark) ALI SHIRWA “

ABDI (his mark)NUR. “

MAHOMED (his mark)ABDY NALAYA.(Ogais Lebay Sub-tribe)

MAHMUD(his mark) SAGULLAY. “

ABDALLAH (his mark) SAGULLAY. “

MAHOMED (his mark) ABDALLAH. “

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER,
(Witness) (Sd.) ALI JAFFER.
(Witness) J.H. RAINIER,
Commdr., Royal Navi.

(Sd.) DUFFERIN,
Viceroy and Govr.-Genl. of India.

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the fifteenth day of May A.D., one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,
Secy. to the Govt. of India, Foreign Dept.

Appendix Sixteen
**Supplementary General Treaties between British
and Habr Toljaala, Habr Gerhajis and
Habr Awal Tribes**

HABR TOLJAALA, 1886

The British Government and the Elders of the Habr Toljaala Tribe who have signed this agreement being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, C.S.I., Political Agent for the Somali Coast, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

The said major F.M. Hunter and the said Elders of the Habr Toljaala have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:-

ARTICLE I

The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned Elders of the Habr Toljaala, hereby undertakes to extend to them and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

ARTICLE II

The said Elders of the Habr Toljaala agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE III

This treaty shall come into operation from the first day of February one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Signed) MAHOMED ABDY	(Occupying Ankor. All of the Rerdad Tribe)
" ABDY MAHOMED,	" "
" HUNI IBRAHIM,	" "
" ABDY ABOKR,	" "
" MUSA ABDY,	" "

" AHMED ABOKR,	(Occupying Rakhuda. All of the Sambur Tribe)
" HUSAIN ABOKR,	" "
" OMAR ABOKR,	" "
" ABDALLA MAHOMED,	(Occupying Ainterad. All of the Adan Madoba Tribe)
" ALI MAHOMED,	" "
" SHINNA YEHIAR,	" "
" GUTALI NUR,	" "
" ABDALLA MAHOMED,	" "
" ASHOOR MUNY,	" "
" JAMA ABDY,	" "
" AHMED GULARD,	" "
" FARAH GUJA,	" "
" MAHOMED AHMED,	" "
" ALI AHMED,	" "
" HASSAN FARAH,	" "
" ALI YUSUF,	" "
" ALI NUR,	" "
" JAMA ADAN,	(Occupying Karram. All of the Yussab Tribe)
" ASHOORD GONANJA,	" "
" FARAH AHMED,	" "
" EGAL DOALLY,	" "
" AWADH HADAY,	" "
" HUSSAN MAGAN,	" "
" ADAN WARSAMA,	" "
" AHMED ALI,	" "
" HASSAN SAID,	(Occupying Hais. All of the Abder Rahim Sub-Tribe)
" MAHOMED ISMAIL,	" "
" JEBRIL MAHOMED,	" "
" AHMED ALI MAGAN,	" "
" JEBRIL ALI,	" "
" ABDULLA HASSAN,	" "
(Sd.) F.M HUNTER, Major, Political Agent, Somali Coast.	
(Sd.) DUFFERIN,	
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.	

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-

General of India in Council at Simla on the thirteenth day of July A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original treaty.

(Sd.) W.J. CUNINGHAM,
Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.
SIMLA,
The 20th July 1886.

HABR GERHAJIS, 1886

The British Government and the Elders of the Habr Gerhajis Tribe who have signed this agreement being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, C.S.I., Political Agent for the Somali Coast, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

The said major Frederick Mercer Hunter and the said Elders of the Habr Gerhajis have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:-

ARTICLE I

The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned Elders of the Habr Gerhajis, hereby undertake to extend to them and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

ARTICLE II

The said Elders of the Habr Gerhajis agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

This treaty shall come into operation upon the first day of February one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Sd.) DOALY AHMED, of the Mahomed Adan Tribe,
 (Occupying Mait and Ras Katib)
 " MOHAMED ALI, of the Ali Said Tribe, " "
 " ADAN MAHOMED, of the Saad Yun Tribe,
 (Occupying Hashud)
 " HASSAN YUSUF, (Occupying Mait and Ras Katib.
 All of the Ibril Aden Tribe)
 " ALI NUR, " "
 " DOALI ALI, " "
 " MOHOMED GES, " "
 " ABDY HASSAN, " "
 " MAHOMED AHMED, " "
 " MAHOMED HIRSEE, " "
 " HASSAN MAHOMED, " "
 " ISMAIL MAHOMED, " "
 " MAHOMED HIRSEE, " "
 " ISMAIL ALI, (Occupying Shelao. All of the Musa
 Assay and Musa Bohi Tribes)
 " WAIS SALEH, " "
 " ALI SALEH, " "
 " MUHAMMED NOH, " "
 " MUHAMMAD ALEALLA, " "
 (Sd.) F.M. HUNTER, Major, Political Agent, Somali Coast.
 (Sd.) DUFFERIN,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the sixteenth day of July A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Sd.) H.M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Certified that the above is a true copy of the original treaty.
 (Sd.) W.J. CUNINGHAM,
 Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
 Foreign Department.
 SIMLA,
 The 20th July 1886.

HABR AWAL, 1886

The British Government and the Elders of the Habr Awal Tribe who have signed this agreement, being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Major Frederick Mercer Hunter, C.S.I., Political Agent for the Somali Coast, to conclude a Treaty for this purpose.

The said Major Frederick Mercer Hunter and the said Elders of the Habr Awal have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:-

ARTICLE I

The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned Elders of the Habr Awal, hereby undertakes to extend to them and to the territories under authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

ARTICLE II

The said Elders of the Habr Awal agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE III

This Treaty shall come into operation from the fifteenth day of March eighteen hundred and eighty-six.

(Sd.) F.M. HUNTER,

Political Agent, Somali Coast.

(Sd.) ELMI (his mark) HUNDULLY (All of the Badila)

” MUHAMMAD (his mark) SALIM ” ”

” HUSSAN (his mark) ALI, ” ”

” JAMA (his mark) YEMUS ” ”

” ABSIYE JAMA by his Agent, (All of Baho)

” GAILA (his mark) FARAH, ” ”

” SAIED (his mark) NUR, ” ”

” OMES (his mark) MUHAMMAD, ” ”

” GAILA (his mark) FARAH, ” ”

” YUSSUF (his mark) FARAH, ”
 ” EBRAHIM (his mark) SAMANTER
 by his Agent and son, (All of the Makail)
 ” JAMA (his mark) IBRAHIM, ”
 ” ILMIR (his mark) ROBLAY, ”
 ” JAMAH (his mark) IBRAHIM, ”
 ” FARAH (his mark) NALAYA, (All of the Bahandain)
 ” SAID (his mark) YUDLADE, ”
 ” WARSUNA (his mark) ELMI, ”
 ” DAHIS (his mark) SAMALES, ”
 ” YUSSIN (his mark) OMAR, (All of the Bukyra
 Mura)
 ” ELENI (his mark) FARAH, ”
 ” MAHOMED (his mark) HASSAN, ”
 ” ELENI (his mark) DUBLA, ”
 ” ABDULLA (his mark) MABILLA, ”
 ” WARFA (his mark) ABTIDONA, (Ba Arab)
 ” BOH (his mark) ALALE,
 ”
 ” ILMI (his mark) SHIRDONA (Res Dillo)
 ” BEGSI (his mark) WARSAMA, ”
 ” BONE (his mark) KHAN, ”
 ” SAMANTER (his mark) BOH, ”
 ” KAHM (his mark) SHIRMANKI, (Geniss)
 ” BOH (his mark) NUR, ”
 ” ILMI (his mark) ADOWA, (Ba Habs Adan)
 ” HEISI (his mark) ILMI, ”
 ” JAMA (his mark) OMER, (Bangarai)
 ” BILLA (his mark) YUNIS (Mahamed Yunis),
 ” EYNEA (his mark) HALDUD, (Maknidaya)
 ” HUSU (his mark) BURUD, ”
 ” HUSAIN (his mark) ZUR ALI, ”
 ” MAHUM (his mark) KEBELLAY, ”
 ” SAMANTER SAID by his Agents, (Adanayaall Ayra
 Musa)
 ” HAMNUILL ADAN MATTER, ”
 On their own } HASSAN ALI, ”
 Behalf } ADEN MATTAR, ”
 Seal of FARAH ASKAR (Both of Baghobo Res (*Rer*) Ali)
 (Sd.) KALNILEH (his mark) MATTAR, ” ”

- ” ALI (his mark) ABSUJAH, (Both of the Baghobo
Res (*Rer*) Mahomed)
- ” OMAR (his mark) ”
- ” ALIM (his mark) GOOLAIDE (Bashik Kashid) (All of
the Ayal Yunus)
- ” HASSON (his mark) ADAN (Batrejhala), ”
- ” ABDUL LAHI (his mark) NUR (Hoosh), ”
- ” WURSAMA (his mark) DAGAL (Ba-gurdaburse)
(Shardone) ”
- ” FARAH (his mark) SAMUNTER (Baho), ”

(Signed Dufferin),

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, at Simla, on the fifteenth day of September, A.D. one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

(Signed) H.M. Durand,

Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Appendix Seventeen
**Political and Commercial Treaty between France
and Abyssinia , 1843**

Following is the text of the "Political and Commercial" Treaty signed between the French King Luois Philippe and Sahle Selassie, King of Shoa, and his successors:

"Vu les rapports de bienveillance qui existent entre Sa Majeste Luois-Philippe, Roi de France, et Sahle Sallasi, Roi de Choa., vu le echanges de cadeaux qui ont eu lieu entre ces Souverains par l'entremise de M. Rochet d'Hericourt, decore des insignes de Grand du Royaume, le Roi de Choa desire alliance et commerce avec la France.

ARTICLE I

"Vu la conformite de religion qui existe entre les deux nations, le Roi de Choa ose esperer qu'en cas de guerre avec les Musulmans et autres entrangers, la France regardera ses ennemis comme les siennes propres.

ARTICLE II

"Sa majeste Luois-Philippe, Roi de France, Protecteur de Jerusalem, s'engage a faire respectger comme les sujets Francais tous les habitants du Choa qui iront en pelerinage, et a les defendere a l'aide de ses Representants sur toute la route contro les avanies des infideles.

ARTICLE III

"Tous les Francais, residant au Choa, seront consideres comme les sujets les plus favorises, et, a ce titre, outre leurs droits, ils jouiront de tous les privileges qui pourraient etre accordes aux autres entrangers.

ARTICLE IV

"Toutes les marchandises Francaises introduites dans le Choa seront soumises a un droit de 3 pour cent une fois paye, et ce droit sera preleve en nature, afin d'eviter toute discussion d'arbitrage sur la valeur des dites marchandises.

ARTICLE V

“Tous les Français pourront commercer dans tout le Royaume de Choa.

ARTICLE VI

Tous les Français résidant au Choa pourront acheter des maisons et des terres dont l'acquisition sera garantie par le Roi de Choa; les Français pourront revendre ou disposer de ces mêmes propriétés.

“Fait en double

“Angolola, le 7 Juin, 1843.

(Signed) ROCHET D'HERICOURT.*

English version of the above Treaty:

“On account of the friendly relations existing between his Majesty Louis Philippe, King of France, and Sahle Selassi, King of Shoa; on account of the exchanges of presents that have taken place between these sovereigns through the medium of M. Rochet d'Hericourt, Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, and decorated with the Insignia of a Grandee of the Kingdom of Shoa, the King of Shoa desires to enter into alliance and commerce with France.

“Considering the uniformity in religion existing between the two nations, the King of Shoa hopes that, in case of war with Muhammadans or other foreigners, France will look upon his enemies as her own.

“His Majesty Louis Philippe, King of France, Defender of Jerusalem, engages himself to treat the inhabitants of Shoa in all respects like French subjects, when proceeding on pilgrimage, and defend them, through his representatives, throughout their journey, from all attack by infidels.

“All Frenchmen residing in Shoa shall be considered as subjects of the most favoured nation, and in this character, in addition to their own rights, they shall enjoy all the privileges which may be accorded to other foreigners.

“All French goods imported into Shoa shall be subject to a duty of three per cent, paid once only, and leviable in kind, so as

* Foreign Department, Secret-E, January 1890, No. 121-133. NAI, New Delhi.

to avoid all discussion as to the estimated value of such goods.

“All French subjects shall be able to trade in the kingdom of Shoa.

“All French subjects residing in Shoa shall be able to buy houses and lands, their acquisitions being guaranteed to them by the King of Shoa; French subjects shall be empowered to resell or otherwise dispose of such property.*

* Foreign Department—Secret—E, February 1886, No. 232-247. NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Eighteen
**Treaty between France and
the Sultan of Gobad, 1884**

The following Treaty has been concluded between M. Legarde, Commandant of Obokh, acting in the name of the French Government, and Ohmed Loeitah, acting in his own name and that of the Chiefs subject to him.

ARTICLE 1

There shall be constant peace and perpetual friendship between the Government of the French Republic and Ohmed Loeitah, Sultan of Gobad.

ARTICLE 2

Ohmed Loeitah engages himself to protect the French subjects, and the caravans of French subjects or their agents, to open to them the most convenient through routes, to furnish them by all the means in his power with every facility for the purchase of camels, mules, provisions of every sort, and to prohibit any demand for transit duty in excess of that fixed by Article 3 from the frontier of the colony of Obokh to that of Aoussa proper, the colony of Obokh being French territory directly subject to French laws.

ARTICLE 3

Ohmed Loeitah is permitted to levy a transit duty on caravans, fixed at one talari for each camel and each European.

ARTICLE 4

In consideration of the transit duty laid down in Article 3, French travellers shall be authorised to supply themselves with water from any wells that they may come across or may see fit to excavate, and shall be exempt from all fresh dues.

ARTICLE 5

Ohmed Loeitah engages himself to afford every facility to French subjects wishing to acquire property of any kind in his

territories, to erect building of any description, to dig wells or canals, or to undertake works which may be considered useful in promoting intercourse between the respective possessions of the contracting parties, and in developing their mutual prosperity.

ARTICLE 6

In cases of dispute between a French subject and a subject of the Sultan, the case shall be referred to the head of the French colony, who will endeavour to arrive at an amicable arrangement, and, in the event of failure so to do, will come to an understanding with the Sultan to investigate the matter conjointly, and decide in accordance with equity.

ARTICLE 7

The Sultan engages himself to conclude no convention and sign no treaty without the assent of the chief of the colony of Obokh, whose counter-signature to every act of this nature shall be required.

ARTICLE 8

In case of disputes, the French text of the treaty shall alone be considered authentic.

Concluded at Obokh, 9th April 1884.

(Signed) LAGARDE

(Signed) OHMED LOITAH.

Appendix Nineteen
**Treaty between France and the Sultan of
Tajourra, 1884**

The following Treaty has been concluded between M. Lagarde, Commandant at Obokh, acting on behalf of the French Government, and Hamed-bin-Mohamed, Sultan of Tajourra, who rules from Ras Ali to Gubbet Kharab: -

ARTICLE 1

There shall henceforth be eternal friendship between France and Sultan Hamed.

ARTICLE 2

Sultan Hamed gives his country to France, in order that the latter may protect him against every Foreign Power.

ARTICLE 3

The French Government will make no change in the laws in force in the country of Sultan Mohammad.

ARTICLE 4

Sultan Hamed, in his own name and in the name of his successors, engages to assist French subjects in the construction of houses and the purchase of lands.

ARTICLE 5

Sultan Hamed engages himself not to sign any treaty with any foreign nation without the assent of the Commandant of Obokh.

ARTICLE 6

The French Government engages to pay a monthly subsidy of 100 dollars to Sultan Hamed, and 80 to the Vizier.

ARTICLE 7

In case of dispute, the French text is to be considered the only authentic one.

Concluded at Obokh, 21st September 1884.

(True copy)

(Signed) LAGARDE.

I, Sultan of Tajourra, give to France, out of friendship, Ras Ali, Sagallo, and Rood Ali (Gubbet Kharab).

Tajourra, Saturday, 18th October 1884. (Signed)

(Seal of Sultan.)

Witnesses:

The Commandant of Obokh The Captain of the "Seignelay"

(Signed) LAGARDE. (Signed) BELLANGER.

(Seal of Sultan Loitah.)

(Seal of the Vizier)

Note—In the Arabic text, written by the Vizier at the Sultan's dictation, the word Rood Ali does not appear. The Sultan's intention was to give the whole of Gubbet Kharab.

(Signed) LAGARDE

Translation of the Deed of Gift by Sultan Loitah.

Homed, Sultan of Tajourra, having his country as far as the place called Adaeli to the French Government, I, Homed Loitah, do the same, and I give to that Government the country from Adaeli to Ambado.

Signatures and Seals of Homed, Sultan of Tajourra, of Brahim, Vizier of the same place, who witness the authenticity of this declaration.

Signature of Homed Loitah, which certifies to the authenticity of his act.

Obokh, 14th December 1884.*

* Foreign Department, Secret—E, February 1886, No. 232-247. NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Twenty
**Treaty between the German East African
Company and Chief of Alula, 1885**

(The texts are as they were originally written)

(Translation of the German Translation of the Arabic Text of a Treaty concluded on November 26, 1885 between the Representative of the East African Company and the Somali Sultan Jusef—Communicated to the Earl of Rosebery by BARON PLESSEN, 17th May 1886)

“Jusef Ali Jusef, Sultan of the Somali of hobga, whose dominion extends from the sea-coast twenty-five days’ journey inland, and from Hobga to the port of Warscheich, near Makdischo [has concluded the following Treaty with] Claus von Andersen, the employe of Mr. Charles Peters and the German East African Company, on the 26th November 1885. The witnesses to it were the Sultan Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad - ibn - Ali, Deshuma - ibn - Musen, and Maksuada.

Henceforth the Sultan Jusef Ali will be the friend of Charles Peters and his Company, and gives him permission to bring his countrymen if there should be anywhere here tracts devoid (of inhabitants) and provided with water. Should he desire to cultivate the land, he is allowed to do so; should there be water in any given place, and he may desire to conduct it to the sea, he is permitted to do so; should he desire to fish in the rivers, or to travel about or to cut wood, or shoot and hunt, or to excavate iron or other material, or to search for coal, he is allowed to do all these things and everything there appertaining to; if his people desire to trade in the country they may do so; and should any one seek to do them injury, or kill them, they may defend themselves; and if people who are charged with a mission of the Sultan should be travelling anywhere, and some one attempts to interfere with them by force in that case Charles Peters, and similarly the Sultan of the Germans, shall come forward as the opponent of such a person. And should Charles Peters desire to send ships to the harbour of Hobga, he may do so. In consi-

deration of the above the Sultan Jusef is to be paid yearly, in Alula or Hobga, 2,000 reals.

Approved.

(Signed) JUSEF ALI JUSEF*

* Foreign Department—Secret, E—August 1886, No. 307-327, NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Twenty-One
**Treaty between the German East African
Company and Sultan of Mijjerteyn, 1885**

Translation of the German Translation of the Arabic Text of a Treaty concluded with the Sultan of the Medschertin Somali Tribe.—(Communicated to the Earl of Rosebery by BARON PLESSES, 17th May 1886)

The dominion of the Sultan Otman Mahmud Jusef, Ruler over the whole Medschertin people, extends from East Cape along the sea-coast to the port of Ziada, and twenty days' journey inland, further in the direction of Cape Hafun, which lies midway in the line.

The architect Horneche, in the name of his Principal, Duk Dekta Kartal Biles, who is our Associate.

Muhammad Hasan, Semter Ismail, Said Semter, and his two sons, Muhmmad and Said Ahmed Said, the Arab Muhammad-ibn-Ali, the Dragoman Dschuma, and Klaus von Andersen; these above-named are witnesses between me and the Sultan Otman Mahmud Jusef.

We undertake to protect from injury the maritime trade and the ships of the Sultan against all Christians, Arabs, and other. He accepts this, and in return undertakes to support the crews of vessels stranded on the coasts of his country, to renounce his right appertaining to foreshores, and to forward the rescued crews to Aden. His Highness the Sultan shall receive therefore 1,900 reals (Maria Theresa dollars) which we shall pay him, if they are not paid by the English. Upon this subject an understanding has been come to between us.

If Duke's ships desire to enter the ports of the Sultan for purpose of trade they shall be allowed to do so.

Should our Principal come in order to enter the land in any chosen districts within the territories of the Sultan, the Sultan shall permit him to do so. Should he desire to shoot birds, or to cut firewood, or to dig in a mountain in order to search for iron, or to erect shops for the purpose of selling and buying, or to make a garden and to plant it, he shall be allowed to do so.

If it pleases God to call the Sultan from this life, and he leave children, and should one of the Christian [?] Chiefs come with the intention of robbing the children of the Sultan of their property, we will render assistance against such a proceeding.

The Sultan Otman has confirmed this Treaty, which was drawn up on Sunday, the 26th Dul Kada (des Jahres) 1323.

(Sd.) SULTAN OTMAN MUHAMMAD HASAN.

Witnesses—

(Sd.) SEMTER ISMAIL.

SAID SEMTER.

MUHAMMAD SAID, Son of the preceding.

AHMED SAID, " "

MUHAMMAD ALI JUSEF.

MUHAMMAD-IBN-ALI, Arab Captain.

MUHAMMAD ALI.

DSCHUMAN, DRAGOMAN.

MUALLIM MUHAMMAD, Writer to the Sultan.

Appendix Twenty-Two
**Convention between Italy and the Sultan of
Zanzibar, 1892**

(Translation from Italian Text by the Author)

CONVENTION
FOR THE CONCESSION TO ITALY
OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PORTS
OF BENADIR

Concession by the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy

The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar and the dependencies of the East Coast of Africa, with the present convention, gives the following concession to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, which, on his part, accepts the following obligations:

Art. I—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar accords to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, all the ports which he possesses on the cities and ports of Benadir namely Brava, Merka and Mogadishu, with a radius towards the interior of 10 maritime miles, Warsheikh, a radius of 5 maritime miles, besides the islands and the nearby small islands, to be administered politically and juridically in the name of the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar and under the protection of his flag; but is agreed that the Government of H.M. the Sultan will neither be responsible nor called to regulate the administration or others such as what might come as a result of the conflict of price of blood nor any complain that may arise.

The Government of the H.M. the King of Italy and his representatives will have only the right to buy or to dispose the public lands within the limits of the above mentioned territories.

The Government of the H.M. the Sultan undertakes to give to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, all the facilities and the use of his authority to assure it all the rights and all the powers so that this convention obtains its full effect.

It is also agreed between the high contracting parties that none of the clauses contained in the following articles of the

present convention, may in any case increase or reduce the rights accorded by the Government H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar to the subjects or to the citizens of Great Britain, of the United States of America, of France, of Germany or of all the other foreign powers which have treaties with the Sultanate of Zanzibar, or obligations that is or are levied by the adhesion of the General Act of Berlin of 1885 of General Act of the Conference of Brussels of 1890.

Art. II—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar authorises the Government of H.M. the King of Italy to pass the administration of the cities and of the ports of Benadir, which are the subject of the present convention, to an Italian Company which will be charged to administer these cities, ports and territories in the name of the government of H.M. the Sultan and under the protection of its flag; but always under the responsibility of the Government of the H.M. the King of Italy.

The Commissaries of the Italian Company can exercise in the name and with the authorisation of the H.M. the King of Italy, all the rights containing in the present concession; they can nominate all the officials and sub-ordinate clerks, establish the justice course, and to adopt all the measures which will be considered necessary or useful for the protection of the interest of the cities, ports and the above-mentioned territories.

The Government of H.M. the Sultan will give to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or to his representatives all the forts and the public service existing at the time when the Italian Administration will occupy the cities of Benadir, as well as all the rights of ownership which he can have on the territory of 10 marine miles of radius towards the interior as far as the the cities of Brava, Merka and Mogadishu are concerned and of 5 marine miles of radius for the village of Warsheikh.

The Government of H.M. the Sultan also authorizes the Government of the H.M. the King of Italy and his representatives to collect all taxes, tributes, duties, patents, the import export duties and to take all necessary measures to provide the expenditure of the local Government, to the maintenance of public force, to the justice administration, to the construction of roads, or ports and other public works or of defense, as well as for the repayment of debts and the payment of the interest on the invested capital.

The governors, all the judiciary officials, and the clerks of all the categories will be appointed by the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or by his representatives.

The honorarium given to the governors, to Arab Judges or indigenes, the salaries of all the officials and clerks, as well as the payment of troops, will be paid by the government of S.M. the King of Italy or by his representatives.

Art. III—The Government of the H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar grants to the Italian Company which will administer, with the authorisation of the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, the cities and the territories of Benadir which are subject of the present concession, or to his representatives, the right to do commerce, to possess property, to execute constructions, to by lands, houses and constructions generally for purchase or for convention in the above-mentioned cities and territories with the consensus of the proprietors of those houses, territories or factories.

Art. IV—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar, grants to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or to his representatives, the exclusive privilege to collect the taxes from the inhabitants and the right to regulate the commerce and the transactions besides the navigation, to control the fishing, construct roads, tramways, railways, canals, ports, telegraphs etc. to collect the taxes and duties on the public services and also to control or prohibit the importation of goods, arms, ammunitions of all kind, alcoholic liquors or all the goods, which on the opinion of the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or of his representatives would be prejudicial to the laws, to the order of the public morality and for which the Government of H.M. the King is bound with other governments. But it is well clear that the exercise of these rights and privileges will in conformity with the existing treaties between the Sultan of Zanzibar and the foreign powers, besides that to the obligations existing or which might be obliged due to the adhesion of the general act of Berlin of 1885 and of the general act of the Conference of Brussels of 1890.

Art. V—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar authorizes the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or his representatives to fix the customs and collect taxes or duty on the ships and goods that enter in the above-mentioned ports or

going out and to take all necessary measures for the prevention of contraband: these measures should be subject to acts treaties and the above-mentioned conventions.

Art. VI—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar, grants to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or to his representatives the right to establish a bank or more banks in the cities which are subject of the present concession, with the exclusive privilege to issue bank-notes or gold currencies, silver and of copper on condition of making uniform to the previous engagement with H.M. the Sultan or by his predecessors.

Art. VII—All the above-mentioned powers, rights and privileges are accorded to H.M. the King of Italy or to his representatives for the period of 25 European years which will start from the day in which the present concession will be approved by the Government of H.M. the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the Empress of India and by the H.M. the King of Italy.

At the end of the this period of 25 European years the present concession could be renewed for a period of time equal to 25 years on the same conditions and with a simple declaration on this effect by the Government of H.M. the King of Italy.

At the end of the period of 25 years or 50, all the public works, constructions, railways etc. will be returned to the Government of H.M. the Sultan if he wishes and for the value which will be determined by mediators selected by the two parties. Excepting for the settlements and the constructions which will be handed over free of charge by the Government of H.M. the Sultan to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, or to his representatives, which will equally be returned (free of charge).

Art. VIII—The Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar, transfers to the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or to his representatives the administration of the customs in the above-mentioned ports for the period of 25 or 50 years as mentioned further above and on the following conditions:

The Government of H.M. the King of Italy undertakes to pay to the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar a sum of 40,000 Rupees (Rs. 40,000) as advance when the Italian administration takes over the ports, cities and territories which are subject of the present concession and thereafter 40,000

Rupees at the end of each quarter of the European year.

But it is clear that the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar will not ask twice the duties of imports and of exports on commerce of the cities of Benadir which are subject of the present concession, and that the Government of H.M. and his representatives, will have the right to reimbursement equal to the amount of custom duties which would be paid directly to the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar, particularly the goods imported or exported from the ports of Benadir, with effect from the entry into force of the present convention.

Art. IX—It is intended that all the government powers, judiciary and of other nature given with the present convention will be exercised by the Government of H.M. the King of Italy, or by his representatives, in the name of the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar and under the protection of his flag and that the Government of H.M. the King of Italy or his representatives, will enjoy all the rights, privileges, immunity and advantages which might be granted to all other governments, companies or private to which the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar would have given or would give of the concessions in all other parts of his dominions, similar to those guarantees given by the present concession or of other character.

The Government of H.M. the King Italy undertakes not to claim the right to change the system of the annual payment established in the present concession, without having the consensus, or following a request by the Government of H.M. the Sultan, or by the Government of H.M. the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India.

Art. X—The present convention will enter into force when the Government of H.M. the King of Italy will judge opportune, giving notice to the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar one month in advance.

The Government of H.M. the King of Italy will be responsible towards the Government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar for the payment of the sum indicated in Art.VIIIo of the present convention, starting, only, from the day that will assume its duties of all the administration, as specified further above: it is also clear that the moment of the free transfer of the ports, lands, public works, the ownership rights etc. which the

government of H.M. the Sultan of Zanzibar possesses in the cities and territories mentioned above, will be established with a special accord, and a detailed list will be handed over at that time to the Government of H.M. the Sultan.

Art. XI—The present convention will be of no value until after it will be approved by the Government of H.M. the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and by the Government of H.M. the King of Italy.

Art. XII—S.A. Said Ali, Sultan of Zanzibar, declared with his letter of 14 Rajab 1307 (6 March 1890) to M. Mackenzie of 5 Moharram (31 July 1892) to M. Portal, that he has no objection to raise regarding the concession of the cities, ports and territories of Benadir to Italy and to accept the accord as it is will be made and approved by the Government of H.M. the Queen of England and Ireland, Empress of India, which is the protectorate power of the Sultanate of Zanzibar.

The present convention is made in 6 copies of which 2 in English language, two in French language and two in Arabic language, all of same text.

In case of misunderstanding in the interpretation of the agreement of the present concession only the texts in English and the French will be trustworthy.

Sir Gerald H. Portal diplomatic agent and consul general of H. Britannic Majesty and M. Pierre Cottoni, director of the Consulate of H.M. the King of Italy have signed the present and have placed their seal.

Done at Zanzibar the 12 August 1892.

Signed: P. Cottoni

G. Portal*

* Tratto da Pos. No. 100 Fascicolo anno 1892 - Arch. Filonardi, ISIAO, Roma.

** Carlo Rossetti, *Manuale di Legislazione della Somalia Italiana*, vol. secondo, Documenti 1892-1908, Page 5. (french Text of the Italian-zanzibar Convention 12 August 1892.

Following is the official Italian version of the law approving the acquisition of Somali territories from the Sultan of Zanzibar signed by the King of Italy, Umberto I:

LEGGE 11 agosto 1896, n. 373, the approva la convezione

12 agosto 1892 relativa alla concessione all'Italia, da parte del Sultano di Zanzibar, degli scali del Benadir.*

UMBERTO I, ecc., RE d'ITALIA.

(The Senate and Chamber of deputies also approved the agreement signed in Zanzibar on August 12, 1892, regarding the concession of Benadir territories to Italy by the Sultan).

Il Senato e la Camera dei deputati hanno approvate;

Noi abbiamo sanzionato e promulghiamo quanto segue:

Articolo unico.

E' approvate con decorrenza dal 15 luglio 1896, l'unita convenzione firmata a Zanzibar il 12 agosto 1892 e relativa alla concessione, da parte del Sultano di Zanzibar, degli scali del Benadir all'Italia (I).

Ordiniamo che la presente, munita del sigillo dello Stato, sia inserita nella Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del regno d'Italia, mandando a chiunque spetti di osservarla e di farla osservare come legge dello Stato.

Dato a Torino, addi 11 agosto 1896.

UMBERTO.

Visconti Venosta.**

* Gazzetta Ufficiale del 24 agosto 1896, n. 200.

** Ref.: Manuale di Legislazione della Somalia Italiana, Vo. Secondo, Doc. 1892-1908, Roma, 1912—Racc. Tratt. Afr., pag. 379 -Libro Verde "Somalia, 1893", pag. 98.

Appendix Twenty-Three
**Protocol Signed by Ambassador of Great Britain
and Foreign Minister of Italy, 1891**

PROTOCOLE

Le Soussignes-

Marquis de Dufferin & Ava, Ambassadeur de sa Majeste la Rine de la Grande Bretagne, Imperatrice des Indes, et

Marquis de Rudini, President du Conseil et Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres de sa Majeste le Roi d'Italie:

Après mur examen des interets respectifs des deux pays dans l'Afrique Orientale, sont convenus de ce qui suit-

1. La ligne de demarcation, dans l'Afrique Orientale, entre les spheres d'influence respectivement reserves a la Grande Bretagne et a l'Italie, suivra, a partir de la mer le "Jhalweg" du fleuve Juba jusqu'au 6° de latitude nord; Kismayu, avec son territoire a la droite du fleuve restant ainsi a l'Angleterre. La ligne suivra ensuite le parallele 6° nord jusqu'au meidiennr 35° est Greenwich qu'elle remontera jusqu'au Nile Bleu.

2. Si les explorations ulterieures venaient, plus tard, en indiquer l'opportunitè, le trace suivant le 6° latitude nord et le 35° longitude est Greenwich purra dans ses details entre amende l'un commun accord d'apres les conditions hydrographiques et orographiques de la contree.

3. Il aura, dons la station de Kismayu et son territoire, egalite de traitement entre sujets et proteges des deux pays, soit pour leur personnes, soit a l'egard de leurs biens, soit en fin en ce qui concerne l'exercise de toute sorte de commerce et industrie.

Fait a Rome, en double exemplaire le 24 Mars 1891.

(Se.) DUFFERIN & AVA

RUDINI.

The Protocol signed on the 24th of March 1891 by the Marquis of Dufferin (British Ambassador to Italy and the Italian Foreign Minister, Marquis De Rudini) draws the line of

* Foreign Department, Secret, E. July 1891—n. 481-496, NAI, New Delhi.

delimitation between the English and Italian spheres of influence from the mouth of the River Juba to the Blue Nile, leaving Kismaya, with its adjoining territory on the right bank of the Juba, within British jurisdiction. Leaving the sea the line follows the “Thalweg” of the Juba, as far as the 6th parallel of latitude north. Continuing along that parallel as far as the 35th meridian east of Greenwich, it follows that degree of longitude as far as the Blue Nile.

This arrangement cuts off the Somali Coast Protectorate from the territory of the East African Company.*

* Foreign Department, Secret E. December 1891—n. 131-147, NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Twenty-Four
Treaty between Britain and Ethiopia, 1897

The full text of the Treaty, which was written in Amharic, and in English, Signed by the Emperor Menelek II, and by Her Majesty's Envoy, At Adis Abbaba, May 14th, 1897.

[Ratified by the Queen, July 28th, 1897]

[English version]

Her Majesty Victoria, by the grace of God, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty Menelek II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, being desirous of strengthening and rendering more effective and profitable the ancient friendship which has existed between their respective kingdoms;

Her Majesty Queen Victoria having appointed as her Special Envoy and Representative to His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, James Rennel Rodd, Esq., Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, whose full powers have been found in due and proper form, and His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, negotiating in his own name as King of Kings of Ethiopia, they have agreed upon and do conclude the following Articles, which shall be binding on themselves, their heirs and successors:-

ARTICLE I

The subjects of or persons protected by each of the Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to come and go and engage in commerce in the territories of the other, enjoying the protection of the Government within whose jurisdiction they are; but it is forbidden for armed bands from either side to cross the frontier of the other on any pretext whatever without previous authorization from the competent authorities.

ARTICLE II

The frontiers of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast recognized by the Emperor Menelek shall be determined sub-

sequently by exchange of notes between James Rennell Rodd, Esq., as Representative of Her Majesty the Queen, and Ras Maconen, as Representative of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek at Harrar. These notes shall be annexed to the present Treaty, of which they will form an integral part, so soon as they have received the approval of the High Contracting Parties, pending which the *status quo* shall be maintained.

ARTICLE III

The caravan route between Zeyla and Harrar by way of Gildessa shall remain open throughout its whole extent to the commerce of both nations.

ARTICLE IV

His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia, on the one hand, accords to Great Britain and her Colonies, in respect of import duties and local taxation, every advantage which he may accord to the subjects of other nations.

On the other hand, all material destined exclusively for the service of the Ethiopian State shall, on application from His Majesty the Emperor, be allowed to pass through the port of Zeyla into Ethiopia free of duty.

ARTICLE V

The transit of fire-arms and ammunition destined for His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia through the territories depending on the Government of Her Britannic Majesty is authorized, subject to the conditions prescribed by the General Act of the Brussels Conference, signed the 2nd July, 1890.

ARTICLE VI

His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to do all in his power to prevent the passage through his dominions of arms and ammunition to the Mahdists, whom he declares to be the enemies of his Empire.

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as its ratification by Her Britannic Majesty shall have been notified to the Emperor of Ethiopia, but it is understood that the prescriptions of Article VI shall be put into force from the date

of its signature.

In faith of which His Majesty Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, in his own name, and James Rennell Rodd, Esq., on behalf of Her Majesty Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, have signed the present Treaty, in duplicate, written in the English and Amharic languages identically, both texts being considered as official, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Adis Abbaba the 14th day of May, 1897.

(L.S.) (Signed) JAMES RENNELL RODD.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)

Annexes to Treaty signed at Adis Abbaba on the 14th May 1897, by His Majesty Emperor Menelek, and by Mr. James Rennell Rodd.

Annex I

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelck.

Your Majesty *Adis Abbaba, the 14th May 1897*

With reference to Article II of the Treaty which we are to sign to-day, I am instructed by my Government, in the event of a possible occupation by Ethiopia of territories inhabited by tribes who have formerly accepted and enjoyed British protection in the districts excluded from the limits of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast, as recognized by Your Majesty, to bring to your knowledge the desire of Majesty the Queen to receive from Your Majesty an assurance that it be your special care that these tribes receive equitable treatment, and are thus no losers by this transfer of suzerainty.

In expressing the hope that Your Majesty will enable me to give this assurance, I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD.

The Emperor Menelek to Mr. Rodd

(Translation)

The Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, Menelek II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to Mr. Rennell Rodd, Envoy of the Kingdom of England.

Peace be unto you,

Your letter, written in Genbot 1889, respecting the Somalis, has reached me. With regard to the question you have put to me, I give you the assurance that the Somalis who may by boundary arrangements become subjects of Ethiopia shall be well treated and have orderly government.

Written at Adis Abbaba, the 6th Genbot, 1889 (14th May 1897)

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II)

Annex 2

The Emperor Menelek to Mr. Rodd
(Translation)

From Menelek II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, Conquering Lion of the tribe of Judah.

May this reach James Rennell Rodd.

Peace be unto you,

With reference to the Treaty which have written in the Amharic and English languages at Adis Abbaba, as I have no interpreter with me who understands the English language well enough to compare the English and Amharic version, if by any possibility in the future there should ever be found any misunderstanding between the Amharic and English versions in any of the Articles of this Treaty, let this translation, which is written in the French language, and which I enclose in this letter, be the witness between us, and if you accept this proposal, send me word of your acceptance by letter.

Dated 7th Genbot, 1889 (14th May 1897).

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor of Menelek II.)*

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelek

Your Majesty, *Adis Ababa, May 14, 1897.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's letter inclosing the French translation of the Treaty

* Foreign Department, Secret, E. July 1897—n. 45/65, Part A, NAI, New Delhi.

which we are to sign this day in English and Amharic, and I agree, on behalf of my Government, to the proposal of your Majesty, that, in case a divergency of opinion should arise hereafter as to the correct interpretation to be given either to the English or Amharic text, the French translation, which has been agreed to on both sides as adequate, should be accepted as furnishing a solution of the matter under dispute.

In recording this assurance, I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD

Annex 3

Mr. Rodd to Ras Makunan

Peace be unto you. *Harrar, the 4th June 1897, (28th Genbot, 1889).*

After friendly discussion with Your Excellency, I have understood that His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia will recognize as frontier of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast the line which, starting from the sea at the point fixed in the Agreement between Great Britain and France on the 9th February 1888, opposite the wells of Hadou, follows the caravan-road, described in that agreement, through Abbasouen till it reaches the hill of Somadou. From this point on the road the line is traced by the Saw Mountains and the hill of Egu to Moga Medir; from Moga Medir it is traced by Eylinta Kaddo to Arran Arrhe, near the intersection of latitude 44° east of Greenwich with longitude 9° north. From this point a straight line is drawn to the intersection of 47° east of Greenwich with 8° north. From here the line will follow the frontier laid down in the Anglo-Italian Protocol of the 5th May 1894, until it reaches the sea.

The tribes occupying either side of the line shall have the right to use the grazing-grounds on the other side, but during their migrations it is understood that they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial authority. Free access to the nearest wells is equally reserved to the tribes occupying either side of the line.

This understanding, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty signed on the 14th May 1897 (7th Genbot 1889), by His

Majesty the Emperor Menelek and Mr. Rennell Rodd, at Adis Abbaba, must be approved by the two High Contracting Parties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RENNELL RODD

Ras Makunan to Mr. Rodd.

(Translation)

*Sent from Ras Makunan, Governor of Harrar
and its dependencies*

May this reach the Honourable Mr. Rennell Rodd, Envoy of the British Kingdom.

I inform you to-day that, after long friendly discussion, the boundary of the British Somali Protectorate upon which we have agreed is as follows:

Starting from the sea-shore opposite the wells of Hadou (as on which the French and the English Governments agreed in February 1888), it follows the caravan road by Abbasouen till Mount Somadou; from Mount Somadou to Mount Saw; from Mount Saw to Mount Egu; from Mount Egu to Moga Medir; starting from Moga Medir, it goes in a direct line to Eylinta Kaddo and Arran Arrhe on 44° east of Greenwich and 9° north, and again in a direct line until 47° east and 8° north. After this the boundary follows the line on which the English and the Italians agreed on the 5th May 1894, until the sea.

The subjects of both the Contracting Parties are at liberty to cross their frontiers and graze their cattle, but these people, in every place where they go, must obey the Governor of the country in which they are, and the wells which are in the neighbourhood shall remain open for the two parties.

These two letters on which we have agreed, according to Article II of the Treaty of His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia and Mr. Rennell Rodd of the 7th Genbot, 1889 (14th May 1897), the two Sovereigns having seen them, if they approve them, shall be sealed again (ratified).

Written at Harrar, the 28th Genbot, 1889 (4th June 1897).

(Signed) RAS MAKUNAN

Mr. Rodd to the Emperor Menelek II.

Cairo, August 30, 1897

From Mr. Rennell Rodd, Special Envoy of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, to His Majesty Menelek II, by the grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia.

Peace be unto your Majesty

I have the honour to announce that the Queen, my gracious Sovereign, has been pleased to approve and ratify the Treaty which I had the honour to sign with your Majesty on the 14th May last.

Her Majesty has also been pleased to approve of the arrangement which, in accordance with the terms of Article II of the Treaty, was agreed upon between Ras Makunan, as Representative of your Majesty, and myself by exchange of notes relative to the frontier of the British Protectorate in the Somali Coast and it is presumed by Her Majesty's Government that your Majesty has also approved of it, as they have received no notification to the contrary.

The notes exchanged have accordingly been annexed to the Treaty which has received ratification, signifying Her Majesty's approval of all these documents.

I have now the honour to return herewith the copy of the Treaty intrusted to me by your Majesty, with its ratification in due form.

When I shall have received from your Majesty a letter signifying that this Treaty, thus ratified and approved, has come safely to your Majesty's hands, it will be made public by the Government of the Queen, that all her subjects may observe it and abide by it, and that it may strengthen the ties of friendship between our countries, and increase the feelings of esteem and good-will towards your Majesty which the reception of the British Mission in Ethiopia has awakened in my country.

I pray that your Majesty's life and health may long be preserved, and that your people may have peace and prosperity.

(Signed) Rennell Rodd.

The Emperor Menelek to the Queen

(Translation)

Menelek II, Elect of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to Her

Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and Empress of India, Upholder and Keeper of the Christian Religion.

May peace be upto you

Your Majesty's letters of the 28th Hamle (3rd August) and 22nd (23rd) Mascarem (1st (2nd) October), 1897, and the Treaty with the Great Seal, dated the 28th hamle (3rd August), 1897, have reached me, and We received it with joy. The Treaty of Peace which is now between your Government and our Government. We hope it will ever increase in firmness and last for ever.

We ask God to give your Majesty health, and to your kingdom quietness and peace.

Written at Adis Abbaba, the 8th December, 1897, A.D.

(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)*

* Foreign Department, Secret, E. April 1898—n. 28/38, NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Twenty-Five
**Convention signed between Italy and
The Sultan of Mijjertain, 1901**

(Translation from the Arabic)

(Translation from the Italian)

In the name of the merciful God.

In view of the preceding Convention between the powerful Italian Government and Sultan Osman Mahmud, of the Mijjertain, dated 6 Shaban 1306, corresponding to 7th April 1889, and in view also of the written declaration of the aforesaid Sultan to the above-mentioned Government, dated 17 Jamad-el-evel 1313, corresponding to 16th November 1894, the aforesaid Sultan Osman Mahmud, seeing that a misunderstanding had arisen between him and the Government of Italy, has admitted that he has disobeyed the orders of the Government, and on the request of the latter, made with a view to define the situation and to remove all causes of misunderstanding, the stipulations given below have been agreed upon between the two parties. For this purpose the Italian Government have appointed as their special delegate Cavaliere Giulio Pestalozza, their Consul-General, and Sultan Mahmud, Sultan of the Mijjertain, signs on his own behalf and in the name of his sons and relatives heirs to the Sultanate, and in full agreement with all the elders and notables of the Mijjertain named below and present at this Act.

ARTICLE 1

Sultan Osman Mahmud, Sultan of the Mijjertain, places his person, his Sultanate, and the whole territory of the Mijjertain under the protection and under the flag of the powerful Government of Italy; he flies the Italian flag at all the ports of the coast, and he and all those under him undertake to guard it.

ARTICLE 2

All Mijjertain sambuks and vessels belonging to the Sultan or to his subjects must be registered by the Italian Government through the Royal Consul and fly the Italian flag, in accordance with the maritime laws and regulations.

ARTICLE 3

The Sultan of the Mijjertain will afford protection and assistance to all Italian and foreigners who may come to his country for purpose of trade or for pleasure. He will be responsible for any injury or loss, which they may suffer in his territories. All exercise of jurisdiction in regard to them is, however, reserved for the Royal Government.

ARTICLE 4

If it should happen, which God forbid, that a ship of any kind should run aground or suffer shipwreck on the shores of the Mijjertain, on no account may the cargo be plundered or the crew or passengers be molested. On the contrary, the Sultan and the elders of the villages nearest to the scene of the disaster must at once afford all assistance and protection, and give facilities for the conveyance of the persons on board to Aden or to whatever other seat of Government may be nearest, according to the desire of the persons concerned. The Sultan will arrange for the careful guarding of the cargo and everything belonging to the ship until the arrival on the spot of the persons entitled to claim them, when he will hand them over. In this manner the Sultan will have obtained for himself and for his assistants, the right to an adequate reward from those entitled to claim the ship and the cargo. This reward will be fixed, if necessary, through the medium of the Royal Consul at Aden, after he has heard the arguments of the Sultan, and according to the circumstances.

ARTICLE 5

In confirmation of his written declaration mentioned above, and in consequence of what has now occurred, the Sultan of the Mijjertain, Osman Mahmud, undertakes formally, with an oath before God, to prohibit the introduction of firearms and ammunition such as bullets and cartridges at any point on the Mijjertain coast, or overland. Accordingly, there may not be imported either for the Sultan himself or for any one else a single gun or a single cartridge unless permission has first been obtained from the Royal Government or their representative, and such permission must be in writing. In the event of any infringement of these orders by the Sultan or by any one under

him, or by any inhabitant of the Mijjertain country, the Sultan will be responsible, and will be bound to cause the guns or cartridges smuggled in to be handed over to the Royal Government: moreover, the guilty party will be liable to imprisonment or to a fine of not less than R100 for every gun and R 300 for every box cartridges which he is proved to have smuggled in; and if the guilty person should take to flight, the fine will be imposed on his tribe or will have to be paid by the Sultan. The Royal Government permits the Sultan to retain the guns he now possesses; they will be numbered and registered in the Sultan's name. If the Government wish it these guns may be exchanged for guns of Italian manufacture.

The prohibition of the introduction of firearms into any part of the Mijjertain country must be prohibited by the Sultan to his people in writing or in such other manner as may be considered best.

ARTICLE 6

If the Royal Government should wish to construct a lighthouse on Cape Assir (Guardafui) with a base at the village of Ollok or the village of Damo, and another lighthouse at some other place which may be Alula or Bandar Felek, they shall have full liberty to do so. The Royal Government will have the right to keep at the places which they select for the erection of lighthouse as many soldiers, employees and servants as they consider necessary for guarding and attending to the lighthouse;

At those places the administration and government will be in the hands of Italy. It is understood that at the two villages of Bandar Alula and Bandar Felek and their dependencies the rights hitherto exercised will remain in the hand of those entitled to exercise them, as in the past.

The present Convention, in duplicate, after being read and explained, was confirmed, approved and signed by the Sultan Osman Mahmud, Sultan of the Mijjertain, and by the elders and notable present with him and here designated.

Done at Bandar Ollok on 3 Jamad-el-evel 1319, corresponding to 18th August 1901.

SULTAN OSMAN MAHMUD JUSUF,
Sultan of the Mijjertain.

(Here follow signatures of elders and notables and witnesses)

G. PESTALOZZA,
Consul-General on Mission.

Present and assisting in the negotiations:

V. RICHERI, Captain,
Commanding the Royal ship *c. colombo*.
F. SOLA,
Royal Italian Consul-General at Aden*

* Proceedings of Foreign Department, May 1902, NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Twenty-Six
**Agreement between British and the Sultan of
Socotra, 1834**

First the said Sultans do promise and agree to the British Government landing and storing on any part of the sea-coast of the Island of Socotra any quantity of coals or other articles which may be sent now or hereafter from the British Government of India to be deposited on the Island.

Secondly, Captain Daniel Ross on the part of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General do promise that there shall be no interference with the laws and customs of the Island of Socotra or with the interior, of the Island, or shall the inhabitants of such parts where the coals are deposited be ill-treated by the English vessels visiting the Island with the coals.

(Sd.) DANIEL ROSS.

(True copies)

(Sd.) W.H. MACNAGHTEN,
Officiating Secretary.

(The above so-called agreement has been signed only by the British officials—Author).

Appendix Twenty-Seven
**Agreement between Sultan of Socotra and the
British Government, 1876**

The text first gives the names of the signatories to the Agreement:

1. The mark of Sultan Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Towaaree bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra and its neighbouring islands.

2. John William Schneider, C.B., Brigadier-General, Political Resident-Governor of Aden.

Witness by-

1. Saad bin Mahed bin Saad bin Afreer.

2. Salem bin Hamed bin Saad bin Afreer.

3. Isa bin Hamed bin Saad bin Afreer.

4. The mark of Sultan Mahomed bin Omer bin Towaaree bin Afreer.

5. The mark of Towaaree bin Omer bin Afreer.

6. The mark of Abdulla bin Mahomed bin Towaaree bin Afreer.

7. The mark of Omer Mahomed bin Towaaree bin Afreer.

8. Kazee Saeed bin Mooburuk ba Abdah.

9. Kazee Mousa bin Saadani bin Moohuruk ba Abdah.

In the presence of:

(Signed) LINDESAY BRINE, Captain, H.M.S. "Briton"

SALEH JAFFER, Interpreter to the Resident.

On board H.M.S. "Briton" off Kisheen, January 23, 1876.

Praise be to God alone

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, on the one part, and Brigadier-General John William Schneider, the Governor of Aden, on behalf of the British Government, on the other part, that the said Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, does pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the Island of Socotra or any its dependencies, the neighbouring islands.

In consideration of the above covenant, the said Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, has received from Brigadier-General John William Schneider, the Governor of Aden, on behalf of himself, his heirs, and successors, an immediate payment of 3,000 dollars, and his heirs and successors, shall further receive from the British Government a yearly subsidy of 360 dollars, it being understood that this stipend imposes on the aforesaid Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, his heirs and successors, the obligation of rendering assistance to any vessel, whether belonging to the British or any other nation, that may be wrecked on the Island of Socotra, or on its dependencies, the neighbouring islands, and of protecting the crew, the passengers, and the cargo thereof, for which acts of friendship and goodwill towards the British Government a suitable reward will also be given to Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, and his heirs and successors after him.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Ali bin Abdulla bin Salem bin Saad bin Afreer, Sultan of Socotra, and Brigadier-General John William Schneider, the Governor of Aden, the former for himself, his heirs and successors, and the latter on behalf of the British Government, do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signatures on this 26th day of Zilhujjeh (A.H.) 1292, corresponding with the 23rd day January (A.D.), 1876.

(Signature in vernacular)

(Signed) J.W. SCHNEIDER, Brigadier-General,
Political Resident, Governor of Aden.

(Sd.) NORTHBROOK,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Calcutta on the first day of March 1876.

(Sd.) T.H. THORNTON,
Offg. Secy to the Govt. of India.

Appendix Twenty-Eight
**Protection Treaty between Sultan of Socotra and
the British Government, 1886**

Protectorate Treaty concluded with the Sultan of Socotra and its dependencies at Kishn on the 23rd April, 1886.

The British Government and Ali-bin-Abdalla-bin-Salim-bin-Sadd-bin-Afrir being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them, the British Government have named and appointed Brigadier-General A.G.F. Hogg, Political Resident at Aden, to conclude a Treaty for the purpose.

The said Brigadier-General A.G.F. Hogg and Sultan Ali-bin-Abdalla aforesaid have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:-

ARTICLE I

The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned, Sultan Ali-bin-Abdalla, hereby undertakes to extend to the Island of Socotra and its dependencies, which are under his authority and jurisdiction, the gracious favour and protection of her Majesty the Queen Empress.

ARTICLE II

The said Sultan Ali-bin-Abdalla agrees and promise, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power except with the knowledge and sanction of the British Government; and further promise to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden, or other British officer, of attempt by any other Power to interfere with the Island of Socotra and its dependencies.

ARTICLE III

The above Treaty shall have effect from this date.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have affixed their signatures or seals, at Kishn, this 23rd day of April 1886.

(On behalf of Brigadier-General A.G.F. Hogg, Political Resident at Aden)

(Signed) CHAS. W.H. SEALY, Second Assistant Resident.

Witness:

(Signed) Mr. S. JAFFER, Native Assistant Resident.

(Signed) ALI BIN ABDALLA BIN SALIM BIN SAAD

JA'WARI BIN AFRIR,

His x mark

Sultan of Socotra and its Dependencies.

Witnesses:

(Signed) SULTAN SALIM BIN AHMED BIN SAAD BIN
AFRIR.

SAAD BIN MUBARAK, Kadthi of Kishn.

MAHOMED BIN SAAD, Kadthi of Gollonsia and
Socotra.

This treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla, on the 23rd day of June A.D., one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six.

Then the Sultan sent the following letter to the Political Resident at Aden. (No date; written on 23rd April 1886).

(After compliments)

We inform you, oh, friend! That our mutual friends, Captain Sealy and Mahomed Saleh (Jaffer), your assistants, came with an Agreement for us regarding the protection of Socotra. After perusing it minutely, we and our relatives saw that we were strongly bound by the second term, viz.: "That we agree and promise, on behalf of ourselves, heirs, and successors, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or Treaty with any foreign Power;" but for your sake, we will prevent ourselves and refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or Treaty with any foreign Power, that on condition that we want your protection for all our districts, that is, Socotra and its dependencies, Kishn and its dependencies, so that our and our successors' hearts may be pleased by such an agreement and protection.

We, oh, friend! are sincere with you in all affairs. We want your protection for all our districts, Kishn and Socotra, from all enemies who will interfere with us, whether Christians, Arabs, &c.

May you be preserved.

Appendix Twenty-Nine
Protectorate Treaty between British and the
Chief of Mahri Tribe, 1888

The British Government and Ali bin Abdalla bin Salim bin Saad bin Afrir al Mahri, Sultan of Kishn and its Dependencies, being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:

The British Government have named and appointed Brigadier-General Adam George Forbes Hogg, C.B., Political Resident at Aden, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

The said Brigadier-General Adam George Forbes Hogg, C.B., and Sultan Ali bin Abdalla bin Salim bin Afrir al Mahri, aforesaid, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles: -

ARTICLE I

The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned, Sultan Ali bin Abdalla bin Salim bin Saad bin Afrir al Mahri, hereby undertake to extend and its dependencies, which are under his authority and jurisdiction, the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

ARTICLE 2

The said Sultan Ali bin Abdalla bin Salim bin Saad bin Afrir al Mahri agrees and promises on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty with any foreign nation or power, except with the knowledge and sanction of the British Government; and further promises to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden, or other British officer, of the attempt by any other power to interfere with Kishn and its dependencies.

ARTICLE 3

The above Treaty shall have effect from this date. In witness

whereof the undersigned have affixed their signatures or seals at Kishn this second day of May, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight.

(Sd.) A.G.F. HOGG, *Brigadier-General, Political Resident.*

WITNESS:

(Sd.) FREDERICK ROOPE, *Lieutenant,
Royal Navy, Her Majesty's "Osprey."*

Signed :

(Mark +) SULTAN ALI BIN ABDALLA BIN
SALIM BIN SAAD BIN TAWARI
BIN AFRIR,
Sultan of Kishn and its Dependencies,
His + mark.
TAWARI BIN AMR BIN TAWARI BIN AFRIR.
His + Mark.
(i.e., SAAD BIN SALIM BIN AMR BIN
TAWARI BIN AFRIR.)
Signed in Arabic.
(SAAID BIN MUBAREK BIN SADIN),
Kadthi of Kishn.
(Sd.) M.S. JAFFER,
Native Assistant Resident, Aden.
(Sd.) LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Fort William on the 26th day of February, A.D. one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

(Sd.) W.J. CUNINGHAM,
*Offg. Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department.*

Appendix Thirty
Agreement between the Italian Government and
Sheikh Muhammad-Bin-Abdulla, 1905

(Translation from the Arabic)
Praise to the merciful God.

In accordance with the common desire of the contracting parties to afford peace and tranquillity to all Somalis, Cavaliere Pestalozza, the special envoy acting under the authority of the Italian Government, and Said Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, acting for himself and for the Chiefs and notables of the tribes following him, have agreed on the complete acceptance of the following clauses and conditions:

1. There shall be peace and lasting accord between the above-mentioned Said Muhammad with all the dervishes dependent on him and the Government of Italy and all its dependents among the Somali Mijjerteins and others.

In view of this and in relation thereto, there shall also be peace and accord between Said Muhammad with his above-mentioned dervishes and the British Government with all its dependents among the Somalis and others. So likewise shall there be peace between the Said with his above-mentioned dervishes and the Government of Abyssinia with all its dependents. The Italian Government guarantee and pledge themselves on behalf of their dependents as also on behalf of the British Government.

Every disagreement or difference between the Said and his people and the dependents of the Italian Government or those for whom the Government have pledged themselves as, for example, the British and their dependents,, shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner by means of Erko or of envoys from the two parties under the presidency of an Italian delegate and also in the presence of an English envoy, *whenever British interests are concerned*.

2. Said Muhammad-bin-Abdullah is authorized by the Italian Government to establish for himself and his people a fixed residence at the point most convenient for communication with the sea between Ras Garad and Ras Gabbe.

This also with the approval of Yusuf Ali and Sultan Osman Mahmud.

That residence and all its inhabitants shall be under the protection of the Italian Government and under their flag.

If and when the Italian Government so desire, they shall be at liberty to install in that residence a representative of Italian nationality or other person as Governor with soldiers and custom house (or tithes).

Said Muhammad shall in every way afford help and support to the Government in all matters, and until the Government appoint a special representative of their own the said Said Muhammad shall be their procurator.

The Government of the tribes subject to him in the interior, shall remain in the hands of Said Muhammad, and shall be exercised with justice and equity.

Moreover, he shall provide for the security of the roads and the safety of the caravans.

3. In the above-mentioned residence commerce shall be free for all, subject to the regulations and ordinances of the Government. However, from henceforth the importation and disembarkation of firearms, cartridges, lead, and powder necessary for the same is absolutely prohibited. Said Muhammad himself and his people pledge themselves by a formal and complete pledge as also by oath before God to prevent the traffic, importation, and disembarkation of slaves and firearms whencesoever they may come, whether by sea or land.

Whoever shall infringe this ordinance shall be liable to such punishment as shall be considered fitting by the Government.

4. The territory assigned to Said Muhammad and his followers is that of the Nogal and the Hod, comprised within the limits of the Italian sphere of interest. But in view of the special agreement between the Governments of Italy and England after the despatch and return of the Erko (Somali delegation) sent to establish peace with the English, according to the Somali customs, and to settle certain formalities necessary for the general tranquillity, the English shall authorize Said Muhammad and his followers to enter their territories (those of the English) in the country of Nogal, to feed their cattle there, according to their former custom.

But the said cattle shall not be permitted to pass beyond

the pasturages of the wells enumerated hereafter: they are the wells of Halin, and from these to those of Hodni, and from Hodni to Tifafl, and from Tifafl to Dom Damo.

In the same manner also in the case of the Mijjerteins there shall be accord and peace between them all and Said Muhammad and all his dervishes.

The question of the pasturages, which is at issue between these latter and the Issa Mahmud as also between them and the Omar Mahmud, shall be settled with the approval and consent of the parties according to former custom.

The lands of Mudung and Galcaio shall continue to belong to Yusuf Ali and his sons.

All questions between the dervishes and their neighbours shall be referred to the examination and the decision of the Italian Government.

In confirmation of all that is above stated and as a pledge of the contracting parties, this document has been signed in duplicate by Said Muhammad-bin-Abdullah for himself and the dervishes, his followers, and by Cavaliere Pestalozza, the authorized delegate of the Italian Government, at Illig, Sunday, the 28th of the month of Zelheggia in the year 1322 of the Hegira, corresponding to the 5th March in the year of 1905.

I have read the above document, have understood its entire contents, have accepted it all in perfect sincerity, and have signed it—in short, Cavaliere Pestalozza, Representative, knows my state—in good faith.

SAYED MOHAMMED-BEN-ABDULLAH

G. PESTALOZZA.

Seen for translation, in conformity with the original in Arabic.

G. PESTALOZZA.

Illig;

The 5th March 1905.*

* Proceedings of the Foreign Department, February 1907, NAI, New Delhi.

Appendix Thirty-One
Peace Accord between The Mullah and Britain,
1905

Sayed Mohamed was always complaining about the British attitude towards him, during his meetings with the Italian Consul, Pestalozza. However it seems that the Italian Diplomat has reached a break through with Sayed Mohamed and convinced him to sign an agreement with the British as well.

As the war was still going on, Sayed Mohamed carefully avoided to fall in the English trap. He did not personally go to Berbera to meet the British officials and sign the agreement with them but sent a delegation instead.

Three week after the Sayed signed the Illig traty with Italian Consul, a provisional peace treaty was signed between Sayid Mohamed Abdulle and the British authority at Berbera. Sayid Mohamed was represented by a delegation composed of the following persons:

1. Abdallah Shihiri, Habr Toljaala, Adan Madhoba;
2. Diria Arraleh, Habr Toljaala, Adan Madhoba;
3. Adem Egal, Mejertein, Rer Egaleh;
4. Moallem Mohamed Nur, Dolbahante Kayet, followers of Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah, taking to Berbera by Cav. Pestalozza, Diplomatic reppesantative of the Italian Government.

The Britanic Majesty's Commissioner for the Somali Protectorate was represented by Mr. Id. Malcolm Junes, deputy Commissioner of the Protectorate. Considering that there for some time in various areas of the Italian and British Protectorates existed a state of war between Sayid Mohamed bin Abdillah and his followers, and the troops and the followers of the two Protectorates. Considering that a peace accord has been concluded on the 5th March 1905 at Illig, between the said Sayed Mohamed Abdillah on his behalf and on behalf of his followers and the representative of the Italian Government on behalf of his Government, which accord is in conformity with the views of Britannic Majesty's Government, and considering that the said Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah has sent now a delegation which was accompanied by Cav. Pestalozza, as it is mentioned

above, to Berbera, for the purpose of confirming the accord which has been reached, and to explain to the Britannic Majesty's Commissioner about it.

The said delegation on behalf of Sayed Mohamed Abdillah and his followers and the said Id. Malcolm Jones on behalf of the Britannic Majesty's Commissioner, agreed upon the following:

1. Peace has been established between the said Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah and his followers and the Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and the peoples of British Somalia.

2. The divergencies that may arise from time to time between the British boundaries, between the followers of Sayed Mohamed Abdillah and the peoples of the British Somalia shall be settled through mediation, in accordance with the Somali customs.

3. Seen that peace and friendship existed since long time between the Italian Government and the Britannic Majesty's Government, and seen that said Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah and his followres have now chosen a place for settlement in the Italian territory, and enjoy the protection of the Italian flag, it will follow, naturally that now peace and friendship, between the said Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah and his followers and the Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and the peoples of the British Somaliland.

4. Seen nevertheless that state of war existed up to now between us, and as consequence the peoples of both parts have been molested, it is up to the Britannic Majesty's Commissioner to say when and upto what extent commerce would be re-started and the relations between the peoples.

5. It is understood that when the followers of the said Sayed Mohamed bin Abdillah enter in the British Somalia for commerce purpose or for some other reason, they will be in all aspects, subjec to the laws, at that moment, of the said Protectorate.

Berbera, 24, March 1905.

Signed: W.M. Yones.

Marks of: Abdallah Shihri, Diria Araleh, Moallen Mohamed Nur, Adam Egal.

Present and witness: G. Pestalozza—F. Smithman.

N.B. From Mr. Jones there was also, in addition to the

present act, given to Abdalla Sceri, who have requested, a written declaration which authorises every religious freedom for any one, provided it will not disturb the public order.

Signed: Pestalozza*

* Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di S.M./Ufficio Storico:SOMALIA, Vol. I, Dalle Origini al 1914, Roma, 1938-XVI, pp.308,309,315, 318,319.

Appendix Thirty-Two
**Convention between Italy and Abyssinia on their
Colonial Frontiers, 1908**

Sua Maesta Vittorio Emanuele III, Re d'Italia, in nome Suo ed in nome dei Suoi successori, per mezzo del suo Rappresentante in Addis Abeba, cav. Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano, capitano di cavalleria, e Sua Maesta Menelik II, Re dei Re d'Etiopia, in nome Suo e dei Suoi Successori, volendo sistemare in modo definitivo la frontiera tra i possedimenti italiani della Somalia e le province dell'Impero etiopico, hanno stabilito di firmare la seguente Convenzione.

Art. I.—La linea di frontiera tra i possedimenti italiani della Somalia e le province dell'Impero etiopico parte da Dolo alla confluenza del Daua e del Ganale, si dirige verso est per le sorgenti del Maidaba e continue fino all'Uebi-Scebeli seguendo i limiti territoriali tra la tribu' di Rahanuin, che resta alla dipendenza dell'Italia, e tutte le tribu' a nord di questa che restano alla dipendenza dell'Abissinia.

Art. 2.—Il punto di frontiera sull'Uebi-Scebeli sara' al punto di confine tra il territorio della tribu' di Baddi Addi, che resta alla dipendenza dell'Italia, ed il territorio delle tribu' a monte di Baddi-Addi che restano alla dipendenza dell'Abissinia.

Art. 3.—Le tribu' sulla sinistra del Giuba, quella di Rahanuin e quelle sul Uebi-Scebeli a valle del punto di frontiera saranno alla dipendenza dell'Italia. La tribu' di Digodia, di Afgab, di Djedjedi e tutte le altre che si trovano a nord della linea di frontiera, saranno alla dipendenza dell'Abissinia.

Art. 4.—Dal Uebi-Scebeli la frontiera si dirige verso nord-est secondo il tracciato accettato dal Governo italiano nel 1897. Tutto il territorio appartenente alla tribu' verso la costa rimarra' alla dipendenza dell'Italia; tutto il territorio di Ogaden e tutto quello delle tribu' verso l'Ogaden rimarra' alla dipendenza dell'Abissinia.

Art. 5.—I due Governi si impegnano a fissare praticamente sul terreno e nel piu' breve tempo la suddetta linea di frontiera.

Art. 6.—I due Governi si impegnano formalmente a non

esercitare alcuna ingerenza ontro la linea di frontiera e a non peremettere alle tribu' loro dipendenti di passare la frontiera per commettere della violenze e danno delle tribu' che si trovano dall'altra parte della medesima; mase sorgessero delle questioni o degli incidenti tra o a cause delle tribu' limitrofe alla frontiera, i due Governi di comune accordo li risolveranno.

Art. 7.—I due Governi si impegnano reciprocamente a non fare e a non permettere da parte dei loro dipendenti alcuna azione che possa essere cause di questioni o di incidenti o possa turbare la tranquillita' delle tribu' di frontiera.

Art. 8.—La presente Convenzione sara', per quanto riguarda l'Italia, sottoposta all'approvazione del Parlamento del Regno e ratificata da Sua Maesta' il Re.

Fatta in duplice copia e di identico tenore nelle due lingue italiana ed amarica. Una della copie resta nelle mani del Governo italiano e l'altra nelle mani del Governo etiopico.

Scritto nella citta' di Addis Abeba, il giorno sedici del mese di maggio dell'anno millenovecentotto.

(Sigillo dell'Impertore Menelik).

GIUSEPPE COLLI DI FELIZZANO

D'ordine di Sua Maesta' il Re:

TITTONI

Allegato B.

....Omissis...

Sua Maesta' Vittorio Emanuele III, Re d'Italia, a mezzo del suo rappresentante in Addis Abeba, cav. Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano, capitano di cavalleria, e Sua Maesta' Menelik II, Re dei Re d'Etiopia, hanno convenuto nel seguente atto addizionale alla convenzione del 16 maggio 1908 per la delimitazione della frontriera tra I possedimenti italiani della Somalia e le Province dell'Impero etiopico.

Articolo unico.

Il Governo di Sua Maesta' il Re d'Italia, dopo l'approvazione data dal Parlamento del Regno e la ratifica per parte di Sua Maesta' il Re del presente atto addizionale, mettera' a disposizione di Sua Maesta' Menelik II, Re dei Re di Etiopia, la somma di tre milioni di lire italiane.

Il presente atto addizionale e' stato scritto in doppio esemplare in ciascuna delle lingue italiana ed amarica.

Scritto nella citta' di Addis Abeba, il giorno sedici del mese

di maggio dell'anno millenovecentotto.
(Sigillo dell'Imperatore Menelik).
GIUSEPPE COLLI DI FELIZZANO
D'ordine di Sua Maesta' il Re:
TITTONI

(Unofficial translation from Italian by the Author)

Law 17 July 1908, n.468.

The approval of the conventions 16 May 1908 between Italy and Ethiopia for the delimitation of the frontiers between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. (Official Gazette 8 August 1908, n.185).

His Majesty Vittorio Emanuele III, King of Italy, in his name and in the name of his successors, through his Representative in Addis Ababa, Cav. Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano, Captain of Cavalry, and his Majesty Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, in his name and the name of his successors, wishing to definitely settle the frontier between the Italian colonies of Somalia and the provinces of the Italian Empire, have decided to sign the following Convention.

Art. 1. - The frontier line between the Italian colonies of Somalia and the provinces of the Ethiopian Empire starts from Dolo to the confluence of Daua and of Ganale, towards east for the sources of Maidaba and continues up to Webi (River) Shebelli, following the territorial limits between the tribe of Rahanweyn, which remain at the dependence of Italy, and all the tribes to the north of this which remain at the dependence of Abyssinia.

Art. 2. - The point of the frontier on the Shebelli River will be the point of the frontier between the territory of the Badi Adde tribe, which remain at the dependence of Italy, and the territory on the uphill of Badi Adde, which remain at the dependence of Abyssinia.

Art. 3. - The tribe on the left of the Giuba (River), that of Rahanweyn and those on the River Shebelli to the downhill of the point of the frontier will be at the dependence of Italy. The tribe of Digodia of Afgab, of Djedjedi and all the others which are on the north of the frontier line, will be at the dependence of Abyssinia.

Art. 4. - From River-Shebelli the frontier runs towards north-east according to the sketch accepted by the Italian Government in 1897. All the territory belonging to the tribes towards the coast will remain at the dependence of Italy; all the territory of Ogaden and all those of the tribes towards Ogaden will remain at the dependence of Abyssinia.

Art. 5. - The two Governments undertake to practically fix on the territory and in shortest time the above-mentioned frontier.

Art. 6. - The two Governments formally undertake not to interfere beyond the line of the frontier and not to permit the tribes under their dependence to cross the frontier to commit violence against the tribes on the other side of the frontier; but in case problems arise or incidents between or because of the neighbouring tribes, the two Governments of common accord will solve it.

Art. 7. - The two Governments reciprocally undertake not to do and not to permit their dependents any action that may cause incidents or may disturb the tranquillity of the tribes of the frontier.

Art. 8. - The present Convention will be, as far as Italy is concerned, submitted to the approval of the Parliament of the Kingdom and the ratification of His Majesty the King.

Done in double copies of identical tenor of the two languages Italian and Amharic. One of the copies remains in the hands of the Italian Government and the other in the hands of the Ethiopian Government.

Written in the city of Addis Abeba, day sixteen of the month of May of the year one-thousand-nine-hundred-eight.

(The Seal of the Emperor Menelik)

GIUSEPPE COLLI DI FELIZZANO

By order of His Majesty the King:
TITTONI

Additional Act

His Majesty Vittorio Emanuele III, King of Italy, through his representative in Addis Abeba, Cav. Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano, Captain of Cavalry, and His Majesty Menelik II, King

of Kings of Ethiopia, have agreed the following Additional Act to the Convention of 16 May 1908 for the delimitation of the frontier between the Italian colonies in Somalia and the Provinces of the Ethiopian Empire.

Single Article

The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, following the approval by the Parliament of the Kingdom and the ratification by His Majesty the King of this Additional Act, will place at the disposal of His Majesty Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, the sum of three million Italian Liras.

The present Additional Act has been written in double copies in Italian and Amharic languages.

Written in the city of Addis Abeba, day sixteen of the month of May of the year one-thousand-nine-hundred-eight.

(The Seal of the Emperor Menelik)

GIUSEPPE COLLI FELIZZANO,

By the Order of His Majesty the King:
ITTONI.*

*Carlo Rossett, *Manuale di Legislazione della SOMALIA ITALIANA* - Vol. Terzo - Roma 1913 pp. 42-43

**Memorandum Regarding the Treaties and
Engagements affecting the Tribes on the Somali
Coast and in the Vicinity of Aden**

Calcutta Records.
MEMO 1887.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT
SECRET E. PROS. JULY 1887, Nos. 110-128.

No. 6903, dated Bombay Castle, 25th November 1886
(Confidential).

From—W. Lee-Warner, Esq. Acting Secretary to the
Government of Bombay,

To—Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to forward herewith, for convenience of reference, five copies of a memorandum, dated 1st instant, prepared in this office showing the treaties and agreements affecting the Somali Coast and Socotra, and also five copies of the treaties and agreements therein referred to.

No. 111.

(Confidential)

Memorandum showing the Treaties and Agreements affecting the Somali Coast and Socotra.

The British Protectorate over the Somali country covers the territory and coast* (*At the present –1886- exclusive of Zaila) line between Ghubbet-Kharab at the western extremity of the Bay of Tajourra and the 49th degree of east longitude, and is based on treaties concluded with the undermentioned tribes: -

Easa, Gadabursi, Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Habr* Gerhajis, and Warsangali. (*The treaties only include the sub-tribes of the Habr Toljaala and the Habr Gerhajis which occupy the coast line)

2. The geographical situation of these tribes going from west to east is as follows:

The Easa extend from Gubbet-Kharab to Ras Khorangarit,

* Aitchison's Treaties, Vol. VII, Calcutta, 1865 -NAI, New Delhi.

the Gadabursi** (** *The Gadabursi occupy this portion of the maritime plain conjointly with the Easa.*) from Ras Khorangarit to near Bulhar, the Habr Awal from Bulhar to Berbera, which ports are administered by the British Government for the benefit of the Habr Awal, the Habr Toljaala from Berbera to Hais, the Habr Gerhajis from Hais to Ras Galweni, and Warsangali from Ras Galweni to the 49th degree.

3. By the treaties at first entered into with them, the above tribes* (**Ratified- Habr Awal, 23rd August 1884. Gadabursi, 20th February 1885. Habr Toljaala, 25th February 1885. Habr Gerhajis, 25th February 1885. Easa, 25th May 1885*) are (1) not to dispose of their territories in any manner save to the British Government; (2) to allow all vessels flying the British flag to trade at their ports; (3) to protect all British subjects residing in or visiting their territories; (4) to abolish slave trade, the British Government having a right to demand the surrender of any slave and to support such demand by force of arms by land and sea; (5) to treat with respect and consideration any agent or agents appointed by the British Government to reside in their territories, such agent being entitled to have for his protection such guard as the British Government may deem sufficient. An additional stipulation (*vide* Article 2), which does not appear in the treaties with the other tribes, was included in the treaties with the Habr Toljaala and Habr Gerhajis, binding them to render assistance to any vessel, British or foreign, wrecked on their shores, and to protect the passengers, crew and cargo of such vessel.

4. The treaty with the Warsangali (ratified 15th May 1886), while binding the tribe to abolish slave trade, to protect wrecks, and to treat with respect the agent or agents appointed to reside in their territory, contains no stipulation permitting British vessels to trade at their ports, and guaranteeing the protection of British subjects in or visiting their territory. But the treaty (Article 1 and 2) accepts a British Protectorate, and stipulates that the tribe will not enter into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign power without the sanction of the British Government, and (Article 6) that they will assist all British officers in the execution of such duties as may be assigned to them and will act upon their advice in all matters connected with the peace and good government of the country

and the interests of commerce.

5. As the aforesaid treaties did not, except in the case of the Warsangali as already stated, provide for the establishment of a British Protectorate over the territories of the several tribes, "Supplementary General Treaties" (ratified 16th July 1886) were concluded with the Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, and Habr Gerhajis, in terms of Articles 1 and 2 of the Warsangali Treaty, establishing such Protectorate and containing the stipulation against dealing with foreign powers. It was not deemed advisable to execute a similar treaty with the Easa and Gadabursi, pending the settlement of the question whether Zaila shall be retained by England or restored to Turkey, as it was thought that, in case of the restoration of Zaila to Turkey, closer agreements with the Easa and Gadabursi tribes than those referred to in paragraph 3 of this memorandum would be embarrassing. But with a view to counteracting French influence, which was being exerted to the detriment of British interests, the Government of India sanctioned the payment of subsidies aggregating R.1000 * (** The full amount is not as yet expended monthly*) per mensem to these two and the inhabitants of Zaila. These subsidies, however, are only provisional.

6. Besides the subsidy of R.1000 above referred to, a sum of R1,250 a month is paid to certain headmen of the Habr Awal tribe from the revenues of the ports of Berbera and Bulhar, and a stipend of \$180 per annum to the Warsangali tribe * (**The Warsangali stipend will not be paid until the Sultan accepts the British flag*). Three headmen of the Habr Gerhajis received stipends. One draws R.50 as Chief Akil, one is Mufti of Berbera and the other is only temporary; both the latter receive R.20 each. No stipend or subsidy appears to be paid to the Habr Toljaala.

7. With regards to the tribes to the eastward of the 49th degree, none of them have any treaty relations with the British Government, excepting the Mijjertain Somalis with whom two treaties were concluded, one in 1886 and the other in 1884. The former treaty only provides for the abolition of slave trade in the territory of the tribe, and the latter only for the protection of wrecks, both British and foreign, occurring on their shores.

The Mijjertain receive from the British Government an annual stipend of \$300 conditionally on their good behaviour

and on their acting up to the obligations imposed upon them by the treaty of 1884.

8. It may not be out of place here to mention that the French Government has set up a claim** (** *The French Vice-Consul at Zaila pretends a portion of the Gadabursi and Jibril Abokr are French protégé. He also claims Dongarita*) to Protectorate over the territory extending from the south coast of the Bay of Tajourra as far as Ras Jibuti, and has been pressing upon Her Majesty's Government the appointment of a Commission, consisting of two officers, one English and the other French, who should proceed to Zaila and examine the respective rights of the two countries on the littoral comprised between Ghubbet-Kharrab and Zaila. Her Majesty's Government have however informed the French Government that they cannot consent to regard as an open question the validity of the Protectorate of Great Britain over any part of the coast between Ghubbet-Kharrab and Zaila, and cannot therefore assent to an enquiry on the spot of the nature suggested by the French Government, but that they are willing to receive and examine any statement which the Government of France may desire to make, supported by the customary proofs, on the subject of French claims to Protectorate on the coast in question. Her Majesty's Government have further intimated to the French Government that they would gladly agree, in order to avoid future misunderstanding, to the appointment of a Commission with the object of delimitating the two Protectorates which end respectively at Ghubbet-Kharab.

The French Government, it appears from recent correspondence, are still urging the appointment of the Commission alluded to at the beginning of this paragraph.

9. On the 26th March last Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India intimated by telegraph to His excellency the Viceroy that Germany had notified a protectorate over the Somali Coast from east of the town of Berbera as far as Warsheik, and that her Majesty's Government proposed to assert the rights of the British Government as far as the 49th degree of east longitude. The German Government's claim to the Protectorate in question was stated to be based on a treaty which the German East African Company had, on the 6th September 1885,, made with the principal Chief of the Mijjertain Somalis, whereby the whole

Somali territory from east of the town of Berbera to Cape (Ras) Aswad was alleged to have been ceded to the Company, whose representative had also made a treaty with the Ruler of the Somali town Obbia (Obbiah), the Sultan Yusuf Ali Yusuf, whereby the Company had acquired, with all sovereign rights, the entire territory between Obbia and the town of Warsheik belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar, on the one side, and between the Indian Ocean and the Gala frontier, about 25 days' journey inland, on the other.

10. From a draft memorandum which the Foreign Office communicated to the India Office on the 5th April last, it appears that the Foreign Office proposed to inform the German Ambassador in London, with reference to Germany's claim to a Protectorate over the Somali Coast from east of Berbera, that the territory and coast line between Ghubbet-Kharab and the 49th degree of east longitude were already under British protection; that Her Majesty's Government did not claim to exercise a Protectorate over the Mijjertain Somalis or any of the tribe eastward of the 49th degree, and were not aware of any other power having claims between that point and Warsheik, excepting in regard to Obbia, which, according to information in the possession of Her Majesty's Government, was annexed by Yusuf Ali at the end of 1884, and by him placed under the Sultan of Zanzibar in April 1885; that this question would no doubt be matter of discussion and negotiation with the Sultan of Zanzibar' and that subject to this, the establishment of a German Protectorate on the Somali Coast eastward of the 49th degree to Cape Guardafui and from thence to Warsheik would be welcomed by Her Majesty's Government. The India Office suggested that a proviso be made that the German Government withdraw all claim to a protectorate west of the 49th degree. The Foreign Office likewise proposed to inform German Ambassador that the Mijjertain Sultan had stated positively to Major Hunter that his tribe was not under German protection, and that he and his people considered themselves under British protection in consequence of the treaty of 1884, referred to in paragraph 7 of this memorandum; but that the German Government would perceive that the treaty in question (copy of which was communicated to them) did not contain any agreement as to a right of Protectorate.

11. There is nothing further on the office records in connection with the subject of Germany's claim to the Protectorate in question.

12. The port of Alula has been recently visited by two German war vessels, it is believed, to compel the Mijjertain to acknowledge German suzerainty, but with what success is not known.

13. On the 29th March last, the Government of India intimated to this Government by telegraph that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India was of the opinion that the treaty which was concluded with the Sultan of Socotra in 1876 did not afford sufficient guarantee against apprehended design of other powers on the Island of Socotra, and that the Sultan should therefore be induced to agree to an additional article, placing himself and his successors under British protection. Negotiations for this purpose were accordingly opened by the Political Resident at Aden with the Sultan, and resulted in the execution on the 23rd April last of a Protectorate Treaty, the terms of which are identical with the "Supplementary General Treaties" referred to in paragraph 5 of this memorandum, except that an additional clause has been inserted in Article II, binding the Sultan "to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden or other British officer of the attempt by any other Power to interfere with the Island of Socotra and its dependencies"

14. By the terms of the treaty of 1876 the Sultan is bound (1) not to dispose of the Island of Socotra or any of its dependencies—the neighbouring islands—except to the British Government, and (2) to render assistance to any vessel whether British or foreign, wrecked on his shores, and to protect the passengers, crew and cargo of such vessels. In consideration of the obligation which the treaty imposes upon him in respect to wrecks, the Sultan receives an annual subsidy of \$360.

1st November 1886.

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Ufficio Coloniale—and Biblioteca Centrale Nazionale, Roma, Italy, British House of Commons, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, British Colonial Office and British Royal Air Force Museum, London as well as the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C..

It took over six years of research to prepare this volume. I feel that there may be more documents available in various libraries to justify further research. I have tried my best to analyse through available documents the colonial history of the Horn of Africa. The Somali people have been victims of the colonial enterprises of all hues. I hope that a day will dawn soon when justice will be done to the Somali people and all the Somalis will march under one flag.

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Glossary

Abuna, (Arabic)	Father, Head of Church
Akkal, Akil (Arabic)	Tribal Chief
Amir (Arabic)	Prince
Arish (Somali)	Hut
Baraza (Swahili)	Gathering, Meeting
Barut (Arabic origin)	Ammunition
Bunder-Bander (Arabic origin)	Port
Dejazmatch (Amharic)	Second High Ranking Leader in the Imperial Abyssinian Army (not in use after the collapse of the Emperor in Ethiopia)
Durbar, Darbar	Court-Assembly
Effendi (Arabic origin)	Chief, Sir
Ergo, Erko (Somali)	Mission, Deputation
Fitnawallas, (Arabic/Hindi)	Mischievous persons
Gerazmatch, (Amharic)	High Ranking Leader in the Imperial Abyssinian Army after Dejazmatch and below Kegnazmatch (not in use after the collapse of the Emperor in Ethiopia)
Giama (Arabic)	Collective
Gibel-ad (Somali)	Fair-skin
Gibel-madow (Somali)	Dark-skin
Guray (Somali)	Left-handed
Habshi (Arabic origin)	Abyssinian

Havildar (Hindi)	Sergeant
Jemadar (Hindi)	Junior-Commission-Officer
Jihad (Arabic)	Muslim Holy War
Jilib (Somali)	Sub-clan
Kafila (Arabic)	Traveling group, Caravan
Kafir (Arabic)	Infedel
Kariya (Arabic)	Village
Koufur (Somali)	South
Maharaja (Hindi)	King
Mahkameh (Arabic origin)	Justice Court
Moudirieh (Arabic origin)	Disrtrict
Naique (Hindi)	Corporal
Pukka (Hindi)	Properly cemented place
Qadi, Kazi, (Arabic origin)	Judge
Ras (Amharic)	High Ranking Leader in the Army if the King is not leading the battle (not in use after the collapse of the Emperor in Ethiopia)
Rihla (Arabic)	Travel
Rupee (Hindi)	Indian Currency
Sahib (Arabic origin)	Sir
Sepoy (Hindi)	Soldier
Shariyah (Arabic)	The Islamic Law
Shoom (Amharic)	Civil or Military appointee
Sircar, Sirkar, Sarkar (Hindi)	The Government
Soubhedar (Hindi)	Junior Comission-Officer
Sumbuq, sambuk	Boat
Tarika (Arabic)	Religious group
Ughaz (Somali)	Title of a Chief of a tribe
Vakeel (Arabic origin)	Representative
Visiers (Arabic origin)	Ministers
Zariba (Arabic origin)	Fence
Zecca/Zacca (Arabic)	Charity given to the poor. (One of the Five Pillars of Islam)

