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HELMUT BUSKE VERLAG HAMBURG

George V. Wright, jr.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S RESPONSE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA
CONFLICT: THE SELLING OF COLD WAR II

SALT lies buried in the sands
of the Ogaden

Zbigniew Brzezinski - National
Security Advisor

President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 promising an approach to foreign policy different from that of the previous three presidential administrations. The basis of Carter's foreign policy was to be a deemphasis on viewing the world only in terms of East-West geo-politics, providing economic assistance for the Third World in lieu of military interventions, a concern for human rights conditions in the world, and an open foreign policy-making apparatus.¹

This position was identified with a number of Carter appointees, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, United Nations' Ambassador Andy Young, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose.

Their analysis was that the roots of conflict in the Third World was regional in nature, and that the Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World should not be blown out of proportion. They believed that the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa and Angola, for example, was not necessarily permanent and that restraint rather than confrontation would help to restore U.S. hegemony in areas of conflict.²

This policy approach was initially applied to the crisis in southern Africa. The Carter Administration immediately began

in the winter, 1977 to criticize South Africa's apartheid system and distance itself from that regime. The United States also joined with Great Britain in an attempt to orchestrate a political solution to the civil war in Zimbabwe.

Beginning in late 1977 and early 1978, however, members of the administration, including President Carter, began to make terse, provocative statements which singled out Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa and Angola. The Soviet presence in Africa was characterized as "meddling" and expansionism in the Third World. The Cubans were portrayed simply as proxies for the Russians.

These statements represented the initial stage of the Carter Administration's shift toward a "new Cold War" posture, a posture that was formalized into policy in early 1980 (and was exacerbated by President Ronald Reagan in 1981).

This study will examine President Carter's Africa policy with particular focus on events in the Horn of Africa. This writer will attempt to show how the Carter Administration's response to those events help to play a major role in laying the groundwork for the shift towards a Cold War rhetoric and posture in Washington. The objective of this paper is to understand the reasons behind this shift which has heightened international tensions and accelerated the possibility of nuclear war.

The Carter Administration faced a multiple, yet interrelated, set of crises that were unique to the post-World War II Pax Americana. This set of crises, in fact, formed the context from which the Carter Administration was forced to formulate policy. The first crisis was that the imperial hegemony the United States had enjoyed world-wide was significantly eroding.

The primary reasons for this erosion included the increasing business competition from Western Europe (particularly West Germany) and Southeast Asia and the success of Third World

nationalist movements and forces (Vietnam, OPEC, Angola, Ethiopia, etc.).

The fundamental results of this crisis for the United States were the weakening of its monetary system, stagnant domestic production, double-digit inflation, rampant unemployment and declining political hegemony in the Third World.

These conditions had begun to emerge during the Nixon Administration. President Nixon did attempt to adopt new policies to counteract them (wage and price controls, devaluation of the dollar, promoting trade with the Soviet Union and China, and a tendency towards protectionism).³ Those actions did not reverse the structural crisis faced by the United States however.

The second crisis President Carter had to face had to do with domestic conditions. Owing to the domestic response (congressional actions and public opinion) to the United States' involvement in Vietnam and to the Watergate scandal the modern imperial presidency faced its severest crisis of legitimacy since the Great Depression.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s a majority of the American people were frustrated and angered by the brutal U.S. excesses in Southeast Asia. Although most people did not understand the motives and objectives of that war a significant percentage of them was opposed to it, overt and covert interventions in the Third World, and military spending. This phenomenon has been labeled the 'Vietnam Syndrome'.

Even though President Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, successfully orchestrated a covert operation which led to the overthrow of Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government in Chile in 1973, he was stymied when he tried to escalate a covert military operation in Angola in 1975. Congress, aware of the operation and sensitive to the mood of the country, put clamps on his designs by passing the Clark Amendment. The amendment prohibited the use of funds

for both overt and covert operations in Angola.⁴

In the early 1970s Congress also passed the War Powers Act (1973) and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974), which gave congress added oversight powers on military interventions.⁵ Military spending as a percentage of the federal budget also declined by the mid-1970s.

The major implication of the 'Vietnam Syndrome' was that the president could not readily use military means to intervene in the Third World.

Thirdly, in spite of the establishment of detents with the Soviet Union during the Nixon Administration, by the late 1970s the military and strategic relationship between the two countries began to change. To best understand this change it must be kept in mind that the United States approached detente from the position that America was militarily and economically superior to the U.S.S.R. and that a favorable relationship could be used to keep the Soviets in line.

World geopolitics altered radically by the mid-1970s however, particularly because of developments in Third World countries, such as Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and others. In each situation the United States had some influence in maintaining a conservative or reactionary regime which was subsequently overthrown. Although each struggle was based on internal class and nationalist forces, the Soviet Union did take selective military and political advantage of the situation by providing military aid. This reality perturbed key policy-makers in both the Nixon/Ford and Carter administrations. Both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski felt that the Soviet actions were in violation of the premise of detente.⁶

The Soviet Union also gained on the United States in another manner which challenged Washington's perception of itself as the world's superpower. During the 1970s the U.S.S.R. reached rough parity with the U.S. in nuclear weapons. Even

though the United States never lost absolute superiority (in number of warheads, accuracy, kill-ratio, etc.), as it claimed, the overwhelming superiority of the United States was dramatically lessened.⁷

Against this background specific events in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa occurred which provided the Carter Administration with a major foreign policy challenge. How president Carter approached these events exhibited the inherent contradictions within the administration as to how to formulate foreign policy. How Carter chose to deal with the Horn of Africa set the stage for the new Cold War which emerged in the late 1970s.

The United States had supported the Ethiopian regime of Emperor Haile Selassie since the early 1950s.⁸ Ethiopia was considered to be of importance because of its general anti-Communist position and because the United States maintained a communication base at Kagnew (formerly Asmara) which was part of its global radion communications network.⁹

Ethiopia was also important because of its strategic proximity to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Between 1951 and 1976 the United States provided Ethiopia with \$ 279 billions in military aid and \$ 350 billions in economic assistance.¹⁰ The aid was used to maintain the corrupt and repressive Selassie regime.

In the early 1970s a wave of demonstrations, strikes and armed conflict threatened to bring down the government. In the context of these events a wing of the Ethiopian military staged in 1974 a successful overthrow of the Selassie government. A Provisional Military Administrative Council (known as the Dergue) was formed. It soon declared Ethiopia a "scientific socialist" state, began systematically to consolidate its power through the suppression of its opposition, and institute a series of radical economic and social reforms.¹¹

The response of the United States was to continue to support the Dergue, albeit hesitantly; the fact that neighboring Somalia was aligned with the Soviet Union was reason enough.¹² By 1976, however, the Dergue was drawing closer to the Soviet Union. It has been reported that in December, 1976, for example, the Dergue signed a secret treaty with the Soviets guaranteeing Ethiopia access to Soviet arms.¹³

In February, 1977 the Carter Administration announced that it was cutting off \$ 100 million worth of military aid on the grounds that it was critical of Ethiopia's "human rights" policies.¹⁴ The Dergue's suppression of its perceived political enemies was bloody, indeed, but there were also several additional reasons for the Carter Administration's actions. One of these was that the United States' Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan) were opposed to Ethiopia's refusal to negotiate the self-determination of Eritrea. By February 3, after Mengistu Haile Mariam gained control of the Dergue, the United States' influence in the Ethiopian government was all but eliminated.¹⁵ On April 23 the Dergue ordered closed all the United States installations in the country (except for the Embassy and the AID office).¹⁶

The cut-off of U.S. military aid put the Dergue in a position to ask the Soviet Union and Cuba to supply them with military aid and personnel.

Ethiopia was in need of military aid because it was committed to maintaining its colonially-acquired empire. Besides suppressing its domestic opposition, the Dergue was fighting a two front war against Eritrean nationalist forces, which was backed by conservative Arab states, and the Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden. The possibility of a confrontation with Somalia also loomed ominously.

During this period the United States and its Western allies in the region actively encouraged Somalia, a socialist-oriented country, to break its alliance with the Soviet Union.

The regional states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Sudan and Iran) did not like the increased Soviet presence. They feared that a radicalization of the Horn might threaten the stability of their regimes.¹⁷ Saudi Arabia had even offered Somalia \$ 300 million if it severed its relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁸

In April, 1977 President Carter told the State Department he wanted "... them to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend."¹⁹ Several overtures were made by Washington in mid-1977. Carter stated in a June II speech at the Naval Academy in Annapolis that he would "aggressively challenge" the Soviet Union in a number of countries, including Somalia.²⁰ On July 15 the State Department officially announced its willingness to supply Somalia with "defensive" weapons.²¹ It has also been reported that the Somalis received private encouragement from Dr. Kevel Cahill, a medical consultant to Somalia's President Siyad Barre and a force in the Democratic Party in New York, that the United States would not rearm Ethiopia in the event of a Somali attack upon the Ogaden, and that the United States would "look askance" on such an attack.²²

The Somali position was pragmatic. President Barre's major objective was the creation of what has been called "Greater Somalia", which meant the "restoring" of the Ogaden, Djibouti and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya to Somalia. These areas were populated by Somali-speaking peoples and were carved up by Western and Ethiopian colonialism. In the Ogaden, the Western Somali Liberation Front was fighting against Ethiopia. Barre supported that struggle and was considering intervening into the war. He was not necessarily committed to aligning with the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union, however. As late as June, 1977 Barre stated that "We are not thinking in terms of divorce and remarriage."²³

In the spring of 1977 the Soviet Union found itself in the awkward position of being allied with two socialist-oriented states in the Horn that were practically at war with one another. Attempting to resolve the situation, the Soviets proposed the creation of a confederation of socialist states in the Horn which would include Ethiopia, Somalia, an independent Eritrea, Djibouti, and South Yemen. In March, 1977 Fidel Castro met with Mengistu and Barre in Aden to discuss this possibility. Soviet President Podgorny also conferred with the two leaders on this matter in April. Barre turned down the proposal, however, reportedly because of his mistrust of Ethiopia and the fact that the confederation would undermine Somalia's quest for a "Greater Somalia".²⁴ Barre was also aware of the potential support he could get from the West and the Arab states.

In late June war erupted in the Ogaden when Somalia intervened against Ethiopia, who was aided by the Soviets and the Cubans. It is clear that Somalia's actions were predicated on the belief that it would be supplied with arms from the United States and its regional allies. Somalia also believed that it would receive arms from West Germany.

Somalia did receive arms from the Arab states (Saudi Arabia and Egypt), Iran and West Germany, although the assistance was slow in coming.²⁵ The military assistance was premised on helping Somalia in case Ethiopia might invade Somalia. Somalia was in an international political bind because regardless of how valid its claim to the Ogaden was, acquisition of that territory through military means was in violation of the charter of the Organization of African Unity, which endorses the integrity of boundaries.²⁶

Military aid from the United States, however, was not forthcoming. Although Carter had sent out signals of U.S. support, Washington would not support Somalia while it was fighting in the Ogaden. There were several reasons for this:

- because of the OAU's position on the boundary question;
- because Kenya, a close ally of the United States, opposed supplying Somalia because of its fears of a Somali attempt to acquire the Northern Frontier District;
- also the aid was not forthcoming owing to the disagreement within the administration over what policy course should be taken.

The war in the Ogaden escalated in the fall of 1977. Much of this was owing to the increased aid to Ethiopia from the Soviet Union and military personnel from Cuba. On November 13, Somalia expelled the Soviet Union and broke off diplomatic ties with Cuba. The Soviet position towards Somalia's actions in the Ogaden was that it was "guilty of aggression", and that the Soviet Union was protecting the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.²⁷

The Soviets had become impressed with the Ethiopian Revolution, claiming it was a Marxist-Leninist revolution similar to the Soviet experience. The facts that the Soviets were providing arms to Ethiopia and that Somalia supported the Eritrean struggle "soured" relations between the two countries.²⁸

In October the Soviets stopped arms shipments and restricted fuel supplies for the Somali army. This was a definite signal that the Soviets were not going to back Somalia's efforts in the Ogaden.

After the break the Soviets began to provide massive amounts of military aid to Ethiopia. Also there was an influx of over 18,000 Cuban military personnel, of which many fought in the Ogaden against Somalia and the Western Somali Liberation Front.

As these events unfolded National Security Advisor Brzezinski began to brief the press about the "growing escalation of Communist military efforts".²⁹ Brzezinski also began to push Carter for a "stronger response" to intimidate the Soviet Union.³⁰ After the Somali-Soviet break President Carter began

to take full political advantage of the situation. On November 22, Carter requested that United Nations Ambassador Andy Young make a speech at the U.N. against the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa.³¹ Brzezinski also met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington on December 14 and "warned him quite flat out that continued influx of Cubans and Soviet war material to Ethiopia would make (the United States) alter (its) position from that of restraint to that of more active involvement."³²

Brzezinski also pressed for a "more direct action", such as the deployment of a carrier task force in the area as a show of strength. The NSC Advisor was adamant that the Soviet involvement be made "increasingly more costly".³³ However he did not have dominant influence over U.S. policy-making at this point. Brzezinski's proposals were constantly voted down by the moderates in the administration.

In spite of this, gradual yet discernibly provocative rhetoric aimed at challenging the Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa continued in 1978.

At a March 2, 1978 press conference at the National Press Club Carter "expressed his hope for Somali withdrawal from the occupied Ogaden region, a removal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Ethiopia, and a lessening of tension in the area ..."³⁴ President Carter then went on and introduced for the first time the possibility of "linkage" as a means of containing Soviet involvement in the Third World. He said:

"The Soviets' violating of these principles would be a cause of concern to me, would lessen the confidence of the American people in the word and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union, would make it more difficult to ratify a SALT agreement of comprehensive test ban agreement if concluded, and therefore the two are linked because of actions by the Soviets. We don't initiate the linkage."³⁴

But "linkage" was not yet an official policy of the administra-

tion. Speaking on the same day before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Vance explained that "There is no linkage between SALT negotiations and the situation in Ethiopia."³⁶

Perhaps the best indicator of a shift to a more hardline rhetorical position was exhibited in a speech given by President Carter at Wake Forest University on March 17. Carter warned "that the Soviet growth in military power and 'ominous inclination' to use this power to intervene in Africa could jeopardize cooperation with the United States."³⁷ He added that U.S. cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in economic, social and scientific fields could be cut back due to such activities. Carter was bluntly alluding to a possible loss of congressional support for the ratification of SALT. Carter also called the Cubans "proxy forces" and "mercenaries".

Laying the groundwork for an eventual arms build-up, Carter took advantage of the anti-Soviet rhetoric to state:

"Our strategic forces must be - and must be known to be - a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. They will never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, to coerce, or to blackmail our friends ... Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but this will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the cost of security and reduce the cost of war. But even then, we must - and will - proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our own security requires."³⁸

It is obvious that the Soviet Union was not the only intended audience for this speech. Carter was also addressing conservative and right-wing congressional elements, and was attempting to create a specific public opinion.

What was coming out of the White House was that the United States was willing to challenge the Soviet Union's "aggression" (although the question of how they were going

to do it was unclear) and its nuclear build-up. The only leverage that Carter had at the moment was "linkage", particularly to the SALT agreement, which the Soviets wanted to have ratified. Another leverage that Carter had was to move towards normalization with China, perhaps coaxing cooperation from Moscow in lieu of a Sino-American alliance.

In early May a crisis in southern Africa took center stage, adding a new dimension to Carter's accusation concerning Soviet and Cuban "culpability" in Africa. Carter claimed that the Soviets and Cubans were responsible for the so-called Shaba II incident, which occurred when the Congolese National Liberation Front (CNLF), which had been based in northern Angola since 1964, for the second time in one year invaded the Shaba Province of Zaire with the purpose of overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko, with whom it had historic grievances.³⁹

However, no evidence existed to support Carter's accusation, which were aimed at creating a climate in the United States to force the repeal of the Clark Amendment. Apparently Brzezinski, who pushed Carter on this issue, wanted to renew a covert operation in Angola against the MPLA government, which was supported by the Soviets and the Cubans.⁴⁰

Brzezinski was enjoying added confidence at this time because in late May he returned from a successful visit to China where he had worked on improving relations with that nation.⁴¹ Nevertheless Brzezinski was limited to stirring up a climate of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even though the American media proclaimed in May the emergence of "Cold War II", Secretary of State Vance's position still prevailed as the administration's dominant policy. The United States, for example, did not provide Somalia with arms, nor did Carter request that Congress take steps to repeal the Clark Amendment. The U.S. also still cooperated with the British in orchestrating a settlement in Zimbabwe. The American people, while aware of the

Soviet (and Cuban) presence in Africa, still did not indicate a willingness to move from the 'Vietnam Syndrome'. In late June, 1978 Secretary Vance on two occasions reaffirmed what United States policy towards Africa would entail. He stated that,

"In these areas of conflicts, and in the peaceful development of the continent, we have a firm and sensitive strategy, to promote our long term interests and strengthen our ties with African nations. It combines efforts to avoid East-West confrontations and positive regional policies that respond to local realities."⁴²

In July Assistant U.N. Ambassador Donald McHenry helped to mediate a dramatic normalization between Angola and Zaire which indicated an implementation of Vance's position. Events in the Third World which continued to weaken United States hegemony accelerated in 1979 lending credence to the possibility of a full blown revived Cold War militarism emanating from Washington. In Iran, the Shah, who had been a major pillar of U.S. Third World support, was overthrown by a mass popular revolution. In March Somalia was defeated in the Ogaden, which greatly strengthened the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. And in July the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. After the "discovery" of Soviet military personnel in Cuba in September (conveniently discovered during the Non-Aligned Nations summit being held in Havana), the "Iranian Hostage" crisis in November and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in December there was no doubt the Cold War had been revived.

The declaration for this revived militarism was formalized in President Carter's State of the Union message delivered on January 23, 1980. Among the things he called for were a dramatic increase in military spending, renewing the draft, the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force and the forma-

tion of regional defense networks in the Third World, which would include Somalia and Kenya along with the Sudan, Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area.⁴³

In conclusion, why did the Carter Administration single-out the events in the Horn as it did in late 1977 and 1978? And why did the new Cold War climate and posture emerge in the United States during this period?

To answer the first question one must simply state that the United States was facing the reality of coping with the loss of empire throughout the Third World, and was searching for a means to maintain and/or regain hegemony. This process was made increasingly more difficult because the United States could not control events in the Third World as it had been able to in the 1950s and 1960s. There were also many domestic and international checks which prevented it from using the full range of instruments of power that it had.

The episode surrounding the conflict in the Horn in 1977/1978 was in effect an example of the political wrestling within the Carter Administration as how to best contend with those various forces (Third World nationalism, Soviet foreign policy, congressional constraints, domestic political and economic contradictions of interventionist policies, etc.). Although the enlightened imperialist policy of Vance differed significantly from the policy of National Security Advisor Brzezinski, one should keep in mind that their objectives were exactly the same.

The second question is somewhat more complicated. Three key interrelated factors, however, can be identified as central to an explanation of the emergence of the new Cold War policies of Carter.

First were the personality and ideological differences within the administration's decision-making apparatus. This was personified by the difference between Brzezinski and Vance.

The National Security Advisor, who prevailed over Vance's position, was the dominant personality behind this shift. The primary basis for Brzezinski's motives was that he viewed political events in "globalist" terms. This view, also prescribed by Henry Kissinger, is based on the premise that events in Africa (or any other region) are viewed only in terms of East-West politics. This implies that there is specific "linkage" between the Soviet Union and/or Cuban involvement in, for example, the Horn of Africa and United States relations.

The fact that Brzezinski had daily access to President Carter as the National Security Advisor also allowed him significant influence in the policy-making process.

A second factor was due to the emergence of the international forces (competition from the West European and East Asian business, Third World nationalism, and socialist revolutions) beginning in the late 1960s which challenged the post World War II hegemony the United States enjoyed throughout the world. The acceleration of the revolutionary process in 1978 and 1979 (Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and especially Iran) forced the Carter Administration's policy-makers to re-evaluate (and redefine) the policy options they originally proposed as a response to these challenges.

The third factor was military spending and the role it plays in the United States political economy. The maintenance of a permanent military state was decided upon in the late 1940s by the United States for two reasons:

- to police the world so as to maintain the status quo and hegemony;
- to guarantee profits for the defense industry.

From this evolved what Gordon Adams has called the "Iron Triangle". This consists of the arms contractors (multinational corporations), key congressional committee chairmanships, and the Pentagon. By the 1950s this was one of the strongest

lobbyist in the United States.

In the mid-1970s as economic growth slowed and military spending declined the so-called "Iron Triangle" went on the offensive, pushing for more military spending. Yet they had to sell the idea to the American people, in order to reverse the 'Vietnam Syndrome' climate. The spectre of "the Soviet threat" was dusted off and given new prominence.⁴⁴ Although there were real examples of Soviet militarization as this paper has attempted to document those situations were distorted at times, sometimes egregiously. The sell job worked. The 'Vietnam Syndrome' dissipated; its proponents were isolated as moralist and irrelevant. President Carter then called for a \$ 1.6 trillion five year spending program for a military build-up.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ President Carter, and 34 members of his administration, were members of the Trilateral Commission. The Commission was financed by David Rockefeller.
- The philosophy of the Trilateral Commission was that there should be cooperation among the Western European countries, the United States and Japan to deal with three major crises faced by those nations:
- economic competition among those countries;
 - the North-South issue;
 - the "crisis of democracy" in the domestic political authority and legitimacy.
- The premise of Carter's foreign policy was rooted in this analysis.
- See: Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy, in: International Bulletin, August 13, 1976.

- ² Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented a speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples on July 1, 1977 outlining Carter's Africa policy. See: Washington Post, July 2, 1977
- ³ Alan Wolfe: America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth, p. 201.
Wolfe claims that the reason Nixon was not able to fully implement policies to rectify the crisis was because he had an "insufficient political base from which to pursue these changes".
- ⁴ The Clark Amendment was passed in 1976 as part of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. The amendment "... prohibits any kind of American military involvement in Angola without congressional approval."
- ⁵ The War Powers Act (1973) requires the president to remove armed forces from any country within 60 days if war has not been declared, if Congress did not extend the period, or physically was unable to meet because of any attack on the United States.
- The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, sponsored by Senator Harold Hughes (Democrat, New Jersey) and the late Representative Leo Ryan (Democrat, California), requires that no covert operations be carried out unless the president deems them important to the national security and that they be reported "in a timely fashion" to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee. These military constraints were aimed at preventing a repeat of Vietnam.
- For discussion on congressional constraints see: The Congressional Quarterly, December 20, 1975, p. 2833 and June 3, 1978, p. I411.
- The weaknesses of those constraints are discussed in Gerry Bender's "Kissinger: Anatomy of Failure" in: Rene Lemar-

chand (ed.), *American Policy in Southern Africa*.
 Senator Clark explains the Clark Amendment and why it should be retained in "Reaffirming the Clark Amendment", in: *The Nation*, August 5 - 12, 1978.

- ⁶ See: Zbigniew Brzezinski: *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor: 1977 - 1981*, p. 147 - 151, and Henry Kissinger: *For the Record*, p. 246.
- ⁷ See: Victor Perlo: *The Myth of Soviet Superiority*, in: *The Nation*, September 13, 1981, and Fred Halliday: *The Sources of the New Cold War*, in: *Exterminism and Cold War*, p. 293-298
- ⁸ See: Fred Halliday: *U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention*, in: *Review of African Political Economy*, September-December 1977
- ⁹ Fred Halliday documents that by the mid-1970s Kagnev became less important to the United States due to developments in satellite communications and because the U.S. was building a base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean for strategic purposes.
- ¹⁰ Fred Halliday: *Threat From the East?: Soviet Policy From Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa*, p. 103
- ¹¹ For contrasting interpretations of the Ethiopian Revolution read Fred Halliday and Maxine Melyneux "Ethiopia's Revolution from Above", *MERIP Report*, June 1982, and Bereket Habte Selassie: *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*.
- ¹² Halliday, *R.A.P.E.*, no. 10, p. 14-17
- ¹³ Roy Lyons: *The U.S.S.R., China and the Horn of Africa*, in: *Review of African Political Economy*, May-August 1978, p. 11
- ¹⁴ See: Halliday, *R.A.P.E.*, no. 10, p. 18-19

- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15, 23-29, and Selassie, p. 151-161
- ¹⁸ Halliday, p. 23
- ¹⁹ Halliday: *Threat from the East*, p. 105
- ²⁰ *Washington Post*, June 12, 1977
- ²¹ Halliday: *Threat from the East*, p. 106
- ²² *Ibid.*
- ²³ *Newsweek*, June 27, 1977
- ²⁴ See: Selassie, Halliday, and Lyons
- ²⁵ Halliday, *R.A.P.E.*, no. 10, p. 21
- ²⁶ For comments on the history of the OAU's position on the border question, see: Bereket Habte Selassie's "Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa", p. 4-5
- ²⁷ See: Ron Lyons, *R.A.P.E.*, no. 12, p. 11
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Brzezinski, p. 180
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 179
- ³¹ *Ibid.*
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 180
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Washington Post*, March 3, 1978
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ *Washington Post*, March 18, 1978
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*

- 39 See: George Wright: President Carter's Response to Shaba II; or How to Play the Cuba Card, in: UFAHAMU, summer, 1980
- 40 In early May, 1978, apparently unbeknownst to President Carter, CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron met with Senator Clark proposing a program for "covert arms aid to Angolan rebels". The plan specifically called for supplying UNITA with arms through France. There were reports that this proposal had been circulating around the National Security Council for three months.
- On May 24, discovering that the Washington Post was going to disclose that he had had the meeting with Turner and Aaron, Clark announced "It is increasingly clear that President Carter has made the decision to reinvolve the United States in the Angolan civil war."
- 41 Carter plays his China Card, in: International Bulletin, June 5, 1978
- 42 Washington Post, June 21, 1978
- 43 See: Somalia and the U.S. Security Framework, in: Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, and
Somalia and the U.S. Security Framework, in: Department of State Bulletin, December 1980
- 44 See: Alan Wolfe: The Myth of the Soviet Threat